蔡奇将被撤换？动蔡奇将会很快动习。人日社论淡化习近平。5年的社论到底发生了什么？他想当重庆市委书记，需要某某某的同意才行啊

 

蔡奇将被撤换？动蔡奇将会很快动习。人日社论淡化习近平。5年的社论到底发生了什么？他想当重庆市委书记，需要某某某的同意才行啊

大家好，先给大家分享今天把我看笑了，政治新闻。
广西：深刻汲取蓝天立、秦如培、刘宏武、张秀隆、周家斌、彭晓春等案教训
这不知道是什么记者写的新闻标题。
这都是副部级以上的官员才写的，局级官员都没有资格被写进标题。
不过既然都被抓了这么多还吸取什么教训呢，这不是被人一锅端了吗？

2020年7月8日，广西壮族自治区第十三届人大常委会第十六次会议表决任命刘宏武为广西壮族自治区人民政府副主席。

2022年1月14日，刘宏武涉嫌严重违纪违法，接受中央纪委国家监委纪律审查和监察调查。

这人很早就抓了，我第一次听说这个人。
2022年6月23日，中央纪委国家监委通报，刘宏武严重违反党的多项纪律，构成严重职务违法并涉嫌受贿犯罪，且在十八大后不收敛、不收手，性质严重，影响恶劣，应予严肃处理，决定给予其开除党籍、开除公职处分，免去其第十二届广西壮族自治区党委委员职务，终止其广西壮族自治区第十二次党代会代表资格，收缴其违纪违法所得，将其涉嫌犯罪问题移送检察机关依法审查起诉，所涉财物一并移送。通报中出现了“寡廉鲜耻”、“既想当官又想发财”等罕见表述。

这个说法太搞笑了，哪个共产党官员当官不是为了发财呢。
“既想当官又想发财”，因为想发财才当官的吧？

这名网友说，
大包，人民日报的建党104周年社论里2442没了，前几年都有的
这是2025年7月1日人民日报发表的社论
坚定信念信心 阔步复兴征程——热烈庆祝中国共产党成立一百零四周年

这个可以套我的三大元素标准，说了一个完整版习思想，说了一个习核心。
但是没有说2442什么，或者二二，两个确立，两个维护。
什么都没有说。
三大元素只说了两个，是一个8分的的表态。

我们简单对比一下去年的2024年7月1日的。
凝聚推进中国式现代化的磅礴力量——热烈庆祝中国共产党成立一百零三周年

去年的不但说了习核心，习思想，两个确立。
还分别复读了一遍。
以前不单是3大元素说满，还能复读。
如果复读也重复计分的话，那么去年的分数就是24分。
今年是8分，今年不但三大元素没有说满，而且只说了一遍，没有复读。
这很明显，就相差甚远。
没法比，一比就发现，习近平下台了。

我们再看看102周年是怎么回事儿。
汇聚强国建设民族复兴的磅礴伟力——热烈庆祝中国共产党成立一百零二周年

2023年就是抽风了，习核心说了两遍，两个确立说了两遍，习思想说了4遍。
也就是说去年人民日报就降调子了，但是降得不多。
今年就快降没了。

越看越有意思，我们再看看101年，中共的表演。

踔厉奋发守初心 迈向壮阔新征程——热烈庆祝中国共产党成立101周年

我们先汇总一下4年的标题
总的趋势是，共产党马上就嗝屁了。
一开始又是壮阔，又是新征程，后面两年是磅礴。
今年就是坚定信心。都没有信心。中共的话语体系，坚定信心，那就是信心不足的意思。

但是2022年没有说习思想，不知道习思想还没有发明，还是怎么回事儿。
说了两遍习核心，一遍2442。

这个2022年并没有写。
习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想是在2017年10月18日至24日举行的中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上正式提出并写入党章的。

我们再看看100周年。铸就百年辉煌 书写千秋伟业——热烈庆祝中国共产党成立一百周年
100周年说了两次习核心，1次2442，两次习思想。

如果从人民日报这5年的社论来看呢，2022年7月1日，也就是20大之前。
本来习近平应该下台的。在20大的前夕，习近平才反击成功的。
在2022年7月1日的时间点上，并没有吹习近平，当时可能预定习近平20大下台的。
当然，今年的调子，比20前的2022年7月1日的调子还低。

我们总是会意外的发现很多答案。
我们注意2021年7月1日的时候，习近平的权力还没有受到影响。
因为2021年8月的北戴河会议，习近平才会胡锦涛和江泽民收拾了。
一直低调到2022年7月1日，就是20大习近平才反击成功的。
20大之后火了两年就不行了。

