四中全会17项议程曝光。习近平丁薛祥蔡奇全退，另有若干政治局委员，中央委员等调整

 

四中全会17项议程曝光。习近平丁薛祥蔡奇全退，另有若干政治局委员，中央委员等调整

大家好，
我们看中共中央军事委员会的人员变动情况。
随便打眼一看，四中全会进行人事变动的情况还是很多的。
也不一定就是四中全会，只要是中央全会，都可以变动。
而且现在中央军委李尚福，苗华，何卫东，已经被抓光了，
不增补也不行啊。
1995年9月28日，十四届五中全会增补：军委副主席张万年，迟浩田，军委委员王克、王瑞林
1999年9月19 – 22日，十五届四中全会增补：军委副主席胡锦涛，军委委员郭伯雄、徐才厚
2004年9月19日，十六届四中全会补选：军委主席胡锦涛，
这是最大的一次变动，当时江泽民退出军委主席，胡锦涛补选为军委主席。
21年后，会不会重演历史呢。
当时还增补：军委副主席郭伯雄，徐才厚，增补军委委员：陈炳德、张定发、乔清晨、靖志远
2010年10月15日，十七届五中全会增补：军委副主席习近平
就是习近平本人也是在中途当上军委副主席。
所以说，中央全会上改选军委，其实应该算是常态
2012年11月1日至4日，十七届七中全会增补：军委副主席范长龙、许其亮

历史上有多次四中全会军委人员发生重大变动

2009年9月十七届四中全会主题为“加强和改进新形势下党的建设”，通过相关决定，强调胡锦涛的“党内民主”和“公道正派用人”，批评任人唯亲，仅增补习近平为军委副主席。2014年10月，十八届四中全会主题为“依法治国”，通过相关决定，在周永康、徐才厚反腐背景下为习近平军改奠基。2019年10月，十九届四中全会主题为“国家治理体系现代化”，通过相关决定，巩固习近平的“两个维护”。2024年7月二十届三中全会主题为“进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化”，通过相关决定，确认秦刚被免去中央委员职务，全会审议并通过了中共中央军事委员会关于李尚福、李玉超、孙金明严重违纪违法问题的审查报告，确认中央政治局之前作出的给予李尚福、李玉超、孙金明开除党籍的处分。
二十届三中全会之所以延期召开，就是因为胡锦涛发动军事政变。
由于二十届三中全会已经延期召开，所以导致四中全会也要延期召开。
其实不仅仅是四中全会，后面的五中全会，六中全会都会延期召开。
顺延嘛。

我们推测二十届四中全会议程
其实有的根本就不需要预测，都是明摆着的，
就说陈小江要在四中全会上接替马兴瑞担任政治局委员。
谁敢预测，四中全会马兴瑞继续担任政治局委员，免掉陈小江新疆党委书记的职务。
然后让马兴瑞重新回去当新疆党委书记，这可能吗？

第一项可能的议程，也就是最重要的议程就是

1. 习近平辞去中共总书记、中央军委主席、国家主席职务
   中国军网最新的《评论员文章》只字不提习近平，表明习近平已经完全丧失军权。
   不可能接着干下去，也不会让习近平接着干下去。
   苗华2024年11月因违纪被停职，2025年6月免职和何卫东（2025年3月起失踪，大概率被抓）。
   习近平军中人马被清除，被人缴械。
   四中全会将接受习近平辞职，以平息军内和党内和民意的不满。
   美国财政部长，贝森特说中国8月初将举行一个秘密会议。
   决定习近平下台。
   虽然这不是贝森特，完全的原话，但是他说的话可以解释成这个意思
   贝森特是美国内阁排名第三的人物，仅次于美国副总统万斯和美国国务卿鲁比奥
   如果不算副总统万斯的话，贝森特就是排名第二的人物。
   这么位高权重的人物，总不能和我们一样，直接说习近平滚蛋吧。
   贝森特已经说的够直白了，还要怎么说啊，总不能直接骂习近平吧。
   再说现在到8月10日也就不到20天了，我们马上就可以验证贝森特的话。

