美国派神秘部队参与倒习行动。普京力救干儿子习。越南纳投名状，配合美国倒习
美国派神秘部队参与倒习行动。普京力救干儿子习。越南纳投名状，配合美国倒习
大家好，
这名网友说，
苏林上位我举个不是很恰当的类比：12年周永康发动政变上位，胡锦涛退休软禁起来，开除温家宝、习近平、李克强的一切职务，其他人清洗一大波，下面的各种职务提拔江派的人顶上
力度确实有点大
我的回复是这件事情要重视起来，不是那么简单的事情。
打个比方说越南前国家主席武文赏。
2024年3月20日，武文赏因涉嫌违反党规，越共中央委员会接受他辞去国家主席、政治局委员以及中央委员等职务。2024年11月，越共中央政治局确认武文赏违反党纪党规，但因其患病，并未给予处分。2025年7月19日，他被解除党内一切职务。
也就是说越南前国家主席武文赏去年已经被拿下了，现在是2025年7月已经1年4个月。
也就是说，越共总书记苏林为什么选择在这个时间点一下拿下四名重量级高官
解除前总理阮春福、前国家主席武文赏、前国会主席王庭惠、前书记处书记黎明慨的党内职务。对应中国政坛，称相当于第一副总理丁薛祥、国家主席习近平、政协主席王沪宁、书记处书记蔡奇
这么大的力度，这么震撼人心，越共总书记的目的是什么？当然是大清洗巩固权力。
主要还是从越南国内的政治考虑，但是为什么早不开除，晚不开除偏偏选在这个时间节点。
就是这个越南国家主席武文赏去年3月就已经被拿下了，这都已经1年多了，为什么早不开除武文赏的一切党内职务，为什么不在6月？为什么不在8月，为什么偏偏选在7月19号呢，原因是什么？
为什么美国财政部长贝森特一说8月初中国要召开秘密会议，为什么越南一下子就搞出这么大动静，一下子开除4名政治局常委级别的一切党内职务，这是不是越南在和美国打配合，越南在吓唬谁？为什么越南能够拿到美国的关税优惠条件，除了经济因素，政治上越南到底给美国纳了什么投名状。
我们把这个事情综合起来看呢，美国和越南已经深度卷入中国倒习派的运动之中。
另外一头也要综合起来看，普京也是在力挺习近平。
一头是美国加越南，另外一头就是俄罗斯加上白俄罗斯。
2025年4月初，美国政府突然宣布将对越南出口商品加征高达46%的“对等关税”，理由是越南对美贸易顺差已突破1230亿美元，成为美国第三大逆差来源国。此举引发越南政府高度警觉，迅速启动外交应对机制。
- 4月4日：越共中央总书记苏林与美国总统川普通话，呼吁美方给予越南商品“同等待遇”，并建议扩大美企在越南的投资布局。
- 4月5日至6日：越南副总理率团赴美磋商，提出一揽子合作方案，包括采购波音飞机、LNG能源、农产品等美国产品，总额高达900亿美元。
经过三轮密集谈判，美越最终于7月3日达成贸易协议，内容如下：
一是，对越南商品关税，从原定46%下调至统一20%
二是，对转运商品关税，加征40%惩罚性关税，针对第三国商品经越南转口
三是，美国商品进入越南实施零关税，越南市场全面开放
首先，越南对美国零关税，完全就是象征性意义。好多国家把美国当二傻子呢，说是我们对美国零关税，换取美国也对我们零关税。
关键这些国家的消费市场规模，和美国消费市场不可同日而语。都是零关税的话，当然是市场规模小的国家占便宜。
真当美国是二傻子呢，还跟美国对等零关税呢，关键是你们那个市场规模，能跟美国对等吗，这不是不要脸。
如果一个国家的市场规模跟美国对等再说跟美国对等零关税的事情，不然就是想占美国的便宜。
越南能够率先拿到20%的关税也是很优惠的条件。因为美国对铁杆盟友英国也是10%的关税，也就是说10%是起步价，所有的国家都要至少加征10%的关税。
等于越南只是被额外加征了10%关税而已。
越南的制造业竞争力已经非常强，尤其在纺织、电子组装、鞋帽等领域，堪称“第二世界工厂”。中国叫做世界工厂，越南也可以叫做世界工厂。越南现在在纺织、电子组装、鞋帽这几个领域的竞争力，比中国只强不弱。越南好多工厂只不过是，中国为了逃避关税把工厂搬到越南而已。
说白了，什么世界工厂，没有什么核心的竞争力，最核心的竞争力就是价格优势。所谓中国的供应链优势，不能说中国没有优势，但是果链三巨头——蓝思科技、立讯精密和歌尔股份 ，说搬也搬了。中国就没明白中国优势来自于哪里。
中国的优势来自于美国的背书，美国翻脸了，中国还有什么优势。
越南加征20%的关税，除了基础的，所有国家都要加征的10%，越南只被额外加征了10%。
这10%你不能说没有影响。
对于越南这样一个制造强国来说，额外10%的关税影响有限，不足以伤筋动骨，反而可能激发其产业升级和出口结构调整。
中国之前不也是被美国加征了综合税率19%的关税。那中国就不做美国的外贸生意了吗？
这个世界上只有赔本的生意没人做，只要挣钱，中国不跟美国做生意，想跟美国做生意的国家排着队呢？
当然关税主要是经济因素，我们不去说经济因素。
我们就是研究，越南能够拿到美好关税优惠的政治因素。
越南的战略算盘就是，经济换政治，政治换安全
- 越南深知自己在中美博弈中的地缘价值，尤其在南海、供应链、制造业等方面。
- 越南通过政治清洗和对美开放市场，向美国展示“合作诚意”，以换取关税优惠和战略庇护。
- 这不是简单的经济协议，而是一次深度的地缘政治交易。
我们看时间线
6月3日， 章家敦转述川普总统的话说，川普担心习近平丧失大权
7月3日，美越最终于达成贸易协议。这个20%的税率就是优惠。过两天看看美国给别的国家加多少关税就知道了。
做外贸讲究不就是所谓的比较优势，只要比别的国家关税低就占便宜。
7月15日，美国财政部长贝森特公开表示，中国将在8月初召开一次“conclave”（密室会议），暗示可能涉及领导层更替。
7月16日，美国前外交官斯莱顿在纽约邮报发表文章习近平正在失去对中国的掌控，川普应该给习一记重拳
7月19日，越南集中解除四名重量级高官党内职务，震撼人心，完全可能是四中全会的预演。
越共为什么这么做，这是巧合还是在跟美国打配合。或者是越南为什么选择这个时间节点这么做。就是越南凭什么拿到美国的优惠关税呢？没跟美国纳投名状，难道优惠关税是白给的吗？斯莱顿在美国财政部长贝森特说中国秘密会议的第二天是川普应该推习近平下台。
川普到底是应该呢，还是已经在推习近平下台呢？
其实还有好多事件
我们把美国和越南的表演加起来，就会发现，越南在配合美国演出。
越南在配合美国向中国施压。
世界没有事情是白来的，越南怎么拿到美国的优惠关税。
越南在这个时间线拿下四名政治局常委，就是表演给中国看的。
配合美国演出。
这名网友说，
