张又侠晋升元帅，7月政治局会议取消，直接召开废习大会。中国突然对美国态度放软

 

张又侠晋升元帅，7月政治局会议取消，直接召开废习大会。中国突然对美国态度放软

大家好，
油管给我推了一个节目，我发现英文圈的脑洞，
比中文圈的脑洞更大，我看了两分钟就看不下去了。

在中国共产党面临一场席卷全球的危机——从经济崩溃到社会动荡，再到政治解体——之际，一位此前默默无闻的人物正在崛起，成为真正的权力中心：张又侠。他既不是总书记，也不是总理或国家主席。但他掌握着能够决定任何政权命运的一项关键权力：掌控军权。

2025年7月中旬，新成立的中央决策协调委员会（该机构旨在取代习近平曾经的绝对权力结构）在一次闭门会议上提出了一个令人震惊的建议：恢复“元帅”军衔。这绝非普通的头衔。自邓小平时代以来，该军衔已被废除，以防止像林彪那样的滥权行为。但现在，它又被重新启用——并非因为战争，而是因为权力正在更迭。

与被清洗或边缘化的许其亮、李尚福等空壳高官不同，张又侠作为真正的红二代，其父亲张宗逊曾是习近平的亲密战友，而张又侠本人则是洪尔德的父亲。
由于是翻译的，他这个人名到底是谁，我也不知道。
就看看他的思路，我不也知道洪尔德是谁啊。

他的权力不仅源于革命血统，更在于实际的军事指挥。从2016年战区司令部改革、中央军委重组到战略武器储备的掌控，张又侠的印记遍布军队的每个关键层面。
这个就属于狂吹张又侠的那一派的风格。

尽管张又侠鲜少公开现身或发表声明，但过去两个月来，第八十二集团军进驻北京、上海机场加强安保等重大军事调动均与他密切相关。
这个车上不是写的清清楚楚的，道路检测车辆，就是为了测试阅兵用的。

在中国现代史上，拥有革命血统并掌控实权的军事人物崛起，往往预示着政权的关键转折点。国际观察家将张又侠比作民国时期的张作霖，被称为“东北无冕之王”，后者凭借纪律和服从而非公众支持掌控权力。
大家看看人家这个脑洞，只是因为张又侠和张作霖都姓张吗？
干脆说张又侠是张作霖的二代或者三代孙子不就行了。

类似地，张又侠无需媒体关注，他的存在足以让北京的文职政客噤声，而这与习近平依赖王朝遗产和宣传的统治模式形成鲜明对比。据《南华早报》分析，军事专家认为，张又侠是唯一能在突发政治动荡中掌控核力量和战略指挥权的人物，恢复元帅军衔（长期视为胜利者的专属头衔）不仅是军事信号，更是直接挑战谢世友模式——后者以军队维护最高领导人稳定为目标。
他说这个谢世友是谁我也不知道。

在张又侠领导下，这一模式逆转，共产党需与军队保持一致，否则将被抛弃。张又侠的崛起让人联想到袁世凯，袁曾拯救清朝却通过称帝自毁前程。尽管张又侠未有帝国主义举动，但2024年10月访越期间未提及习近平，以及中国官方媒体的异常沉默，已表明权力核心的转移。北京政治史上，军事干预民政屡次留下创伤，如利诺、德瓦尼瑞、杨德吉、利瓦等人物均曾动摇文职体系稳定，张又侠或成为这一循环的新一轮代表。
这些名字都是音译，我不知道他们是谁

中共从未真正摆脱军阀政治基因，仅以中央军委和组织部掩盖，当人民失去信心、党的控制力动摇时，军队成为最后依靠。如果张又侠未来几周获授元帅军衔，这将超越军事晋升，标志中国新权力时代的开启，士兵的声音将压倒政局。

这个没有说张又侠担任军委主席。

一旦“枪杆子”摆上谈判桌，民间机构将沦为道具。在民意与政治脱节的国家，每一次拔枪都书写历史新篇——是统一还是分裂？是复兴还是崩溃？答案不再由党决定，而是由持枪者掌控。中国未来已非西方和平演变的边缘，而是因拒绝改革而崩溃的深渊。过去十年，“改革”一词自习近平上台后悄然淡出政治话语，相互矛盾的命令、空洞的会议以及领导人对自身政策的怀疑，正在从内部腐蚀政权。