四中全会的第二项议程就是

2. 免去何卫东政治局委员职务
   其实这也不需要预测，这都是大概率会发生的事情。
   何卫东在2022年二十大任政治局委员，作为军委副主席和政工主管，2025年3月起持续失踪，虽然还没有官宣何卫东被调查，但是中央军委的规定已经开始清除何卫东流毒。可能因为何卫东未能监督苗华的违纪（如不公用人）。免去其政治局委员职务反映反腐深入军委高层，回应“公道正派用人”。甚至直接在四中全会开除何卫东党籍，这都是有可能发生的。

四中全会的第三项议程就是

3. 刘振立增补为政治局委员，接替何卫东职务
   刘振立（军委联合参谋部参谋长，2022年二十大中央委员），可能增补为政治局委员，接替何卫东，呼应《军委规定》的公平用人，平衡军内派系。刘振立是王西欣提拔的，王西欣是桂全智提拔的，桂全智在西藏的时候和胡锦涛关系不错。
   这是刘振立最简单一句话的人际关系。我们之前分析过好多。
   和刘振立有关系的人，好多都是跟着胡锦涛参加汶川大地震救灾的人。

四中全会的第四项议程就是
4.增补3名军委委员

四中全会的第五项议程就是
5.免去丁薛祥政治局常委等职务
技术上说丁薛祥可能继续担任副总理到明年二会。

四中全会的第六项议程就是
6.补选袁家军为政治局常委接替丁薛祥。
以前我没怎么关注过袁家军。
这两天看见了袁家军接替陈敏尔担任重庆市委书记的影片。
2022年12月，当时习近平可是掌握大权。
当时陈敏尔那个跪舔习近平。
袁家军也在跪舔但是和陈敏尔可就差远了。什么是都怕比。
当时如果陈敏尔的舔包分数是100分的话，袁家军撑死只有20分。
习近平掌握大权的时候，袁家军都敢对习近平不咸不淡的。
确实太牛了，在2022年的时候。

四中全会的第七项议程就是
7.免去蔡奇政治局常委、中央书记处等职务
蔡奇（2022年二十大政治局常委、中央书记处第一书记）涉及新疆阿克苏地委书记黄三平和窦万贵腐败案件，蔡奇2011-2013年浙江援疆工作负责人，浙江对口援助的就是新疆阿克苏地区。
和舞蹈家协会案件（韦立为其情妇，韩子荣为其后台）。
舞蹈家协会冯双白、罗斌、韦立同时被查：被指包养多名情妇，善于潜规则女演员
韦立是蔡奇的情妇
韦立是西城区文联副主席，与蔡奇关系密切。韦立的后台正是北京文联主席韩子荣。韩子荣不仅是蔡奇的亲信，还先后担任蔡奇和王岐山的“大秘”。
这些案件可能牵连蔡奇，免去蔡奇职务直接打击习近平核心圈，习近平下台后垂帘听政的可能性也大为降低。
贾庆林，王岐山，吉林，蔡奇，这些都是习近平派系的北京的官员。
他们就是渡船人，或者说摆渡人，就是北京官员习近平派系的马仔。主要靠他们4个人给提拔上去的。
每个省都是相似的操作

四中全会的第八项议程就是
8.增补胡春华为政治局委员，补选为总书记

四中全会的第九项议程就是

9. 免去马兴瑞政治局委员职务
   马兴瑞（新疆党委书记，2022年二十大政治局委员）作为习近平亲信，可能因地方治理争议或反腐调查被免职。
   这个没什么可说的吧，这是四中全会比较确凿的议程。

四中全会的第十项议程就是

10. 陈小江增补为政治局委员，接替马兴瑞职务
    陈小江（国家民委主任，2022年二十大中央委员），增补为政治局委员，接替马兴瑞，陈小江是胡锦涛的马仔。
    从陈小江接替马兴瑞也能看出来是胡春华接替习近平担任总书记。

四中全会的第11项议程就是

11. 免去李干杰政治局委员职务
    李干杰（中央统战部部长，2022年二十大政治局委员），李干杰已经被从中组部长贬黜成统战部长。
    应该是省委书记接替李干杰的统战部长职位

