美财长贝森特确认习下台。新证据：温家宝会见了白俄总统卢卡申科？湖南副书记谢卫江是谁的马仔？

 

美财长贝森特确认习下台。新证据：温家宝会见了白俄总统卢卡申科？湖南副书记谢卫江是谁的马仔？

大家好，
贝森特侧面证实习近平8月8日四中全会下台：美中谈判与权力博弈

贝森特言论与习近平下台传闻

2025年7月，美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特在彭博电视节目“彭博观察”中表示，美中关税停火的8月12日截止日期具有灵活性，市场无需担忧关税恢复至停战前的破坏性水平。贝森特强调，谈判“进展顺利”，计划8月初在第三国与中国国务院副总理何立峰会面，可能在中国领导人“重要闭门会议”前后。贝森特侧面证实习近平将在8月8日下台，贝森特提到的“8月初重要闭门会议”即四中全会，而非小型定调会议，贝森特以“conclave”比喻，暗示类似“教皇选举”的重大人事更替。贝森特作为严谨的金融从业者，措辞谨慎，没有直接提及中共总书记更替，仅表示“重要性与规模成反比”，符合中国政治惯例。“conclave”在英文中指秘密选举新教皇，如果贝森特意指此义，则8月8日四中全会可能宣布习近平下台。贝森特的表态缓解市场担忧，标普500指数自4月低点上涨26%，但暗含习近平权力瓦解的政治信号。

贝森特的情报来源与“conclave”解读

贝森特的言论并非基于智库或自媒体“听床”八卦，而是来自美国情报系统（如中情局、美国国家安全局）每日简报。中情局近期发布中文招聘广告（《Washington Post》，2025年6月），显示对华情报收集力度加大。

内事不决贝森特，外事不决卢比奥
贝森特和鲁比奥现在就是川普的左右手。
本森特连美国的情报简报都看不到吗？

贝森特以“conclave”形容8月8日四中全会，暗示其为决定习近平去留的秘密高层会议，类似梵蒂冈选举教皇的闭门性质。习近平在2024年7月15-18日的三中全会，后失去军委多数支持，军中亲信（如李尚福、苗华，何卫东相继被抓。贝森特的“conclave”比喻表明，四中全会（8月8日）可能宣布习近平下台，开启权力过渡。

关税停火的灵活性与经济背景

贝森特表示，5月12日宣布的90天关税减免期（至8月12日）可灵活延长，称：“我告诉市场参与者不要担心8月12日。”此言缓解了投资者对贸易战升级的恐慌，2024年美中贸易额因关税战下降12%。贝森特与何立峰5月在日内瓦达成“对等关税暂停90天”、6月在伦敦放宽稀土出口管制，计划8月初在第三国（如瑞士）会面，商讨半导体、稀土及农产品贸易。美国向英伟达发放H20 AI芯片对华销售许可为谈判筹码，中国以稀土资源换取技术放宽，双方形成平衡。贝森特的乐观表态为中国经济争取喘息空间，但若习近平8月8日下台，四中全会后谈判可能由新领导层主导。

川普10月底访华将在四中全会后，意在“确认习近平是否下台”，贝森特9月访华为其铺垫，川普可能与新领导层会晤。贝森特暗示的8月8日四中全会将决定习近平去留，如果下台成定局。9月3日抗战80周年阅兵安保升级（81军、82军进京，坦克通过长安街）可为8月8日四中全会提供稳定环境。8月8日全会若宣布习近平下台，可能持续四天。贝森特9月访华可能与新领导层接触，川普10月底访华将确认结果，贸易谈判或更倾向美国利益（如稀土、农产品让步）。

贝森特的角色与谈判前景

贝森特作为川普政府对华谈判核心人物，其“conclave”言论基于情报支持，显示美国掌握中共高层动态。四中全会可能调整政治局常委，团派或改革派（如汪洋、胡春华）上位。贝森特的乐观态度缓解市场恐慌，但川普可能以“重大让步”为访华条件，压迫中国在半导体、能源及汇率透明度上妥协。如果习近平8月8日下台，新领导层可能在9月贝森特访华中展现灵活性，10月底川普访华或标志美中关系新阶段。经济压力（2024年资本外流超3000亿美元，青年失业率超20%）可能迫使新领导层加快改革，类似邓小平后集体领导模式。

