李克强遇刺案，6人小组分析。谁是幕后黑手，习近平还是彭丽媛？为什么一直边控彭丽媛？

 

李克强遇刺案，6人小组分析。谁是幕后黑手，习近平还是彭丽媛？为什么一直边控彭丽媛？

大家好,2025年，中南海暗流涌动，习近平下台传言席卷网络。胡锦涛为何隐瞒真相，是不是想力保四中全会胡春华接班？陕西500多访民上书揭开惊天秘密。更棘手的是李克强遇刺案，到底如何处理，这次习近平去哈萨克斯坦，果不其然，彭丽媛又没有随行。
只有一种解释，彭丽媛涉及李克强案，而且习近平指使彭丽媛，彭丽媛亲自下手的，如今“洗地”舆论四起。中共如何应对？我们分析处理彭丽媛和习近平的六种组合，揭秘胡春华接班布局。

核心背景：为何隐瞒习近平下台？

中共为何一直隐瞒习近平下台消息？陕西访民给出我们答案。中共政权十分脆弱，有一点风吹草动。就是草木皆兵，风声鹤唳，吓得要命。
2025年6月9日，陕西500多访民上书胡锦涛、汪洋，痛斥习近平家乡富平成“法外之地”，冤案暴增，信访窗口暴力截访。信中指习近平“扫黑除恶”“依法治国”是空话，要求废除维稳产业链、寻衅滋事罪，成立宪法法院，试点民主改革。“民怨总爆发。”

胡锦涛、胡春华隐瞒习近平下台的消息，就是害怕民意要求清算习近平政策，连带追责中共体制，收不住，直接动摇中共独裁统治的根基。胡春华计划四中全会接班，如果民怨失控，接班将泡汤。李克强之死更添危机：2023年10月27日去世，官方称“心梗”，大家都认为是习近平指使的。但是真相是什么，没人知道，我们今天分析传言的这些消息。

所谓的李克强案的李松是真是假？

李克强遇刺传言是中共的危机，处理方式决定胡春华接班成败。

到底如何处理呢，第一种方式是不处理彭丽媛，也不处理习近平

处理方式：否认遇刺，维持“心梗”说法。官媒宣传李克强“自然死亡”，淡化这些消息传言。习近平下台继续保密，直到胡春华四中全会接班。

墙内审查删帖，官媒强调“稳定”。短期保稳定，胡春华接班顺利；长期如果真相被公布，执政合法性受损。

第二种处理方式是处理彭丽媛、不处理习近平
处理方式：承认彭丽媛涉案，比如“个人行为”切割习近平，把彭丽媛低调软禁，不公开审判。习近平下台继续保密，官媒称“健康原因退休”。胡春华接班。

墙内彭丽媛被查可以稍微平息民怨，但是不处理习近平肯定会引发猜测。被质疑是找“替罪羊”，海外媒体挖派系斗争。如果证据指向习近平，压力还是会增大。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期有助于胡春华接班，长期如果真相公开，胡春华会被职责“护短”。

第三种处理方式是不处理彭丽媛、软切割处理习近平
处理方式：习近平“软切割”，低调下台，官媒称“健康原因”，定性为“领导失误”，不涉及李克强遇刺案。彭丽媛不受处理。胡春华接班。

墙内缓解民怨，但指“软着陆”无疑就是包庇习近平罪行，海外媒体会质疑胡春华的改革诚意。如果证据流出，胡春华信任下降。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期顺利接班，长期真相未解威胁信誉。

第4种处理方式是不处理彭丽媛、硬切割处理习近平
一人做事一人当，主谋站出来承担责任，不要把锅甩给别人。
处理方式：习近平“硬切割”，公开承认遇刺罪行，党内惩处，不公开审判。彭丽媛不受处理。胡春华接班，强调“清除腐败”。