四中全会的第12项议程就是

12. 追认对朱芝松的开除党籍处分
    2025年6月10日，央视报道，朱芝松（二十届中央候补委员）2025年5月中纪委立案审查结束，被开除党籍，中央纪委常委会和政治局会议已审议，待四中全会追认。案件涉及彭丽媛。这项议程是中纪委官宣确认的议程，这也证明中纪委确认，四中全会，很快就会召开。

四中全会的第13项议程就是

13. 追认对唐仁健的开除党籍处分
    唐仁健（二十届中央委员，农业农村部部长）2024年5月被中纪委调查，2024年11月15日，唐仁健被双开。可能与朱芝松案一同在四中全会追认。
    唐仁健被双开的时候，中纪委并没有，待召开中央委员会全体会议时予以追认。这种表述，也就是说2024年11月，还没有决定要召开四中全会。

四中全会的第14项议程就是

14. 追认对张建春的开除党籍处分
    张建春（二十届中央委员）2024年12月10日被中纪委开除党籍，终止二十大代表资格，案件涉及彭丽媛和彭丽媛的妹夫徐兴建的腐败，待四中全会追认。
    张建春开除党籍比唐仁健还晚一个月。当时中纪委也没有说等四中全会追认。
    这种事情就相当于橡皮图章，都已经开除党籍了，四中全会，百分百会追认，难道还能替彭丽媛把张建春给平反了吗？
    朱芝松，唐仁健，张建春这些官员都是中央委员，或者中央候补委员，应该是会出现在四中全会的公报之中的。
    再加上苗华，何卫东，四中全会被官宣开除党籍的官员名单会很长。

四中全会的第15项议程就是

15. 审议《中共中央关于加强党的纪律建设若干重大问题的决定》
    《中办规定》和《军委规定》的纪律整顿背景，结合二十届四中全会的党建主题，四中全会可能审议纪律建设决定，聚焦反腐、干部作风和公平用人，回应苗华、何卫东的“流毒”和胡春华的团派诉求。

四中全会的第16项议程就是

16. 审议经济和社会发展规划调整
    二十届三中全会的经济改革主题表明，四中全会可能讨论“十四五”规划收官和“十五五”规划准备。胡春华的乡村振兴经验或推动社会公平议题，挑战习近平的经济集权。

四中全会的第17项议程就是

17. 审议军队现代化和政治整训规划
    《军委规定》强调“政治建军”和“流毒”整顿，四中全会可能审议军队现代化规划，聚焦政治工作系统改革，回应苗华、何卫东被查，推进“建军一百年目标”。
    为什么苗华被开除军委委员不到一个月就要肃清流毒，可能就是要赶在四中全会之前。说明四中全会马上召开。

二十届四中全会可能议程包括习近平辞职，胡春华接替、丁薛祥蔡奇何卫东和李干杰被免职、刘振立和陈小江增补政治局委员、马兴瑞被免职、追认朱芝松和唐仁健开除党籍、审议纪律建设和规划调整。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

The 17 agenda items of the Fourth Plenary Session have been revealed. Xi Jinping, Ding Xuexiang, and Cai Qi have all retired; several other Politburo members and Central Committee members have also been adjusted.

Hello everyone,

Let’s look at the personnel changes in the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China.

At a glance, there are quite a few personnel changes at the Fourth Plenary Session.

And it doesn’t necessarily have to be the Fourth Plenary Session; any Central Committee plenary session can make changes.

Moreover, Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, and He Weidong of the Central Military Commission have already been arrested;

they have no choice but to fill the vacancies.

On September 28, 1995, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee added Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian as Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Wang Ke and Wang Ruilin as members of the CMC.

From September 19 to 22, 1999, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee added Hu Jintao as Vice Chairman of the CMC, and Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as members of the CMC.

On September 19, 2004, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee elected Hu Jintao as Chairman of the CMC.

This was the biggest change, as Jiang Zemin stepped down as Chairman of the CMC, and Hu Jintao was elected in his place.

Will history repeat itself 21 years later?

At that time, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were added as Vice Chairmen of the CMC, and Chen Bingde, Zhang Dingfa, Qiao Qingchen, and Jing Zhiyuan were added as members of the CMC.

On October 15, 2010, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee added Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the CMC.

Xi Jinping himself also became Vice Chairman of the CMC midway through his term.