贝森特表示，美中关税停火8月12日截止日期灵活，谈判“进展顺利”，市场无需担忧，标普500上涨26%。他计划8月初与何立峰在第三国会面，暗示8月8日四中全会将宣布习近平下台，而非小型定调会议。贝森特言论基于美国情报，并非八卦，显示习近平因经济困境、军中清洗可能在8月8日失去总书记等职务。川普10月底访华将在四中全会后，确认新领导层，贝森特9月访华为其铺路，可能促成稀土、芯片协议。阅兵（9月3日）安保可为8月8日全会提供稳定环境。如果习近平下台，团派或改革派可能主导谈判，倾向美国利益。

7月16日，北京市政府发布通告称，从当天零点起到9月3日午夜12点止，将东城、西城、朝阳、海淀、丰台、石景山、通州、昌平、门头沟等9个行政区域，设置为净空限制区，禁止升放任何影响飞行安全的物体，分段限制放飞养殖鸽等鸟类。

从北京到北戴河沿线的安保，6月下旬已经升级。途经路线上的岗哨暴增，车站和车上也都实施多重查验。目前，不论是在北京还是前往北戴河旅游的访民、异议人士，都遭到严格管控。

而天津则有网友发帖说，学校开学日期延期到了9月4日，老师通知延迟开学，但不在群里发，而是一个一个打电话，搞得很神秘。

现在就是不清楚，中共只是为93阅兵。还是明修栈道，暗度陈仓。
真实的目的为了召开四中全会。

反正马上就开会了，美国财政部长已经明确说了是8月初，开会
美国的文化和中国也不一样。
贝森特说这个和中国专有名词也不是一一对应的。
到底是不是就是四中全会。

这名网友说，
快开会了
我的回复是大家都这么觉得。
但是没有贝森特的情报丰富啊。
你这么的泛泛的一说，我也不知道你就是随便说说，
还是有把握

这名网友说，
财政部贝森特，前天说，税八月初东大有重要高层会议。其他的没说。只是说了会期：两周后。
我的回复是，其实我觉得贝森特的话，应该和斯莱顿
联系起来看
习近平正在失去对中国的控制——川普可以给他一记重击
贝森特和斯莱顿同时表态，
说明这可能是川普政府或者说美国政府的态度。

美国的情报系统这么强大，如果美国已经掌握了习近平马上下台的确切情报。
那肯定要站队啊。
中国这么大的国家，要换总书记。美国不能假装什么事情都没有发生吧。
斯莱顿已经明确说了，川普应该反习近平
但是斯莱顿不是美国的官方人士。
按照中国的说法，所谓二轨外交。
假装是民间人士，其实是由官方背景。
万一有什么变故，还有回旋的余地。
期间是就官方的态度，披着民间人士的外衣而已。
总不能让美国的财政部长说习近平要下台了吧。

美国财政部长贝森特和斯莱顿明显就是在唱双簧。

这名网友说，
大包，新任湖南省委副书记谢卫江是最开始是一家水利贸易公司出身的，也是胡的人吗？
我的回复是，
温家宝，刘顺达
我只是猜测。
因为这是公司，和地方的政务系统，不太一样，搞清楚难度比较大。

网上有一篇特别牛的文章叫做
中国两任总理家族之间的电力争夺战
2011年的文章。

温家宝撰文纪念胡耀邦，被海内外高调解读为温曲线表达政改意愿的信号。但知情人透露，温此举实有另番用意：借民间的”六四”记忆树立自己打击李鹏，为在已经开始的电力争夺战中抢得民意先手。

英国《金融时报》分析，随着2002年开始的权力交替，江泽民之子江绵恒和朱镕基之子朱云来的影响力在消退，而更为年轻的一代太子党开始呼风唤雨。温云松和他旗下的新天域资本是更为强势的太子党的”红小兵”

