解放军清除习近平流毒，这回来个狠角色，苗华还没判刑，何卫东还没官宣，就已经迫不及待地清除苗华和何卫东流毒了。为什么不是张又侠干的？彭丽媛只能上三版？

 

解放军清除习近平流毒，这回来个狠角色，苗华还没判刑，何卫东还没官宣，就已经迫不及待地清除苗华和何卫东流毒了。为什么不是张又侠干的？彭丽媛只能上三版？

大家好，这名网友说，
中央军委印发《关于大力弘扬优良传统、全面肃清流毒影响 重塑政治干部形象威信的若干规定》
清除习近平余毒？
连名字都不给了全文一个xi
这名网友说，
大包看一下今天的新闻《中央军委：全面肃清流毒影响》，这个新闻很有意思，解放军报的评论也很有意思，通篇无主语，文章狗屁不通，感觉要么就是被人修改的面目全非，要么就是很多话想说又不敢明说。流毒流毒，谁的流毒

《军委规定》和《评论员文章》的标题“牢固立起政治干部形象威信”明确指向政工干部，“肃清流毒影响”都不敢点名主语。苗华和何卫东，均为政工干部很可能为“流毒”的主要对象。苗华2017-2024年作为中央军委政治工作部主任，负责全军政治工作，直接关联《军委规定》的主题。政治干部，这个指向很明显，苗华2024年11月因严重违纪被停职，2025年4月被罢免全国人大代表职务，6月被免去中央军委委员职务，表明苗华政治生涯终结。《军委规定》2025年7月发布紧随2025年6月苗华免职，暗示“流毒”主要针对苗华在政治工作部的违纪影响，如形式主义、官僚主义、不公用人或腐败。
苗华刚刚被免去中央军委委员职务，这不到一个月就开始清除苗华，
这回真的来一个狠角色。
《评论员文章》强调“清除形形色色损害形象威信的负面因素”，可能暗指苗华的管理失职导致政治干部形象受损。苗华的落马暴露政治工作系统深层问题，与《军委规定》的“重塑形象威信”目标一致，是“流毒”的首要对象。

何卫东2023年起作为中央军委副主席主管政工，负责监督政治工作部等机构，地位高于苗华。何卫东2025年3月起失踪4个月，大概率被抓但没有官宣，表明可能涉及违纪。何卫东失职或违纪行为可能包括没能有效监督苗华，导致政治工作部问题长期未被发现，使他成为“流毒”的次要对象。何卫东失踪早于苗华免职，可能为《军委规定》起草的背景，暗示“流毒”涵盖何卫东影响。
但是何卫东应该次要流毒，毕竟苗华主管政工工作。苗华管了7年的政治工作部。何卫东刚分管两年多，而且何卫东主要是一个军事干部。
中国军网的《评论员文章》对习近平只字未提，完全没有把习近平放在眼里。苗华和何卫东的落马共同构成政治工作系统的双重危机，动摇习近平的“政治建军”根基，《军委规定》旨在肃清两人的“流毒”。

李尚福和魏凤和作为前国防部长，涉及火箭军和装备发展部腐败，但不是政工干部，与《军委规定》的“政治干部”主题不符，排除为“流毒”主要对象。尽管火箭军案为军内反腐背景，但不直接相关。

《军委政治干部形象威信规定》强调“公道正派用人”，结合胡春华2022年二十大没有进政治局，反映习近平对团派的清洗，引发军内对不公用人的不满。苗华和何卫东的落马强化这一诉求，与《中办规定》的背景相呼应，暗示胡春华可能主导两份文件，挑战习近平的用人政策。

胡春华作为团派代表（2012-2022年政治局委员），曾被视为接班人选，2012-2017年任广东省委书记，2018-2023年任副总理，负责农业和扶贫，延续胡锦涛的“以人为本”理念。2022年中共二十大，胡春华未进入政治局，标志团派（胡锦涛、李克强、汪洋等）被习近平彻底边缘化。习近平通过2018年修宪和二十大连任打破邓小平“隔代指定接班”惯例，安插亲信掌控政治局。胡春华的落选被解读为习近平对温和派和制度化治理的否定，可能引发军内对“唯忠诚论”的争议，导致用人偏颇，忽视能力和公平。