Therefore, re-election of the Central Military Commission at the Central Committee plenary session is actually quite common.

From November 1st to 4th, 2012, the 7th Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee added Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang as Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission.

Historically, there have been several significant changes in the personnel of the Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee.

In September 2009, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee focused on “Strengthening and Improving Party Building under the New Circumstances,” and passed relevant decisions emphasizing Hu Jintao’s “intra-party democracy” and “fair and upright personnel selection,” criticizing nepotism, and only adding Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In October 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee focused on “Rule of Law,” and passed relevant decisions, laying the foundation for Xi Jinping’s military reforms against the backdrop of the anti-corruption campaigns led by Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou. In October 2019, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee focused on “Modernization of the National Governance System,” and passed relevant decisions consolidating Xi Jinping’s “two safeguards.” The Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, held in July 2024, focused on “Further Comprehensively Deepening Reform and Advancing Chinese-Style Modernization.” It passed relevant decisions, confirming Qin Gang’s removal from his position as a member of the Central Committee. The session reviewed and approved the report of the Central Military Commission on the serious disciplinary and legal violations of Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, and Sun Jinming, confirming the previous decision by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to expel them from the Party.

The Third Plenary Session was postponed because Hu Jintao launched a military coup.

Because the Third Plenary Session was postponed, the Fourth Plenary Session was also postponed.

In fact, not only the Fourth Plenary Session, but also the Fifth and Sixth Plenary Sessions were postponed.

It’s a matter of postponement.

We speculate on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee.

Actually, some things don’t even need prediction; they’re all obvious.

For example, Chen Xiaojiang was expected to replace Ma Xingrui as a member of the Political Bureau at the Fourth Plenary Session.

Who dares to predict that at the Fourth Plenary Session, Ma Xingrui will remain a member of the Politburo, and Chen Xiaojiang will be removed from his post as Xinjiang Party Secretary?

And then Ma Xingrui will be reinstated as Xinjiang Party Secretary? Is that even possible?

The first and most important agenda item is:

Xi Jinping resigning from his positions as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the People’s Republic of China. The latest commentary on the China Military Network makes no mention of Xi Jinping, indicating that he has completely lost military power.

It’s impossible for him to continue, and he won’t be allowed to continue.

Miao Hua was suspended from his post in November 2024 for disciplinary violations and dismissed in June 2025, along with He Weidong (who has been missing since March 2025 and is likely to be arrested).

Xi Jinping’s military associates have been purged and disarmed.

The Fourth Plenary Session will accept Xi Jinping’s resignation to quell discontent within the military, the Party, and among the public.

US Treasury Secretary Bessenter said that China will hold a secret meeting in early August.

to decide on Xi Jinping’s resignation.

While this isn’t Bessant’s exact quote, it can be interpreted as follows:
Bessant is the third-ranking official in the US cabinet, after Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio.

If Vice President Vance is excluded, Bessant is the second-ranking official.

Such a high-ranking and powerful figure can’t simply say “Get out” like we would.

Bessant has already been quite blunt; what more could he say? He can’t just directly criticize Xi Jinping.

Besides, there are less than 20 days until August 10th, and we’ll soon be able to verify Bessant’s words.

The second item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Removing He Weidong from his position as a member of the Politburo.

This doesn’t need prediction; it’s highly likely to happen.

He Weidong was appointed a member of the Politburo at the 20th National Congress in 2022, serving as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and head of political work. He has been missing since March 2025. Although there hasn’t been an official announcement of an investigation into He Weidong, regulations from the Central Military Commission have already begun to purge his influence. It’s possible that He Weidong failed to supervise Miao Hua’s disciplinary violations (such as unfair personnel appointments). Removing him from his Politburo post reflects the deepening of the anti-corruption campaign within the Central Military Commission and responds to the call for “fair and impartial personnel appointments.” It’s even possible that He Weidong will be expelled from the Party at the Fourth Plenary Session.

The third item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Liu Zhenli’s appointment as a Politburo member, succeeding He Weidong.

Liu Zhenli (Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, a member of the 20th Central Committee in 2022) may be appointed as a Politburo member, succeeding He Weidong, echoing the fair personnel appointments stipulated in the “Regulations of the Central Military Commission” and balancing factions within the military. Liu Zhenli was promoted by Wang Xixin, who in turn was promoted by Gui Quanzhi, who had a good relationship with Hu Jintao when he was in Tibet.