近年来连续的电力改革，正是温家宝争夺电力系统掌控权，觊觎和抢夺李鹏家族掌控下的电力行业的重要手段。现在温家宝与李鹏两大家族已经撕破脸皮，公然开战。

按照我们的分析温家宝就是胡锦涛派系的，李鹏就是习近平派系的。

温家宝对电力觊觎之心已久。他妻子张蓓莉已实际上掌握了中国的珠宝业，在国际珠宝业也有很高的地位，但这个行业在国民经营中无足轻重，总属微末，虽然可以换得盆满钵溢，家财数亿，但与煤炭、能源一类战略性行业相比，是典型的”边角余料”，难以掌握国计民生的命脉。不掌握事关国计民生的命脉产业，在政治上话语权就不强，即上不得台面，又容易授人以柄，更易被人打压。

2010年2月初电力系统大调整的原因。知情人士讲，目前，中国电力行业正在迎来自2002年电改以来，最为密集的一轮人事变动，首当其冲的就是李鹏人马。

知情人士讲，温对电力系统下手，真可谓高瞻远瞩，步步为营，杀法绝断，手段老道，端得是即稳又准还狠。与之相反，李鹏则节节败退，顾此失彼。 温能做到这一点，是因为他前期就铺排有方。自十六大上台后，温即策动电力改革。

2008年5月，工业和信息化部副部长王旭东接替尤权出任国家电监会主席。这王旭东也是一波三折的人物，原是”小木匠”李瑞环的人马。1993年由天津市委副书记升任中央组织部副部长，但自此仕途转缓，一干就是7年。直到2000年，才担任河北省委书记。李瑞环一下台，王旭东失去靠山，受政敌攻击被调查，被迫让出诸侯大位，转而到信息产业部降格使用，担任党组书记和副部长。 因是内阁成员，有机会与温走得近，在向温表示了效忠之后，得到温的力保，终于摆脱困境，2003年担任信息产业部部长、党组书记。2008年信息产业部改组为工业和信息化部后，温调任他担任国家电力监管委员会主席、党组书记，秘密受命为温争夺电力天下服务。

这一段按照他的说法
因是内阁成员，有机会与温走得近，在向温表示了效忠之后，得到温的力保，终于摆脱困境

按照我们的说法，因为李瑞环和温家宝是一个派系的，
温家宝才提拔王旭东。
按照他的说法就是效忠，感觉随时跳船，这个不太可能。

但是这篇文章就是这么写的。

嗅出异常的李鹏震怒，但此时已无人可靠。无奈之下，李鹏只好亲自出面，向温提出，要求李小鹏从政。其意是希望通过李小鹏向政坛高位进军，以保李家的未来。温果然同意，2008年6月2日，原华能集团党组书记兼总经理李小鹏告别了华能集团，出任山西省副省长。

进入到2010年1月，温再一次吹响向电力行业进军的号角，如，大唐集团总经理、党组书记翟若愚正式退休，大唐集团副总经理刘顺达接任董事长职务

这里面出现了两个人，翟若愚和刘顺达。
这篇文章中国两任总理家族之间的电力争夺战
牛就牛
写的特别详细，大家感兴趣可以自己去看。

就是翟若愚就是李鹏的人也就是习近平的人
刘顺达就是温家宝的人。
他们应该是大唐集团的一把手和二把手。

就看这个谢卫江到底是翟若愚的人还是刘顺达的人。
翟若愚就是李鹏习近平的马仔
刘顺达就是温家宝的马仔。

谢卫江是张庆伟的大秘
张庆伟是什么派系我也不知道。
张庆伟的资历20大应该是担任政治局委员。
政治局委员的资格就是当过两个省委书记。
最后张庆伟只是当了人大副委员长，这就是有可能不是习近平的人。

温家宝5年4次访河北兴隆县六道河中学
这是2014年2015年温家宝已经退休了。

温家宝告诉贾利民，为了这次讲座，他专门学习了初中地理教材，教案改了七次。
温家宝为什么跑到河北中学去讲课，绝对不是什么情怀。
肯定是政治原因
六道河中学网站上，在学校简介一栏中有这样的内容：河北省委书记周本顺、省长张庆伟、省委副书记赵勇、副省长许宁以及承德市委书记、市长、兴隆县里四大领导班子到我校进行走访调研，对我校的管理和改革给予了充分肯定。