这件事情要和2025年6月5日中办发的《党组讨论和决定党员处分规定》
联系起来看，因为都是一个人干的。
中办发的《党组讨论和决定党员处分规定》
直接删除了2018年11月版本的19大精神。
汪洋19大入常了，汪洋为什么要删除19大精神？这不是自我打脸吗？谁19大没有入常？
就是胡春华。
有人说19大精神时过境迁了，那么就应该加上20大精神。
或者吹捧习近平的其他话，加没加呢，没加啊。
20大精神，胡春华更不让加了，20大胡春华都没有进入政治局。

所以今天军委发的政治干部清除流毒的规定还是胡春华发的人。
那么习近平怎么就没有公道正派用人，那不就是20大没有让胡春华进政治局吗？
张又侠19大当上军委副主席，20大连任军委副主席。
张又侠怎么会觉得是没有公道正派用人呢，
只有胡春华才会这样认为啊。

《军委规定》的“公道正派用人”直指习近平清洗团派导致的不公。苗华作为政治工作部主任，负责全军干部选拔，苗华2024-2025年因违纪落马，如果苗华涉及不公用人（比如任人唯亲、压制异见干部），可能被视为习近平用人政策的缩影。何卫东作为政工主管被抓，可能因未能纠正政治工作部的用人偏差，强化不公争议。政治工作系统与全军干部直接接触，苗华何卫东两人的被查可能引发基层对习近平用人的广泛质疑。《军委规定》的“全军监督”和“优良传统”措辞与胡锦涛的“党内民主”、胡春华的“清廉为官”理念呼应，反映军内对团派公平治理的怀念，试图纠正“唯忠诚论”导致的偏颇。

《中办规定》（2025年6月5日）删除2018年版的“十九大精神”，未提及“二十大精神”或习近平相关表述，引发关注。十九大（2017年）汪洋进入政治局常委，但胡春华未入常，仅留任政治局委员；二十大（2022年）胡春华连政治局席位都失去。删除“十九大精神”可能由胡春华主导，反映其对十九大的不满（未入常），而未加入“二十大精神”或习近平吹捧话语，进一步暗示对二十大清洗团派的抗议。汪洋作为团派成员，入常后未明显反对习近平，删除“十九大精神”对其无直接打击意义，反而可能为胡春华的立场服务。《中办规定》和《军委规定》均强调纪律和公平，时间接近（2025年6月和7月），可能由胡春华推动，挑战习近平的用人政策。

张又侠（中央军委副主席，2017年十九大于军委副主席，2022年二十大连任）。胡春华未进政治局，经历与张又侠形成鲜明对比。《军委规定》的“公道正派用人”更可能反映胡春华对习近平清洗团派的不满，而非张又侠的立场。张又侠在军委的稳固地位使其无理由质疑习近平的用人政策，而胡春华的边缘化使其有动机推动《军委规定》和《中办规定》，通过“公道正派用人”批评习近平的“唯忠诚论”。

结合苗华、何卫东的落马、“公道正派用人”的团派关联、《中办规定》的背景和《评论员文章》未提习近平，以下论证“习近平下台”的可能性：

中国军网《评论员文章》通篇没有提“习近平”或“习主席”，与《军委规定》的“贯彻习主席决策部署”形成对比，在中共高度控制的宣传体系中异常，可能暗示宣传系统有意淡化习近平的个人崇拜。苗华和何卫东的作为习近平马仔，被查。
现在习近平还没有官宣下台，军队已经开始清除苗华流毒，何卫东流毒。
胡春华有点迫不及待。
胡春华真的是个狠人，如果胡锦涛磨磨唧唧。
苗华刚开除军委委员一个月，就已经清楚了苗华流毒了。