这就是大概内容，我觉得英文扯淡比中文还厉害呢。

根据最新信息，全国人大常委会委员长赵乐际将于2025年7月23日至31日应吉尔吉斯斯坦议长图尔贡别克乌鲁、匈牙利国会主席格维尔、瑞士联邦议会国民院议长里尼克和联邦院议长卡罗尼、各国议会联盟主席阿克松和秘书长纯贡的邀请，对吉尔吉斯斯坦、匈牙利、瑞士进行正式友好访问，并出席在瑞士举行的第六次世界议长大会。这一出访安排意味着赵乐际在7月下旬将全程不在中国。这引发了关于7月政治局会议可能取消的猜测，同时与美国财政部长贝森特（Scott Bessent）提到的8月初可能召开的“秘密会议”（类似教皇选举的闭门会议）联系起来，暗示了一个潜在的政治动向。

赵乐际作为中共中央政治局常委、排名第三的高层领导人，其出访通常需协调国内重大会议安排。中共政治局会议通常每月召开一次，7月会议若按惯例举行，赵乐际的缺席将是不寻常的。X上部分帖子提到7月政治局会议可能已结束或未开，推测与赵乐际的行程冲突有关，但官方未发布任何通稿，政治局收集意见的总理座谈会也未举行，这与常规程序不符。因此，赵乐际的出访可能导致7月政治局会议被取消或推迟，这一安排可能为后续事件预留空间。

贝森特近期表示，8月初中南海可能举行一次“闭门会议”（conclave），类似教皇选举的秘密聚会。这一说法虽未获中国官方证实，但结合赵乐际的出访和7月会议可能取消的背景，引发了关于高层权力调整的猜测。赵乐际的缺席可能不仅是行程安排的结果，更可能是为8月初的潜在会议让路。历史上，中共重要人事变动或权力交接（如邓小平1988年家中会议决定江泽民接班）常在非公开场合决定，若8月会议涉及类似议题，取消7月政治局会议可避免提前曝光敏感讨论。

赵乐际此次出访吉尔吉斯斯坦、匈牙利、瑞士，涵盖中亚、欧洲及国际议会平台，显示中国欲在国际舞台强化外交影响力。然而，访问期间的长时间缺席，也可能被解读为高层内部对国内局势的某种战略调整。结合近期苗华、何卫东落马，朱芝松、张建春开除党籍，蔡奇牵连案件，以及张又侠的军事崛起，党内权力斗争加剧。若8月会议确为权力交接或清洗后的重新布局，赵乐际的出访或为其调整立场或观察国际反应提供缓冲。

这名网友说，
财联社7月22日电，市场监管总局暂停对杜邦中国集团有限公司的反垄断调查程序。
我的回复是这是一个很重要的新闻。

就在过去的24小时，中国的外交部门突然放低了调门。
我也不知道这是暂时的，
还是怎么回事儿。
首先中国扣了几个人质
中交部发言人郭家昆在周一的例行新闻发布会上说。“据了解，毛晨月女士因涉及中国正在办理的一起刑事案件，已被中国执法部门依法采取限制出境措施。根据中国法律，案件正在调查中，毛晨月女士不能离境，并依法有义务配合调查。”

他没有详细说明该刑事案件以及毛晨月如何涉及的内容。

郭家昆补充说：“无论是中国人还是外国人，在中国都必须遵守中国法律。中方在调查中将依法保障其合法权益。我想强调，这是一起司法个案。中国将一如既往欢迎各国人员来华旅游和经商，并依法保障其合法权益。”

路透社报道，富国银行不愿就此发表评论。周五该银行表示正在 “通过适当渠道 ”确保毛晨月返回美国。

一位知情人士上周告诉路透社，在毛晨月被限制出境后，富国银行暂停了所有员工前往中国的商业旅行。

报道指，北京对中国和外国公民实施出境禁令，通常与民事纠纷、监管调查或刑事调查有关。富国银行对员工出台赴中旅行禁令之际，美国和中国外交及商业关系仍持续紧绷。

虽然中国扣下了毛晨月当作人质。

但是中国的外交政策似乎有猛烈转向的迹象
到底是暂时的，还是技术性调整，还是重大发生我就不知道了。
毕竟现在时间节点比较敏感。

据市场监管总局网站7月22日消息，市场监管总局暂停对杜邦中国集团有限公司的反垄断调查程序。

杜邦美股盘前直线拉升，截至发稿涨超2%。

今年4月，因杜邦中国集团有限公司涉嫌违反《中华人民共和国反垄断法》，市场监管总局依法对杜邦中国集团有限公司开展立案调查。

公开资料显示，杜邦公司（DuPont）是一家美国公司，成立于1802年，最初是火药制造商，后来转型为全球性科研企业，业务覆盖农业、电子、能源等多个领域。与中国市场的情缘最早可追溯至1863年。伴随着中国的改革开放，杜邦公司于1984年在北京设立办事处，并于1988年在深圳注册成立杜邦中国集团有限公司，成为最早开展对华投资的世界500强企业之一。