这里面只有两个正部级，一个周本顺一个张庆伟。
如果温家宝是去背书张庆伟的话。张庆伟是温家宝的马仔。
那么卢卡申科6月2日到4日访华，
会见的这个人始终不给镜头是不是温家宝呢
因为张庆伟随后访问了白俄。
如果张庆伟是温家宝的马仔
那么卢卡申科有可能会见的是温家宝。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

US Treasury Secretary Bessenter confirms Xi Jinping’s resignation on August 8. New evidence: Wen Jiabao met with Belarusian President Lukashenko? Who is Hunan Deputy Party Secretary Xie Weijiang’s henchman?

Hello everyone, Bessenter indirectly confirms Xi Jinping’s resignation at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee on August 8: US-China negotiations and power struggles

Bessenter’s remarks and rumors of Xi Jinping’s resignation

In July 2025, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessenter stated on Bloomberg’s “Bloomberg Watch” television program that the August 12 deadline for the US-China tariff ceasefire was flexible, and the market did not need to worry about tariffs returning to the destructive levels before the ceasefire. Bessenter emphasized that the negotiations were “progressing well” and planned to meet with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in a third country in early August, possibly around the time of an “important closed-door meeting” of Chinese leaders. Bessant indirectly confirmed that Xi Jinping will step down on August 8th. The “important closed-door meeting in early August” Bessant mentioned refers to the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, not a small, policy-setting meeting. Bessant used the metaphor of a “conclave,” hinting at a major personnel change similar to a “papal election.” As a meticulous financial professional, Bessant used cautious language, not directly mentioning the change of the CPC General Secretary, only stating that “importance is inversely proportional to scale,” consistent with Chinese political conventions. “Conclave” in English refers to a secret election of a new pope; if Bessant meant this, the Fourth Plenary Session on August 8th may announce Xi Jinping’s resignation. Bessant’s statement eased market concerns, with the S&P 500 rising 26% from its April low, but it also implicitly signaled the political collapse of Xi Jinping’s power.

Bessant’s Intelligence Sources and the Interpretation of “Conclave”

Bessant’s remarks were not based on gossip from think tanks or self-media, but rather on daily briefings from US intelligence systems (such as the CIA and NSA). The CIA recently posted a Chinese-language job advertisement (Washington Post, June 2025), indicating an increased intelligence gathering effort against China.

“Domestic affairs are decided by Bessent, foreign affairs by Rubio.”

Bessent and Rubio are now Trump’s right-hand men.

Can’t Bessent even see US intelligence briefings?

Bessent described the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee on August 8th as a “conclave,” implying it was a secret high-level meeting to decide Xi Jinping’s future, similar to the closed-door nature of the Vatican’s election of the Pope. Following the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee from July 15-18, 2024, Xi Jinping lost the support of a majority in the Central Military Commission, and close confidants in the military (such as Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, and He Weidong) were subsequently arrested. Bessant’s “conclave” metaphor suggests that the Fourth Plenary Session (August 8) may announce Xi Jinping’s resignation and initiate a power transition.

The Flexibility of the Tariff Ceasefire and the Economic Background

Bessant stated that the 90-day tariff relief period announced on May 12 (until August 12) could be flexibly extended, saying, “I told market participants not to worry about August 12.” This statement alleviated investor panic about an escalation of the trade war, which is projected to reduce US-China trade by 12% in 2024. Bessant and He Lifeng reached a 90-day agreement in Geneva in May for a “reciprocal tariff suspension,” and in June, they eased rare earth export controls in London. They plan to meet in a third country (such as Switzerland) in early August to discuss semiconductor, rare earth, and agricultural trade. The US has issued H2O visas to Nvidia. AI chip sales licenses to China serve as bargaining chips, with China exchanging rare earth resources for technological easing, creating a balance between the two sides. Bessant’s optimistic remarks offer breathing room for the Chinese economy, but if Xi Jinping steps down on August 8th, negotiations after the Fourth Plenary Session may be dominated by the new leadership.