苗华（政治工作部主任，2025年6月免职）和何卫东（军委副主席，2025年3月起失踪）两任构成中国军队政治工作系统的双重危机。苗华的违纪（如形式主义、不公用人）表明政治工作部管理失职，何卫东的失踪（被抓）表明其未能有效监督系统问题。两人作为习近平铁杆马仔，被查可能被解读为习近平用人失察或治理失败，动摇习近平军内控制力，为反对派系提供理由。
清除苗华何卫东流毒，不可能是习近平，
清除苗华何卫东流毒，就等于清除习近平流毒。
胡锦涛这么墨迹，张又侠又没有觉得用人不公的理由。只有胡春华了。

《军委规定》的“公道正派用人”直指习近平清洗团派（如胡春华2022年没进政治局）导致的不公争议。苗华、何卫东的被查强化这一批评，反映军内对“唯忠诚论”的强烈不满。《中办规定》删除“十九大精神”，却闭口不提提“二十大精神”或习近平，表明胡春华主导。
这份规定别的就不用分析，一个有19大精神，一个没有被删除了。
这是事实
这是中共中央办公厅发的文件，也是一个事实

《中办规定》和《军委规定》对公平、纪律的相似对诉求可能由胡春华推动，挑战习近平的用人政策。张又侠的连任表明其认同习近平的用人，而胡春华的边缘化使其有动机通过两份文件表达不满。

“流毒”指向苗华和何卫东，表明政治工作系统危机，直接质疑习近平的反腐成效和治理能力。
如果说没有主语，那只能说要清除习近平流毒。

《军委规定》的“全军监督”可能挑战其集权模式，暗示军内基层对团派公平理念的支持。
中国军网的派论文章，说明习近平对军队完全插不上手。

这名网友说，
最近彭丽媛的露面大包怎么看？
我的回复是
我怎么看？
我拿过人民日报一看，彭丽媛在第三版呢
彭丽媛出席2025年“鼓岭缘”中美青少年联谊活动
得亏这是人民日报，我还以为是英国的太阳报呢
彭丽媛在第三版，没有发照片，我怎么看
我看不了啊。都是文字啊
第三版都是照片啊，都是文字你让我怎么看啊，

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

The PLA is purging Xi Jinping’s poison, and this time a ruthless player has arrived. Miao Hua hasn’t even been sentenced, and He Weidong hasn’t been officially announced, yet they’re already eagerly purging their influence. Why wasn’t it Zhang Youxia who did it? Why can Peng Liyuan only appear on the third page?

Hello everyone, this netizen said, “The Central Military Commission issued ‘Several Provisions on Vigorously Promoting Fine Traditions, Comprehensively Eliminating the Poisonous Influence, and Reshaping the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres.'”

Purging Xi Jinping’s remaining poison?

They didn’t even give his name; the whole text only mentions “xi.”

This netizen said, “Take a look at today’s news, ‘Central Military Commission: Comprehensively Eliminating the Poisonous Influence.’ This news is very interesting, and the PLA Daily’s commentary is also very interesting. It lacks a subject throughout; the article is utter nonsense. It feels either completely altered, or there are many things they want to say but dare not say openly. Poisonous influence, whose poisonous influence? ”

The titles of the “Central Military Commission Provisions” and the “Commentary Article,” “Firmly Establishing the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres,” clearly target political work cadres. “Eliminating the poisonous influence” doesn’t even dare to name a subject. Miao Hua and He Weidong, both political work cadres, are likely to be key targets of the “poisonous influence.” Miao Hua, as Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC) from 2017 to 2024, was responsible for the political work of the entire military, directly related to the themes of the “CMC Regulations.” The target is clearly a political cadre. Miao Hua was suspended from his post in November 2024 for serious disciplinary violations, removed from his position as a National People’s Congress representative in April 2025, and removed from his position as a member of the CMC in June 2025, indicating the end of his political career. The “CMC Regulations” were released in July 2025, followed by Miao Hua’s removal in June 2025, suggesting that the “poisonous influence” mainly targets the disciplinary impact of Miao Hua’s violations within the Political Work Department, such as formalism, bureaucracy, unfair personnel appointments, or corruption.

