军报开足马力批习，列出习三桩罪，开出一张药方。特勤局失守，习被缴械，凌志峰副局级是谁提拔的？习近平秘密去了几次千岛湖？哇哈哈与农夫山泉的派系

 

军报开足马力批习，列出习三桩罪，开出一张药方。特勤局失守，习被缴械，凌志峰副局级是谁提拔的？习近平秘密去了几次千岛湖？哇哈哈与农夫山泉的派系

大家好，
这名网友说，
大包，凌志峰在夏宝龙任期内升任副厅级，19大连中央委员都没有连任，会不会不是陈云派系
我的回复是凌志峰的副厅级不是在夏宝龙任期内晋升的。

2009年6月，41岁的凌志峰任中共淳安县委副书记、县人民政府代县长，2010年1月正式任县长。当时的杭州市委书记是王国平 (2000年4月 – 2010年1月)，杭州市长是蔡奇 (2007年4月 – 2010年7月)。当时的浙江省委书记是赵洪祝 (2007年3月 – 2012年11月)。浙江省长是吕祖善（2003年1月 – 2011年8月）

2011年11月，43岁的凌志峰任中共杭州市淳安县委书记。当时的杭州市委书记是黄坤明 (2010年1月 – 2013年9月)，杭州市长是邵占维 (2010年7月 – 2013年3月)。

绍兴市
2014年8月，46岁的凌志峰任中共绍兴市委常委、市公安局局长。当时的浙江省委书记是夏宝龙(2012年12月 – 2017年4月)，浙江省长是李强（2012年12月 – 2016年7月）。

这名网友可能误解，以为凌志峰第一次晋升副厅级是绍兴市委常委，市公安局局长这一步。
其实不是。淳安县长已经是副厅级了。
凌志峰的简历上没有写的那么清楚。
我们看其他淳安县长，淳安县委书记。
我们看这个
1997年6月 – 1998年3月，39岁的孙景淼任淳安县委副书记、代县长（副厅级）
写的一清二楚，淳安县长已经是副厅级了。
因为杭州市副省级城市，杭州下面的区县，区长县长都是副厅级。

我们再看一个，接替凌志峰担任淳安县委书记的朱党其
2014年9月 – 2016年10月，48岁的朱党其任中共淳安县委书记（副厅级）
朱党其的简历中也明确写了，他这个淳安县委书记是副厅级。
淳安县长，县委书记都是副厅级。
再后面的淳安县委书记黄海峰，也写得清清楚楚，黄海峰担任淳安县委书记之前
担任富阳市长已经明确写的副厅级，之后富阳市改叫富阳区
黄海峰是从富阳区长调任淳安县委书记的。

如果是这样，凌志峰简历就更清楚了。
2002年凌志峰第一次晋升正处级，担任淳安县组织部长。
当时的杭州市委书记王国平是张德江的大秘。除非再掰扯当时的杭州市长茅临生的派系。
茅临生会不会是习近平的人，没准儿是胡锦涛的人呢。
当时张德江刚从浙江离开不到一个月，习近平刚刚到浙江。

凌志峰第一次晋升副局级是在2009年担任淳安县长。
习近平在浙江干了4年半，习近平去了淳安7次，都没有把凌志峰提拔的成副局级。
习近平都不提拔，蔡奇会提拔吗？
凌志峰的副局级不是这个绍兴市委常委，而是淳安县长。
在夏宝龙担任浙江省委书记4年半的时间内，凌志峰一直在各种副局级的岗位平调
没有晋升正局级。
凌志峰完美的避开了习近平和夏宝龙，只是没有避开蔡奇而已。

这名网友说，
州提拔副县一般没问题，正县特别是县委书记都要省委组织部备案
一般地级市的县委书记都要报省委组织部备案。
杭州是副省级城市，凌志峰这个淳安县长是浙江省管干部。

既然凌志峰淳安县长是副局级是浙江省管干部。
当时浙江省委书记是赵洪祝，副书记吕祖善是省长，夏宝龙是专职副书记。
夏宝龙基本可以排除，如果当时夏宝龙担任省委副书记提拔凌志峰。
当上省委书记反而不提拔凌志峰正局级，这个怎么解释呢。
王华元可能是习近平派系的，当时被抓了。
王国平和赵洪祝的可能性最大，王国平当时是杭州市委书记。
斯鑫良当时的是组织部长。斯鑫良是什么派系我不知道也被抓了，斯鑫良从张德江担任省委书记期间担任组织部长，历任习近平，赵洪祝，三任省委书记。
陈敏尔当时是常务副省长，王辉忠这个应该是习近平派系的，当时市政法委书记，之后是宁波市委书记。当时的宁波市委书记是巴音朝鲁，李强当时是省委秘书长，
王贺文是浙江省军区司令，黄坤明当时是宣传部长，葛慧君是副省长。