Trump’s visit to China at the end of October, following the Fourth Plenary Session, aims to “confirm whether Xi Jinping will step down.” Bessant’s September visit paves the way for this, and Trump may meet with the new leadership. Bessant’s implication that the August 8th Fourth Plenary Session will decide Xi Jinping’s fate is certain, and if his resignation is a foregone conclusion, the upgraded security for the September 3rd 80th anniversary of the victory against Japan parade (the 81st and 82nd Armies entering Beijing, tanks passing through Chang’an Avenue) could provide a stable environment for the August 8th Fourth Plenary Session. If the August 8th plenary session announces Xi Jinping’s resignation, it could last four days. Bessant’s September visit may involve contact with the new leadership, while Trump’s late October visit will confirm the outcome, potentially leading to trade negotiations more favoring US interests (such as rare earths and agricultural products). (Step).

Bessant’s Role and Negotiation Prospects

As a key figure in the Trump administration’s negotiations with China, Bessant’s “conclave” remarks, based on intelligence support, indicate that the US has a grasp of the dynamics of the CCP’s top leadership. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee may reshuffle the Politburo Standing Committee, with members of the Youth League faction or reformists (such as Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua) taking over. Bessant’s optimistic attitude alleviated market panic, but Trump may use “significant concessions” as a condition for his visit to China, pressuring China to compromise on semiconductors, energy, and currency transparency. If Xi Jinping steps down on August 8, the new leadership may demonstrate flexibility during Bessant’s visit to China in September, and Trump’s visit to China at the end of October may mark a new stage in US-China relations. Economic pressures (capital outflows exceeding $300 billion by 2024, youth unemployment exceeding 20%) may force the new leadership to accelerate reforms, similar to the collective leadership model after Deng Xiaoping.

Bessant stated that the August 12 deadline for the US-China tariff truce is flexible, and negotiations are “progressing smoothly.” The market need not worry; the S&P 500 rose 26%. He plans to meet with He Lifeng in a third country in early August, hinting that the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee on August 8th will announce Xi Jinping’s resignation, rather than a small, policy-setting meeting. Bessant’s remarks are based on US intelligence, not gossip, indicating that Xi Jinping may lose his position as General Secretary and other posts on August 8th due to economic difficulties and a military purge. Trump’s visit to China at the end of October will confirm the new leadership after the Fourth Plenary Session. Bessant’s visit in September paves the way for this and may facilitate rare earth and chip agreements. Security for the military parade (September 3rd) can provide a stable environment for the August 8th plenary session. If Xi Jinping steps down, the Youth League faction or reformists may dominate negotiations, favoring US interests.

On July 16th, the Beijing Municipal Government issued a notice stating that from midnight that day until midnight on September 3rd, nine administrative districts—Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, Shijingshan, Tongzhou, Changping, and Mentougou—would be designated as restricted airspace zones, prohibiting unauthorized flights. Objects that could affect flight safety are subject to phased restrictions on the release of farmed pigeons and other birds.

Security along the Beijing-Beidaihe route was escalated in late June. Checkpoints along the route have increased dramatically, and multiple checks are being implemented at stations and on trains. Currently, petitioners and dissidents, whether in Beijing or traveling to Beidaihe, are under strict control.

Meanwhile, a netizen in Tianjin posted that the school opening date has been postponed to September 4th. Teachers notified students of the delay not through group chats, but by phone, creating an air of secrecy.

It’s unclear whether the CCP is merely preparing for the September 3rd military parade, or if this is a pretext for a covert operation.

The real purpose is to convene the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

Anyway, the meeting is about to begin; the US Treasury Secretary has clearly stated it will be in early August.

American culture is different from Chinese culture.

Bessant said this doesn’t correspond one-to-one with Chinese proper nouns.

Is it really the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee?

This netizen… A friend said, “The meeting is coming up soon.” My reply was that everyone thinks so.

But no one has as much information as Bessant.

You’re just saying this casually; I don’t know if you’re just saying it offhand,

or if you’re confident.

This netizen said, “Treasury Treasury Secretary Bessant said the day before yesterday that there’s an important high-level meeting at the University of Tokyo in early August. He didn’t say anything else, only the date: two weeks later.”