中国不单是取消了对美国杜邦公司的调查，对美国财政贝森特的回应
也是特别的温和。

7月22日，外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会。

　　彭博社记者提问，美国财政部长贝森特表示，下一轮中美关税谈判可能包括讨论中国购买俄罗斯和伊朗石油的问题。外交部对此有何评论？

　　郭嘉昆表示，中方立场是一贯和明确的，希望美方同中方一道，落实两国元首通话达成的重要共识，发挥中美经贸磋商机制的作用，通过对话沟通，增进共识，减少误解，加强合作，推动中美关系稳定、健康、可持续发展。

　　“具体情况请向主管部门询问。”郭嘉昆说。

大家注意，美国财政部长贝森特刚刚说了中国可能要开秘密会议更换总书记。
中国的外交部发言人郭嘉昆没有对贝森特进行任何的抗议
反而回答了有关贝森特的问题。
这是美国要制裁
中国购买俄罗斯和伊朗石油
中国没有说坚决反对，什么搬起石头砸自己的脚，
反而说的是对话沟通，增进共识，减少误解，加强合作
太温和，画风突变，不知道怎么了。

当然我们也没有办法像胡锡进一样，天天跟随总路线一起左右摇摆。
还要继续观察，中国外交部动不动就抽风，没准儿一天一个调子。
如果一直维持对美国这么温和的态度，可能是要和美国达成什么协议。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Zhang Youxia promoted to Marshal, July Politburo meeting canceled, direct meeting to depose Xi Jinping convened. China suddenly softens its stance towards the US.

Hello everyone, YouTube recommended a program to me, and I found that the imaginations of the English-speaking world are even more outlandish than those of the Chinese-speaking world. I couldn’t watch for more than two minutes.

As the Chinese Communist Party faces a global crisis—from economic collapse to social unrest to political disintegration—a previously unknown figure is rising to become the true center of power: Zhang Youxia. He is neither the General Secretary, nor the Premier, nor the President. But he wields a crucial power that can determine the fate of any regime: control of the military.

In mid-July 2025, the newly established Central Decision-Making Coordination Committee (an institution intended to replace Xi Jinping’s former absolute power structure) made a shocking suggestion in a closed-door meeting: to reinstate the rank of “Marshal.” This is no ordinary title. It had been abolished since the Deng Xiaoping era to prevent abuses of power like those of Lin Biao. But now, it is being reinstated—not because of war, but because power is shifting.

Unlike Xu Qiliang and Li Shangfu, who were purged or marginalized as high-ranking officials with empty titles, Zhang Youxia, a true “red second generation,” is the son of Zhang Zongxun, a close comrade of Xi Jinping, and Zhang Youxia himself is the father of Hong Erde.

Since this is a translation, I don’t know who this person actually is.

Just look at his line of thinking; I don’t know who Hong Erde is either.

His power stems not only from his revolutionary lineage but also from actual military command. From the 2016 reform of the theater commands and the reorganization of the Central Military Commission to control of strategic weapons reserves, Zhang Youxia’s influence is pervasive at every key level of the military.

This is typical of those who lavish praise on Zhang Youxia.

Although Zhang Youxia rarely appears in public or makes statements, the major military movements of the past two months, such as the 82nd Group Army’s deployment to Beijing and the increased security at Shanghai airport, are closely related to him.

This vehicle clearly states that it’s a road inspection vehicle, used for testing military parades.

In modern Chinese history, the rise of military figures with revolutionary lineage and real power often foreshadows crucial turning points in regime change. International observers have compared Zhang Youxia to Zhang Zuolin of the Republic of China era, calling him the “uncrowned king of Northeast China,” who seized power through discipline and obedience rather than public support.

Look at this wild imagination! Is it just because Zhang Youxia and Zhang Zuolin share the same surname?

Why not just say Zhang Youxia is Zhang Zuolin’s second or third-generation grandson?

Similarly, Zhang Youxia doesn’t need media attention; his very existence is enough to silence Beijing’s civilian politicians, a stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s ruling model, which relies on dynastic legacies and propaganda. According to an analysis by the South China Morning Post, military experts believe Zhang Youxia is the only person capable of controlling nuclear forces and strategic command during sudden political turmoil. Restoring the rank of Marshal (long considered a title reserved for victors) is not only a military signal but also a direct challenge to the Xie Shiyou model—which prioritizes the military’s role in maintaining the stability of the supreme leader.