This is Liu Zhenli’s simplest example of interpersonal relationships. We’ve analyzed many of these before.

Many of those associated with Liu Zhenli were people who participated in the Wenchuan earthquake relief efforts alongside Hu Jintao.

The fourth item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

4. To add three new members to the Central Military Commission.

The fifth item on the agenda was:

5. To remove Ding Xuexiang from his positions as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Technically speaking, Ding Xuexiang may continue to serve as Vice Premier until the Second Plenary Session next year.

The sixth item on the agenda was:

6. To elect Yuan Jiajun as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee to replace Ding Xuexiang.

I hadn’t paid much attention to Yuan Jiajun before.

These past two days, I saw a video of Yuan Jiajun replacing Chen Min’er as the Chongqing Municipal Party Secretary.

In December 2022, Xi Jinping held absolute power.

At that time, Chen Min’er was fawning over Xi Jinping.

Yuan Jiajun was also fawning, but he was far inferior to Chen Min’er. Everything is relative.

If Chen Min’er’s sycophancy score was 100 points, Yuan Jiajun’s was at most 20 points.

When Xi Jinping held absolute power, Yuan Jiajun dared to be indifferent to him.

That’s truly impressive, especially considering it happened in 2022.

The seventh item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

7. Removal of Cai Qi from his positions as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Cai Qi (a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the 20th National Congress in 2022) was involved in the corruption cases of Huang Sanping and Dou Wangui, secretaries of the Aksu Prefectural Committee in Xinjiang. Cai Qi was in charge of Zhejiang’s aid to Xinjiang from 2011 to 2013, and Zhejiang provided counterpart assistance to Aksu Prefecture in Xinjiang.

And the Dancers Association case (Wei Li was his mistress, and Han Zirong was his backer).

Feng Shuangbai, Luo Bin, and Wei Li of the Dancers Association were investigated simultaneously: accused of keeping multiple mistresses and being adept at using their influence to sexually harass actresses.

Wei Li was Cai Qi’s mistress.

Wei Li was the vice chairman of the Xicheng District Federation of Literary and Art Circles and had a close relationship with Cai Qi. Wei Li’s backer was Han Zirong, chairman of the Beijing Federation of Literary and Art Circles. Han Zirong was not only a confidant of Cai Qi but also served as the “chief secretary” to both Cai Qi and Wang Qishan.

These cases may implicate Cai Qi. Removing Cai Qi from his post would directly damage Xi Jinping’s inner circle, significantly reducing the possibility of Xi Jinping ruling from behind the scenes after stepping down.

Jia Qinglin, Wang Qishan, Ji Lin, and Cai Qi are all Beijing officials from Xi Jinping’s faction.

They are the ferrymen, or rather, the middlemen—Xi Jinping’s cronies in Beijing. Their promotions were mainly due to these four individuals.

Similar operations are conducted in each province.

The eighth item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

8. Appoint Hu Chunhua as a member of the Politburo and elect him as General Secretary.

The ninth item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

Removing Ma Xingrui from his position as a member of the Politburo. Ma Xingrui (Xinjiang Party Secretary, a member of the Politburo for the 2022 20th National Congress), as a close confidant of Xi Jinping, may be dismissed due to local governance controversies or anti-corruption investigations.

This is fairly certain; it’s a relatively confirmed agenda item of the Fourth Plenary Session.

The tenth item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

Chen Xiaojiang was added to the Politburo, succeeding Ma Xingrui.

Chen Xiaojiang (Director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, member of the 20th CPC Central Committee at the 2022 CPC National Congress) was added to the Politburo, succeeding Ma Xingrui. Chen Xiaojiang is a close associate of Hu Jintao.

Chen Xiaojiang’s replacement of Ma Xingrui also indicates that Hu Chunhua will succeed Xi Jinping as General Secretary.

The eleventh item on the agenda was:

Removing Li Ganjie from his position as a member of the Politburo.

Li Ganjie (Minister of the United Front Work Department, member of the 20th CPC National Congress at the 2022 CPC National Congress) has been demoted from Minister of the Organization Department to Minister of the United Front Work Department.

