习近平变身傀儡吉祥物。82军宣誓效忠新中央。军队八连评为胡春华《深圳改革》保驾护航

 

习近平变身傀儡吉祥物。82军宣誓效忠新中央。军队八连评为胡春华《深圳改革》保驾护航

大家好
解放军第82集团军（原38集团军，驻河北保定，被称为“万岁军”，承担拱卫京畿重任）最近的公开表态引发广泛关注。5月28日，《解放军报》刊登了66172部队第80合成旅政治工作部主任赵治国撰写的文章，6月10日中部战区“忠诚号”理论宣讲服务队活动进一步释放信号。结合2025年5月29日政治局会议决策背景及军方高层变动，我们深入分析其背后的权力更替含义。

第82集团军的背景与赵治国身份

第82集团军源于38集团军，历史悠久，曾在抗美援朝中立下战功，被视为解放军核心部队，驻守保定，负责北京及周边安全。赵治国作为第80合成旅政治工作部主任，隶属66172部队，其文章代表集团军层级的官方声音。文章高喊“对党忠诚”，却绝口不提习近平，这一选择耐人寻味。

文章信号的解读

赵治国的文章核心是“用实际行动诠释对党忠诚”，这篇文章打开的时候还404，不知道什么原因。强调履行党员义务、恪守纪律、发扬战斗精神、坚守岗位，引用历史事例（如刘志海、杨根思）及现代典型（如王忠心），提出“确保部队随时拉得出、冲得上、打得赢”，“不相信有完不成的任务，不相信有克服不了的困难，不相信有战胜不了的敌人”。然而，文章没有提及“习近平”或“习近平强军思想”，以往军方宣传中极为常见习近平，不见了。

“对党忠诚”而非“对习近平忠诚”：

传统上，军队表忠心多以个人领袖（尤其是习近平）为中心。赵治国回避习近平，聚焦“党”，可能暗示其效忠对象已非个人，而是中共集体领导或新权力核心。这并非偶然，而是精心选择。
而且暗含警告：

“拉得出、冲得上、打得赢”及“不信有战胜不了的敌人”，表面是战斗动员，实则可能暗指对习近平残余势力的警告。拱卫京畿的“万岁军”如果不姓“习”，其战斗力或指向内部清洗。5月29日政治局会议接连处理苗华和许其亮（军委委员+副主席），时间线完美吻合：赵某某5月31日发布许其亮消息，官方6月2日确认死亡（赵某某称5月28日去世），会议29日召开，决策高效。

中部战区信号的佐证

2025年6月10日，中部战区陆军“忠诚号”理论宣讲服务队开展巡回宣讲，形式为“小课精讲、班排互动、故事化表达”。宣传稿同样没有提习近平或习近平思想，与赵治国文章一致。这一中部战区层面的动向，强化了军队高层对习近平的集体疏远。中部战区控制第81、82集团军，拱卫北京，中部战区的集体沉默表明军权可能易手。结合苗华被开除党籍、何卫东出事，而军委副主席张又侠没有被波及，军权或已落入张又侠胡春华手中。2025年5月8日政法领导干部专题研讨班，武警副司令曹均章（中将，为胡锦涛、刘振立系）亮相1秒，司令缺席，或显示军权调整。

最新的消息是纪念陈云诞辰120周年座谈会。张又侠出席，并在主席台就坐。

中共中央举行纪念陈云同志诞辰120周年座谈会习近平发表重要讲话，习近平纪念他大爹了。
这陈云是习近平货真价实的政治干爹。习近平所有的人归根到底都是陈云提拔的。习近平本人也是陈云提拔的。1990年6月，习近平升任福州市委书记，1993年升任福建省委常委。副部级必须要一把手二把手点头才行。习近平就是陈云提拔的。这个会，比较重要，看点比较多，我专门给大家说一期。

张又侠出席，习近平就没戏。

我给大家开10个指标性人物，习近平如果大权在握就把这个10个人打包抓了，或者抓1个，就说明他大权在握。
退休常委，胡锦涛，李瑞环，温家宝，张德江。
现任常委，李强，赵乐际，李希。
现任军委，张又侠，刘振立，张升民。

习近平真牛的话，随便抓一个就行。胡锦涛都能把何卫东抓走，习近平如果牛的话，为什么不能张又侠？
天天让胡锦涛一个花圈接着一个花圈送， 习近平如果牛的，就不让胡锦涛送花圈，又能怎么着。说明习近平不行。

