新闻联播官宣，七下八上，习近平下，温家宝接总书记。李强公开回应温家宝的6点要求。解放军报背书我的陈云周恩来是习政治干爹的说法
新闻联播官宣，七下八上，习近平下，温家宝接总书记。李强公开回应温家宝的6点要求。解放军报背书我的陈云周恩来是习政治干爹的说法
大家好，
我们继续关注解放军报的批习文章。
首先解放军报是官方媒体，这就是定调子，要预告将来怎么处理习近平。
枪杆子杀气腾腾到底想干嘛呀
《解放军报》2025年7月24日发表的《为强军育人 以事业取人》（来源：中国军网，系列谈③）和2025年7月25日发表的《实事求是 求真务实》（来源：解放军报，系列谈④），作为“牢固立起 政治干部形象威信”系列的第三、四篇，延续了前两篇《强化政治忠诚 永葆初心本色》和《恪守党性原则 坚守风骨品格》的基调。表面上聚焦政治干部的培养与工作作风，实则可能暗含针对习近平的隐晦批判，反映胡春华（可能代表团派及胡锦涛意志）组织的系统性政治攻势。基调保持杀气腾腾、针锋相对。
首先我就没法评论这个事情，因为解放军报隔空回应了我的说法。
我不知道为什么啊。
我上一次是这么说的。
第一篇的文章要求“拔除错误思想根子”， 第二篇就更狠了。直接就是果断亮剑，不怕撕破脸，要当斗士不当绅士，这都搂不住了，下一篇再怎么写呢？
现在第三篇，第四篇都已经出来了。
这四篇解放军报的文章都是在批斗习近平
关注的自媒体或者媒体肯定不止我一个。
解放军报微调一下调子，肯定不是因为我的说法。
因为第三篇很突兀地提了一句，习主席，但是第四篇又没有了。
继续批斗习近平。
解放军报不可能是因为我的说法就调整调子。
可能其他自媒体也在说这个调子起的太高了。所以解放军报微调了一下。
关键解放军报把习近平的政治干爹陈云给扛出来了。
明确指出习近平的政治干爹是陈云，除了我之外，
我不知道还有没有别人这么说啊。
解放军报等于在变相背书我的说法。
这让我没法说了。
第三篇《为强军育人 以事业取人》强调“选人用人公不公、好不好、准不准”关乎强军，提出五湖四海“任人唯贤”“德才兼备、以德为先”，并以延安时期“正派路线”和习主席“注重基层、实干、官兵公认”的标准为依据，暗批当前用人失误。
中共的党八股就是缺什么，嚷嚷什么，既然说公不公，那就是不公，
既然说好不好，那就是不好，
既然说准不准，那就是不准。
文章要求“把脚踏实地干事业的人用起来”，而“搞投机钻营的人推上位”会“挫伤一大片”，就在在批判习近平偏离集体领导，培植小圈子。2022年二十大习近平强行连任（对抗江泽民、胡锦涛“退休党中央”），中部战区标语“集体领导，民主集中，个别酝酿，会议决定”（胡锦涛的16字方针）之前被忽视，暗示习近平“另立中央”行为。
这句话既然都已经说出来了，就是在批判习近平把“搞投机钻营的人推上位”
推上位这三个字明摆着说的就是何卫东。
何卫东连20大代表都不是，结果成了 政治局委员，当上军委副主席。
苗华20大是连任的军委委员，这个不需要推，只有何卫东推上位。
李尚福的资格都比何卫东深，李尚福是2019年7月晋升上将
何卫东是2019年12月晋升上将。
李尚福比何卫东早半年晋升上将，只当了一个军委委员，
何卫东就直接军委副主席了。
这个推上位，除了何卫东，不能是说别人。
第四篇《实事求是 求真务实》以“实事求是”为核心，引用周恩来反对“空谈、空喊”的教诲，以及李延年质朴动员的战前讲话，强调“言行一致践行硬道理”。这与《恪守党性原则》中的谭震林“有一说一”及前文“两个嘴巴说话、两张面孔做人”如出一辙，直指虚伪行为。
习近平2022年二十大前假意答应江泽民、胡锦涛退休，却暗地筹划强行三连任，如今又玩弄权谋，这种“弄虚作假、回避问题”的两面派作风，正是文章痛斥的“私心作祟”。《为强军育人》要求“坚信党组织是最大的靠山”，而非个人，暗讽习近平以个人利益凌驾党利。胡春华可能借此批判习近平的小圈子治理，呼吁回归老实干事、真抓实干的传统。
《为强军育人》提出“为强军育人、以事业取人”，强调“干干净净从政”“靠真本事、真业绩成长”，《实事求是》进一步批判“政绩表达”“虚招歪招”，要求“干实事、谋实招、求实效”，反对“主观主义”“急功近利”。这延续前文的“对党忠诚不是挂嘴上表态的，而是用行动践行的”观点，被视为对习近平时代“过度表忠”的精准狙击，尤其在“忠诚核心”“两个维护”成为标配的背景下，暗讽“嘴上忠诚、行动失真”的形式主义。蔡奇的“入脑入心入魂”表忠文化是典型。《实事求是》强调“一切建设和工作的根本指向是战斗力”，暗批习近平推崇的表忠文化偏离打仗需求，文章“果断亮剑”“不怕撕破脸”“当斗士不当绅士”的杀气腾腾基调，似在警告“拔除错误思想根子”已不足，需彻底清除其势力。丰泽园特权案例（习近平曾称在丰泽园纯一斋办公）被提及，可能意在讽刺其特权作风。
