美情报确认习下台。美总统不会见四中全会前的习近平。吴英杰死缓，陈奎元提拔的吴英杰。陈奎元批温家宝自由、人权，并非资本主义所独有

 

美情报确认习下台。美总统不会见四中全会前的习近平。吴英杰死缓，陈奎元提拔的吴英杰。陈奎元批温家宝自由、人权，并非资本主义所独有

大家好，
我们关注这个新闻，
美国财长为筹备峰会将于9月访华。
这个新闻基本确定美国总统川普不会在四中全会之前
会见习近平。
说这个新闻之前，我们先看，西藏党委书记，一把手，正部级的吴英杰被判死缓。
这名网友说，吴英杰是谁的人？
我的回复是习近平的人。

2025年7月16日，北京市第三中级人民法院公开宣判十四届全国政协原常委、文化文史和学习委员会原主任吴英杰受贿一案，以受贿罪判处被告人吴英杰死刑，缓期二年执行，剥夺政治权利终身，并处没收个人全部财产；将追缴在案的吴英杰受贿所得财物及其孳息依法上缴国库，不足部分继续追缴。

吴英杰是陈奎元提拔的，陈奎元是陈云的人，与胡锦涛无关。”吴英杰仕途起步于陈奎元（1992-2000年任西藏自治区党委书记）的提拔。1993年，37岁的吴英杰任西藏教委接受援助办公室主任，1994年升任教委副主任，1998年任教工委副书记，2000年任教育厅副厅长、厅长。2000年3月，陈奎元将其送往中央党校中青年干部培训班，为副部级晋升铺路，2003年1月吴英杰升任西藏政府副主席，时任总理为朱镕基。
这个中央党校中青年干部培训班，就当相当于副部级资格证书班。
想要提拔的副部级，一般都要参加这个培训。
陈奎元离开西藏之前已经把吴英杰送进了副部级的资格培训班。
朱镕基退休之前几个月把吴英杰提拔为副部级的。
2003年刚好不对应着江泽民退休，江泽民是2002年退出总书记，2004年退出军委主席。
2003年刚好是朱镕基退休。

2016年8月，60岁的吴英杰任中共西藏自治区党委书记，西藏军区党委第一书记，区党委党校校长。
我们看胡锦涛接任国家主席， 温家宝接任总理之前吴英杰升任副部级。
整整13年吴英杰没有升任正部级。在胡温执政的10年之中，吴英杰没有升任正部级。

陈奎元是内蒙古呼伦贝尔盟出身，属陈云派系，呼伦贝尔盟在文革期间（1966-1976）归黑龙江管辖，属陈云掌控的东北局。陈奎元由杰尔格勒（1972年恢复工作，任呼伦贝尔盟常委）提拔，杰尔格勒与周恩来、陈云关系密切。杰尔格勒是周恩来的人，周恩来与陈云是一派，习仲勋是周恩来大秘，朱镕基、谢立娟也属陈云派系。

我们记住这个时间节点，1973年3月，邓小平复出任副总理
邓小平当时定性为党内最大的走资派。
是一个派，凡是邓小平的马仔一律被打倒。
邓小平1973年3月复出的，杰尔格勒是1972年恢复工作。
凡是1971年1972年恢复工作的。肯定不是邓小平的人，邓小平当时还处于被打倒的状态。
文革那么疯狂的年代，邓小平的马仔，一个也别想出来。

胡春华不是陈奎元提拔的，胡春华是胡锦涛提拔。1997年陈奎元任西藏书记时，胡春华转至团中央（第一书记为李克强），2001年陈奎元离任后才返回西藏。陈奎元压着胡春华，不让提拔，胡春华躲着跑了。胡锦涛1988-1992年任西藏书记，上一任西藏书记不能提拔下一任，这是常识，只有总书记或总理有权提拔省委书记。1992年陈奎元上任时，总书记为江泽民，总理为李鹏，实际一把手为邓小平，二把手为陈云。胡锦涛非总书记，无权直接提拔吴英杰或干预西藏人事。共青团不是胡锦涛家开的，西藏也不是胡锦涛家开的。
胡锦涛当时就是一个西藏党委书记，如果他能提拔下一任西藏党委书记。
那西藏就死循环了，一直是胡锦涛的人。