凌志峰提拔淳安县长，第一次晋升副局级这一步
浙江省委书记是赵洪祝 (2007年3月 – 2012年11月)
浙江省长是吕祖善（2003年1月 – 2011年8月）
浙江省委副书记夏宝龙
组织部长斯鑫良
杭州市委书记是王国平 (2000年4月 – 2010年1月)
杭州市长是蔡奇 (2007年4月 – 2010年7月)

那么习近平不提拔，夏宝龙不提吧，单单蔡奇提拔的道理是什么
而且蔡奇从杭州市长升任浙江省组织部长，接替斯鑫良。
蔡奇担任组织部长期间凌志峰也没有晋升正局级。
从哪儿都看不出，凌志峰是蔡奇提拔的。

习近平一共去了7次淳安县2003年去了3次，2004年去了1次，2005年去了2次
2006年去了1次。
习近平去了这么多次淳安县，当时凌志峰就是淳安县组织部长，都没说提拔一次凌志峰。
认识肯定是认识，但是习近平亲自提拔的凌志峰，这是一个事实。

这名网友说，
什么五任书记的联络点，不就是去千岛湖吃喝玩乐吗？
这名网友说到点子上了。

千岛湖，也称为新安江水库，位于中国浙江省杭州市淳安县和建德市境内

习书记每次到淳安，就算有陪同任务，也挤时间了解淳安的工作情况，体察民意、倾听民声、为民解难。

这是谁说的呢？当时的淳安县委书记陈新华
我们看着都是高级黑，习近平去淳安是工作都是陪同，工作都是挤时间。
就是给习近平戴高帽，习近平天天睡大觉，还有时间工作呢。

我们看江泽民去过李鹏去过，朱镕基，王忠禹，张德江，王恩茂，
王恩茂这是习仲勋的铁杆马仔，杨汝岱是赵紫阳的铁杆马仔。

所以35岁正部级定律，凌志峰32岁担任淳安县组织部长。
这千岛湖就是一个度假村，土共的高层的度假村和北戴河也差不多。
谁知道凌志峰当时认识了谁。从2002年前来说。
有可能是江泽民派系的人，也有可能是胡温。

这里面还有一个哇哈哈和农夫山泉派系的线索
陈新华说：习书记第一次到淳安是2003年4月23日至24日。他考察了农夫山泉股份有限公司和淳安中学，到下姜村走村入户

这名网友说
大包，你再搞个投票，商界和娱乐界的派系保管有大把人喜欢听，比如良品铺子是武汉国资委、携程旅游、范冰冰陈道明景甜这些八卦，当一期噱头挺好
我的回复是，商人的派系不是那么明显。
除非和一名或者几名官员绑定了才比较容易分析。
江胡时代，商人可以脚踩两只船。
江胡也是独裁为什么中国经济能发展呢，到习近平这里就不行呢。
政治上的很多政策，是累积效果，延期效果。
冰冻三尺非一日之寒。
习近平天天这么瞎折腾，等到习近平都发现中国经济不行了，那就太晚了。

所以凌志峰是在赵洪祝任内晋升副局级的
车俊担任浙江省委书记，袁家军担任浙江省长期间第一次晋升正局级。
凌志峰在夏宝龙4年半的浙江省委书记任期之内，一直在副局级平调。
他的副局级是在夏宝龙的前任赵洪祝任内晋升的。
习近平本人去了7次淳安县千岛湖，都没有提拔过凌志峰。
凌志峰完美的跳过了习近平和夏宝龙
肯定不是习近平的人。

《解放军报》连续第二天批斗习近平，这篇《强化政治忠诚 永葆初心本色》的评论员文章，表面是给政治干部上忠诚课，实则暗藏杀招。这篇文章高举“忠诚”大旗，给习近平开除三大罪状：另立中央、搞小圈子、推崇肤浅庸俗的表忠文化。文章句句敲打，尤其以“对党忠诚不是抽象的，而是具体的；不是挂嘴上表态的，而是用行动践行的”为利刃，直戳“表忠过度、行动失真”的要害。明摆着就是在批评习近平的2442表忠文化。