总的来说呢，第三篇文章提了一句习主席
把调子稍微收了收。
第三篇的亮点就是推上位这三个字。矛头直至何卫东的。
只有何卫东是强行推上位，苗华20大是连任军委委员，资历是够了。
看样子这个月 政治局会议可能会公布何卫东的罪状。
而且解放军报第三篇提陈云，第四篇提周恩来。
这都是我天天在说的习近平的政治干爹。
把我整不会了。我不知道这算不算是解放军报在变相背书我的说法。
把习近平的两个政治大爹都扛出来了。
中国国务院总理李强在北京举行的中欧峰会上，针对欧盟对中国工业补贴过度的担忧，发表了坦率的评论，称中国“没那么富裕，负担不起”。此番言论旨在回应欧盟对巨额贸易逆差和廉价出口涌入的担忧，也反映了中欧贸易关系中的紧张态势。
李强说：“中国没有欧洲那么富裕，我们负担不起。”
他补充道：“我们不会愚蠢到用政府和人民辛勤工作积累的财政资金，把我们的产品卖给外国消费者。”
我们不去李强说这些话有多傻叉。
首先别的说，什么叫做政府积累的财政资金。
政府从来就不创造财政资金，政府只有税收才能获得收入。
都是从人民身上抢劫过来的。纯属在偷换概念。
但是李强说这种话，就证明习近平不行了
习近平没有权力。
这种话就是和固本培元一样，带有李强强烈的个人色彩。
李强说的这段话以后肯定还会被引用。
李强都当三年总理了，
以前李强说过什么话吗？总理记者会被习近平取消了。
甭管李强说话的水平
起码李强现在敢说了。说出了一段，带有李强强烈个人色彩的话。
如果李强以后继续说出三四段带有强烈个人色彩的话，
我们就能知道李强的水平和政策倾向。
温家宝为什么叫做影帝呢，因为温家宝自己想说就说什么呢
也不能说温家宝想说什么就说什么。
反正温家宝表达了很多带有个人色彩的东西。
我们就能知道温家宝的个人偏好什么是，他的思想是什么
他的政策倾向是什么？
甭管李强说这些话，招人待见还是不招人待见。
李强都当三年总理了，
李强以前说过什么话，我们有印象吗？没印象啊。
温家宝说了那么多话，说明温家宝有权力。
李强能出说都有强烈个人色彩的话，证明李强有权力了。
这是2024年1月17日的人民日报
和2025年7月25日的人民日报。
去年2024年也是李强会见欧盟主席冯德莱恩。
今年2025年也是李强会见欧盟主席冯德莱恩。
2024年习近平定于一尊，占着大半的版面，压着李强。
2025年，李强和习近平平起平坐但是比习近平低了半头。
这些人民日报党八股天天整的也不知道故意，还是巧合。
如果李强的 政治地位大幅度上升，就意味习近平的政治地位大幅度下降。
这就是零和博弈，中共的权力一共就那么多。
权力不可能和经济一样，每年都增长，还能做大蛋糕呢。
蛋糕永远是那么大。
人民日报已经完全表明，习近平的政治地位下降。
李强主持召开国务院常务会议 部署逐步推行免费学前教育有关举措
国务院总理李强7月25日主持召开国务院常务会议，听取当前防汛抗旱情况和下一步工作安排汇报，审议通过《自然灾害调查评估暂行办法》，部署逐步推行免费学前教育有关举措。
这里面有三大看点
首先土共是越来越退化， 越来越黑箱。
这张照片是以前的国务院常务会议，现在连照片都没有
因为中共一共就4个副总理，国务委员从5个降到3个
李尚福秦刚被拿下。
现在加上李强一共只有8个人。
就算不公布出席名单。这些总理副总理大部分人都能认出来。
这张照片就起到了点名的作用。
我们看这张照片何立峰就缺席。
这还四个自信呢， 土共现在连8个总理副总理国务委员，能不能
保证都在的自信都没有。
就说明这些人指不定哪天就被拿下了，比如说王小洪，比如说何立峰
也就是说中国自己都没有谱儿，王小洪或者何立峰还能坚持多久。
所以不敢公布国务院常务会议的照片。
怂成这样。
第二点，李强说，
会议指出，逐步推行免费学前教育是涉及千家万户、事关长远发展的重要惠民举措。要指导各地尽快细化工作方案，按照分担比例安排好补助资金，确保按时足额拨付。
前两天传言温家宝提出的要求
加强社会治理，回应民意诉求：温家宝强调，近年社会不满（如白纸运动）源于民生问题，建议四中全会聚焦教育、医疗、住房改革，重建政府公信力，延续其“亲民总理”风格。