陈奎元属陈云派系，与内蒙古其他陈云派系人物（如杰尔格勒、李文、巴图巴根、布特格）有关。杰尔格勒自称“要把周总理誉为模范区的内蒙古建设好”，表明其为周恩来的人。1972年林彪倒台后，杰尔格勒恢复工作，呼伦贝尔盟归黑龙江管辖，黑龙江书记汪家道与陈云、高岗关系密切。1989年江泽民、朱镕基接见上海回民中学（负责西藏内地班，吴英杰参与），谢立娟（上海市副市长，1985-1996年，九三学社成员）与朱镕基关系密切。陈奎元提拔吴英杰，因陈奎元、朱镕基同属陈云派系，朱镕基认识吴英杰。习仲勋1981-1987年主管统战，谢立娟在其任内加入九三学社，升任上海副区长、副市长。

吴英杰自己怎么说的呢？
尽管有中央决策和国家部委的明确政策，但毕竟是开天辟地新事物，内地省市对设立西藏学校的重视程度不一样，配套支持与提供条件的力度也不一样。频繁穿梭于内地各城市之间的吴英杰不是能说会道之人，最直接的办法只有一招，用大杯子将白酒倒满，张开嘴一倒而尽，恳切地看着对方说：“我代表西藏人民和孩子们感谢你们了。”这种淳朴的作风，使他和内地18个省市教育部门和校长成了好朋友。到目前为止，吴英杰只要看到西藏班的学生，都能讲出他上的初中和初中校长的名字。

　　那几年，吴英杰与我们聚会时总是喊累。首先，肯定是身体上喝酒喝得累。是啊，再大的酒量喝多了也会伤身体，这是谁都明白的道理。他曾对记者说，酒喝多了容易泛胃酸。有一次在某城市喝多了，晚上睡觉时一口酸水泛出来，第二天早上竟发现床单溅上胃酸的地方出现了几个小洞。长此以往，胃不穿孔才叫怪。

按照吴英杰自己的说法，他为了就西藏内地班
和18个省市的教育部门的负责人喝大酒。就是喝酒人士的朱镕基。

然后我们看热地和吴英杰的关系。
热地是胡锦涛在西藏的政敌。
胡锦涛当时是西藏的一把手，热地是二把手或者三把手。
胡锦涛被热地整的被迫说，多换思想少换人。
不敢更换热地提拔的官员。

2025年6月6日，热地86岁死了。是不是被胡春华拔管了，我不知道，反正
热地不单是胡锦涛的政敌，还是胡春华的政敌。
2025年7月16日，吴英杰判死缓。相差一个月10天。

2012年9月15日上午，那曲镇托古拉山口红旗招展，彩旗飘扬，洋溢着一派节日的气氛，国道317线黑昌公路那曲至巴青段油路竣工通车仪式在这里隆重举行。十届全国人大常委会副委员长热地专门发来贺信，区党委副书记、常务副主席吴英杰代表自治区党委、政府出席通车典礼并宣布竣工通车，自治区人大常委会副主任嘎玛宣读了热地同志的贺信。自治区政府副秘书长梁建平，地委书记边巴扎西等人出席竣工通车仪式。

这个新闻里面出现了好多人
我们关注其中4个人。
热地，吴英杰，梁建平，边巴扎西
热地最早就是那曲地委书记。等于吴英杰给热地的家乡那曲市
修了一条公路。
当时的那曲地委书记边巴扎西，之后担任西藏副主席期间的大秘张宏亮现在是丁薛祥大秘

丁薛祥给习近平当了10年的秘书，还有人洗地
丁薛祥还能习近平，天天扯淡。

梁建平是吴英杰的大秘，
梁建平也特别奇葩。
梁建平，男，藏族，1959年8月生，山东莱阳人
山东还有藏族人呢，不过梁建平长得有点像藏族人。
吴英杰也是山东人。不过吴英杰从小在西藏长大。
梁建平当年很可能就是陈奎元的秘书。
证明就是陈奎元提拔的吴英杰。