赵治国文章及中部战区宣讲的沉默，暗示习近平已经失去军队支持。5月29日会议果断处理两名军委高官，显示高层清洗加速。我们讨论的重点不在于许其亮是胡锦涛的人还是习近平的人，而在于追悼会级别及宣传由政治局会议决定，反映主持者权威。不管此人是谁（胡春华、汪洋、胡锦涛或习近平），展现“杀伐果断，完全控盘”的姿态。

张又侠的角色：张又侠未受牵连，可能接管军权。第82集团军和中部战区表态，或为其稳固地位铺路。谁给此人胆子？武警司令、中部战区司令、火箭军司令身份决定军权归属，此人手握枪杆子，方敢同时处理苗华和许其亮。很简单的问题：中部战区控制北京安全，此人“浑不吝”，底气十足。

“对党忠诚”的新指向：军队效忠可能转向集体领导（比如张又侠）或新领导人（传胡春华代理总书记），而非习近平个人。枪杆子掌握在一人手中，解释其果断决策。

第82集团军的政治信号表明，拱卫京畿的“万岁军”已不再效忠习近平。这一转变与5月29日政治局会议有关，军方清洗习近平旧部，配合贸易谈判（如接受55%关税）调整内外政策。赵治国文章的“战斗精神”呼声，或是向习近平余党发出最后通牒。

从5月30日至6月8日，《解放军报》头版刊登八篇“明辨是非系列谈”，主题涵盖成长进步、利益得失、人情往来、战友情谊、情趣爱好、家风家教、手中权力及监督约束，另有谈忠诚的文章。

我们看，就是这个陆军第八十二集团军政治工作部发通知说，解放军报自5月30起，在一版重要位置推出《怎么正确对待成长进步》《怎么正确对待利益得失》《怎么正确对待人情往来》等8篇“明辨是非系列谈”署名评论，引导党员干部明辨是非问题，澄清模糊认识，自觉纠偏正向，让我们一起学习。

5月30日《怎么正确对待成长进步》指出“把职务提升作为唯一标准”“背靠大树好乘凉”“素质硬不如关系硬”，并批评选人用人的宗派主义、任人唯亲，影射整个中共官场腐败，尤其指向近期军队高官落马（如苗华）。5月31日《怎么正确对待利益得失》提及“孤芳自赏”与“登绝顶”，暗喻习近平“一尊”地位动摇及下台可能。6月1日《怎么正确对待人情往来》将受贿、卖官淡化为“人情”，定性落马者搞“小山头、小团体”，指向习近平亲信。6月2日《怎么正确对待战友情谊》提出“以上率下”净化交往圈，追责军队“违规、违纪之交”至军委主席。6月4日《怎么正确对待情趣爱好》揭“爱好”掩贪腐，6月5日《怎么正确对待家风家教》暗讽“封妻荫子”，似戳习近平家事。6月6日《怎么正确对待手中权力》称权力与金钱联姻，6月8日《怎么正确对待监督约束》直指“绝对权力导致绝对腐败”，暗示习近平不配领导。这些文章虽未点名，但语境指向高层。

八连评借官场弊端之名，实则批评习近平领导下的腐败与权力滥用。6月2日《擦亮革命军人的忠诚底色》仅提“对党忠诚”，抹去对习近平宣传，6月5日《水田插秧》呼“顺时而动，应时而为”，似提醒官员重新站队，好像1992年邓小平南巡后《为改革开放保驾护航》社论重现。6月10日、11日头版刊登民生与深圳改革意见，呼应改革派声音。我们看任正非的文章发表的第二天6月11日的人民日报头版头条刊登《中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于深入推进深圳综合改革试点深化改革创新扩大开放的意见》（2024年8月30日）。中办发的第二个决定，《深圳改革》由胡春华制定，去年2024年7月三中全会上，胡春华坐在习近平身边。胡春华曾经主政过广东深圳。如今由中国发改委副主任李春临介绍该文件，等于军队拿枪杆子支持胡春华的深圳改革决定。