My reply was, “Actually, I think Bessant’s words should be considered in conjunction with Slayton’s.”

Xi Jinping is losing control of China—Trump could deliver a heavy blow.

Bessant and Slayton’s simultaneous statements indicate that this might be the attitude of the Trump administration or the US government.

The US intelligence system is so powerful; if the US already has concrete intelligence that Xi Jinping will soon step down,

then they’ll definitely have to take sides.

For a country as large as China to change its General Secretary, the US can’t pretend nothing’s happening.

Slayton has already clearly stated that Trump… Putin should oppose Xi Jinping.

However, Slayton is not an official US figure.

According to China’s terminology, this is so-called “track two diplomacy.”

He pretends to be a civilian, but actually has an official background.

In case of any unforeseen circumstances, there is still room for maneuver.

During this period, he is simply using the guise of a civilian to express his official stance.

He can’t very well have the US Treasury Secretary say that Xi Jinping is about to step down.

US Treasury Secretary Bessenter and Slayton are clearly putting on a show.

This netizen asked, “Da Bao, is Xie Weijiang, the newly appointed Deputy Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, originally from a water conservancy trading company? Is he also one of Hu’s people?”

My reply is, “Wen Jiabao, Liu Shunda.”

I’m just speculating.

Because this is a company, it’s quite different from the local government system, making it difficult to figure out.

There’s a particularly impressive article online called “The Electricity Battle Between the Families of Two Chinese Premiers,” an article from 2011.

Wen Jiabao wrote an article commemorating Hu Yaobang, which was… Both domestically and internationally, this was widely interpreted as Wen Jiabao subtly signaling his willingness to pursue political reforms. However, insiders revealed that Wen’s move had another purpose: to leverage public memory of the June Fourth Incident to solidify his position and weaken Li Peng, thereby gaining the upper hand in the already ongoing battle for control of the power sector.

The Financial Times analyzed that with the power transition that began in 2002, the influence of Jiang Zemin’s son Jiang Mianheng and Zhu Rongji’s son Zhu Yunlai was waning, while a younger generation of princelings was gaining power. Wen Yunsong and his New Horizon Capital are the more powerful “red scouts” of this princeling faction.

The continuous power sector reforms in recent years have been a key tool for Wen Jiabao to vie for control of the power system and to seize control of the power industry under the Li Peng family’s control. Now, the Wen and Li families have openly broken ties and entered into a war.

According to our analysis, Wen Jiabao belongs to Hu Jintao’s faction, while Li Peng belongs to Xi Jinping’s faction.

Wen Jiabao has long coveted the power sector. His wife… Zhang Beili has effectively controlled China’s jewelry industry and holds a high position in the international jewelry sector. However, this industry is insignificant in the national economy, always considered a small part. Although it can generate enormous wealth, amounting to hundreds of millions, compared to strategic industries like coal and energy, it’s a typical “leftover,” unable to control the lifeline of the national economy and people’s livelihood. Without control over vital industries, one lacks political influence, is not respected, is easily manipulated, and is more vulnerable to suppression.

The reason for the major power system reshuffle in early February 2010. Insiders say that the Chinese power industry is currently undergoing the most intensive round of personnel changes since the 2002 power reform, with Li Peng’s faction bearing the brunt.

Insiders say that Wen Jiabao’s move against the power system was truly farsighted, step-by-step, decisive, and shrewd—stable, accurate, and ruthless. Conversely, Li Peng suffered repeated setbacks and lost ground. Wen was able to achieve this because he had laid the groundwork well in advance. After taking office at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Wen immediately initiated power sector reform.