也就是说7月18日，传言温家宝提出关注民生问题
7月25日，李强就公开回应温家宝提出的第6点要求。
我不知道怎么回事儿，之前我说温家宝要出来
温家宝第二天就出来了。
现在李强在国务院会议上就回应了温家宝的要求。
然后还一个梗。
七下八上，
七十岁下
八十岁上
七十岁就是习近平，八十岁就是温家宝
习近平下，温家宝上，温家宝接任总书记
这是国务院会议说的，不是我说的。
好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
The CCTV Evening News officially announced that Xi Jinping will step down and Wen Jiabao will take over as General Secretary. Li Qiang publicly responded to Wen Jiabao’s six demands. The PLA Daily endorsed the claim that Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai were Xi Jinping’s political godfathers.
Hello everyone,
We continue to follow the PLA Daily’s articles criticizing Xi Jinping.
First of all, the PLA Daily is an official media outlet, which sets the tone and foreshadows how Xi Jinping will be dealt with in the future.
What exactly is the political maneuvering behind this show of force?
The PLA Daily’s articles published on July 24, 2025, titled “Cultivating Talent for a Strong Military and Selecting People Based on Their Careers” (Source: China Military Network, Series ③) and July 25, 2025, titled “Seeking Truth from Facts and Being Pragmatic” (Source: PLA Daily, Series ④), as the third and fourth articles in the series “Firmly Establishing the Image and Prestige of Political Cadres,” continue the tone of the previous two articles, “Strengthening Political Loyalty and Maintaining the Original Aspiration and True Colors” and “Adhering to Party Principles and Upholding Integrity and Character.” On the surface, the focus is on the training and work style of political cadres, but in reality, it may contain veiled criticism of Xi Jinping, reflecting a systematic political offensive organized by Hu Chunhua (possibly representing the delegation faction and Hu Jintao’s will). The tone remains aggressive and confrontational.