The provincial party secretary should replace Li Ganjie as head of the United Front Work Department.

Item 12 of the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Randomly approving the expulsion from the Party of Zhu Zhisong.

On June 10, 2025, CCTV reported that Zhu Zhisong (an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee) was expelled from the Party after his investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) concluded in May 2025. The CCDI Standing Committee and the Politburo have reviewed the case, pending ratification at the Fourth Plenary Session. The case involves Peng Liyuan. This agenda item was officially confirmed by the CCDI, proving that the Fourth Plenary Session will be held soon.

Item 13 of the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Randomly approving the expulsion from the Party of Tang Renjian.

Tang Renjian (a member of the 20th Central Committee and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs) was investigated by the CCDI in May 2024 and expelled from the Party and removed from public office on November 15, 2024. His expulsion from the Party and removal from public office may be ratified at the Fourth Plenary Session along with the Zhu Zhisong case.

When Tang Renjian was expelled from the Party and removed from public office, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) did not ratify the decision until the Central Committee plenary session. This statement means that as of November 2024, the decision to convene the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee had not yet been made.

The 14th item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session was:

Randomizing the expulsion of Zhang Jianchun from the Party.

Zhang Jianchun (a member of the 20th CPC Central Committee) was expelled from the Party and removed from his position as a delegate to the 20th CPC National Congress by the CCDI on December 10, 2024. His case involved corruption involving Peng Liyuan and her brother-in-law, Xu Xingjian. The Fourth Plenary Session was to ratify the decision.

Zhang Jianchun’s expulsion from the Party occurred a month later than Tang Renjian’s. At that time, the CCDI did not mention waiting for the Fourth Plenary Session to ratify it.

This is essentially a rubber stamp; since he had already been expelled from the Party, the Fourth Plenary Session would almost certainly ratify it. Could it possibly exonerate Zhang Jianchun on behalf of Peng Liyuan?

Zhu Zhisong, Tang Renjian, and Zhang Jianchun are all members or alternate members of the Central Committee and should appear in the communique of the Fourth Plenary Session.

Adding Miao Hua and He Weidong, the list of officials officially expelled from the Party by the Fourth Plenary Session will be very long.

Item 15 of the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Deliberating on the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Strengthening Party Discipline.” Given the background of disciplinary rectification in the “Regulations of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee” and the “Regulations of the Central Military Commission,” combined with the Party building theme of the 20th CPC Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session, the session may deliberate on the decision on discipline construction, focusing on anti-corruption, cadre conduct, and fair personnel selection, responding to the “poisonous influence” of Miao Hua and He Weidong and the demands of Hu Chunhua’s Youth League faction.

Item 16 of the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Deliberating on the adjustment of the economic and social development plan. The economic reform theme of the 20th CPC Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session indicates that the Fourth Plenary Session may discuss the conclusion of the 14th Five-Year Plan and the preparation for the 15th Five-Year Plan. Hu Chunhua’s experience in rural revitalization may promote social equity issues, challenging Xi Jinping’s economic centralization.

The 17th item on the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session is:

Reviewing the plan for military modernization and political rectification. The “Regulations of the Central Military Commission” emphasize “building the army politically” and rectifying the “poisonous influence” of certain groups. The Fourth Plenary Session may review the plan for military modernization, focusing on the reform of the political work system, responding to the investigations of Miao Hua and He Weidong, and advancing the “centenary goal of building the army.”

The reason why the “poisonous influence” of Miao Hua was purged less than a month after his removal from the Central Military Commission is likely to be before the Fourth Plenary Session. This indicates that the Fourth Plenary Session is about to convene.

The possible agenda of the 20th Fourth Plenary Session includes Xi Jinping’s resignation and Hu Chunhua’s succession; the removal of Ding Xuexiang, Cai Qi, He Weidong, and Li Ganjie from their posts; the addition of Liu Zhenli and Chen Xiaojiang to the Politburo; the removal of Ma Xingrui from his post; the posthumous recognition of the expulsion of Zhu Zhisong and Tang Renjian from the Party; and the review of disciplinary construction and planning adjustments.

Okay, thank you everyone.