温家宝北戴河会议提出6点要求。美专家再发声，习近平失去对中国的控制。广西书记陈刚将接替尹力担任北京市委书记

 

温家宝北戴河会议提出6点要求。美专家再发声，习近平失去对中国的控制。广西书记陈刚将接替尹力担任北京市委书记

大家好，
前美国高级外交官斯莱顿再度在纽约邮报发表文章。
标题是习近平正在失去对中国的控制——川普可以给他一记重击
我们看一下具体的内容。

习近平权力动摇的迹象
习近平自2012年起担任中国最高领导人，掌控中共和军队的权威一度无可撼动，但2025年7月，其权力基础出现明显裂痕。格雷戈里·W·斯莱顿在2025年7月16日文章中指出，习近平对中共和军队的控制正逐渐瓦解，而美国总统唐纳德·川普可能通过经济和外交施压加速其下台。

文章强调，习近平缺席2025年巴西金砖国家峰会，打破其利用峰会宣传国际影响力的惯例，引发外界猜测。彭丽媛两个多月没有公开出现，
不过就在斯莱顿文章发表的时代，时隔两个多月，彭丽媛首次出现。

斯莱顿文章继续说，习近平亲信马兴瑞被调离新疆党委书记职务，显示高层人事动荡。近期多位习近平盟友被免职或神秘死亡，类似苏联解体前政治局的衰退迹象，暗示习近平政权可能面临崩溃。经济困境与党内压力中国经济面临严峻挑战：疲软增长，2024年GDP预计仅4.5%、巨额资本外流，2024年外流超3000亿美元、高失业率，青年失业率超20%，及不可持续的公共和私人债务，债务/GDP比超300%。这些问题在全国引发社会不安，甚至公开抗议，如2022年白纸运动的余波。文章指出，如果中共高层认为国家无法承受进一步动荡，可能正策划习近平的平稳下台，以避免混乱的权力斗争。

北戴河会议是“党内博弈最后窗口”，四中全会或决定习近平命运。习近平试图抵制下台压力，但党内改革派和元老（如温家宝）可能推动集体领导模式，类似邓小平取代毛泽东后的改革。

文章认为，川普的关税政策已将中国经济推入困境，削弱习近平的权力基础。
川普的关税战导致2024年中美元贸易额下降12%，中国出口企业利润受挫。
文章建议川普继续施压，具体措施包括：支持对俄制裁法案：签署参议院审议的对俄制裁法案，对购买俄罗斯能源的国家（如中国）征收100%“二次关税”，迫使中国在支持普京或重新融入全球经济间抉择。
打击中国间谍活动：加强反制中国在美及其盟国的工业间谍行为，遏制中国武器技术抄袭（如歼-20与F-35的相似性）。
欢迎新领导层：川普应明确表示支持和平外交的中国新领导人，鼓励集体领导和改革。

这些措施可能加剧中国经济压力，促使党内加速习近平下台，为川普访华创造更有利的谈判环境。贝森特9月访华可能促成稀土、农产品等领域的临时协议，但川普或以“重大让步”为访华条件。

这名网友说，
最近好像在开北戴河，包下不下就这一哆嗦了。。。
我的回复是这都折腾一年，难道还能最后就黄了吗？

现在进程都已经90%了，最后就临门一脚了。
军队的下面的就不说了，加上三中全会之前拿下的李尚福，再加上苗华何卫东。
现在军委除了习近平就剩下，张又侠，刘振立和张升民。
就他们三个人在习近平就百分百没戏。
习近平只要重掌大权，那么是不是要把张又侠，刘振立，张升民都抓了。
平反李尚福，苗华，何卫东，让他们三个人出来主持中央军委的工作。
现在军委就剩下张又侠，刘振立，张升民三个人了。
习近平只要重掌大权，那么习近平把他们三个人抓了，中央军委不能只剩下，习近平
一个光杆司令啊。