罪状一：另立中央，凌驾党上

文章拎出红军时期张国焘另立“中央”、反对党中央北上的历史，朱德坚定维护中央，说“天下红军是一家”。这例子挑得太狠！这段就是冲着习近平去的，控诉习近平“另立中央”的罪状。表面拥护党中央，实则暗地搞“小山头”，试图凌驾于党的集体领导之上。
因为中共一共有三个党中央，江泽民，胡锦涛，习近平。
江泽民就是党中央，不过是退休的党中央，
胡锦涛就是党中央，不过是退休的党中央。
如果江泽民和胡锦涛都给同意习近平20大退休
那么习近平20大强行连任，就是
就是习近平这个党中央对抗，江泽民和胡锦涛两个退休的党中央。

文章强调“关键时刻的关键抉择”是检验忠诚的试金石，关键时刻就是20大的关键时刻

暗讽某人态度暧昧、立场模糊，“两个嘴巴说话、两张面孔做人”。这不就是在点党内两派的分裂吗？
我已经给分析好多遍，根据多个人事变动，证明2021年的北戴河会议真实存在
而且习近平一面假意答应江泽民和胡锦涛20大退休。
一面暗地筹划，霸王硬上弓，强行三连任。现在又玩陷了，真是个废物。
“两个嘴巴说话、两张面孔做人”
说的就是习近平
胡春华代表的“铸魂派”维护党中央的集体领导，而“蛀魂派”却想把权力集中在习近平手里，搞“个人中央”。胡春华借军报放话：党的领导是集体的，谁也别想另起炉灶！

罪状二：搞小圈子，破坏团结

文章提到“忠诚上一旦注了水、掺了假，复杂斗争和利益考验面前‘小我’就会压过‘大我’”，这话火药味浓。胡春华在背后策划，这就是在控诉四包子搞小圈子的罪状。表面喊着“忠诚”，实则忙着培植亲信、清除异己，在军队和党内拉帮结派，破坏党的团结。文章列举罗荣桓、萧华、甘泗淇等老一辈“铁心向党”的典范，暗讽某人忘了革命初心，把“忠诚”当工具，搞“小圈子”来巩固个人权力，只顾着自己终身连任。胡春华可能借此提醒党内同志：真正的忠诚是对党的信仰，不是围着习近平建“私人俱乐部”。这点直指两派博弈：“铸魂派”要团结全党，“蛀魂派”却在分裂党内，胡春华显然站在前者，借军报开炮。

习近平罪状三：推崇肤浅庸俗的表忠文化

文章抛出“对党忠诚不是抽象的，而是具体的；不是挂嘴上表态的，而是用行动践行的”，这句话被视为对“过度表忠”的精准狙击，批评就是2442。“忠诚核心”之类的口号喊得震天响，表态政治成了标配。
尤其是蔡奇，入脑入心入魂，庸俗的表忠文化
这句就是在控诉习近平推崇肤浅庸俗的表忠文化的罪状。光喊口号、表忠心，行动却偏离党的原则，搞形式主义那一套。文章强调“维护党指挥枪根本原则和制度”，像在暗示：真正的忠诚是落实党的集体领导，不是靠嘴上“表忠”堆砌个人权威。胡春华可能借此敲打：“蛀魂派”推的这套表忠文化，肤浅又虚伪，离“为人民服务”的初心十万八千里。两派分歧摆上台面：“铸魂派”要真忠诚，“蛀魂派”却在玩虚头巴脑的表态游戏。

开出的药方就是：连根拔起习近平在军队的势力

文章提到“固根与拔根的较量、铸魂与蛀魂的拉锯”，并要求政治干部“把错误思想根子拔除掉、把正确价值观念立起来”，这话火药味浓到爆，已经明说了党内两派博弈的你死我活。胡春华这段就是开出的药方：要把习近平在军队的势力连根拔起！“错误思想根子”指的就是习近平通过“忠诚”幌子，在军队培植的个人派系、亲信网络，搞乱了军队的政治生态。胡春华的“铸魂派”提出解决方案：彻底清除这些“蛀魂”势力，恢复军队对党的绝对忠诚。文章点名批评“关系学、厚黑学、官场术、潜规则”等“庸俗腐朽的政治文化”，就是要拔掉习近平靠这些手段在军队扎下的根基。药方很明确——“铸魂”：用党的信仰和集体领导重新武装军队；“拔根”：把习近平的私人势力连根铲除，确保枪杆子只听党指挥。这场“铸魂派”与“蛀魂派”的暗战，胡春华借军报亮出了“手术刀”。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

The military newspaper launched a full-scale attack on Xi Jinping, listing three major offenses and offering a remedy. The Special Service was compromised, Xi was disarmed, and who promoted Ling Zhifeng to deputy bureau-level? How many times did Xi Jinping secretly visit Qiandao Lake? The factions of Wahaha and Nongfu Spring.