习近平和毛泽东还是差距很大的

彻底走四人帮模式，习近平和毛泽东还是差距很大的，毛泽东是中共的创始人。习近平不过是一个中共总书记而已，胡耀邦赵紫阳都打到了。中共照样维持独裁统治。

当然这样处理，墙内肯定是震撼性的，官媒肯定会严控讨论。也会有质疑彭丽媛未受处罚，也可能导致习近平余党的反弹。对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期增强合法性，长期清算风险可能会威胁稳定。

第5种处理方式是处理彭丽媛、软切割处理习近平
处理方式：彭丽媛低调软禁，习近平“软切割”下台，不承认涉及李克强遇刺。胡春华接班，强调“团结”。

习近平彭丽媛双双被处理平息民怨，但是模糊态度会引发猜测。只能是“权宜之计”，海外媒体质疑改革决心。如果证据流出，信誉受损。

对胡春华接班的影响呢，短期助接班，长期真相未揭威胁稳定。

组合6：处理彭丽媛、硬切割处理习近平
处理方式：彭丽媛公开处理（如党内通报），习近平“硬切割”，承认遇刺罪行，党内惩处。胡春华接班，强调“清腐败”。

就是彻底清算。其实彭丽媛不是核心问题，核心是习近平的问题。

这样处理党内的分裂的风险很高，需要一个强有力政治强人出现，才会有这样的结果。

李克强遇刺案是中共烫手山芋，处理方式的将决定胡春华接班问题。不处理习近平彭丽媛两人保短期稳定，但真相浮出水面，信誉会崩塌；处理彭丽媛转移视线，助接班，但习近平未罚引质疑；软切割习近平平稳过渡，硬切割增强合法性，但风险动荡。最佳策略：处理彭丽媛、硬切割习近平，树立胡春华“正义”形象，但是需要严控清算范围。

胡春华有没有这样的政治手腕，的确是让人怀疑，因为胡春华毕竟从来没有真正当过总书记或者核心，放在聚光灯，供大家检验和评头论足。没人真正知道他到底是什么人？

要揭开李克强遇刺案，也需要时机。

这名网友的说法很好
放开也恢复不了了，具体原因有：公信力被玩崩了、人口红利也吃不了多久了和出口贸易也黄了，怎么恢复？
公信力崩塌，人口红利丧失，出口贸易黄了。
我觉得这名网友说的这个点都很好。接过习近平这个烂摊子。完全可以用百废待兴来形容。稳住经济，稳住政权才是核心议题。李克强遇刺案和这些议题相比算不上核心议题，无非就是表明态度。

我看这个所谓爆料，我看就想笑啊。

我们看这一段，李玉强，一共112个字，写得假的不能再假的，唐的不能再唐了，傻叉的不能再傻叉了。
第一个穿帮，李玉强47岁，那就是1978年出生，李玉强18岁参军就是1996年，28岁就是2006关键是1996年到2006年中国和谁打过仗？和哪个国家打仗。中国最后一次大规模战争是1979年对越战争，李玉强那时才1岁，正在吃奶呢。2006年，解放军主要进行训练和维稳任务，哪来的“敌后斩首”？即使是特种部队，也没有任何公开记录显示此类任务。离开中国国境，解放军敢去斩首谁啊，斩首谁不得引起重要的外交纠纷。

你要是张又侠这岁数，参加过越战，玩个敌后斩首还说的过去，2006年，中国跟谁打仗的，解放军都多少年没有打过仗。去斩谁的首，这不就是纯纯扯淡吗？。

第二个穿帮，南部战区特种作战旅，
南部战区成立于2016年，南部战区有两个特种作战旅第74集团军特种作战第74旅（南国利剑）和第75集团军特种作战第75旅（丛林猛虎）。2017年才组建。 李玉强如果1996年参军，2006年28岁，2017年已39岁。特种作战旅以年轻、体能强的高素质士兵为主，39岁还能在特种部队服役？更别说2017年前根本不存在南部战区。如果编出一个“广州军区”还稍微可信，但是广州军区2016年撤销，南部战区接管。 编小说的连基本时间线都搞错，硬生生把李玉强塞进不存在的部队，简直是历史盲。
2017年李玉强39岁，一般是少校营长或者副团长。也就是说39岁没有提干就退伍了，提干呢，级别高很可能有公开报道。李玉强能不能找到公开报道，肯定没有啊。