Miao Hua was just removed from his position as a member of the CMC, and the purge of him began less than a month later.

This time, a truly ruthless character has emerged.

The commentary article emphasizes “eliminating all kinds of negative factors that damage image and prestige,” possibly alluding to Miao Hua’s mismanagement leading to damage to the image of political cadres. Miao Hua’s downfall exposed deep-seated problems within the political work system, aligning with the “rebuilding image and prestige” goal of the Central Military Commission’s regulations, making him a primary target of the “poisonous influence.”

He Weidong, as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2023, was in charge of political work and oversaw institutions such as the Political Work Department, holding a higher position than Miao Hua. He Weidong disappeared for four months starting in March 2025, and while his arrest is highly probable but not officially announced, it suggests possible disciplinary violations. He Weidong’s dereliction of duty or disciplinary violations may include failing to effectively supervise Miao Hua, leading to the long-term undetected problems within the Political Work Department, making him a secondary target of the “poisonous influence.” He Weidong’s disappearance predates Miao Hua’s dismissal, possibly indicating the background of the drafting of the Central Military Commission’s regulations, suggesting that the “poisonous influence” includes He Weidong’s impact.

However, He Weidong’s influence should be considered secondary, given that Miao Hua was in charge of political work for seven years. He Weidong had only been in charge for a little over two years, and He Weidong is primarily a military officer.

The commentary article on China Military Online made no mention of Xi Jinping, completely disregarding him. The downfall of Miao Hua and He Weidong constitutes a dual crisis within the political work system, shaking the foundations of Xi Jinping’s “political building of the military.” The “Regulations of the Central Military Commission” aim to purge the “poisonous influence” of these two.

Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, as former defense ministers, were involved in corruption within the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department, but were not political cadres, thus not fitting the “political cadre” theme of the “Regulations of the Central Military Commission,” and are excluded as key targets of the “poisonous influence.” Although the Rocket Force case is part of the military’s anti-corruption campaign, it is not directly related.

The “Regulations on the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres of the Central Military Commission” emphasizes “fair and upright personnel selection.” Combined with Hu Chunhua’s exclusion from the Politburo at the 2022 National Congress, this reflects Xi Jinping’s purge of the Youth League faction, sparking discontent within the military regarding unfair personnel selection. The downfall of Miao Hua and He Weidong reinforces this demand, echoing the background of the “Regulations of the General Office of the Central Committee,” suggesting that Hu Chunhua may have spearheaded both documents, challenging Xi Jinping’s personnel policies.

Hu Chunhua, a representative of the Youth League faction (a member of the Politburo from 2012 to 2022), was once considered a successor. He served as Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee from 2012 to 2017 and as Vice Premier from 2018 to 2023, responsible for agriculture and poverty alleviation, continuing Hu Jintao’s “people-centered” philosophy. At the 2022 CPC National Congress, Hu Chunhua failed to enter the Politburo, marking the complete marginalization of the Youth League faction (Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, etc.) by Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping broke with Deng Xiaoping’s practice of “designating successors across generations” through the 2018 constitutional amendment and his re-election at the 20th CPC National Congress, placing his cronies in control of the Politburo. Hu Chunhua’s failure to be elected is interpreted as Xi Jinping’s rejection of moderates and institutionalized governance, potentially triggering controversy within the military regarding “loyalty above all else,” leading to biased personnel appointments and neglect of ability and fairness.

This matter should be viewed in conjunction with the “Regulations on Party Group Discussion and Decision on Disciplinary Actions Against Party Members” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee on June 5, 2025, because both were carried out by the same person. The General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued the “Regulations on Party Group Discussion and Decision-Making of Disciplinary Actions Against Party Members,” which directly deleted the November 2018 version of the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress.

Wang Yang entered the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 19th CPC National Congress. Why did he delete the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress? Isn’t this a self-contradiction? Who didn’t enter the Standing Committee at the 19th CPC National Congress?

It was Hu Chunhua.

Some say the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress is outdated, so the spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress should be added.