2007年时任中共中央政治局常委、国务院总理温家宝发文称“科学、民主、法制、自由、人权，并非资本主义所独有，而是人类在漫长的历史进程中共同追求的价值观和共同创造的文明成果。”陈奎元在社科院改革座谈会上带头痛批“中国有些人跟随西方国家步调起舞”，人民日报也转载相关专栏文章，暗批温家宝。
陈奎元骂过温家宝。

四中全会传言与川普访华的时机2025年7月，关于中共二十届四中全会的召开时间存在两种传言：可能在8月或10月举行。美国总统唐纳德·川普已确定于10月底或更晚的时候访华，时间点可能在韩国亚太经济合作组织（APEC）峰会（10月底）前后，晚于四中全会。
现在四中全会就是看7月底的政治局会议，没几天了，如果公布
8月召开四中全会，那么8月就会召开，如果不公布，还要推迟。

川普将在四中全会之后，确认习近平是否下台后再访华。”这表明川普访华的安排可能受四中全会结果的影响，尤其是习近平的领导地位是否发生变动。北京消息人士7月15日透露，美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特将于9月访华，为川普访华铺路，商讨美中关税冲突的突破口。此前，美国媒体报道称，川普正考虑在APEC峰会前后访华，与习近平会晤。习近平不愿在APEC多边场合首次会晤川普，可能因担心被美国主导的外交格局牵制。四中全会作为中共权力调整的关键节点，可能决定习近平在川普访华时的谈判主动性。贝森特9月访华的战略意义贝森特9月访华被视为中美可能达成实质性协议的信号。消息人士表示：“中国不愿举行作秀式会晤，贝森特的访问表明双方在经济和贸易领域已准备好取得成果。”

贝森特可能与副总理何立峰会面，甚至可能与习近平会晤，但预计避开9月3日中国抗战胜利纪念日活动。美国寻求中国在矿物和零部件供应稳定、扩大农产品和能源进口、对美国企业优待及汇率透明度等方面做出让步，而中国可能要求美国放宽投资限制和技术管控。贝森特访华的时机与9月美国多国关税谈判相吻合，2025年9月恰逢美中贸易战进入第7个月。2018年川普第一任期内贸易战爆发后，财政部长史蒂文·姆努钦在2019年2月（冲突7个多月后）访华，会见刘鹤及习近平。贝森特访华延续类似节奏，旨在为川普10月底访华铺垫，可能推动贸易战关键突破。

美中贸易谈判的进展与分歧贝森特与何立峰在2025年5月（日内瓦）、6月（伦敦）及7月1日（日内瓦）三次会面，协调关税争端，达成“对等关税暂停90天”及“中国恢复稀土出口”等临时协议。但双方立场仍存分歧，川普可能以“重大让步”为访华条件，贸易争端随时可能升级。消息人士称，美国将推动中国在战略矿产、农产品及能源进口等领域让步，而中国手握战略矿产王牌，可能要求美国放宽技术限制。2025年美中贸易战导致双边贸易额下降，9月谈判可能聚焦稀土出口、农产品贸易及投资限制，试图缓解关税战压力。川普访华若成行，可能标志贸易战转折点，但习近平权力受限或削弱其谈判主动性。

因为川普已经说过了，这是章家敦转述的川普的说法。
川普：他担心中国内部发生的事情

川普邀请习近平参加自己的就职典礼，结果韩正，去了，习近平也没有去。
川普一开始还嚷嚷让蔡奇参加贸易谈判，
蔡奇去没去，蔡奇最后不是没去吗？
把川普邀请习近平去美国，邀请蔡奇参加贸易谈判
作为习近平还掌权的证据，很明显是不成立的。
这些事情都是川普一个人在嚷嚷，最后都没有发生。