He said, “I don’t even know who this Xie Shiyou is.”

Under Zhang Youxia’s leadership, this model has reversed; the Communist Party must align itself with the military or face abandonment. Zhang’s rise is reminiscent of Yuan Shikai, who once saved the Qing Dynasty but ruined his career by attempting to become emperor. Although Zhang has not engaged in imperialist actions, his failure to mention Xi Jinping during his October 2024 visit to Vietnam, and the unusual silence of Chinese state media, indicate a shift in the core of power. In Beijing’s political history, military intervention in civil affairs has repeatedly left scars. Figures such as Lino, Devani, Yang Deji, and Liwa have all shaken the stability of the civilian system; Zhang may become a new representative of this cycle.

These names are transliterations; I don’t know who they are.

The CCP has never truly rid itself of its warlord political genes, merely masking them with the Central Military Commission and the Organization Department. When the people lose faith and the Party’s control falters, the military becomes the last resort. If Zhang is awarded the rank of Marshal in the coming weeks, this will transcend military promotion, marking the beginning of a new era of power in China, where the voice of the soldiers will overshadow the political landscape.

This does not mention Zhang Youxia becoming Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Once the “barrel of guns” is placed on the negotiating table, non-governmental organizations will become mere props. In a country where public opinion and politics are disconnected, every act of violence writes a new chapter in history—unity or division? Revival or collapse? The answer is no longer decided by the Party, but by those who wield the guns. China’s future is no longer on the brink of peaceful evolution by the West, but on the abyss of collapse due to its refusal to reform. Over the past decade, the word “reform” has quietly faded from political discourse since Xi Jinping came to power. Contradictory orders, empty meetings, and leaders’ own doubts about their policies are eroding the regime from within.

That’s the gist of it. I think English nonsense is even better than Chinese.

According to the latest information, Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, will pay official friendly visits to Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, and Switzerland from July 23 to 31, 2025, at the invitation of Kyrgyz Parliament Speaker Turgunbekulu, Hungarian Parliament Speaker Göwel, Swiss Federal Council Speaker Rinnik and Federal Council Speaker Karonni, Inter-Parliamentary Union President Aksson and Secretary General Cungon. He will also attend the Sixth World Conference of Speakers of Parliament in Switzerland. This trip means Zhao Leji will be out of China for the entire latter part of July. This has sparked speculation about the possible cancellation of the July Politburo meeting, and is linked to a possible “secret meeting” (similar to a closed-door meeting for papal elections) mentioned by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in early August, hinting at a potential political development.

As a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and the third-ranking high-ranking leader, Zhao Leji’s overseas trips usually involve coordinating important domestic meetings. The Politburo meetings are typically held monthly; Zhao Leji’s absence from the July meeting would be unusual if it proceeds as usual. Some posts on X mentioned that the July Politburo meeting may have ended or not even taken place, speculating that it was related to a scheduling conflict with Zhao Leji. However, no official press release was issued, and the Premier’s symposium for the Politburo to gather opinions was not held, which is inconsistent with routine procedures. Therefore, Zhao Leji’s trip abroad may have led to the cancellation or postponement of the July Politburo meeting, an arrangement that may leave room for subsequent events.

Bessant recently stated that a “conclave meeting,” similar to a secret gathering for the papal election, might be held in Zhongnanhai in early August. Although this statement has not been confirmed by Chinese officials, combined with Zhao Leji’s trip abroad and the possible cancellation of the July meeting, it has sparked speculation about a power shift at the top. Zhao Leji’s absence may not only be a result of scheduling conflicts, but may also be making way for a potential meeting in early August. Historically, important personnel changes or power transitions within the CCP (such as Deng Xiaoping’s decision to appoint Jiang Zemin as successor at a home meeting in 1988) are often decided in private. If the August meeting involves similar topics, canceling the July Politburo meeting could avoid premature exposure of sensitive discussions.

Zhao Leji’s recent trip to Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, and Switzerland, covering Central Asia, Europe, and international parliamentary platforms, demonstrates China’s desire to strengthen its diplomatic influence on the international stage. However, his extended absence during the trip could also be interpreted as a strategic adjustment by the top leadership regarding the domestic situation. Combined with the recent downfall of Miao Hua and He Weidong, the expulsion of Zhu Zhisong and Zhang Jianchun from the Party, Cai Qi’s involvement in a case, and Zhang Youxia’s military rise, the power struggle within the Party has intensified. If the August meeting is indeed a reshuffling of power after a power transition or purge, Zhao Leji’s trip may provide a buffer for adjusting his stance or observing international reactions.