Or other statements praising Xi Jinping should be added. Were they added? No.

Hu Chunhua was even less allowed to be included in the spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress; he didn’t even enter the Politburo at the 20th CPC National Congress.

So today, the regulations issued by the Central Military Commission to purge the pernicious influence of political cadres were issued by Hu Chunhua.

Then how can Xi Jinping not be fair and impartial in his personnel appointments? Isn’t it because he didn’t let Hu Chunhua enter the Politburo at the 20th CPC National Congress?

Zhang Youxia became Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the 19th CPC National Congress and was re-elected Vice Chairman at the 20th CPC National Congress.

How could Zhang Youxia believe there was a lack of fairness and impartiality in personnel selection? Only Hu Chunhua would think so.

The “fair and impartial personnel selection” clause in the Central Military Commission Regulations directly addresses the injustices caused by Xi Jinping’s purge of the Youth League faction. Miao Hua, as the director of the Political Work Department, was responsible for the selection of cadres across the entire army. Miao Hua was dismissed for disciplinary violations in 2024-2025. If Miao Hua was involved in unfair personnel selection (such as nepotism or suppression of dissent), it could be seen as a microcosm of Xi Jinping’s personnel policies. He Weidong, as the head of political work, was arrested, possibly because he failed to correct the personnel selection biases within the Political Work Department, thus intensifying the controversy surrounding unfairness. The political work system has direct contact with cadres throughout the army, and the investigations of Miao Hua and He Weidong could trigger widespread questioning of Xi Jinping’s personnel selection at the grassroots level. The wording of “army-wide supervision” and “fine tradition” in the Central Military Commission Regulations echoes Hu Jintao’s “intra-party democracy” and Hu Chunhua’s “clean and honest official conduct” ideals, reflecting a longing within the military for fair governance of the Youth League faction and an attempt to correct the biases caused by the “loyalty-only” approach.

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee’s regulations (June 5, 2025) removed the “spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress” from the 2018 version, and made no mention of the “spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress” or any related statements by Xi Jinping, drawing attention. At the 19th CPC National Congress (2017), Wang Yang entered the Politburo Standing Committee, but Hu Chunhua did not, remaining only a member of the Politburo; at the 20th CPC National Congress (2022), Hu Chunhua lost even his Politburo seat. The removal of the “spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress” may have been spearheaded by Hu Chunhua, reflecting his dissatisfaction with the 19th CPC National Congress (due to his failure to enter the Standing Committee), while the absence of the “spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress” or Xi Jinping’s praise further suggests a protest against the purge of the Youth League faction at the 20th CPC National Congress. As a member of the Youth League faction, Wang Yang did not explicitly oppose Xi Jinping after entering the Standing Committee; therefore, the removal of the “spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress” has no direct impact on him, and may instead serve Hu Chunhua’s position. Both the General Office of the CPC Central Committee’s regulations and the Central Military Commission’s regulations emphasize discipline and fairness, and their timing (June and July 2025) suggests that Hu Chunhua may have been driving this move, challenging Xi Jinping’s personnel policies.

Zhang Youxia (Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, elected Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, and re-elected at the 20th National Congress in 2022). Hu Chunhua’s failure to enter the Politburo contrasts sharply with Zhang Youxia’s experience. The “fair and impartial personnel selection” clause in the “Regulations of the Central Military Commission” is more likely to reflect Hu Chunhua’s dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping’s purge of the Youth League faction, rather than Zhang Youxia’s stance. Zhang Youxia’s stable position in the Central Military Commission leaves him with no reason to question Xi Jinping’s personnel policies, while Hu Chunhua’s marginalization gives him an incentive to push for the “Regulations of the Central Military Commission” and the “Regulations of the General Office of the Central Committee,” using the “fair and impartial personnel selection” clause to criticize Xi Jinping’s “loyalty-only” approach.