川普也应该明白过来了，习近平已经不掌握大权。
但是川普没有必要等中国，中国一直拖着。

川普现在最早可能在10月才访问中国，甚至不访问中国，
反正还没有敲定。
最后就两种情况一种是四中全会之后，习近平还是总书记，军委主席，国家主席。
另外一种就是我们推断的情况，
川普如果一定要在10月访问中国。到时候中国的国家主席是习近平
总书记和军委主席是胡春华。
那么川普可能就要分别会见习近平和胡春华。

所以，川普很明显也是在等四中全会的结果。

要等习近平下台，官宣了，川普才能和中国谈啊。
好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

US intelligence confirms Xi Jinping’s downfall. The US president will not meet with Xi Jinping before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee. Wu Yingjie, who was promoted by Chen Kuiyuan, has been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. Chen Kuiyuan criticizes Wen Jiabao for emphasizing freedom and human rights, stating they are not unique to capitalism.

Hello everyone,

We are following this news: The US Treasury Secretary will visit China in September to prepare for the summit.

This news basically confirms that US President Trump will not meet with Xi Jinping before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee.

Before discussing this news, let’s look at the case of Wu Yingjie, the Party Secretary of Tibet, a ministerial-level official, who was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve.

This netizen asked, “Whose side is Wu Yingjie on?”

My reply is: Xi Jinping’s side.

On July 16, 2025, the Beijing Third Intermediate People’s Court publicly pronounced judgment in the bribery case of Wu Yingjie, former Standing Committee member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and former director of the Committee on Culture, History and Learning. Wu Yingjie was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for bribery, deprived of his political rights for life, and all his personal property was confiscated. The proceeds of Wu Yingjie’s bribery and their accrued interest will be turned over to the national treasury, with further recovery efforts continuing.

Wu Yingjie was promoted by Chen Kuiyuan, who was a protégé of Chen Yun, and had no connection to Hu Jintao. Wu Yingjie’s career began with the promotion of Chen Kuiyuan (who served as Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee from 1992 to 2000). In 1993, at the age of 37, Wu Yingjie became the Director of the Tibet Education Commission’s Office for Receiving Assistance. In 1994, he was promoted to Deputy Director of the Education Commission, and in 1998, he became Deputy Secretary of the Education Workers’ Committee. In 2000, he became Deputy Director and then Director of the Education Department. In March 2000, Chen Kuiyuan sent him to the Central Party School’s training program for young and middle-aged cadres, paving the way for his promotion to vice-ministerial level. In January 2003, Wu Yingjie was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Tibet Government, with Zhu Rongji as Premier at the time.

This training program for young and middle-aged cadres at the Central Party School was equivalent to a vice-ministerial level qualification. Certificate training course.

Those seeking promotion to vice-ministerial level generally need to attend this training.

Before leaving Tibet, Chen Kuiyuan had already sent Wu Yingjie to a qualification training course for vice-ministerial level officials.

Zhu Rongji promoted Wu Yingjie to vice-ministerial level a few months before his retirement.

2003 did not coincide with Jiang Zemin’s retirement; Jiang Zemin stepped down as General Secretary in 2002 and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2004.

2003 was the year Zhu Rongji retired.

In August 2016, 60-year-old Wu Yingjie became Secretary of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Region Committee, First Secretary of the CPC Tibet Military Region Committee, and Principal of the Party School of the Tibet Autonomous Region Committee.

We see this as Hu Jintao succeeding as President of the People’s Republic of China… Before Wen Jiabao became Premier, Wu Yingjie was promoted to vice-ministerial level.

For a full 13 years, Wu Yingjie was not promoted to ministerial level. During the 10 years of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s rule, Wu Yingjie was not promoted to ministerial level.

Chen Kuiyuan was from Hulunbuir League in Inner Mongolia and belonged to Chen Yun’s faction. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Hulunbuir League was under the jurisdiction of Heilongjiang Province and belonged to the Northeast Bureau controlled by Chen Yun. Chen Kuiyuan was transferred from Jiergeler (resumed work in 1972, serving as…) (Promoted by a member of the Standing Committee of the Lembah League), Degerd had close ties with Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. Degerd was Zhou Enlai’s man; Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun were in the same faction. Xi Zhongxun was Zhou Enlai’s chief secretary, and Zhu Rongji and Xie Lijuan also belonged to Chen Yun’s faction.