胡锦涛2024年6月19日发动军事政变，7月1日的人民日报社论还没有反应。
等到今年2025年7月1日就已经完全体现出来了。

从2021年的高调全面，到2022年的低调试探，再到2023-2024年的短暂回暖，2025年社论的急剧降调清晰勾勒出习近平权力从巅峰到衰退的轨迹。尤其是2025年“2442”的彻底缺失，表明中共宣传体系已不再强调“两个确立/两个维护”，这在中共高度集中的政治文化中，几乎等同于对习近平核心地位的公开弱化。

所以想观察中共内部的变化，可以有无数个维度观察出来。

人民日报社论标题的用词变化，从2021-2024年的豪迈到2025年的谨慎，折射出中共内部信心的崩塌：2021年：“铸就百年辉煌 书写千秋伟业”气势恢宏，彰显建党百年的历史自信。
2022年：“踔厉奋发守初心 迈向壮阔新征程”虽然仍然积极，但是“壮阔”略显空泛，表明二十大前的谨慎。
2023-2024年：“磅礴伟力”“磅礴力量”延续高调，这正是习近平狂妄的时候，试图掩盖2022年的低谷。
2025年：“坚定信念信心 阔步复兴征程”直接崩塌了。“坚定信心”在中共话语体系中往往暗示“信心不足”。在经济下行、地缘冲突加剧的背景下，2025年标题放弃“磅礴”式的豪言，转而强调“信念”“信心”，实际上是中共对内外困境的间接承认。

这种标题用词的退化，从“辉煌”“磅礴”到“坚定信心”，不仅是宣传风格的转变，更暗示中共政权对自身前景的担忧。

光从这5个标题上，已经可以证明，习近平下台了。
新任的中共领导人，比较低调务实，不像习近平这么狂妄自大。

从5个标题就能看出来，习近平已经下台了。

我们打分之后，一目了然，20大前的低调，到20大后的权力巅峰。
然后迅速从巅峰跌倒谷底。

月满则亏
亢龙有悔
这是世界上一切事情发展的必然规律。

这名网友说
蒋某某预告袁家军接中办主任，不能够吧？袁胃口小了点吧？
这名网友说
蒋某某7月4日最新报料 陈吉宁去重庆任书记 袁家军上中央任中办主任 蒋观点胡扯 但消息尚准 马兴瑞事他6月26日就报了
此如果确实 大动作开始了
我的回复是
我也不知道谁要当中办主任，如果要换中办主任的话，要动蔡奇的话，那就是要动习近平了。
再说中办主任不是金善文吗？
而且中办主任一定非要是政治局委员。
令计划就不是政治局委员，而只是中央书记处书记。
再说陈小江也不是政治局委员，不是照样当新疆书记吗？
完全可以补手续。这些根本就没有什么影响。
我不知道蒋某某是真消息还是自己瞎编。
政治局委员这个条件限制了他的想象力。
如果比照陈小江的话，完全可以先任命一个正部级的中央办公厅主任。
等到四中全会补手续，晋升政治局委员或者中央书记处书记。
完全不受影响。共产党还在乎这个。

我们泛泛的说一下，传言袁家军要入常
如果袁家军接任中办主任，那么下一任中办主任还要和蔡奇一样是常委吗？
这个可能性比较低，因为胡锦涛的两个中办主任王刚和令计划都不是政治局常委。
习近平都已经把中办主任弄成常委，胡锦涛肯定不会。
不需要原因，就是看习近平不顺眼。
也就是说如果袁家军接任中办主任，他暂时就不会入常了。
那么还要再找一个人接替蔡奇。
袁家军应该是预定的接替蔡奇担任中央书记处书记的人选。
但是不会担任中办主任。

那么这个消息只能是蔡奇放出来的，蔡奇还不想下去呗。
只想交出中办主任，不想退休，想得美啊。
蔡奇和习近平绑定，习近平下台，蔡奇必须跟着下台。

其次是陈吉宁去见江绵恒，去见胡海峰，去见吴邦国的儿子吴磊
这都明摆着，江派想要陈吉宁的位置。

其次我们今天刚刚说了，因为提拔黄建发担任中组部长的常务副部长。
黄建发挂职福建时期的福建省委书记宋德福和张德江共用一个秘书肖志恒。
因为张德江掌握人事大权，所以张德江是江派的共主。
张德江曾经担任过重庆市委书记，陈吉宁想去重庆，张德江不点头行吗？
李强曾经担任过上海市委书记，肯定也得李强同意。