八连评与传胡春华主持5月29日政治局会议决策呼应。会议开除军委委员苗华党籍、决定前军委副主席许其亮追悼会规格，时间线吻合：许其亮消息5月31日由“赵某某”发布，6月2日官方确认死亡（赵某某称5月28日）。不论许其亮背景如何（胡锦涛或习近平派系），决策者展现“杀伐果断，完全控盘”权威。枪杆子掌握在胡春华一人手中，武警副司令曹均章（传胡锦涛系）5月8日亮相，司令缺席，强化军权易手迹象。李春临的主子是谁？我不知道，仅提供可能性：李春临陕西出身，2008年挂职安康市市长助理，时任市长方玮峰是温家宝“徒孙”（中纪委马馼马仔），方玮峰曾任李建国（与李瑞环关系好）或宋洪武秘书，或有温家宝、李瑞环、李克强背景。

意义与展望

八连评信号表明，军队与高层对习近平失势形成共识，军报借评点官场弊端，实推翻其权威。新领导胡春华借反腐与改革调整政策。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Xi Jinping turns into a puppet mascot. The 82nd Army pledges allegiance to the new central government. The Eighth Company of the Army is rated as Hu Chunhua’s “Shenzhen Reform” escort

Hello everyone
The recent public statements of the 82nd Army of the People’s Liberation Army (formerly the 38th Army, stationed in Baoding, Hebei, known as the “Long Live Army”, responsible for the important task of defending the capital) have attracted widespread attention. On May 28, the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” published an article written by Zhao Zhiguo, director of the Political Work Department of the 80th Combined Brigade of the 66172th Unit. On June 10, the “Loyalty” Theory Propaganda Service Team of the Central Theater Command further released signals. Combined with the decision-making background of the Politburo meeting on May 29, 2025 and the changes in the military’s top leadership, we deeply analyze the meaning of the power change behind it.

The background of the 82nd Army and Zhao Zhiguo’s identity
The 82nd Army originated from the 38th Army and has a long history. It has made military achievements in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. It is regarded as the core force of the People’s Liberation Army. It is stationed in Baoding and is responsible for the security of Beijing and its surrounding areas. Zhao Zhiguo, as the director of the Political Work Department of the 80th Combined Brigade, is affiliated with the 66172th Unit. His article represents the official voice of the group army level. The article shouts “loyalty to the party”, but never mentions Xi Jinping. This choice is intriguing.

Interpretation of the article signal
The core of Zhao Zhiguo’s article is “interpreting loyalty to the party with practical actions”. When the article was opened, it was still 404. I don’t know why. It emphasizes fulfilling the obligations of party members, abiding by discipline, carrying forward the fighting spirit, and sticking to the post. It cites historical examples (such as Liu Zhihai and Yang Gensi) and modern models (such as Wang Zhongxin), and proposes “ensuring that the troops can be pulled out, rushed up, and won at any time”, “do not believe that there are unfinished tasks, do not believe that there are difficulties that cannot be overcome, and do not believe that there are enemies that cannot be defeated”. However, the article does not mention “Xi Jinping” or “Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Army”. Xi Jinping was very common in the military propaganda in the past, but he is gone.

“Loyalty to the party” instead of “loyalty to Xi Jinping”:
Traditionally, the military’s loyalty is centered on individual leaders (especially Xi Jinping). Zhao Zhiguo avoided Xi Jinping and focused on the “Party”, which may imply that his loyalty is no longer to an individual, but to the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China or the new power core. This is not accidental, but a careful choice.
And it implies a warning:

“We can pull out, rush up, and win” and “I don’t believe there is an enemy that cannot be defeated” are combat mobilizations on the surface, but in fact they may imply a warning to Xi Jinping’s remaining forces. If the “Long Live Army” guarding the capital is not named “Xi”, its combat effectiveness may point to internal cleansing. On May 29, the Politburo meeting dealt with Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang (member of the Military Commission + Vice Chairman) in succession, and the timeline was perfectly matched: Zhao Moumou released the news of Xu Qiliang on May 31, and the official confirmed his death on June 2 (Zhao Moumou said he died on May 28), and the meeting was held on the 29th, and the decision was efficient.