这名网友说，
海外某某开始有计划发布习近平重新夺取大权的节目了，估计有人放风一些什么了。中共政局动态波谲云诡。
我的回复是，放个淡风，他们什么都不知道，本来就是瞎猜。
最近三个月抓了何卫东，贬黜了李干杰和马兴瑞。这是过去几十年没有过的事情
从八九六四之后，三十多年没有过的事情。
三中全会之后提拔了200多名副部级以上的官员。
抓了100多名官员，去年抓了60多个，今年抓了30多个。
抓的基本都是习近平的人。
提拔的就没有习近平的人。
一线的副部级官员也就1000个左右。
等于习近平的实力从三中全会之前的60%到65%
降到现在的20%到30%。

折腾这一圈下来，现在不就等最后官宣了。
最近让包蜜提气的新闻不就是习近平主持了一个中央城市工作会议。
陈一新没抓，陈希也没抓。
但是军队习近平没戏，公安部也开始换副部长。
习近平还有什么呀，光凭陈一新和陈希两个人好使吗？

2025年7月，北戴河会议在河北秦皇岛召开，中共元老、现任领导人及关键派系齐聚，讨论四中全会议程及“十五五”规划。习近平在二十届三中全会（2024年7月15-18日）后丧失大权，7月1-7日“隐身”，仅在6月30日政治局会议后短暂现身，7月15日会见阿尔巴尼斯和拉夫罗夫。习近平“被迫妥协以换取留任”，四中全会可能决定其领导地位。在这一敏感时刻，前国务院总理温家宝（2003-2013年在任）以元老身份出席北戴河会议，向习近平提出六点要求，震动会场。

温家宝以改革派、亲民形象著称，卸任后低调但影响力犹存。他在北戴河会议闭门会上直面习近平，提出六点要求，语气沉稳却掷地有声。

第一点要求习近平辞去中共中央总书记、中央军委主席、国家主席等职务，理由是“党内团结需新气象，国际环境需新面孔”。
其他五点要求如下：辞去总书记、中央军委主席、国家主席等职务：温家宝认为，习近平长期集权导致党内分歧加剧，经济、外交压力增大，需通过辞职为四中全会注入新活力，稳定党内局势，应对川普访华等外交挑战。
推动政治体制改革，重启党内民主：温家宝建议恢复党内选举竞争机制，扩大政治局和中央委员的决策权，限制总书记“一言堂”，以回应党内对集权的批评，类似其2012年两会倡导的“政改”理念。
释放被打压的改革派干部：温家宝要求重新评估近年落马的团派及改革派官员（如胡春华、李克强旧部），为其平反或恢复职务，弥合派系裂痕，增强党内团结。
开放经济政策，减轻民企压力：温家宝指出，近年强监管和高税收重创民企，建议四中全会推出减税、放宽市场准入等措施，重振经济信心，呼应其2008年应对金融危机的宽松政策。
改善外交环境，缓和中美关系：温家宝建议调整对美强硬立场，在贝森特9月访华及川普10月底访华中展现灵活性，争取贸易战突破，降低国际孤立风险。
加强社会治理，回应民意诉求：温家宝强调，近年社会不满（如白纸运动）源于民生问题，建议四中全会聚焦教育、医疗、住房改革，重建政府公信力，延续其“亲民总理”风格。

温家宝的六点要求并非个人冲动，而是改革派元老的集体诉求。北戴河会议是“党内博弈的最后窗口”，元老们希望通过四中全会调整权力格局。温家宝第一点要求习近平辞职，直指其权力集中导致的经济停滞（如2024年GDP增长仅4.5%）、外交孤立（如美欧制裁加剧）及党内分裂（如团派边缘化）。第二点政改诉求呼应其2010年“深圳讲话”，倡导党内民主以制衡集权。第三点释放改革派干部意在恢复团派影响力，平衡习近平派系。第四点经济改革针对民企困境（如2024年民企投资下降15%），延续温家宝2003-2013年的市场化倾向。第五点改善中美关系与贝森特、川普访华直接相关，意在为中国争取谈判空间。第六点社会治理回应民生危机，巩固中共执政合法性。

这些政治局委员都知道习近平下台，陈吉宁接连见了江绵恒，胡海峰和吴邦国的儿子吴磊。

无独有偶，北京市委书记尹力也有动作。
尹力去滑跪谁呢？
7月16日上午，市委书记尹力围绕“加快建设北京国际科技创新中心，发展壮大战略性新兴产业”到北京经济技术开发区调研。
这个新闻有什么特殊的呢
这不尹力考察一个下属单位吗？