We should remember this key date: March 1973, when Deng Xiaoping returned to power as Vice Premier.

Deng Xiaoping was then labeled as the biggest capitalist roader within the Party.

He belonged to a faction, and all of Deng Xiaoping’s cronies were purged.

Deng Xiaoping returned to power in March 1973, while Jeergeler resumed work in 1972.

Anyone who resumed work in 1971 or 1972 was definitely not one of Deng Xiaoping’s men, as Deng Xiaoping was still under persecution at the time.

During the madness of the Cultural Revolution, none of Deng Xiaoping’s cronies could have gotten out.

Hu Chunhua was not promoted by Chen Kuiyuan; he was promoted by Hu Jintao. In 1997, when Chen Kuiyuan was the Tibet Party Secretary, Hu Chunhua transferred to the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (with Li Keqiang as First Secretary). He only returned to Tibet after Chen Kuiyuan left office in 2001. Chen Kuiyuan suppressed Hu Chunhua, preventing his promotion, so Hu Chunhua fled. Hu Jintao served as the Tibet Party Secretary from 1988 to 1992. It’s common knowledge that the previous Tibet Party Secretary cannot promote the next; only the General Secretary or Premier has the authority to promote provincial Party Secretaries. When Chen Kuiyuan took office in 1992, Jiang Zemin was the General Secretary and Li Peng was the Premier, effectively… The top leader was Deng Xiaoping, and the second-in-command was Chen Yun. Hu Jintao was not the General Secretary and had no power to directly promote Wu Yingjie or interfere in personnel matters in Tibet. The Communist Youth League was not run by Hu Jintao, nor was Tibet.

Hu Jintao was then the Party Secretary of Tibet. If he could promote the next Party Secretary of Tibet,

Tibet would be in a vicious cycle, always remaining under Hu Jintao’s control.

Chen Kuiyuan belonged to Chen Yun’s faction and was associated with other figures in Chen Yun’s faction in Inner Mongolia (such as Jiergeler, Li Wen, Batu Bagan, and Butege). Jiergeler claimed he “would build Inner Mongolia, which Premier Zhou praised as a model region, well,” indicating his loyalty to Zhou Enlai. After Lin Biao’s downfall in 1972, Jiergeler resumed his work. Hulunbuir League was placed under the jurisdiction of Heilongjiang Province, and Heilongjiang Party Secretary Wang Jiadao had close ties with Chen Yun and Gao Gang. In 1989, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji met with Wu Yingjie from the Shanghai Hui Nationality Middle School (responsible for the Tibetan inland class). Xie Lijuan (Vice Mayor of Shanghai, 1985-1996, member of the Jiusan Society) had a close relationship with Zhu Rongji. Chen Kuiyuan promoted Wu Yingjie because Chen Kuiyuan and Zhu Rongji belonged to the Chen Yun faction, and Zhu Rongji knew Wu Yingjie. Xi Zhongxun was in charge of the United Front Work Department from 1981 to 1987. During his tenure, Xie Lijuan joined the Jiusan Society and was promoted to Vice Mayor and Vice District Head of Shanghai.

What did Wu Yingjie himself say?

Despite the central government’s decisions and clear policies from national ministries, it was still a groundbreaking undertaking. The level of importance attached to establishing Tibetan schools varied among inland provinces and cities, as did the level of support and resources provided. Wu Yingjie, who frequently traveled between inland cities, was not a smooth talker. His most direct approach was to fill a large glass with baijiu (Chinese liquor), open his mouth, and drink it all in one gulp, earnestly looking at the other party and saying, “On behalf of the Tibetan people and children, I thank you.” “This simple and honest style made him good friends with education officials and principals from 18 provinces and municipalities in mainland China. To this day, Wu Yingjie can still name the junior high school and its principal whenever he sees a student from the Tibetan class.