Hello everyone,

This netizen said,

Da Bao, Ling Zhifeng was promoted to deputy department-level during Xia Baolong’s term, and he didn’t get re-elected as a member of the Central Committee in 19th National Congress. Could he not be part of Chen Yun’s faction?

My reply is that Ling Zhifeng’s deputy department-level promotion did not occur during Xia Baolong’s term.

In June 2009, 41-year-old Ling Zhifeng became Deputy Secretary of the CPC Chun’an County Committee and Acting County Head of the County People’s Government. He officially became County Head in January 2010. At that time, the Secretary of the Hangzhou Municipal Committee was Wang Guoping (April 2000 – January 2010), and the Mayor of Hangzhou was Cai Qi (April 2007 – July 2010). The then-Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee was Zhao Hongzhu (March 2007 – November 2012). The Governor of Zhejiang Province was Lü Zushan (January 2003 – August 2011).

In November 2011, 43-year-old Ling Zhifeng became the Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee in Hangzhou. The then-Secretary of the Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee was Huang Kunming (January 2010 – September 2013), and the Mayor of Hangzhou was Shao Zhanwei (July 2010 – March 2013).

In August 2014, 46-year-old Ling Zhifeng became a member of the Standing Committee of the Shaoxing Municipal Party Committee and Director of the Shaoxing Municipal Public Security Bureau. The then-Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee was Xia Baolong (December 2012 – April 2017), and the Governor of Zhejiang Province was Li Qiang (December 2012 – July 2016).

This netizen may have misunderstood, thinking that Ling Zhifeng’s first promotion to deputy provincial-level rank was as a member of the Shaoxing Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee and Director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau.

Actually, that’s not the case. The County Head of Chun’an was already at the deputy provincial-level rank.

Ling Zhifeng’s resume doesn’t clearly state this.

Let’s look at other Chun’an County Heads and County Party Secretaries.

Let’s look at this:

June 1997 – March 1998, 39-year-old Sun Jingmiao served as Deputy Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee and Acting County Head (Deputy Provincial-level).

It’s clearly stated that the County Head of Chun’an was already at the deputy provincial-level rank.

Because Hangzhou is a sub-provincial city, the district and county heads under Hangzhou are all at the deputy provincial-level rank.

Let’s look at another one, Zhu Dangqi, who succeeded Ling Zhifeng as Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee

September 2014 – October 2016, 48-year-old Zhu Dangqi served as Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee (Deputy Provincial-level).

Zhu Dangqi’s resume also clearly states that his position as Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee was at the deputy provincial-level rank.

The county magistrate and county party secretary of Chun’an County were both at the deputy provincial level.

The subsequent Chun’an County Party Secretary, Huang Haifeng, is also clearly stated. Before becoming the Chun’an County Party Secretary, Huang Haifeng served as the mayor of Fuyang City, a position explicitly stated as deputy provincial level. After Fuyang City was renamed Fuyang District, Huang Haifeng was transferred from the position of district head of Fuyang to become the Chun’an County Party Secretary.

If this is the case, Ling Zhifeng’s resume becomes even clearer.

In 2002, Ling Zhifeng was first promoted to the full county level, serving as the Organization Minister of Chun’an County.

Then, Wang Guoping, the Party Secretary of Hangzhou City, was Zhang Dejiang’s chief secretary. Unless we delve into the factional affiliation of then-Hangzhou Mayor Mao Linsheng.

Could Mao Linsheng be a Xi Jinping supporter, or perhaps a Hu Jintao supporter?

At that time, Zhang Dejiang had just left Zhejiang less than a month prior, and Xi Jinping had just arrived in Zhejiang.

Ling Zhifeng was first promoted to the deputy bureau level in 2009 when he became the Chun’an County Magistrate.

Xi Jinping served in Zhejiang for four and a half years, visiting Chun’an seven times, yet he never promoted Ling Zhifeng to deputy bureau-level.