这是我前几天发的推特。
1997年，江泽民访美探望恩师顾毓琇。
江泽民当时志得意满。
现在顾毓琇，王大中的一名清华学生是正局级官员，47岁。
有可能被提拔为副部级，甚至正部级。

世事难料。
本来没戏，因为习近平下台。
所以江泽民的马仔也能被提拔了。

我没有说这名47岁的官员是谁。但是没想到
我发了推特之后，尹力去看
尹力这不是去北京经济开发区吗？

我说的这名江泽民的老师顾毓琇，王大中的学生是谁啊
就是
北京经济技术开发区工委书记孔磊。
我刚说第二天尹力就去了，我真没想到啊。

所以
这名网友说的好，
共产党最拿手的本事就是造假，当面一套背后一套，台面上的事都是表演，只有人事上的安排才能体现其实质

官方媒体的报道都是假的
尹力来到经开区
就这些官方的文章，如果不解释，
怎么可能知道尹力的真实目的是看江泽民老师的学生。

这是今年2月11日，尹力和北京市长殷勇去开发区。当时孔磊在现场。

刚刚尹力这次去没有拍到孔磊的照片

那么我是怎么知道这个梗的，怎么知道孔磊这个人呢？
怎么知道北京市委书记去经开区的真实目的呢？

尹力是7月16日去的。
就在头一天。
7月15日，自治区党委书记、自治区人大常委会主任陈刚带队到北京经济技术开发区学习调研，学习借鉴北京经济技术开发区科技创新、产业创新、人工智能发展等方面的先进理念和成功经验，深化交流合作，携手共同发展。
从照片上看这个人就是
北京经济技术开发区工委书记孔磊。

这共产党没有一句真话。
自治区党委常委、自治区常务副主席许永锞，自治区党委常委、秘书长周异决，北京经济技术开发区主要负责人，以及自治区大数据发展局、科技厅和驻京办主要负责同志等参加。

连孔磊的名字都不敢写，真是地下党。

2009年9月1日之前，孔磊任共青团北京市朝阳区委书记。当时的朝阳区委书记是陈刚 （2006年11月 – 2012年7月）

孔磊任北京市朝阳区委香河园街道工委副书记、办事处主任，

孔磊任北京市朝阳区委八里庄街道工委副书记、办事处主任。

2013年02月，35岁的孔磊任北京汽车集团有限公司副总经理。

我们看陈刚从朝阳区离开之后，孔磊也离开了。
陈刚从朝阳区委书记升任北京市委常委之后，很快离开北京去贵阳了。
所以孔磊也离开朝阳区了。

也就是说，北京开发区书记孔磊当年在朝阳区就是陈刚的小马仔。
陈刚头一天去了，北京市委书记尹力第二天就去了，这还能再明显一点吗？

陈刚四中全会肯定要进政治局，21大可能入常。
陈刚入常的话，孔磊肯定要提拔副部级。
一共7个政治局常委，前面三个人总书记，总理，人大委员长可以提拔正部级
后面4个常委可以提拔副部级。简单粗暴的这么划分。

尹力是一个政治局委员，他能不知道这些事情吗？
没准儿陈刚就是要接替尹力担任北京市委书记。
陈刚是江泽民的扬州老乡，我都怀疑陈刚是江泽民家的亲戚。
这个孔磊就是江泽民老师的学生，都是一家人，都是江泽民的人。
当年陈刚为什么提拔孔磊呢？

陈刚当过雄安新区的书记，就说习近平，
那不是没干一年就赶走了吗？

孔磊是清华大学第35届学生会主席

孔磊任期内发生了震惊全国的清华学生刘海洋伤熊事件，该事件在社会上造成了极坏的影响，严重损害了清华大学的声誉。那段时间，孔磊临危不乱，四处奔走斡旋，协调各方面关系，密切配合王大中校长等校领导，密切配合校党委和校团委，开展大规模的公关活动。他组织全校师生开展捐款和签名活动，并发表了《致北京动物园的一封信》。这场危机最终得以化解，孔磊功不可没。

王大中是中科院的，江绵恒吗。
都是江泽民的人。王大中是江泽民老师顾毓琇的学生
孔磊是王大中的学生，陈刚是江泽民的扬州老乡，提拔的孔磊。
逻辑都闭环
陈刚去的第二天尹力也去了。
还能再怎么明显点

共产党的宣传都是假的，只有人事安排才是真的。
这什么什么消息都是扯淡，我就不相信他们比陈吉宁和尹力还有消息。
陈吉宁和尹力都去滑跪谁了。
好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Wen Jiabao put forward six demands at the Beidaihe meeting. US expert speaks out again: Xi Jinping is losing control of China. Guangxi Party Secretary Chen Gang will replace Yin Li as Beijing Party Secretary.