Evidence of the signal of the Central Theater Command
On June 10, 2025, the Central Theater Command Army’s “Loyalty” Theory Propaganda Service Team carried out a tour of propaganda in the form of “small class lectures, class interaction, and storytelling expression.” The propaganda draft also did not mention Xi Jinping or Xi Jinping Thought, which is consistent with Zhao Zhiguo’s article. This trend at the Central Theater Command level has strengthened the collective alienation of the military’s top brass from Xi Jinping. The Central Theater Command controls the 81st and 82nd Group Armies to protect Beijing. The collective silence of the Central Theater Command indicates that military power may change hands. Combined with Miao Hua’s expulsion from the party and He Weidong’s incident, while Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Military Commission, was not affected, military power may have fallen into the hands of Zhang Youxia and Hu Chunhua. At the special seminar for political and legal leading cadres on May 8, 2025, Cao Junzhang (lieutenant general, from Hu Jintao and Liu Zhenli) appeared for 1 second at the Armed Police Deputy Commander, and the commander was absent, which may indicate a military power adjustment.

The latest news is the symposium commemorating the 120th anniversary of Chen Yun’s birth. Zhang Youxia attended and sat on the rostrum.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a symposium to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Comrade Chen Yun’s birth. Xi Jinping delivered an important speech. Xi Jinping commemorated his big daddy .
This Chen Yun is Xi Jinping’s real political godfather. All of Xi Jinping’s people were promoted by Chen Yun. Xi Jinping himself was also promoted by Chen Yun. In June 1990, Xi Jinping was promoted to the Secretary of the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee, and in 1993 he was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee. Deputy ministerial level positions must be approved by the top or second-in-command. Xi Jinping was promoted by Chen Yun. This meeting is quite important and has many highlights. I will tell you about it in a special issue.

If Zhang Youxia attends, Xi Jinping will have no chance.

I will give you 10 indicator figures. If Xi Jinping holds power, he will arrest these 10 people in a package, or arrest one of them, which means he holds power.
Retired Standing Committee members: Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Zhang Dejiang.
Current Standing Committee members: Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Li Xi.
Current Military Commission members: Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Zhang Shengmin.

If Xi Jinping is really powerful, he can just arrest any one of them. Hu Jintao can arrest He Weidong. If Xi Jinping is powerful, why can’t he arrest Zhang Youxia?
Every day, Hu Jintao was asked to send wreaths one after another. If Xi Jinping was powerful, what would happen if he didn’t let Hu Jintao send wreaths? It shows that Xi Jinping is not good enough.

Zhao Zhiguo’s article and the silence of the Central Theater Command’s propaganda imply that Xi Jinping has lost the support of the army. The decisive handling of two senior CMC officials at the meeting on May 29 showed that the high-level purge was accelerating. The focus of our discussion is not whether Xu Qiliang is Hu Jintao’s or Xi Jinping’s people, but that the level and publicity of the memorial service were decided by the Politburo meeting, reflecting the authority of the host. No matter who this person is (Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping), he showed a “decisive killing and complete control” attitude.

Zhang Youxia’s role: Zhang Youxia was not implicated and may take over the military power. The statements of the 82nd Group Army and the Central Theater Command may pave the way for him to consolidate his position. Who gave this person the courage? The identities of the commander of the armed police, the commander of the Central Theater Command, and the commander of the Rocket Force determine the ownership of the military power. This person holds the gun, so he dares to deal with Miao Hua and Xu Qiliang at the same time. It’s a very simple question: the Central Theater controls Beijing’s security, and this person is “unsparing” and full of confidence.

The new direction of “loyalty to the party”: the army’s loyalty may shift to collective leadership (such as Zhang Youxia) or new leaders (Hu Chunhua is rumored to be acting general secretary), rather than Xi Jinping personally. The gun is in the hands of one person, explaining his decisive decision.

The political signal of the 82nd Army Group shows that the “Long Live Army” guarding the capital is no longer loyal to Xi Jinping. This change is related to the Politburo meeting on May 29, when the military purged Xi Jinping’s old subordinates and adjusted domestic and foreign policies in conjunction with trade negotiations (such as accepting a 55% tariff). The call for “fighting spirit” in Zhao Zhiguo’s article may be an ultimatum to Xi Jinping’s remnants.

From May 30 to June 8, the front page of the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” published eight “Distinguishing Right from Wrong Series Talks”, covering topics such as growth and progress, gains and losses, personal relationships, comradeship, hobbies, family style and education, power in hand and supervision and restraint, and another article on loyalty.

Let’s see, it was the Political Work Department of the 82nd Army Group that issued a notice saying that since May 30, the People’s Liberation Army Daily has launched eight signed comments in the “Distinguishing Right from Wrong Series” such as “How to Correctly Treat Growth and Progress”, “How to Correctly Treat Gains and Losses of Interests”, and “How to Correctly Treat Interpersonal Relationships” in an important position on the first page, guiding party members and cadres to distinguish right from wrong, clarify vague understandings, and consciously correct deviations. Let us learn together.