First of all, I can’t comment on this matter because the PLA Daily has responded to my statement remotely.
I don’t know why.
This is what I said last time.
The first article called for “uprooting the roots of erroneous thinking,” and the second was even harsher. It was a direct and decisive confrontation, unafraid to tear off the mask, wanting to be a fighter rather than a gentleman. If they can’t hold back now, how will they write the next article?
Now the third and fourth articles have already been published.
These four articles in the PLA Daily are all criticizing Xi Jinping.
I’m certainly not the only self-media or media outlet that has followed this.
The PLA Daily’s slight adjustment in tone is definitely not because of my statement.
Because the third article abruptly mentioned “President Xi,” but the fourth article didn’t.
Continuing to criticize Xi Jinping.
The PLA Daily wouldn’t have changed its tone just because of my statement.
Other self-media outlets might have also been saying that the tone was too high. So the PLA Daily made a slight adjustment.
The key point is that the PLA Daily brought up Chen Yun, Xi Jinping’s political godfather.
They explicitly stated that Chen Yun was Xi Jinping’s political godfather.
Besides me,
I don’t know if anyone else has said this.
The PLA Daily is essentially endorsing my statement.
This leaves me speechless.
The third article, “Cultivating Talent for a Strong Military: Selecting People Based on Their Career,” emphasizes that the fairness, quality, and accuracy of personnel selection are crucial to strengthening the military. It proposes “appointing people based on merit” and “both virtue and talent, with virtue as the priority,” and implicitly criticizes current personnel selection errors based on the “upright line” of the Yan’an period and President Xi’s standards of “emphasizing grassroots, practical work, and recognition by officers and soldiers.”
The CCP’s bureaucratic style is to shout about what it lacks. If it’s about fairness, then it’s unfair.
If it’s about quality, then it’s bad.
If it’s about accuracy, then it’s inaccurate.
The article calls for “using those who are down-to-earth and dedicated to their work,” while saying that “promoting those who engage in opportunism and scheming” would “damage a large number of people,” thus criticizing Xi Jinping for deviating from collective leadership and cultivating a clique. Xi Jinping’s forceful re-election at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (confronting Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s “retirement of the Party Central Committee”) and the previous disregard for the Central Theater Command’s slogan, “Collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual deliberation, and decision by meeting” (Hu Jintao’s 16-character policy), hinted at Xi Jinping’s “establishment of a separate central government.”
Since this statement has been made, it is a criticism of Xi Jinping for “promoting those who engage in opportunism and scheming.”
The phrase “promoted” clearly refers to He Weidong.
He Weidong wasn’t even a delegate to the 20th Party Congress, yet he became a member of the Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Miao Hua was a re-elected member of the Central Military Commission at the 20th Party Congress; he didn’t need to be promoted. Only He Weidong was promoted.
Li Shangfu’s qualifications are far superior to He Weidong’s. Li Shangfu was promoted to general in July 2019, while He Weidong was promoted in December 2019.
Li Shangfu was promoted to general six months earlier than He Weidong, but only served as a member of the Central Military Commission, while He Weidong went directly to the position of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.
This promotion can only be attributed to He Weidong; it cannot be anyone else.
The fourth article, “Seeking Truth from Facts and Being Pragmatic,” centers on “seeking truth from facts,” quoting Zhou Enlai’s admonition against “empty talk and empty slogans,” and Li Yannian’s simple pre-battle mobilization speech, emphasizing “consistency between words and deeds in practicing hard truths.” This is identical to Tan Zhenlin’s “speaking the truth” in “Upholding Party Principles” and the earlier “speaking with two mouths and acting with two faces,” directly pointing to hypocrisy.