Hello everyone, former senior US diplomat Gregory W. Slayton has published another article in the New York Post.

The title is “Xi Jinping is Losing Control of China—Trump Could Give Him a Heavy Blow.”

Let’s look at the details.

Signs of Xi Jinping’s Shaking Power

Since 2012, Xi Jinping has served as China’s top leader, and his authority over the CCP and the military was once unshakeable. However, by July 2025, a clear crack has appeared in his power base. In his article dated July 16, 2025, Gregory W. Slayton points out that Xi Jinping’s control over the CCP and the military is gradually crumbling, and US President Donald Trump may accelerate his downfall through economic and diplomatic pressure.

The article emphasizes that Xi Jinping’s absence from the 2025 BRICS summit in Brazil breaks his usual practice of using summits to promote international influence, sparking speculation. Peng Liyuan had not made a public appearance for over two months.

However, around the time Slayton’s article was published, Peng Liyuan made her first public appearance in over two months.

Slayton’s article continued, stating that the removal of Xi Jinping’s close confidant Ma Xingrui from his position as Xinjiang Party Secretary indicated high-level personnel turmoil. The recent dismissals or mysterious deaths of several Xi Jinping allies, resembling signs of decline in the Politburo before the collapse of the Soviet Union, suggested that the Xi Jinping regime might be facing collapse. Economic difficulties and internal party pressure: China’s economy faces severe challenges: sluggish growth, with GDP projected to grow by only 4.5% in 2024; massive capital outflows, exceeding $300 billion in 2024; high unemployment, with youth unemployment exceeding 20%; and unsustainable public and private debt, with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 300%. These problems have triggered social unrest and even public protests across the country, such as the aftermath of the 2022 “blank slate” movement. The article pointed out that if the CCP leadership believes the country cannot withstand further turmoil, it may be planning a smooth step down for Xi Jinping to avoid a chaotic power struggle.

The Beidaihe meeting is the “last window for intra-party power struggles,” and the Fourth Plenary Session may determine Xi Jinping’s fate. Xi is attempting to resist pressure to step down, but reformists and veterans within the party (such as Wen Jiabao) may push for a collective leadership model, similar to the reforms implemented after Deng Xiaoping replaced Mao Zedong.

The article argues that Trump’s tariff policies have pushed the Chinese economy into crisis, weakening Xi Jinping’s power base.

Trump’s tariff war has led to a 12% decline in Sino-US trade in 2024, impacting the profits of Chinese export companies.

The article recommends that Trump continue to exert pressure, with specific measures including: supporting sanctions against Russia: signing the Senate-pending sanctions bill against Russia, imposing a 100% “secondary tariff” on countries purchasing Russian energy (such as China), forcing China to choose between supporting Putin or reintegrating into the global economy.

Combating Chinese espionage: strengthening countermeasures against Chinese industrial espionage in the US and its allies, and curbing Chinese weapons technology copying (such as the similarities between the J-20 and F-35).

Welcoming a new leadership: Trump should clearly express support for a new Chinese leader with a peaceful diplomacy, encouraging collective leadership and reform. These measures could exacerbate economic pressure in China, prompting a faster step down for Xi Jinping within the Party and creating a more favorable negotiating environment for Trump’s visit to China. Bessant’s September visit to China may lead to temporary agreements in areas such as rare earths and agricultural products, but Trump may make “significant concessions” a condition for his visit.

This netizen said, “It seems like they’re holding a meeting at Beidaihe recently; whether they can secure the land or not depends on this one hurdle…”

My reply was, “It’s been going on for a year already, how could it possibly fall through in the end?”

The process is already 90% complete; it’s just one step away.