Considering the downfall of Miao Hua and He Weidong, the Youth League faction’s connection to the “fair and upright personnel selection” policy, the background of the Central Committee’s regulations, and the fact that the commentator’s article did not mention Xi Jinping, the following arguments support the possibility of Xi Jinping stepping down:

The commentator’s article on the China Military Network made no mention of “Xi Jinping” or “Chairman Xi,” contrasting with the Central Military Commission’s regulations which state “implementing Chairman Xi’s decisions and deployments.” This is unusual within the CCP’s highly controlled propaganda system and may suggest that the propaganda system is intentionally downplaying Xi Jinping’s personality cult. Miao Hua and He Weidong, as Xi Jinping’s henchmen, are under investigation.

Even before Xi Jinping has officially announced his resignation, the military has already begun purging the influence of Miao Hua and He Weidong.

Hu Chunhua seems impatient.

Hu Chunhua is truly ruthless; if Hu Jintao had hesitated…

Miao Hua was dismissed from the Central Military Commission just one month ago, and the military has already cleared out Miao Hua’s influence.

Miao Hua (Director of the Political Work Department, dismissed in June 2025) and He Weidong (Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, missing since March 2025) represent a dual crisis for the political work system of the Chinese military. Miao Hua’s disciplinary violations (such as formalism and unfair personnel appointments) indicate mismanagement within the Political Work Department, while He Weidong’s disappearance (and subsequent arrest) suggests a failure to effectively oversee systemic problems. As staunch supporters of Xi Jinping, their investigations could be interpreted as Xi Jinping’s oversight in personnel selection or governance failures, potentially undermining his control within the military and providing grounds for opposition factions.

Purge the pernicious influence of Miao Hua and He Weidong cannot be Xi Jinping’s doing;

Purgeing the pernicious influence of Miao Hua and He Weidong is tantamount to purging the pernicious influence of Xi Jinping himself.

Hu Jintao’s procrastination and Zhang Youxia’s lack of justification for perceived unfair personnel appointments leave only Hu Chunhua.

The “fair and impartial personnel appointments” clause in the Central Military Commission’s regulations directly addresses the controversy surrounding the unfairness stemming from Xi Jinping’s purge of the Youth League faction (such as Hu Chunhua’s exclusion from the Politburo in 2022). The investigations of Miao Hua and He Weidong reinforce this criticism, reflecting strong dissatisfaction within the military regarding the “loyalty-only” mentality. The deletion of the “spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress” from the General Office’s regulations, while remaining silent on the “spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress” or Xi Jinping himself, indicates Hu Chunhua’s leadership.

This regulation needs no further analysis; one includes the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress, while the other was not deleted.

This is a fact.

This is a document issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, also a fact.

The similarities in fairness and discipline between the General Office’s regulations and the Central Military Commission’s regulations suggest that Hu Chunhua may have been driving the demand, challenging Xi Jinping’s personnel policies. Zhang Youxia’s re-election indicates his agreement with Xi Jinping’s personnel choices, while Hu Chunhua’s marginalization provides him with an incentive to express his dissatisfaction through these two documents.

The “poisonous influence” directed at Miao Hua and He Weidong indicates a crisis in the political work system, directly questioning Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts and governance capabilities.

If there is no subject, then it can only be said that the “poisonous influence” of Xi Jinping needs to be eliminated.

The “military-wide supervision” in the Central Military Commission’s regulations may challenge its centralized model, implying support within the military’s grassroots for the Youth League faction’s fairness ideals.

An opinion piece on the China Military website demonstrates that Xi Jinping has absolutely no control over the military.

This netizen asked, “What do you think of Peng Liyuan’s recent public appearances?”

My reply was, “How can I think about it?”

I looked at the People’s Daily, and Peng Liyuan was on page three: “Peng Liyuan Attends 2025 ‘Gulingyuan’ China-US Youth Friendship Activity.”

Thank goodness this is the People’s Daily; I thought it was the British tabloid, The Sun.

Peng Liyuan is on page three, but there’s no photo. How can I read it?

I can’t read it. It’s all text.

Page three is all photos; it’s all text. How am I supposed to read it?

Okay, thank you everyone.