第三个穿帮，退役后转入国防部情报局。

这太搞笑了。中国国防部压根没有“情报局”。中国军队实行“党指挥枪”，中共最忌讳的就是军队国家化。国防部是空架子，主要职能是对外宣传和新闻发布，实际军事指挥权在中央军委。情报工作由军委联合参谋部（原总参谋部）的情报局负责，而且均为现役军官。 李玉强如果退役，怎可能转入军委情报局？更别说国防部情报局压根就不存在。退役军人通常转地方工作（比如公安、民政），而不是进入核心军事情报机构。编小说这个人脑子抽了，连中国军队架构都不懂，硬编一个“国防部情报局”，脑洞大到离谱。

第四个穿帮，对内 “战时维稳 ” 特别行动
哈哈，乌克兰特别行动听多了吧，中共就没有特别行动这个词。
这完全是乌克兰剧本翻版。中共话语体系从不用“战时维稳”或“特别行动”这种术语。“维稳”在中共党八股中通常称“维护社会稳定”或“社会治安综合治理”，如2011年中央维稳工作会议提出的“加强和创新社会管理”。2023年中国无战时状态，李克强去世时国内稳定，哪来的“战时”？维稳任务由武警、公安负责，非特种部队或情报局。至于“特别行动”，中共更偏好“专项行动”或“专项整治”，如“扫黑除恶专项斗争”。“特别行动”明显受“乌克兰特别军事行动”启发，套用外国术语，显得不伦不类。“现场总指挥”更是空洞，连地点、时间、方式都没提，纯属玄幻。

这完全是乌克兰剧本翻版。中共话语体系从不用“战时维稳”或“特别行动”。“维稳”在党八股中通常称“维护社会稳定”或“社会治安综合治理”，如2011年中央维稳工作会议提出的“加强和创新社会管理”。2023年中国没有战时状态，李克强死的时候中国没有打仗，哪来的“战时”。维稳任务由武警、公安负责，而非特种部队或情报局。中国总参情报局的确，有时候会发一些维稳的情报。但是总参他们从来不参加行动。这个傻叉，懂不懂，太唐了。他懂不懂情报和行动的区别是什么呀？“特别行动”更像“乌克兰特别军事行动”的生搬硬套，中共常用“专项行动”或“专项整治”，比如“扫黑除恶专项斗争”。“现场总指挥”空洞无比，连地点、时间、方式都没提，纯属虚构。

太二了，多演穿帮啊。大外宣把这个内容现在改成这个版本了。
李XX（队长）：主要负责整个任务实施，确保每一步都能按计划执行。
原来112个字，现在改成31个字，就说他连100个字都说不明白。

我们看另外一个人，他瞎编的，赵烨晨，男，32岁，浙江杭州人，于2015年毕业于清华大学计算机系，拥有硕士学位，并于2016年进入国家安全部技术部门，赵烨晨专攻网络安全与信号干扰。32岁就是1993年出生，2015年毕业于清华大学计算机系，22岁硕士毕业。又是神童啊， 连跳三级，一般硕士24岁25岁毕业。清华神童硕士搞暗杀，清华都混成这样了。怪不得习近平混到下台了。清华大学不行啊。

据清华大学研究生院消息，2015年清华大学计算机系考研拟录取名单已公布，详情如下：
有49个人，我们找找看，里面有没有叫做赵烨晨的人，对不对。

多演穿帮，编的细节太详细了，但是漏洞百出，全是假的。清华研究生计算机系2015年录取的49个人里面还真的有7个人备注强军计划，可能和解放军有关系。哎，赵烨晨是国家安全部的，不是军队的，有穿帮了。而且一会儿任职中国电子科技集团，一会儿任职国家安全部。这是一个部门还是两个部门啊？