In those years, Wu Yingjie always complained of being tired when we gathered. First and foremost, it was definitely physical exhaustion from drinking. Yes, even the greatest alcohol tolerance will harm your health if you drink too much; everyone understands that. He once told a reporter that drinking too much easily causes acid reflux. Once, after drinking too much in a city, he vomited acid while sleeping that night, and the next morning he found several small holes in the sheets where the acid had splattered. If this continued, it would be strange if his stomach didn’t perforate.

According to Wu Yingjie himself, he drank with education officials from 18 provinces and municipalities in order to support the Tibetan class in mainland China…” “Big drinking.” This refers to Zhu Rongji, a heavy drinker.

Then let’s look at the relationship between Redi and Wu Yingjie.

Redi was Hu Jintao’s political enemy in Tibet.

Hu Jintao was the top leader in Tibet at the time, and Redi was the second or third in command.

Hu Jintao was forced by Redi to say, “Change ideas more, change people less.”

He dared not replace the officials promoted by Redi.

On June 6, 2025, Redi died at the age of 86. Whether he was removed from his post by Hu Chunhua, I don’t know, but Redi was not only Hu Jintao’s political enemy, but also Hu Chunhua’s.

On July 16, 2025, Wu Yingjie was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. The difference was one month and ten days.

On the morning of September 15, 2012, red flags fluttered and colorful flags waved at the Togula Pass in Nagqu Town, creating a festive atmosphere. This was on National Highway 317, the Nagqu-Baqing section of the Heilongjiang-Changzhi Highway. The completion and opening ceremony of the road was solemnly held here. Raidi, former Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress, sent a congratulatory letter. Wu Yingjie, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Executive Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, attended the ceremony on behalf of the Party Committee and Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region and announced the completion and opening of the road. Garma, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress, read Raidi’s congratulatory letter. Liang Jianping, Deputy Secretary-General of the Tibet Autonomous Region Government, and Bianba Zhaxi, Secretary of the Nagqu Prefectural Party Committee, attended the ceremony.

This news features many people.

We focus on four of them:

Raidi, Wu Yingjie, Liang Jianping, and Bianba Zhaxi.

Raidi was originally the Secretary of the Nagqu Prefectural Party Committee. It’s as if Wu Yingjie built a road for Raidi’s hometown, Nagqu City.

Bianba Zhaxi, the then Secretary of the Nagqu Prefectural Party Committee, later became the chief secretary to Zhang Hongliang, who served as Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and is now the chief secretary to Ding Xuexiang. Ding Xuexiang served as Xi Jinping’s secretary for 10 years, and some people are still trying to whitewash him.

Ding Xuexiang is still talking nonsense about Xi Jinping.

Liang Jianping was Wu Yingjie’s chief secretary.

Liang Jianping is also quite eccentric.

Liang Jianping, male, Tibetan, born in August 1959, from Laiyang, Shandong.

There are Tibetans in Shandong, but Liang Jianping looks somewhat Tibetan.

Wu Yingjie is also from Shandong. However, Wu Yingjie grew up in Tibet.

Liang Jianping was very likely Chen Kuiyuan’s secretary back then.

This proves that Wu Yingjie was promoted by Chen Kuiyuan.

In 2007, Wen Jiabao, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council, published an article stating that “science, democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and human rights are not unique to capitalism, but are values ​​and achievements of civilization jointly pursued and created by mankind in the long historical process.” At a symposium on reforms at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chen Kuiyuan led a scathing critique of “some people in China following the lead of Western countries,” and the People’s Daily also reprinted a related column, implicitly criticizing Wen Jiabao.

Chen Kuiyuan had previously criticized Wen Jiabao.

Regarding the timing of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee and Trump’s visit to China: In July 2025, there were two rumors about the timing of the Fourth Plenary Session: it might be held in August or October. US President Donald Trump was confirmed to visit China at the end of October or later, possibly around the time of the APEC summit in South Korea (end of October), later than the Fourth Plenary Session.

Now, the Fourth Plenary Session hinges on the Politburo meeting at the end of July. With only a few days left, if it’s announced that the Fourth Plenary Session will be held in August, then it will be held in August; if not, it will be postponed.