Before the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping feigned agreement to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s retirement, but secretly planned a forced third term. Now, he is again engaging in power struggles. This two-faced style of “deception and evasion of problems” is precisely what the article criticizes as “selfishness.” “Cultivating Talent for a Strong Military” demands “firm belief that the Party organization is the greatest support,” not the individual, implicitly criticizing Xi Jinping for prioritizing personal interests over Party interests. Hu Chunhua may use this to criticize Xi Jinping’s clique-based governance and call for a return to the tradition of honest work and practical results.
“Cultivating Talent for a Strong Military” proposes “cultivating talent for a strong military and selecting people based on their careers,” emphasizing “clean political conduct” and “growing through genuine ability and achievements.” “Seeking Truth from Facts” further criticizes “performance presentation” and “deceptive tactics,” demanding “doing practical work, devising practical measures, and seeking practical results,” and opposing “subjectivism” and “short-sightedness.” This continues the earlier point that “loyalty to the Party is not just lip service, but demonstrated through action,” and is seen as a precise attack on the “excessive displays of loyalty” during the Xi Jinping era, especially given the standardization of “loyalty to the core leadership” and “upholding the two safeguards,” subtly criticizing the formalism of “lip service loyalty but distorted actions.” Cai Qi’s “deeply ingrained, heartfelt, and soul-stirring” culture of loyalty is a typical example. Seeking Truth from Facts emphasizes that “the fundamental orientation of all construction and work is combat effectiveness,” implicitly criticizing the loyalty culture promoted by Xi Jinping for deviating from the needs of warfare. The article’s aggressive tone—”decisively drawing the sword,” “not afraid to tear off the mask,” and “acting as a fighter, not a gentleman”—seems to warn that “uprooting the roots of erroneous thinking” is insufficient and that its influence must be thoroughly eliminated. The mention of the Fengzeyuan privilege case (Xi Jinping once stated that he worked in Chunyizhai at Fengzeyuan) may be intended to satirize his privileged lifestyle.
In general, the third article mentions President Xi briefly, slightly toning down the tone.
The highlight of the third article is the phrase “promoting the rise to power.” The spearhead is directed at He Weidong.
Only He Weidong was forcibly promoted, while Miao Hua was re-elected as a member of the Central Military Commission at the 20th Party Congress; his qualifications are sufficient.
It seems the Politburo meeting this month might announce He Weidong’s crimes.
Furthermore, the PLA Daily mentioned Chen Yun in its third article and Zhou Enlai in its fourth.
These are the political godfathers of Xi Jinping that I mention every day.
This is confusing me. I don’t know if this counts as the PLA Daily indirectly endorsing my statement.
They’ve brought up two of Xi Jinping’s political godfathers. Politics.
At the China-EU summit in Beijing, Chinese Premier Li Qiang made frank comments regarding the EU’s concerns about excessive subsidies to Chinese industries, stating that China is “not that rich and cannot afford it.” These remarks were intended to respond to the EU’s concerns about the huge trade deficit and the influx of cheap exports, and also reflect the tense situation in China-EU trade relations.
Li Qiang said, “China is not as wealthy as Europe; we cannot afford it.”
He added, “We are not foolish enough to use the public funds accumulated through the hard work of the government and the people to sell our products to foreign consumers.”
Let’s not dwell on how stupid Li Qiang’s words are.
First, let’s discuss what constitutes “government-accumulated public funds.”
The government never creates public funds; it only earns revenue through taxes.
It’s all robbed from the people. This is a pure case of misrepresentation.
But Li Qiang saying this proves that Xi Jinping is incompetent.
Xi Jinping has no power.
These words, like “strengthening the foundation and cultivating the source,” bear Li Qiang’s strong personal bias.
This statement by Li Qiang will certainly be quoted again in the future.
Li Qiang has been Premier for three years.
What has Li Qiang said before? Xi Jinping canceled the Premier’s press conference. (Geographical reference information)
Regardless of Li Qiang’s speaking ability,
at least Li Qiang dares to speak now. He has uttered a statement bearing Li Qiang’s strong personal bias.
If Li Qiang continues to make three or four more statements with a strong personal bias,
we will be able to understand Li Qiang’s competence and policy inclinations.
Why is Wen Jiabao called a “movie star”? Because Wen Jiabao said whatever he wanted.