On May 30, “How to Correctly Treat Growth and Progress” pointed out that “promotion of position is the only standard”, “it is better to lean on a big tree to enjoy the shade”, and “strong quality is not as good as strong relationship”, and criticized the sectarianism and nepotism in selecting and employing people, alluding to the corruption of the entire CCP officialdom, especially pointing to the recent fall of senior military officials (such as Miao Hua). On May 31, “How to Correctly Treat Gains and Losses of Interests” mentioned “self-admiration” and “reaching the top”, implying that Xi Jinping’s “one man” status was shaken and he might step down. On June 1, “How to Treat Personal Relationships Correctly” downplayed bribery and selling official positions as “personal relationships”, and characterized those who were dismissed as “small groups and small groups”, pointing to Xi Jinping’s cronies. On June 2, “How to Treat Comrades’ Friendship Correctly” proposed “leading by example” to purify the social circle, and held the military “violations of rules and disciplines” accountable to the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. On June 4, “How to Treat Hobbies Correctly” revealed that “hobbies” covered up corruption, and on June 5, “How to Treat Family Style and Family Education Correctly” implied “conferring wives and children”, which seemed to poke at Xi Jinping’s family affairs. On June 6, “How to Treat Power Correctly” said that power and money are married, and on June 8, “How to Treat Supervision and Restraint Correctly” directly pointed out that “absolute power leads to absolute corruption”, implying that Xi Jinping is not worthy of leadership. Although these articles did not name names, the context pointed to the top.

The Eighth Commentary borrowed the name of official malpractices to criticize corruption and abuse of power under Xi Jinping’s leadership. On June 2, “Polishing the Loyalty of Revolutionary Soldiers” only mentioned “loyalty to the party” and erased the propaganda about Xi Jinping. On June 5, “Planting Rice in Paddy Fields” called for “moving with the times and responding to the times”, which seemed to remind officials to re-align themselves, as if the editorial “Escorting Reform and Opening Up” after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 reappeared. On June 10 and 11, the front page published opinions on people’s livelihood and Shenzhen reform, echoing the voice of the reformists. Let’s look at the front page headline of the People’s Daily on June 11, the second day after Ren Zhengfei’s article was published, which published “Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Deepening the Shenzhen Comprehensive Reform Pilot, Deepening Reform, Innovation and Expanding Opening Up” (August 30, 2024). The second decision issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, “Shenzhen Reform”, was formulated by Hu Chunhua, who sat next to Xi Jinping at the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee in July 2024 last year. Hu Chunhua once governed Shenzhen, Guangdong. Now that Li Chunlin, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, introduced the document, it is equivalent to the army using guns to support Hu Chunhua’s Shenzhen reform decision.

The eight consecutive comments echoed the decision made by Hu Chunhua at the Politburo meeting on May 29. The meeting expelled CMC member Miao Hua from the party and decided on the specifications of the memorial service for former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang. The timeline matched: Xu Qiliang’s news was released by “Zhao XX” on May 31, and his death was officially confirmed on June 2 (Zhao XX said it was May 28). Regardless of Xu Qiliang’s background (Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping’s faction), the decision-maker showed the authority of “decisive killing and complete control”. The gun is in the hands of Hu Chunhua alone. Deputy Commander of the Armed Police Cao Junzhang (rumored to be from Hu Jintao’s faction) appeared on May 8, and the commander was absent, which strengthened the signs of a change of military power. Who is Li Chunlin’s master? I don’t know, I can only offer a possibility: Li Chunlin was born in Shaanxi Province, and was appointed as the assistant mayor of Ankang in 2008. The then mayor Fang Weifeng was Wen Jiabao’s “disciple” (Ma Yan’s henchman of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection). Fang Weifeng had served as the secretary of Li Jianguo (who had a good relationship with Li Ruihuan) or Song Hongwu, or had a background in Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, and Li Keqiang.

Significance and Prospects

The signal of the eight consecutive comments shows that the military and the top leaders have reached a consensus on Xi Jinping’s loss of power. The military newspaper used the comments to point out the malpractices of the officialdom to overthrow his authority. The new leader Hu Chunhua used anti-corruption and reform to adjust policies.

OK, thank you all.