If Xi Jinping didn’t promote him, would Cai Qi?

Ling Zhifeng’s deputy bureau-level position wasn’t as a member of the Shaoxing Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee, but as the county head of Chun’an.

During Xia Baolong’s four and a half years as Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary, Ling Zhifeng was transferred laterally through various deputy bureau-level positions, never being promoted to bureau-level.

Ling Zhifeng perfectly avoided Xi Jinping and Xia Baolong, only failing to avoid Cai Qi.

This netizen said that promoting a prefecture-level official to deputy county-level is generally not a problem, but promoting a county-level official, especially a county party secretary, requires filing with the provincial party committee’s organization department.

Generally, county party secretaries in prefecture-level cities need to be filed with the provincial party committee’s organization department.

Hangzhou is a sub-provincial city, and Ling Zhifeng, as the county head of Chun’an, is a cadre managed by Zhejiang Province.

Since Ling Zhifeng, as the county head of Chun’an, is a deputy bureau-level cadre managed by Zhejiang Province,

At that time, the Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary was Zhao Hongzhu, the deputy secretary Lü Zushan was the governor, and Xia Baolong was the full-time deputy secretary. Xia Baolong can be largely ruled out, especially if he promoted Ling Zhifeng when he was Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee.

How can we explain the fact that he didn’t promote Ling Zhifeng to the rank of Director-General after becoming Provincial Party Secretary?

Wang Huayuan was likely from Xi Jinping’s faction and was arrested at the time.

Wang Guoping and Zhao Hongzhu are the most likely candidates. Wang Guoping was the Party Secretary of Hangzhou at the time.

Si Xinliang was the Organization Minister at the time. I don’t know which faction Si Xinliang belonged to, but he was also arrested. Si Xinliang served as Organization Minister from the time Zhang Dejiang was Provincial Party Secretary, and then under Xi Jinping and Zhao Hongzhu, three different Provincial Party Secretaries.

Chen Min’er was the Executive Vice Governor at the time. Wang Huizhong was likely from Xi Jinping’s faction; he was the Secretary of the Municipal Political and Legal Committee at the time, and later the Party Secretary of Ningbo. The Party Secretary of Ningbo at the time was Bayanqolu. Li Qiang was the Secretary-General of the Provincial Party Committee.

Wang Hewen was the Commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region. Huang Kunming was the Propaganda Minister, and Ge Huijun was the Vice Governor.

Ling Zhifeng was promoted to County Head of Chun’an County, his first promotion to deputy bureau-level.

The Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee was Zhao Hongzhu (March 2007 – November 2012).
The Governor of Zhejiang Province was Lü Zushan (January 2003 – August 2011).
The Deputy Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee was Xia Baolong.
The Organization Minister was Si Xinliang.
The Secretary of the Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee was Wang Guoping (April 2000 – January 2010).
The Mayor of Hangzhou was Cai Qi (April 2007 – July 2010).

So why didn’t Xi Jinping promote him, or Xia Baolong, but only Cai Qi?

Furthermore, Cai Qi was promoted from Mayor of Hangzhou to Organization Minister of Zhejiang Province, succeeding Si Xinliang.

During Cai Qi’s tenure as Organization Minister, Ling Zhifeng was not promoted to bureau-level.

There’s no indication from any of this that Ling Zhifeng was promoted by Cai Qi.

Xi Jinping visited Chun’an County a total of seven times: three times in 2003, once in 2004, twice in 2005, and once in 2006.

Despite Xi Jinping’s numerous visits to Chun’an County, during which time Ling Zhifeng was the Organization Minister, he was never promoted.

They certainly knew each other, but it’s a fact that Xi Jinping personally promoted Ling Zhifeng.

This netizen said, “What ‘liaison point for five secretaries’? Isn’t it just about eating, drinking, and having fun at Qiandao Lake?”

This netizen hit the nail on the head.

Qiandao Lake, also known as Xin’anjiang Reservoir, is located in Chun’an County and Jiande City, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, China.

Every time Secretary Xi visited Chun’an, even with accompanying duties, he would still make time to understand the work situation in Chun’an, observe public opinion, listen to the people’s voices, and solve their problems.

Who said this? Chen Xinhua, the then Secretary of the Chun’an County Party Committee.

We all see this as a subtle dig; Xi Jinping’s visits to Chun’an were all work-related, always involving accompanying officials, and he always squeezed in time for work.