有消息说，俄乌8月要大决战，双方现在都在边界调集军队，如果是真的，那是不是从侧面证明，普京知道习近平要下去了，趁习近平要下去之前，还能获得中国的大量援助的时候，跟乌克兰来场决战，否则俄军更加虚弱
这名网友说，
王毅前几天在欧洲公开声称，中国不能接受俄爹在乌克兰战场失利。引起一片哗然。可能不外乎两个原因：一是知道自己仕途到了终点，所以往中国外交的裤裆里最后拉一泡大的。二是彻底摆烂，再不愿当里外不是人的牛马，逼迫新中央让他退休。。。还是那句话，不杀一两个大家伙，这帮坏种就不懂什么叫害怕，抓住机会就使坏。
我们俄罗斯白俄罗斯这面的事情加起来
就是普京在救他的干儿子习近平。
2025年6月2日，卢卡申科访华探监习近平。当时习近平已经被关了两个礼拜
2025年6月2日，央视罕见公布东风5参数。对俄罗斯进行核威慑
2025年6月4日，习近平会见卢卡申科。当时习近平已经被关了两个礼拜，普京不派卢卡申科来见他干儿子习近平，习近平能出来吗？
2025年6月5日晚上7点，习近平与川普通话
2025年6月12日至14日，张庆伟率团访问白俄罗斯，会见卢卡申科总统
2025年7月4日，王毅告诉欧盟中国不希望看到俄罗斯在乌克兰失败
2025年7月14日，川普威胁说，如果俄罗斯不能在50天内与乌克兰达成结束战争的协议，美国将对俄实施100%的“二级关税”。
2025年7月15日上午，习近平在北京人民大会堂会见俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫
这里面呢，张庆伟为什么访问白俄罗斯，我们不知道。
但是呢。最近湖南省提拔了副书记谢卫江。
根据电力系统内部人的文章呢，
温家宝对电力系统下手，真可谓高瞻远瞩，步步为营，杀法绝断，手段老道，端得是即稳又准还狠。
大唐集团的一把手翟若愚就是李鹏习近平的马仔
大唐集团的二把手刘顺达就是温家宝的马仔。后来把温家宝提拔成一把手
这个谢卫江一开始就有可能是温家宝的马仔。
卢卡申科6月2日到4日访华，会见的这个人始终不给镜头是不是温家宝呢
这名网友说，大包，我在之前白鹅来访的视频就评论过，会见商界的代表不出镜就怀疑是温家宝或胡春华
温家宝5年4次访河北兴隆县六道河中学
这是2014年2015年温家宝已经退休了。
温家宝告诉贾利民，为了这次讲座，他专门学习了初中地理教材，教案改了七次。
温家宝为什么跑到河北中学去讲课，绝对不是什么情怀。
温家宝的一切行为都是有政治目的，包括见他的老上级朱训，给他的老师写信。
温家宝出来和习近平喝红酒，温家宝缺这杯红酒吗？
当年他们就糟蹋温家宝说是，温家宝为什么总是仰望星空呢，原来是儿子看上了卫星通信。
那这谢卫江就是温家宝当年争抢电力系统的马仔。
谢卫江是张庆伟的大秘
如果张庆伟是温家宝的马仔
那么卢卡申科有可能会见的是温家宝。
那么普京这一系列动作就是在力挺习近平。
温家宝派张庆伟去见卢卡申科，就是要摆平卢卡申科。
整个说下来，就是美国要扳倒习近平
俄爹普京要力挺习近平。
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The US deployed a secret force to participate in the campaign to oust Xi Jinping. Putin tried to save his “adopted son,” Xi. Vietnam pledged its allegiance to cooperate with the US in ousting Xi.
Hello everyone,
This netizen said,
Regarding Su Lin’s rise to power, I’ll use a somewhat inappropriate analogy: In 2012, Zhou Yongkang staged a coup to seize power, Hu Jintao retired and was placed under house arrest, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, and Li Keqiang were dismissed from all their posts, and a large number of others were purged. People from the Jiang faction were promoted to various positions.
The力度 (intensity/force) was indeed quite strong.
My reply is that this matter needs to be taken seriously; it’s not a simple matter.
For example, former Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong.
On March 20, 2024, Vo Van Thuong was accepted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam to resign from his positions as President, Politburo member, and Central Committee member due to suspected violations of party regulations. In November 2024, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam confirmed that Vo Van Thuong had violated party discipline and regulations, but due to illness, no punishment was given. On July 19, 2025, he was removed from all party posts.
In other words, former Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong was removed from his post last year, and it has now been 1 year and 4 months since then (July 2025).