It’s not that Wen Jiabao said whatever he wanted.
Anyway, Wen Jiabao expressed a lot of things with a personal bias.
We can then understand Wen Jiabao’s personal preferences, his thoughts, and his policy inclinations.
Regardless of whether Li Qiang’s words are popular or not,
Li Qiang has been Premier for three years.
Do we remember what Li Qiang said before? No.
Wen Jiabao said so much, which shows that Wen Jiabao had power.
Li Qiang’s ability to make statements with a strong personal bias proves that Li Qiang has power.
This is from the People’s Daily on January 17, 2024, and July 25, 2025.
Last year, 2024, was also Li Qiang’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
This year, 2025, is also the year Li Qiang meets with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
In 2024, Xi Jinping was firmly established as the supreme leader, occupying most of the space and overshadowing Li Qiang.
In 2025, Li Qiang will be on equal footing with Xi Jinping, but slightly less prominent.
These daily Party jargon articles in the People’s Daily are either intentional or coincidental.
If Li Qiang’s political status rises significantly, it means Xi Jinping’s political status will decline significantly.
This is a zero-sum game; the CCP’s power is finite.
Power cannot grow every year like the economy, nor can it expand the pie.
The pie is always the same size.
The People’s Daily has clearly indicated that Xi Jinping’s political status is declining.
Li Qiang chaired an executive meeting of the State Council, deploying measures to gradually implement free preschool education.
On July 25, Premier Li Qiang chaired an executive meeting of the State Council, hearing reports on the current flood and drought situation and the next steps, reviewing and approving the “Interim Measures for Natural Disaster Investigation and Assessment,” and deploying measures to gradually implement free preschool education.
There are three key points here:
First, the CCP is becoming increasingly degenerate and opaque.
This photo is from a previous State Council executive meeting; now there aren’t even any photos of it.
Because the CCP only has four vice premiers, and the number of State Councilors has decreased from five to three.
Li Shangfu and Qin Gang have been removed from their posts.
Now, including Li Qiang, there are only eight people in total.
Even without releasing the attendance list, most of these premiers and vice premiers are recognizable.
This photo serves as a roll call.
We see that He Lifeng is absent from this photo.
They still have the confidence to have four vice premiers? The CCP now doesn’t even have the confidence to guarantee that all eight premiers, vice premiers, and State Councilors will be present.
This shows that these people could be removed at any time, like Wang Xiaohong or He Lifeng.
In other words, even China itself doesn’t know how long Wang Xiaohong or He Lifeng can hold on.
That’s why they dare not release photos of the State Council executive meeting.
They’re so cowardly.
Second, Li Qiang said,
The meeting pointed out that gradually implementing free preschool education is an important measure to benefit the people, involving millions of households and concerning long-term development. Local governments should be guided to refine their work plans as soon as possible, allocate subsidies according to the sharing ratio, and ensure timely and full disbursement.
A few days ago, rumors circulated that Wen Jiabao’s demands included strengthening social governance and responding to public demands. Wen Jiabao emphasized that recent social discontent (such as the “blank paper movement”) stemmed from livelihood issues, and suggested that the Fourth Plenary Session focus on education, healthcare, and housing reforms to rebuild government credibility and continue his “people-friendly premier” style.
In other words, on July 18th, rumors circulated that Wen Jiabao would focus on livelihood issues.
On July 25th, Li Qiang publicly responded to Wen Jiabao’s sixth demand.
I don’t know what happened. I previously said Wen Jiabao was going to step down.
Wen Jiabao stepped down the next day.
Now Li Qiang responded to Wen Jiabao’s demands at a State Council meeting.
And then there’s this joke:
“Seven down, eight up,”
“Seventy years old down, eighty years old up.”
“Seventy years old is Xi Jinping, eighty years old is Wen Jiabao.”
“Xi Jinping down, Wen Jiabao up, Wen Jiabao takes over as General Secretary.”
This was said at a State Council meeting, not by me.
Okay, thank you everyone.
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