This is just flattering Xi Jinping, implying he sleeps all day and still has time to work.

We see Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Wang Zhongyu, Zhang Dejiang, and Wang Enmao all visited.

Wang Enmao was a staunch henchman of Xi Zhongxun, and Yang Rudai was a staunch henchman of Zhao Ziyang.

Therefore, the “35-year-old ministerial-level rule” applies; Ling Zhifeng became the Organization Minister of Chun’an County at 32.

Qiandao Lake is just a resort, similar to Beidaihe for high-ranking CCP officials.

Who knows who Ling Zhifeng knew back then? Before 2002.

It could have been someone from Jiang Zemin’s faction, or it could have been Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.

There’s also a clue about the Wahaha and Nongfu Spring factions involved.

Chen Xinhua said: Secretary Xi’s first visit to Chun’an was from April 23rd to 24th, 2003. He visited Nongfu Spring Co., Ltd. and Chun’an Middle School, and went door-to-door in Xiajiang Village.

This netizen said, “Da Bao, why don’t you hold a poll? The factions in the business and entertainment circles will definitely be popular. For example, gossip about Liangpin Shop being affiliated with the Wuhan State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Ctrip, Fan Bingbing, Chen Daoming, and Jing Tian—that would be great for a gimmick! ”

My reply was that business factions aren’t that obvious.

It’s easier to analyze them unless they’re tied to one or more officials.

During the Jiang-Hu era, businessmen could have their cake and eat it too.

Jiang and Hu were also dictators, so why did China’s economy develop? Why isn’t it developing under Xi Jinping?

Many political policies have cumulative effects, delayed effects.

Rome wasn’t built in a day.

If Xi Jinping keeps making such fuss, by the time he realizes the Chinese economy is failing, it will be too late.

Therefore, Ling Zhifeng was promoted to deputy bureau-level during Zhao Hongzhu’s tenure. Che Jun was promoted to bureau-level for the first time during his tenure as Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary, and Yuan Jiajun as Zhejiang Governor.

During Xia Baolong’s four and a half years as Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary, Ling Zhifeng was consistently transferred to the deputy bureau-level lateral transfer.

His deputy bureau-level promotion occurred during the tenure of Xia Baolong’s predecessor, Zhao Hongzhu.

Xi Jinping himself visited Qiandao Lake in Chun’an County seven times but did not promote Ling Zhifeng.

Ling Zhifeng perfectly bypassed both Xi Jinping and Xia Baolong.

He is definitely not one of Xi Jinping’s people.

The PLA Daily criticized Xi Jinping for the second consecutive day. This commentary, titled “Strengthening Political Loyalty and Maintaining the Original Aspiration,” ostensibly a lesson in loyalty for political cadres, actually contains a hidden weapon. The article, waving the banner of “loyalty,” accuses Xi Jinping of three major crimes: establishing a separate central government, forming cliques, and promoting a superficial and vulgar culture of loyalty. The article is scathing, especially using the phrase “Loyalty to the Party is not abstract, but concrete; not just lip service, but practiced through action” as a sharp weapon to directly attack the crux of “excessive expressions of loyalty and distorted actions.” It’s clearly a critique of Xi Jinping’s “2442” culture of expressing loyalty.

Criminal Charge One: Establishing a Separate Central Committee and Placing It Above the Party

The article cites the history of Zhang Guotao establishing a separate “Central Committee” during the Red Army period and opposing the Central Committee’s northward march, while Zhu De firmly defended the Central Committee, saying “All Red Army soldiers are one family.” This example is extremely harsh! This section is aimed directly at Xi Jinping, accusing him of “establishing a separate Central Committee.” He outwardly supports the Central Committee but secretly forms “factions,” attempting to rise above the collective leadership of the Party.

Because the CCP has three Central Committees: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.

Jiang Zemin is the Central Committee, but a retired one.

Hu Jintao is the Central Committee, but a retired one.

If both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao agree to Xi Jinping’s retirement at the 20th Party Congress, then Xi Jinping’s forced re-election at the 20th Party Congress would mean that the Xi Jinping Party Central Committee is confronting two retired Party Central Committees, one led by Jiang Zemin and the other by Hu Jintao.

The article emphasizes that “critical choices at critical moments” are the touchstone for testing loyalty, and the critical moment is the critical moment of the 20th Party Congress.

It subtly criticizes someone’s ambiguous attitude and unclear stance, saying “two mouths, two faces.” Isn’t this pointing to the split between the two factions within the Party?