So why did General Secretary To Lam of the Communist Party of Vietnam choose this particular time to remove four high-ranking officials from their party posts—former Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, former President Vo Van Thuong, former National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, and former Secretariat Secretary Le Minh Kai? In Chinese politics, this is equivalent to First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, President Xi Jinping, CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning, and Secretariat Secretary Cai Qi.
What is the purpose of such a large-scale and shocking purge by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam? It is, of course, a purge to consolidate power.
The main consideration is domestic politics in Vietnam. But why not earlier or later, and why choose this particular time?
Vo Van Thuong was removed from his post last March, more than a year ago. Why wasn’t he removed from all his party posts earlier? Why not in June? Why not in August? Why choose July 19th specifically? What is the reason?
Why did Vietnam react so strongly to US Treasury Secretary Bessenter’s announcement of a secret meeting in China in early August, immediately dismissing four Politburo Standing Committee members from all their party posts? Is Vietnam cooperating with the US? Who is Vietnam trying to intimidate? Why was Vietnam able to obtain preferential tariffs from the US? Besides economic factors, what political concessions has Vietnam made to the US?
Looking at this all together, the US and Vietnam are deeply involved in the anti-Xi Jinping movement in China.
On the other hand, Putin is also strongly supporting Xi Jinping.
On one side is the US and Vietnam; on the other side is Russia and Belarus.
In early April 2025, the US government suddenly announced a 46% “reciprocal tariff” on Vietnamese exports, citing Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US exceeding $123 billion, making it the third-largest source of the US trade deficit. This move triggered a high level of alert from the Vietnamese government, which quickly activated its diplomatic response mechanism.
April 4: General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam, spoke with US President Trump, urging the US to grant Vietnamese goods “equal treatment” and suggesting expanding US investment in Vietnam.
April 5-6: The Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister led a delegation to the US for consultations, proposing a comprehensive cooperation plan, including the purchase of US products such as Boeing aircraft, LNG energy, and agricultural products, totaling up to $90 billion.