This netizen said, “On July 22, Cailian Press reported that the State Administration for Market Regulation suspended its anti-monopoly investigation into DuPont China Group Co., Ltd.”

My reply was that this is very important news.

In the past 24 hours, China’s foreign ministry suddenly lowered its tone.

I don’t know if this is temporary,

or what’s going on.

“First, China has taken several hostages,” said Guo Jiakun, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a regular press conference on Monday. “It is understood that Ms. Mao Chenyue has been placed under travel restrictions by Chinese law enforcement authorities in accordance with the law due to her involvement in an ongoing criminal case in China. According to Chinese law, the case is under investigation, and Ms. Mao Chenyue is not allowed to leave the country and is legally obligated to cooperate with the investigation.”

He did not elaborate on the criminal case or how Mao Chenyue is involved.

Guo Jiakun added, “Whether Chinese or foreign, everyone in China must abide by Chinese law. The Chinese side will protect their legitimate rights and interests in accordance with the law during the investigation. I want to emphasize that this is a specific judicial case. China will, as always, welcome people from all countries to travel and do business in China and will protect their legitimate rights and interests in accordance with the law.”

Reuters reported that Wells Fargo declined to comment. On Friday, the bank said it was “through appropriate channels” to ensure Mao Chenyue’s return to the United States.

A source familiar with the matter told Reuters last week that Wells Fargo suspended all business travel to China for its employees after Mao Chenyue was restricted from leaving the country.

The report indicates that Beijing’s travel bans on Chinese and foreign citizens are usually related to civil disputes, regulatory investigations, or criminal investigations. As Wells Fargo issued a travel ban on its employees to China, diplomatic and commercial relations between the United States and China remained tense.

Although China has taken Mao Chenyue hostage,

China’s foreign policy seems to be showing signs of a sharp shift. Whether this is temporary, a technical adjustment, or a major event, I don’t know.

After all, the timing is quite sensitive.

According to a July 22 announcement on the website of the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Administration has suspended its anti-monopoly investigation into DuPont China Group Co., Ltd.

DuPont’s US-listed shares surged in pre-market trading, rising over 2% as of press time.

In April of this year, the State Administration for Market Regulation initiated an investigation into DuPont China Group Co., Ltd. for suspected violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China.

Public information shows that DuPont is an American company founded in 1802. Initially a gunpowder manufacturer, it later transformed into a global research and development company with businesses covering agriculture, electronics, energy, and other fields. Its connection with the Chinese market dates back to 1863. Alongside China’s reform and opening up, DuPont established an office in Beijing in 1984 and registered DuPont China Group Co., Ltd. in Shenzhen in 1988, becoming one of the earliest Fortune 500 companies to invest in China.

China not only dropped its investigation into DuPont, but its response to US Treasury Secretary Bessenter was also remarkably mild.

On July 22, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference.

A Bloomberg reporter asked, “US Treasury Secretary Bessenter stated that the next round of China-US tariff negotiations may include discussions on China’s purchase of Russian and Iranian oil. What is the Foreign Ministry’s comment on this?”

Guo Jiakun stated that China’s position is consistent and clear. China hopes the US will work with China to implement the important consensus reached during the phone call between the two heads of state, leverage the China-US economic and trade consultation mechanism, enhance consensus through dialogue and communication, reduce misunderstandings, strengthen cooperation, and promote the stable, healthy, and sustainable development of China-US relations.

“For specific details, please inquire with the relevant authorities,” Guo Jiakun said.

Note that US Treasury Secretary Bessenter just mentioned that China may hold a secret meeting to replace its General Secretary. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun did not protest against Bessenter at all.

Instead, he answered questions about Bessenter.

This comes amidst the US sanctions against China’s purchase of Russian and Iranian oil. China didn’t express firm opposition, avoiding any talk of shooting itself in the foot.

Instead, it spoke of dialogue and communication, building consensus, reducing misunderstandings, and strengthening cooperation. Such a mild tone, such a sudden change in style, is baffling.

Of course, we can’t be like Hu Xijin, constantly swaying back and forth with the general line.

We need to continue observing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry is prone to erratic behavior; its stance might change daily.

If it maintains this mild attitude towards the US, it might indicate an agreement is being reached.

Okay, thank you everyone.