I have analyzed this many times, based on multiple personnel changes, proving that the Beidaihe meeting in 2021 really happened.

Moreover, Xi Jinping pretended to agree to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s retirement at the 20th Party Congress,

while secretly planning to force a three-term re-election. Now he’s backfired; he’s truly useless.

“Two mouths, two faces”—this perfectly describes Xi Jinping. The “soul-building faction,” represented by Hu Chunhua, upholds the collective leadership of the Party Central Committee, while the “soul-corrupting faction” wants to concentrate power in Xi Jinping’s hands, creating a “personal central government.” Hu Chunhua, through the military newspaper, declared: Party leadership is collective; no one can start their own faction!

Criminal Charge Two: Forming Cliques and Undermining Unity

The article stated, “Once loyalty is watered down or adulterated, in the face of complex struggles and tests of interest, the ‘small self’ will override the ‘greater self’,” a statement laced with veiled hostility. Hu Chunhua, behind the scenes, is essentially accusing Xi Jinping and his cronies of forming cliques. While outwardly proclaiming “loyalty,” they are actually busy cultivating cronies and eliminating dissidents, forming factions within the military and the Party, and undermining Party unity. The article cites exemplary figures like Luo Ronghuan, Xiao Hua, and Gan Siqi, all older generation members known for their unwavering loyalty to the Party, subtly criticizing someone for forgetting their revolutionary ideals, using “loyalty” as a tool to consolidate personal power through cliques, and prioritizing their own lifelong re-election. Hu Chunhua may be using this to remind Party members: true loyalty is faith in the Party, not building a “private club” around Xi Jinping. This directly points to the power struggle between two factions: the “soul-building faction” seeks to unite the entire Party, while the “soul-corrupting faction” aims to divide the Party. Hu Chunhua clearly sides with the former, using the military newspaper to launch his attack.

Xi Jinping’s Third Offense: Promoting a Superficial and Vulgar Culture of Loyalty

The article states, “Loyalty to the Party is not abstract, but concrete; it is not just lip service, but practiced through action.” This statement is seen as a precise attack on “excessive displays of loyalty,” a criticism that is essentially 2442. Slogans like “loyalty to the core” are shouted loudly, and political pronouncements have become standard practice.

Especially Cai Qi, this vulgar culture of loyalty has become deeply ingrained.

This statement is an accusation against Xi Jinping for promoting a superficial and vulgar culture of loyalty. He merely shouts slogans and expresses loyalty, but his actions deviate from Party principles, engaging in formalism. The article emphasizes “upholding the fundamental principle and system of the Party commanding the gun,” implying that true loyalty is about implementing the Party’s collective leadership, not about building personal authority through verbal “loyalty.” Hu Chunhua may be using this opportunity to criticize the “corrupt faction,” stating that their culture of loyalty is superficial and hypocritical, a far cry from the original intention of “serving the people.” The two factions’ differences are now out in the open: the “soul-building faction” demands genuine loyalty, while the “corrupt faction” is playing a game of empty rhetoric.

The prescribed remedy is: uproot Xi Jinping’s influence in the military.

The article mentions “the struggle between consolidating and uprooting, the tug-of-war between forging and corrupting,” and demands that political cadres “eradicate the roots of erroneous thinking and establish correct values.” This statement is extremely inflammatory, clearly indicating the life-or-death struggle between the two factions within the Party. Hu Chunhua’s statement is the prescribed remedy: uproot Xi Jinping’s influence in the military! The “roots of erroneous thinking” refer to the personal factions and crony networks that Xi Jinping has cultivated in the military under the guise of “loyalty,” disrupting the military’s political ecosystem. Hu Chunhua’s “soul-building faction” proposed a solution: thoroughly eliminate these “parasites” and restore the army’s absolute loyalty to the Party. The article specifically criticizes “vulgar and decadent political culture” such as “relationship-building, Machiavellianism, bureaucratic maneuvering, and unspoken rules,” aiming to uproot the foundation Xi Jinping has built within the military through these methods. The prescription is clear—”soul-building”: rearming the army with the Party’s faith and collective leadership; “rooting out”: eradicating Xi Jinping’s personal power base to ensure the gun obeys only the Party’s command. In this covert battle between the “soul-building faction” and the “parasites,” Hu Chunhua used the military newspaper to wield his “scalpel.”

Okay, thank you everyone.