After three rounds of intensive negotiations, the US and Vietnam finally reached a trade agreement on July 3, the contents of which are as follows:
First, tariffs on Vietnamese goods were reduced from the original 46% to a unified 20%.
Second, a 40% punitive tariff was imposed on transshipment goods, targeting goods from third countries re-exported through Vietnam.
Third, US goods entering Vietnam will be subject to zero tariffs, and the Vietnamese market will be fully open.
Firstly, Vietnam’s zero tariffs on US goods are entirely symbolic. Many countries are treating the US like fools, claiming that we have zero tariffs on the US in exchange for the US reciprocating.
The key is that the size of these countries’ consumer markets is incomparable to that of the US consumer market. If all tariffs are zero, then of course smaller markets benefit.
Do you really think the US is a fool, talking about reciprocating with zero tariffs? The key question is, can your market size really match the US’s? Isn’t that shameless?
Only a country with a market size equivalent to the US should talk about reciprocating with zero tariffs; otherwise, it’s just trying to take advantage of the US.
Vietnam being able to get the 20% tariff first is a very favorable condition. Because the US imposes a 10% tariff on its staunch ally, the UK, meaning 10% is the starting point, and all countries must impose at least an additional 10%.
Equivalently, Vietnam is only subject to an extra 10% tariff.
Vietnam’s manufacturing competitiveness is already very strong, especially in textiles, electronics assembly, and footwear, making it a veritable “second world factory.” China is called the world’s factory, and Vietnam can also be called the world’s factory. Vietnam’s competitiveness in textiles, electronics assembly, and footwear is now no weaker than China’s. Many factories in Vietnam are simply Chinese factories that have moved there to avoid tariffs.
To put it bluntly, the so-called “world factory” lacks core competitiveness; its most crucial competitive advantage is price. As for China’s so-called supply chain advantage, it’s not that China has no advantages, but the three giants in the Apple supply chain—Lens Technology, Luxshare Precision, and Goertek—have all relocated. China clearly doesn’t understand where its advantage comes from.
China’s advantage stemmed from US backing; now that the US has turned its back, what advantage does China have left?
Vietnam’s 20% tariff increase, in addition to the basic 10% tariffs imposed on all other countries, only resulted in an extra 10% tariff on Vietnam.
This 10% cannot be said to have no impact.
For a manufacturing powerhouse like Vietnam, the extra 10% tariff has a limited impact, insufficient to cripple it; instead, it may stimulate industrial upgrading and export restructuring.
Didn’t China previously face a 19% comprehensive tariff increase from the US? Does that mean China will stop doing foreign trade with the US?
In this world, no one does business if it’s unprofitable. If it’s profitable, even if China doesn’t do business with the US, countries wanting to do business with the US are lining up.
Of course, tariffs are primarily driven by economic factors, which we won’t delve into here.
We’ll focus on the political factors that enabled Vietnam to secure favorable tariff preferences.
Vietnam’s strategic calculation is to exchange economic gains for political influence, and political influence for security.
Vietnam is acutely aware of its geopolitical value in the US-China rivalry, particularly in the South China Sea, supply chains, and manufacturing.
Through political purges and opening its markets to the US, Vietnam demonstrated its “sincere willingness to cooperate” in exchange for tariff preferences and strategic protection.
This isn’t a simple economic agreement; it’s a profound geopolitical transaction.
Let’s look at the timeline:
June 3rd: Gordon Chang relayed President Trump’s statement that Trump was worried about Xi Jinping losing power.
July 3rd: The US and Vietnam finally reached a trade agreement. This 20% tariff rate is the preferential treatment. We’ll see how much tariff the US imposes on other countries in a couple of days.
Isn’t foreign trade all about comparative advantage? Lower tariffs than other countries mean an advantage.
On July 15th, US Treasury Secretary Bessenter publicly stated that China would hold a “conclave” meeting in early August, hinting at a possible leadership change.
On July 16th, former US diplomat Slayton published an article in the New York Post stating that Xi Jinping is losing control of China and that Trump should deliver a heavy blow.
On July 19th, Vietnam dismissed four high-ranking party officials, a shocking move that could very well be a prelude to the Fourth Plenum of the 19th CPC Central Committee.
Why did the Vietnamese Communist Party do this? Was it a coincidence or a collaboration with the US? Or why did Vietnam choose this particular time to do so? Why did Vietnam receive preferential tariffs from the US? Without pledging allegiance to the US, were these preferential tariffs given away for free? Slayton’s statement, made the day after Treasury Secretary Bessenter’s claim of a secret Chinese meeting, suggested that Trump should oust Xi Jinping.
Is Trump really “should,” or is he already pushing Xi Jinping out of power?