Not to mention the lower levels of the military, plus Li Shangfu, who was removed before the Third Plenum, plus Miao Hua and He Weidong.

Now, besides Xi Jinping, the Central Military Commission only has Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin left.

With just these three, Xi Jinping has a 100% chance of losing power.

If Xi Jinping regains power, will he arrest Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin?

Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, and He Weidong have been exonerated, and they have been reinstated to lead the Central Military Commission.

Now the Central Military Commission only has Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin left.

If Xi Jinping regains power, he will arrest these three. The Central Military Commission cannot be left with only Xi Jinping as a lone commander.

This netizen said that “someone overseas is planning to release a program about Xi Jinping regaining power,” probably because someone is leaking information.  The dynamics of the CCP’s political situation are unpredictable.

My reply is that they are just releasing a rumor; they know nothing and are just speculating.

In the past three months, He Weidong was arrested, and Li Ganjie and Ma Xingrui were demoted. This is unprecedented in the past few decades, and has not happened in over 30 years since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

Since the Third Plenary Session, more than 200 officials at the vice-ministerial level or above have been promoted.

More than 100 officials have been arrested; more than 60 were arrested last year, and more than 30 this year.

Those arrested were almost all Xi Jinping’s people.

Those promoted were none of Xi Jinping’s people.

There are only about 1,000 vice-ministerial level officials at the front line.

This means Xi Jinping’s power has dropped from 60%-65% before the Third Plenum to 20%-30% now.

After all this turmoil, now we’re just waiting for the official announcement.

The recent news that boosted the morale of Xi Jinping’s supporters was that he chaired a central urban work conference.

Chen Yixin wasn’t arrested, nor was Chen Xi.

But Xi Jinping has no chance in the military, and the Ministry of Public Security has started replacing its vice ministers.

What does Xi Jinping have left? Are Chen Yixin and Chen Xi enough?

In July 2025, the Beidaihe Conference will be held in Qinhuangdao, Hebei Province, bringing together CCP elders, current leaders, and key factions to discuss the agenda of the Fourth Plenum and the 15th Five-Year Plan. Following the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee (July 15-18, 2024), Xi Jinping lost power and remained largely out of the public eye from July 1-7, only briefly appearing after the Politburo meeting on June 30, and meeting with Albanese and Lavrov on July 15. Xi was “forced to compromise in exchange for remaining in office,” and the Fourth Plenary Session may determine his leadership position. At this sensitive moment, former Premier Wen Jiabao (in office from 2003-2013), as a senior figure, attended the Beidaihe meeting and presented Xi with six demands, shaking the meeting hall.

Wen Jiabao was known for his reformist and populist image. Even after leaving office, he maintained a low profile but retained considerable influence. In the closed-door meeting at Beidaihe, he directly confronted Xi Jinping, presenting six demands in a calm yet forceful tone.

The first demand was that Xi resign from his positions as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the People’s Republic of China, arguing that “a new atmosphere is needed for party unity, and a new face is needed in the international environment.”

The other five demands are as follows: Resign from the positions of General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the People’s Republic of China: Wen Jiabao believes that Xi Jinping’s long-term centralization of power has exacerbated internal party divisions and increased economic and diplomatic pressures. His resignation is necessary to inject new vitality into the Fourth Plenary Session, stabilize the party situation, and address diplomatic challenges such as Trump’s visit to China.

Promote political system reform and restart intra-party democracy: Wen Jiabao suggests restoring the intra-party election competition mechanism, expanding the decision-making power of the Politburo and Central Committee members, and limiting the General Secretary’s “one-man rule,” in response to criticism within the party regarding centralization of power, similar to his “political reform” concept advocated at the 2012 Two Sessions.

Release suppressed reformist cadres: Wen Jiabao demands a reassessment of recently dismissed Youth League and reformist officials (such as former subordinates of Hu Chunhua and Li Keqiang), to exonerate or reinstate them, bridging factional rifts and strengthening party unity.

Open economic policies to alleviate pressure on private enterprises: Wen Jiabao pointed out that recent years’ stringent regulations and high taxes have severely damaged private enterprises. He suggested that the Fourth Plenary Session introduce measures such as tax cuts and relaxed market access to revitalize economic confidence, echoing his loose monetary policies in response to the 2008 financial crisis.