国家安全部是情报机构，负责国内外安全事务，技术部门聚焦网络安全、信号监听等。中国电子科技集团公司是国企，专注军工电子和通信设备研发，如雷达、干扰系统。两者性质完全不同：国安部是政府机关，电科集团是企业。这人说赵烨晨在两个单位任职，2016年23岁进入国安部，之前还挤时间在电科集团参与军用项目，时间线和资历都不合理。23岁刚毕业的硕士，怎可能在两个高安全机构身兼要职。这不是瞎编是什么。

学位和专业不符。清华大学计算机系硕士通常授予工学硕士学位，聚焦计算机科学与技术，如算法、软件开发、网络安全。他说赵烨晨专攻信号干扰与通信屏蔽，这属于电子工程或通信工程领域，与计算机系课程不匹配。清华大学电子工程系（而非计算机系）才涉及信号干扰相关研究，而且授予工学硕士。

就是不管念计算机系还是念的电子工程系，最后都是授予工学硕士。没有电子工程硕士这个说法。他混淆计算机系与电子工程系学位，硬把网络安全专长扯到信号干扰，只能说这个人没有上过大学。

这名网友说，
不可能是真的，因为他知道的太多了。即便亲身参与，也只可能了解很有限的一部分，例如刺杀金正男事件，行刺者不知道自己在行刺，策划者在事发前逃离现场，也就不知道现场细节。如果全程参与，必遭灭口。

我的回复是，痕迹再消灭也不可能完全消灭的，最保险的方法就是死人不会不说话。再说当时都敢灭了李克强，还怕人发现吗？那就是在给彭少将打掩护了。刚刚都爆出全部内容。多演穿帮。

目的就是为真凶打掩护，洋洋洒洒几千字。但有价值的一个字也没有。比如他们是如何替换了原有李克强的安保团队，又比如上海地方介入的具体时间及人物，地方不介入是不可能的。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

A Six-Person Analysis of the Li Keqiang Assassination Case: Who is the Mastermind, Xi Jinping or Peng Liyuan? Why Has Peng Liyuan Been Under Border Control?

Hello everyone, in 2025, undercurrents are swirling in Zhongnanhai, and rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation are sweeping the internet. Why is Hu Jintao concealing the truth? Is he trying to ensure Hu Chunhua’s succession at the Fourth Plenary Session? More than 500 petitioners from Shaanxi have revealed a shocking secret. Even more thorny is the Li Keqiang assassination case. How should it be handled? This time, when Xi Jinping went to Kazakhstan, as expected, Peng Liyuan did not accompany him.

There is only one explanation: Peng Liyuan is involved in the Li Keqiang case, and Xi Jinping instructed Peng Liyuan, who personally carried out the assassination. Now, there is widespread “whitewashing” rhetoric. How will the CCP respond? We analyze six possible combinations of Peng Liyuan and Xi Jinping, revealing the Hu Chunhua succession plan.

Core Background: Why Conceal Xi Jinping’s Resignation?

Why has the CCP been concealing the news of Xi Jinping’s resignation? The Shaanxi petitioners provide the answer. The CCP regime is extremely fragile; the slightest disturbance triggers a climate of fear and paranoia.

On June 9, 2025, over 500 petitioners from Shaanxi Province wrote to Hu Jintao and Wang Yang, denouncing Xi Jinping’s hometown of Fuping as a “lawless zone,” with a surge in wrongful convictions and violent interception at petition offices. The letter accused Xi Jinping’s “anti-gang and anti-crime” and “rule of law” pronouncements as empty rhetoric, demanding the abolition of the “stability maintenance industry chain” and the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” the establishment of a constitutional court, and pilot democratic reforms. “Public resentment is about to erupt.”

Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua concealed news of Xi Jinping’s potential resignation because they feared public pressure to hold him accountable for his policies and the CCP system itself, which, if unchecked, would directly shake the foundations of the CCP’s authoritarian rule. Hu Chunhua planned to succeed Xi at the Fourth Plenary Session; if public resentment spiraled out of control, his succession would be jeopardized. The death of Li Keqiang further exacerbated the crisis: he died on October 27, 2023, officially attributed to a “heart attack,” but many believe it was orchestrated by Xi Jinping. But the truth remains unknown. Today, we’ll analyze these rumors.

Is the alleged Li Song in the Li Keqiang case real or fake?

The rumors of Li Keqiang’s assassination attempt are a crisis for the CCP, and how they are handled will determine the success or failure of Hu Chunhua’s succession.

How should it be handled? The first option is to neither punish Peng Liyuan nor Xi Jinping.

The approach: Deny the assassination attempt, maintain the “heart attack” explanation. State media publicizes Li Keqiang’s “natural death,” downplaying these rumors. Xi Jinping’s resignation remains secret until Hu Chunhua takes over at the Fourth Plenary Session.

Censorship and deletion of posts within the Great Firewall, state media emphasizes “stability.” This ensures short-term stability and a smooth succession for Hu Chunhua; in the long term, if the truth is revealed, the legitimacy of the regime will be damaged.

The second option is to punish Peng Liyuan, not Xi Jinping.

The approach: Acknowledge Peng Liyuan’s involvement, for example, by severing ties with Xi Jinping through “personal actions,” place Peng Liyuan under house arrest discreetly, and hold no public trial. Xi Jinping’s resignation remains secret, with state media stating “retirement for health reasons.” Hu Chunhua succeeds.

The investigation of Peng Liyuan within China might slightly quell public anger, but leaving Xi Jinping unpunished will inevitably fuel speculation. It could be seen as a scapegoat, with overseas media digging into factional infighting. If evidence points to Xi Jinping, the pressure will increase.

Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term it might facilitate his transition, but in the long term, if the truth comes out, Hu Chunhua will be accused of “protecting his own.”

The third approach is to leave Peng Liyuan unpunished and handle Xi Jinping with a “soft landing.”

Approach: Xi Jinping “softly” steps down, citing “health reasons” in state media, characterizing it as a “leadership error,” and excluding the assassination attempt on Li Keqiang. Peng Liyuan remains unpunished. Hu Chunhua succeeds him.

This approach alleviates public anger within China, but a “soft landing” would undoubtedly be seen as protecting Xi Jinping’s crimes, leading overseas media to question Hu Chunhua’s sincerity in reform. If evidence leaks, Hu Chunhua’s credibility will decline.

Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term it would ensure a smooth transition, but in the long term, the unresolved truth threatens his credibility.

The fourth approach is to leave Peng Liyuan alone and completely sever ties with Xi Jinping.

One person should take responsibility for their actions; the mastermind should step forward and not try to shift the blame.

Approach: Xi Jinping completely severes ties, publicly admitting to the assassination attempt, receiving internal party punishment, and undergoing a closed trial. Peng Liyuan is not punished. Hu Chunhua succeeds him, emphasizing “anti-corruption.”

Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong are still very different. Completely following the Gang of Four model, Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong are still very different. Mao Zedong was the founder of the CCP. Xi Jinping is merely the General Secretary of the CCP; even though Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were overthrown, the CCP still maintains its dictatorial rule.

Of course, this approach would be shocking within China, and state media would strictly control discussion. There would also be questions about Peng Liyuan’s lack of punishment, and it could lead to a backlash from Xi Jinping’s remaining supporters. Regarding the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, in the short term, it would enhance legitimacy, but in the long term, the potential for political maneuvering could threaten stability.

The fifth approach is to deal with Peng Liyuan and completely sever ties with Xi Jinping.