In May 2008, Wang Xudong, Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology, succeeded You Quan as Chairman of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission. Wang Xudong’s career was also fraught with ups and downs; he was originally a protégé of Li Ruihuan, the “Little Carpenter.” In 1993, he was promoted from Deputy Secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee to Vice Minister of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, but his career slowed down after that, remaining in that position for seven years. It wasn’t until 2000 that he became Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee. After Li Ruihuan stepped down, Wang Xudong lost his patron, was attacked by political enemies, investigated, and forced to relinquish his powerful position, instead being reassigned to the Ministry of Information Industry as Party Secretary and Vice Minister. As a cabinet member, he had the opportunity to get close to Wen Jiabao. After pledging his loyalty to Wen, he received Wen’s strong protection and finally escaped his predicament, becoming Minister and Party Secretary of the Ministry of Information Industry in 2003. In 2008, after the Ministry of Information Industry was reorganized into the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Wen transferred him to the State Electricity Regulatory Commission as Chairman and Party Secretary, secretly tasked with serving Wen’s ambition to seize control of the electricity sector.

According to his account, this section states that because he was a cabinet member, he had the opportunity to get close to Wen, and after pledging his loyalty to Wen, he received Wen’s strong protection and finally escaped his predicament.

According to our account, because Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao belonged to the same faction, Wen Jiabao promoted Wang Xudong.

According to his account, it was about loyalty, and it seems unlikely he would jump ship at any moment.

However, this is how the article is written.

Li Peng, sensing something amiss, was furious, but by then it was too late. The man was reliable. Left with no other option, Li Peng personally approached Wen Jiabao and requested that Li Xiaopeng enter politics. His intention was to secure the Li family’s future by having Li Xiaopeng advance into a high-ranking political position. Wen Jiabao agreed, and on June 2, 2008, Li Xiaopeng, the former Party Secretary and General Manager of Huaneng Group, left Huaneng Group to become the Vice Governor of Shanxi Province.

In January 2010, Wen Jiabao once again sounded the horn for expansion into the power industry. For example, Zhai Ruoyu, General Manager and Party Secretary of Datang Group, officially retired, and Liu Shunda, Vice General Manager of Datang Group, succeeded him as Chairman.

Two people appeared here: Zhai Ruoyu and Liu Shunda.

This article, “The Power Scramble Between the Families of Two Chinese Premiers,” is very detailed; those interested can read it themselves.

In short, Zhai Ruoyu was Li Peng’s man, which is also Xi Jinping’s man.

Liu Shunda was… They are Wen Jiabao’s people.

They should be the top two leaders of the Datang Group.

It depends on whether Xie Weijiang is a man of Zhai Ruoyu or Liu Shunda.

Zhai Ruoyu is a henchman of Li Peng and Xi Jinping.

Liu Shunda is a henchman of Wen Jiabao.

Xie Weijiang is Zhang Qingwei’s chief secretary.

I don’t know which faction Zhang Qingwei belongs to.

Zhang Qingwei’s qualifications should have been a member of the Politburo at the 20th National Congress.

The qualification for a Politburo member is having served as the Party Secretary of two provinces.

In the end, Zhang Qingwei only became the Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress, which means he might not be a man of Xi Jinping.

Wen Jiabao visited Liudahe Middle School in Xinglong County, Hebei Province, four times in five years.

This was in 2014 and 2015, after Wen Jiabao had retired.

Wen Jiabao told Jia Limin that he specifically studied the junior high school geography textbook for this lecture and revised the lesson plan seven times.

Why did Wen Jiabao go to Hebei Middle School? Going to teach is definitely not out of sentimentality.

It’s definitely for political reasons. The Liudahe Middle School website has this in its school introduction section: “Zhou Benshun, Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, Zhang Qingwei, Governor of Hebei Province, Zhao Yong, Deputy Secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, Xu Ning, Vice Governor of Hebei Province, as well as the Secretary and Mayor of Chengde City, and the four leading bodies of Xinglong County visited our school for research and fully affirmed our school’s management and reforms.”

Only two of these are at the ministerial level: Zhou Benshun and Zhang Qingwei.

If Wen Jiabao went to endorse Zhang Qingwei, then Zhang Qingwei is Wen Jiabao’s henchman.

Then, during Lukashenko’s visit to China from June 2nd to 4th,

was the person he met with, whose image was never shown on camera, Wen Jiabao?

Because Zhang Qingwei subsequently visited Belarus.

If Zhang Qingwei is Wen Jiabao’s henchman,

then Lukashenko might have met with Wen Jiabao.

Okay, thank you everyone.