Improve the diplomatic environment and ease Sino-US relations: Wen Jiabao suggested adjusting the hardline stance towards the US, showing flexibility during Bessant’s September visit to China and Trump’s visit at the end of October, striving for a breakthrough in the trade war, and reducing the risk of international isolation.

Strengthen social governance and respond to public demands: Wen Jiabao emphasized that recent social discontent (such as the “blank paper movement”) stems from livelihood issues. He suggested that the Fourth Plenary Session focus on education, healthcare, and housing reforms to rebuild government credibility and continue his “people-friendly premier” style.

Wen Jiabao’s six demands were not personal impulsiveness, but rather the collective demands of reformist elders. The Beidaihe meeting was the “last window for intra-party power struggles,” and the elders hoped to adjust the power structure through the Fourth Plenary Session. Wen Jiabao’s first point was demanding Xi Jinping’s resignation, directly addressing the economic stagnation (e.g., a mere 4.5% GDP growth in 2024), diplomatic isolation (e.g., escalating US and EU sanctions), and internal party divisions (e.g., the marginalization of the Youth League faction) caused by Xi’s centralized power. His second point, demanding political reform, echoed his 2010 “Shenzhen speech,” advocating intra-party democracy to counterbalance centralized power. His third point, releasing reformist cadres, aimed to restore the Youth League faction’s influence and balance Xi Jinping’s faction. His fourth point, economic reforms targeting the plight of private enterprises (e.g., a 15% decline in private enterprise investment in 2024), continued Wen Jiabao’s market-oriented tendencies from 2003-2013. His fifth point, improving Sino-US relations, was directly related to the visits to China by Bessant and Trump, aiming to gain negotiating leverage for China. His sixth point, social governance, addressed the livelihood crisis and consolidated the CCP’s legitimacy.

These Politburo members all knew Xi Jinping was stepping down. Chen Jining met with Jiang Mianheng, Hu Haifeng, and Wu Bangguo’s son, Wu Lei.

Coincidentally, Beijing Party Secretary Yin Li also made moves.

Whom did Yin Li kneel before? On the morning of July 16th, Yin Li, the Party Secretary of Beijing, conducted research at the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area, focusing on “accelerating the construction of Beijing as an international science and technology innovation center and developing and strengthening strategic emerging industries.”

What’s so special about this news?
Isn’t this just Yin Li inspecting a subordinate unit?

This is a tweet I posted a few days ago.

In 1997, Jiang Zemin visited the United States to see his mentor, Gu Yuxiu.

Jiang Zemin was very pleased with himself at the time.

Now, Gu Yuxiu, a Tsinghua University student of Wang Dazhong, is a bureau-level official, 47 years old.

He might be promoted to vice-ministerial level, or even ministerial level.

Things are unpredictable.

Originally, it seemed unlikely, because Xi Jinping stepped down.

So even Jiang Zemin’s cronies can be promoted.

I didn’t say who this 47-year-old official is. But unexpectedly,

after I posted the tweet, Yin Li went to see it.

Isn’t Yin Li going to the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area?

The person I’m referring to as Gu Yuxiu, Jiang Zemin’s teacher, and Wang Dazhong’s student, is Kong Lei, the Party Secretary of the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area.

I just mentioned that Yin Li went there the very next day; I really didn’t expect that.

So, this netizen is right. The Communist Party’s greatest skill is fabrication; they say one thing to your face and another behind your back. What’s done on the surface is all an act; only personnel arrangements reveal the true nature.

Official media reports are all fake. Yin Li’s visit to the Development Area—without explanation from these official articles, how could anyone know that Yin Li’s real purpose was to see Jiang Zemin’s teacher’s student?

This is from February 11th of this year, when Yin Li and Beijing Mayor Yin Yong visited the Development Area. Kong Lei was present at the time.

Yin Li didn’t get a photo of Kong Lei this time.

So how did I know about this? How did I know who Kong Lei is?

How did I know the real purpose of the Beijing Party Secretary’s visit to the Development Area?

Yin Li went on July 16th.

Just the day before.

On July 15th, Chen Gang, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Autonomous Region, led a delegation to the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area (BDA) for study and research. The delegation aimed to learn from BDA’s advanced concepts and successful experiences in technological innovation, industrial innovation, and artificial intelligence development, deepen exchanges and cooperation, and work together for common development.