Trump will visit China after the Fourth Plenary Session to confirm whether Xi Jinping will step down. This indicates that Trump’s visit to China may be influenced by the outcome of the Fourth Plenary Session, especially whether Xi Jinping’s leadership position will change. Sources in Beijing revealed on July 15 that US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant will visit China in September to pave the way for Trump’s visit and discuss a breakthrough in the US-China tariff conflict. Previously, US media reported that Trump was considering visiting China around the time of the APEC summit to meet with Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping’s reluctance to meet Trump for the first time at a multilateral event like APEC may stem from concerns about being constrained by the US-led diplomatic landscape. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, a crucial juncture in the CCP’s power adjustment, may determine Xi Jinping’s negotiating initiative during Trump’s visit. The strategic significance of Bessant’s September visit is seen as a signal that the US and China may reach a substantial agreement. Sources stated, “China is unwilling to hold a showy meeting; Bessant’s visit indicates that both sides are ready to achieve results in the economic and trade fields.”

Bessant may meet with Vice Premier He Lifeng, and even possibly with Xi Jinping, but is expected to avoid the September 3rd commemoration of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The US is seeking concessions from China on stable mineral and component supplies, increased imports of agricultural products and energy, preferential treatment for US companies, and currency transparency, while China may demand that the US ease investment restrictions and technology controls. Bessenter’s visit to China coincides with the September tariff negotiations between the US and other countries, and September 2025 will mark the seventh month of the US-China trade war. Following the outbreak of the trade war during Trump’s first term in 2018, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin visited China in February 2019 (more than seven months after the conflict began), meeting with Liu He and Xi Jinping. Bessenter’s visit follows a similar pattern, aiming to pave the way for Trump’s visit to China at the end of October and potentially drive a key breakthrough in the trade war.

Regarding the progress and differences in US-China trade negotiations, Bessenter and He Lifeng met three times in May (Geneva), June (London), and July 1 (Geneva) in 2025 to coordinate the tariff dispute, reaching temporary agreements such as a 90-day suspension of reciprocal tariffs and the resumption of rare earth exports from China. However, differences remain between the two sides, and Trump may make “significant concessions” a condition for his visit to China, meaning the trade dispute could escalate at any time. Sources say the US will push China to make concessions in areas such as strategic minerals, agricultural products, and energy imports. China, holding the trump card of strategic minerals, may demand the US ease technological restrictions. The US-China trade war, expected to lead to a decline in bilateral trade by 2025, may see September negotiations focus on rare earth exports, agricultural trade, and investment restrictions, attempting to alleviate the pressure of the tariff war. A Trump visit to China could mark a turning point in the trade war, but Xi Jinping’s limited power may weaken his negotiating initiative.

This is because Trump has already stated this; this is a quote from Trump relayed by Gordon Chang.

Trump: He is worried about what is happening internally in China.

Trump invited Xi Jinping to his inauguration, but Han Zheng attended while Xi Jinping did not.

Trump initially called for Cai Qi to participate in trade negotiations.

Cai Qi didn’t attend, did he?

Using Trump’s invitations to Xi Jinping and Cai Qi to participate in trade negotiations

as evidence that Xi Jinping still holds power is clearly unfounded.

These are all just Trump’s pronouncements; nothing has actually happened.

Trump should have realized that Xi Jinping no longer holds real power.

But Trump doesn’t need to wait for China; China has been dragging its feet.

Trump might visit China as early as October, or even not at all;

It’s not finalized yet.

There are ultimately two scenarios: one is that after the Fourth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping remains General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President.

The other is the scenario we speculate:

If Trump insists on visiting China in October, then Xi Jinping will be President, and Hu Chunhua will be General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

In that case, Trump would likely have to meet separately with Xi Jinping and Hu Chunhua.

Therefore, Trump is clearly waiting for the outcome of the Fourth Plenary Session.

He needs to wait for Xi Jinping to step down, for it to be officially announced, before Trump can talk to China.

Okay, thank you everyone.