Approach: Peng Liyuan is placed under house arrest in a low-key manner; Xi Jinping completely severes ties and steps down, denying any involvement in Li Keqiang’s assassination attempt. Hu Chunhua’s succession emphasizes “unity.”

The handling of Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan has quelled public discontent, but the ambiguous stance will fuel speculation. It can only be a “stopgap measure,” with overseas media questioning the determination to reform. If evidence leaks, credibility will be damaged.

As for the impact on Hu Chunhua’s succession, it will facilitate the succession in the short term, but in the long term, the unresolved truth threatens stability.

Combination 6: Handling Peng Liyuan, a hard separation from Xi Jinping

Handling method: Peng Liyuan is publicly dealt with (e.g., an internal party announcement), Xi Jinping “hard-severes ties,” admitting to the assassination attempt, and receiving internal party punishment. Hu Chunhua’s succession emphasizes “cleaning up corruption.”

This is a thorough purge. In fact, Peng Liyuan is not the core issue; the core issue is Xi Jinping.

This approach carries a high risk of internal party division and requires the emergence of a strong political leader to achieve such an outcome.

The Li Keqiang assassination case is a hot potato for the CCP; how it is handled will determine Hu Chunhua’s succession. Not dealing with Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan could maintain short-term stability, but the truth would surface, and their credibility would collapse. Dealing with Peng Liyuan could divert attention and facilitate succession, but Xi Jinping’s lack of punishment would raise questions. A soft approach would allow for a smooth transition for Xi Jinping, while a hard approach would enhance legitimacy, but this carries risks and instability. The best strategy: deal with Peng Liyuan, hard-sever ties with Xi Jinping, and establish Hu Chunhua’s “righteous” image, but the scope of the purge needs strict control.

Whether Hu Chunhua possesses such political skill is indeed questionable, because he has never truly served as General Secretary or a core figure, nor has he been placed under the spotlight for public scrutiny and judgment. No one truly knows who he really is.

Uncovering the Li Keqiang assassination attempt also requires the right opportunity.

This netizen’s point is excellent: Even if things are allowed to continue, they can’t be restored. Specific reasons include: public trust has been completely destroyed, the demographic dividend won’t last much longer, and export trade has collapsed. How can it be restored?  Public trust has collapsed, the demographic dividend has been lost, and export trade has collapsed.

I think this netizen’s points are all very good. He inherited Xi Jinping’s mess. The situation can only be described as one of utter devastation. Stabilizing the economy and the regime are the core issues. The assassination attempt on Li Keqiang is not a core issue compared to these; it’s merely a statement of intent.

I just want to laugh at this so-called “revelation.”

Look at this passage: Li Yuqiang, a total of 112 characters, written so obviously fake, so ridiculously absurd, so utterly idiotic.

The first major flaw: Li Yuqiang is 47 years old, meaning he was born in 1978. He joined the army at 18 in 1996, and at 28 in 2006. The crucial question is, between 1996 and 2006, who did China fight? Which country? China’s last large-scale war was the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Li Yuqiang was only one year old then, still breastfeeding. In 2006, the PLA was mainly conducting training and maintaining stability; where did this “decapitation strike behind enemy lines” come from? Even special forces have no publicly available records of such missions. Outside of China’s borders, who would the PLA dare to decapitate? Such an operation would cause a major diplomatic incident.

If you were Zhang Youxia’s age and had participated in the Vietnam War, a decapitation strike behind enemy lines might be plausible. But in 2006, who was China fighting? The PLA hadn’t fought a war in years. Decapitating someone? That’s pure nonsense.