The person in the photo appears to be Kong Lei, Secretary of the Party Working Committee of the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area.

This Communist Party doesn’t tell the truth.

Xu Yongke, Standing Committee Member of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region and Executive Vice Chairman of the Autonomous Region; Zhou Yijue, Standing Committee Member of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region and Secretary-General; principal leaders of the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area; and principal leaders of the Autonomous Region’s Big Data Development Bureau, Science and Technology Department, and Beijing Office participated.

They don’t even dare to write Kong Lei’s name; they’re truly underground party members.

Before September 1, 2009, Kong Lei served as Secretary of the Communist Youth League Committee of Chaoyang District, Beijing. At the time, Chen Gang was the Party Secretary of Chaoyang District (November 2006 – July 2012).

Kong Lei served as Deputy Secretary of the Party Working Committee and Director of the Office of Xiangheyuan Subdistrict, Chaoyang District Committee, Beijing.

Kong Lei also served as Deputy Secretary of the Party Working Committee and Director of the Office of Balizhuang Subdistrict, Chaoyang District Committee, Beijing.

In February 2013, at the age of 35, Kong Lei became Vice President of Beijing Automotive Group Co., Ltd.

We see that after Chen Gang left Chaoyang District, Kong Lei also left.

After Chen Gang was promoted from Party Secretary of Chaoyang District to a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Committee, he quickly left Beijing for Guiyang.

Therefore, Kong Lei also left Chaoyang District.

In other words, Kong Lei, the Party Secretary of the Beijing Development Zone, was Chen Gang’s henchman in Chaoyang District.

Chen Gang went there one day, and Yin Li, the Party Secretary of Beijing Municipality, went the next day. Could it be any more obvious?

Chen Gang will definitely enter the Politburo at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, and may enter the Standing Committee at the 21st CPC National Congress.

If Chen Gang enters the Standing Committee, Kong Lei will definitely be promoted to vice-ministerial level. There are seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee. The first three—the General Secretary, the Premier, and the Chairman of the National People’s Congress—can be promoted to ministerial level.

The last four members can be promoted to vice-ministerial level. This is a simple and straightforward division.

Yin Li is a Politburo member; how could he not know these things?

Perhaps Chen Gang is going to succeed Yin Li as the Beijing Municipal Party Secretary.

Chen Gang is from Yangzhou, a fellow townsman of Jiang Zemin; I even suspect he’s a relative of Jiang Zemin.

Kong Lei is a student of Jiang Zemin’s teacher; they’re all family, all Jiang Zemin’s people.

Why did Chen Gang promote Kong Lei back then?

Chen Gang served as the Party Secretary of Xiong’an New Area, and then there was Xi Jinping,

but he was ousted after less than a year, wasn’t he?

Kong Lei was the 35th Student Union Chairman of Tsinghua University.

During Kong Lei’s tenure, the shocking incident of Tsinghua student Liu Haiyang injuring a bear occurred, causing extremely negative social impact and severely damaging Tsinghua University’s reputation. During that period, Kong Lei remained calm and composed, tirelessly working to mediate and coordinate relationships with various parties. He closely cooperated with Principal Wang Dazhong and other school leaders, as well as the school’s Party Committee and Youth League Committee, to launch a large-scale public relations campaign. He organized a fundraising and signature drive among the entire faculty and students and published “A Letter to the Beijing Zoo.” The crisis was ultimately resolved, and Kong Lei’s contribution was indispensable.

Wang Dazhong is from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is he Jiang Mianheng?

They are both Jiang Zemin’s people. Wang Dazhong was a student of Gu Yuxiu, Jiang Zemin’s teacher.

Kong Lei was Wang Dazhong’s student, and Chen Gang was a fellow townsman of Jiang Zemin from Yangzhou, who promoted Kong Lei.

The logic is closed.

The day after Chen Gang went, Yin Li also went.

How obvious could it be?

The Communist Party’s propaganda is all fake; only personnel arrangements are real.

These so-called news reports are all nonsense. I don’t believe they have more inside information than Chen Jining and Yin Li.

Who did Chen Jining and Yin Li kneel before?

Okay, thank you everyone.