Actually, there are many other events.
If we add up the performances of the US and Vietnam, we’ll find that Vietnam is cooperating with the US.
Vietnam is cooperating with the US to pressure China.
Nothing in this world comes for free; how did Vietnam obtain preferential tariffs from the US?
Vietnam’s appointment of four Politburo Standing Committee members at this time is a performance for China.
Cooperating with the US in this performance.
This netizen said,
There are reports that Russia and Ukraine will have a major battle in August, and both sides are currently mobilizing troops on the border. If true, doesn’t this indirectly prove that Putin knows Xi Jinping is about to step down, and is taking advantage of the fact that he can still obtain substantial aid from China before Xi’s departure to have a decisive battle with Ukraine, otherwise the Russian army will be even weaker?
This netizen said,
Wang Yi publicly stated in Europe a few days ago that China cannot accept its Russian “father’s” defeat on the Ukrainian battlefield. This caused an uproar. There are probably two reasons: one, knowing his political career is coming to an end, he’s trying to salvage the situation for China’s diplomacy; two, he’s completely giving up, unwilling to be a slave to both sides, forcing the new central leadership to let him retire… As the saying goes, unless a few big shots are killed, these bad apples won’t know what fear is, and they’ll seize any opportunity to cause trouble. The events in Russia and Belarus, taken together, boil down to Putin trying to save his godson, Xi Jinping.
On June 2, 2025, Lukashenko visited China to see Xi Jinping in prison. Xi Jinping had already been detained for two weeks at that time.
On June 2, 2025, CCTV unusually released parameters for the Dongfeng-5 missile system, a nuclear deterrent against Russia.
On June 4, 2025, Xi Jinping met with Lukashenko. Xi Jinping had already been detained for two weeks. If Putin hadn’t sent Lukashenko to see his godson, could Xi Jinping have been released? On June 5, 2025, at 7 PM, Xi Jinping spoke with Trump.
From June 12 to 14, 2025, Zhang Qingwei led a delegation to Belarus and met with President Lukashenko.
On July 4, 2025, Wang Yi told the EU that China did not want to see Russia fail in Ukraine.
On July 14, 2025, Trump threatened that if Russia could not reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the war within 50 days, the US would impose a 100% “secondary tariff” on Russia.
On the morning of July 15, 2025, Xi Jinping met with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Why Zhang Qingwei visited Belarus is unknown.
However, recently, Hunan Province promoted Deputy Secretary Xie Weijiang.
According to an article from an insider in the power system, Wen Jiabao’s actions against the power system were truly farsighted, methodical, decisive, and ruthless—a combination of stability, accuracy, and viciousness. Zhai Ruoyu, the head of Datang Group, is a henchman of Li Peng and Xi Jinping.
Liu Shunda, the second-in-command of Datang Group, is a henchman of Wen Jiabao. He later promoted Wen Jiabao to the top position.
Xie Weijiang may have been a henchman of Wen Jiabao from the beginning.
During Lukashenko’s visit to China from June 2nd to 4th, the person he met with was consistently kept out of the camera’s view. Was it Wen Jiabao?
This netizen said, “Da Bao, I commented on the video of Bai’e’s visit before. If a business representative isn’t shown in the camera, I suspect it’s Wen Jiabao or Hu Chunhua.”
Wen Jiabao visited Liudahe Middle School in Xinglong County, Hebei Province, four times in five years.
This was in 2014. Wen Jiabao had already retired by 2015.
Wen Jiabao told Jia Limin that he specifically studied the junior high school geography textbook for this lecture and revised his lesson plan seven times.
Why did Wen Jiabao go to a middle school in Hebei to give a lecture? It was definitely not out of sentimentality.
Wen Jiabao’s every action is politically motivated, including meeting his former superior Zhu Xun and writing letters to his teacher.
Wen Jiabao drinking red wine with Xi Jinping—does Wen Jiabao need that glass of wine?
Back then, they smeared Wen Jiabao, saying that the reason he always looked up at the stars was because his son was interested in satellite communications.
This Xie Weijiang was Wen Jiabao’s henchman in the power system battle.
Xie Weijiang was Zhang Qingwei’s chief secretary.
If Zhang Qingwei was Wen Jiabao’s henchman,
then Lukashenko might have met with Wen Jiabao.
Therefore, Putin’s series of actions are a show of support for Xi Jinping.
Wen Jiabao sending Zhang Qingwei to meet Lukashenko was to appease him. Peng Liyuan’s jewelry.
In short, the US wants to bring down Xi Jinping, and Russia’s “father,” Putin, wants to support Xi Jinping.
Okay, thank you everyone.
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