The second inconsistency: the Southern Theater Command Special Operations Brigade. The Southern Theater Command was established in 2016 and has two special operations brigades: the 74th Special Operations Brigade of the 74th Group Army (Southern Sword) and the 75th Special Operations Brigade of the 75th Group Army (Jungle Tiger). They were only formed in 2017. If Li Yuqiang joined the army in 1996, he would be 28 years old in 2006 and 39 years old in 2017. Special operations brigades primarily consist of young, physically strong, and highly qualified soldiers. Could a 39-year-old still be serving in special forces? Not to mention, the Southern Theater Command didn’t even exist before 2017. If a “Guangzhou Military Region” had been fabricated, it might be somewhat believable, but the Guangzhou Military Region was abolished in 2016 and taken over by the Southern Theater Command. The novelist got even the basic timeline wrong, forcibly placing Li Yuqiang in a non-existent unit—a clear case of historical illiteracy.

In 2017, Li Yuqiang was 39 years old, typically a major battalion commander or deputy regimental commander. This means he retired at 39 without being promoted. Promotion to a higher rank would likely be publicly reported. Could you find any publicly reported information about Li Yuqiang? Certainly not.

The third plot hole is that he transferred to the National Defense Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau after retirement.

This is ridiculous. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense doesn’t have an “Intelligence Bureau.” The Chinese military operates under the principle of “the Party commands the gun,” and the CCP is most averse to the nationalization of the military. The Ministry of National Defense is a shell, its main functions being external propaganda and press releases; actual military command rests with the Central Military Commission. Intelligence work is handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly the General Staff Department), and all its personnel are active-duty officers. If Li Yuqiang were to retire, how could he possibly transfer to the Central Military Commission’s Intelligence Bureau? Not to mention, the Ministry of National Defense’s Intelligence Bureau doesn’t even exist. Retired military personnel typically transfer to local jobs (such as public security or civil affairs), not to core military intelligence agencies. The person who wrote this novel is out of their mind; they don’t even understand the structure of the Chinese military, yet they fabricated a “Ministry of National Defense Intelligence Bureau”—it’s an absurdly wild idea.

The fourth plot hole: Internal “wartime stability maintenance” special operations.

Haha, you’ve heard too much about Ukrainian special operations, haven’t you? The CCP doesn’t use the term “special operations.”

This is a complete copy of the Ukrainian script. The CCP’s discourse never uses terms like “wartime stability maintenance” or “special operations.” “Stability maintenance” in CCP official documents is usually referred to as “maintaining social stability” or “comprehensive social security management,” such as the “strengthening and innovating social management” proposed at the 2011 Central Stability Maintenance Work Conference. In 2023, China is not in a state of war; when Li Keqiang passed away, the country was stable—where did this “wartime” come from? Stability maintenance tasks are handled by the Armed Police and Public Security Bureau, not special forces or the intelligence bureau. As for “special operations,” the CCP prefers “special operations” or “special rectification,” such as the “anti-gang and anti-crime campaign.” The term “special operations” is clearly inspired by the “Ukrainian special military operation,” and the use of foreign terminology feels incongruous. The “on-site commander” is even more vague, failing to mention the location, time, or method—pure fantasy.

This is a complete rehash of the Ukrainian script. The CCP’s discourse never uses “wartime stability maintenance” or “special operations.” “Stability maintenance” in Party jargon is usually referred to as “maintaining social stability” or “comprehensive social security management,” such as the “strengthening and innovating social management” proposed at the 2011 Central Stability Maintenance Work Conference. In 2023, China is not in a state of war; when Li Keqiang died, China was not at war, so where does the “wartime” come from? Stability maintenance tasks are handled by the Armed Police and Public Security Bureau, not special forces or intelligence agencies. The General Staff Intelligence Bureau of China does sometimes issue intelligence related to stability maintenance. However, the General Staff never participates in operations. This idiot, doesn’t he understand? He’s so clueless. Does he even understand the difference between intelligence and operations? The term “special operation” is more like a forced imitation of the “Ukrainian special military operation.” The CCP often uses terms like “special operation” or “special rectification,” such as the “anti-gang and anti-crime campaign.” The “on-site commander” is utterly hollow, failing to mention the location, time, or method—purely fabricated.

This is ridiculous; the flaws are obvious. The CCP’s propaganda machine has now changed this version.

Li XX (Captain): Primarily responsible for the entire mission implementation, ensuring every step is executed according to plan.

Originally 112 characters, now reduced to 31, showing he can’t even explain 100 words clearly.

Let’s look at another person, someone he made up: Zhao Yechen, male, 32 years old, from Hangzhou, Zhejiang, graduated from Tsinghua University’s Computer Science Department in 2015 with a master’s degree, and joined the Ministry of State Security’s technical department in 2016. Zhao Yechen specializes in network security and signal jamming. 32 years old means born in 1993, graduated from Tsinghua University’s Computer Science Department in 2015, and graduated with a master’s degree at 22. Another child prodigy! Skipping three grades, while most master’s students graduate at 24 or 25. A Tsinghua prodigy master’s student involved in assassination—Tsinghua has fallen so low. No wonder Xi Jinping was forced to step down. Tsinghua University is failing.

According to Tsinghua University’s Graduate School, the list of candidates to be admitted to the Computer Science Department in 2015 has been released. Details are as follows: There are 49 people. Let’s see if anyone named Zhao Yechen is on it.

This is a complete fabrication. The details are too elaborate, but full of loopholes; it’s all fake. Of the 49 people admitted to Tsinghua’s Computer Science Department in 2015, 7 actually have a note about the “Strengthening the Military Plan,” possibly related to the People’s Liberation Army. Alas, Zhao Yechen works for the Ministry of State Security, not the military—another slip-up. And he’s sometimes employed by the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, sometimes by the Ministry of State Security. Is it one department or two?

The Ministry of State Security is an intelligence agency responsible for domestic and international security affairs. Its technical department focuses on network security, signal monitoring, etc. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is a state-owned enterprise specializing in the research and development of military electronics and communication equipment, such as radar and jamming systems. The two entities are completely different: the Ministry of State Security is a government agency, while CETC is a company. This person claims Zhao Yechen held positions in both, joining the Ministry of State Security in 2016 at the age of 23, and prior to that, squeezing in time to participate in military projects at CETC. The timeline and qualifications are illogical. How could a 23-year-old recent master’s graduate hold important positions in two high-security institutions? This is pure fabrication.

The degree and major do not match. Master’s degrees in Computer Science at Tsinghua University are typically awarded a Master of Engineering degree, focusing on computer science and technology, such as algorithms, software development, and network security. He claims Zhao Yechen specialized in signal jamming and communication shielding, which falls under the fields of electronic engineering or communication engineering, and is incompatible with Computer Science courses. Tsinghua University’s Department of Electronic Engineering (not Computer Science) is where signal jamming-related research is conducted, and awards a Master of Engineering degree there.

In short, regardless of whether one studies Computer Science or Electronic Engineering, the final degree awarded is a Master of Engineering. There is no such thing as a Master of Electronic Engineering. He confused computer science and electrical engineering degrees, and forced his cybersecurity expertise to signal jamming; it just shows this person never went to university.

This netizen said, “It can’t be true because he knows too much. Even if someone was personally involved, they could only know a very limited part. For example, in the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the assassin didn’t know he was carrying out an assassination, and the planner fled the scene before the incident, so they didn’t know the details. If someone was involved in the whole thing, they would definitely be silenced.”

My reply is that traces can never be completely erased, no matter how much you try to eliminate them. The safest way is that the dead don’t stay silent. Besides, if they dared to eliminate Li Keqiang back then, would they be afraid of being discovered? That was to cover for Major General Peng. The whole story has just been revealed. They’re just making excuses.

The purpose is to cover for the real culprit, thousands of words long. But not a single word is valuable. For example, how did they replace Li Keqiang’s original security team? Or the specific time and people involved in Shanghai’s intervention? It’s impossible for the local authorities not to intervene.

Okay, thank you everyone.