所以陈吉宁去找江绵恒。
江绵恒说了也不算，
江派的人要排名的话，
张德江，李强，曾庆红，江绵恒
江绵恒最多排第4个，可能还有别人。
轮也轮不到江绵恒做主。
陈吉宁去找江绵恒也没用。
除非陈吉宁去找张德江，张德江能点头没准有戏。
但是张德江自己人可能都安排不过来，还顾得上陈吉宁呢。

我就是随便一说，我也没有消息
好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Will Cai Qi be replaced? Moving Cai Qi will soon lead to moving Xi Jinping. The People’s Daily editorial downplays Xi Jinping. What exactly happened in the editorials of the past five years? He wants to be the Chongqing Party Secretary; he needs so-and-so’s approval first!

Hello everyone, let me share some political news that made me laugh today.

Guangxi: Deeply learn from the lessons of the cases of Lan Tianli, Qin Rupei, Liu Hongwu, Zhang Xiulong, Zhou Jiabin, Peng Xiaochun, etc.

I don’t know what kind of reporter wrote this headline.

These are headlines written by officials at the vice-ministerial level or above; even bureau-level officials aren’t qualified to be mentioned.

But since so many have been arrested, what lessons are there to learn? Isn’t this just a case of being swept up in one fell swoop?

On July 8, 2020, the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region voted to appoint Liu Hongwu as Vice Chairman of the People’s Government of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

On January 14, 2022, Liu Hongwu was suspected of serious violations of discipline and law and was placed under disciplinary review and supervisory investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission.

This person was arrested a long time ago; this is the first time I’ve heard of him.

On June 23, 2022, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Liu Hongwu had seriously violated multiple Party disciplines, constituted serious job-related violations, and was suspected of bribery. Furthermore, he showed no restraint after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, indicating the serious nature and egregious impact of his actions. He was expelled from the Party and removed from public office, removed from his position as a member of the 12th Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Committee, and his qualifications as a delegate to the 12th Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Congress were terminated. His illegal gains were confiscated, and his suspected crimes were transferred to the procuratorate for investigation and prosecution, along with related assets. The announcement included unusual phrases such as “shameless” and “wanting to be an official and also wanting to get rich.”

This statement is ridiculous. Which Communist Party official doesn’t become an official to get rich?

“Wanting to be an official and also wanting to get rich”—he became an official because he wanted to get rich, right?

This netizen said, “Hey, the People’s Daily editorial commemorating the 104th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China no longer includes ‘2442,’ which was present in previous years.

This is the People’s Daily editorial published on July 1, 2025: ‘Firmly Upholding Beliefs and Confidence, Striding Forward on the Journey of Rejuvenation—Warmly Celebrating the 104th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.’

This can be applied to my three-element standard. It presents a complete version of Xi Jinping Thought and mentions Xi Jinping’s core leadership.

However, it doesn’t mention ‘2442,’ or anything like ‘two-two,’ ‘two establishments,’ or ‘two safeguards.’

It says nothing.

It only mentions two of the three elements, making it an 8-point statement.

Let’s briefly compare it to last year’s, July 1, 2024: ‘Gathering the Mighty Force to Advance Chinese-Style Modernization—Warmly Celebrating the 103rd Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.’

Last year’s not only mentioned Xi Jinping’s core leadership, Xi Jinping Thought, and the ‘two establishments,’

it also repeated each of them.

Previously, not only were the three elements fully stated, but they could also be repeated.

If repeated statements are also counted, then last year’s score would be 24 points.” This year’s score is 8 out of 10. Not only were the three key elements not fully mentioned, but they were only mentioned once, without repetition.

This is obvious, a huge difference.

There’s no comparison; a comparison reveals that Xi Jinping is out of power.

Let’s look at what happened on the 102nd anniversary.

“Gathering the immense power for building a strong nation and national rejuvenation—Warmly celebrating the 102nd anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China”

2023 was a mess. The “Xi Jinping core” was mentioned twice, the “two establishments” were mentioned twice, and “Xi Jinping Thought” was mentioned four times.

In other words, the People’s Daily lowered its tone last year, but not by much.

This year, it’s almost gone.

The more we look, the more interesting it becomes. Let’s look at the CCP’s performance on the 101st anniversary.

“Striving forward to uphold the original aspiration and embark on a magnificent new journey—Warmly celebrating the 101st anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China”

Let’s summarize the titles of the past four years.

The general trend is that the Communist Party is about to collapse.

At the beginning, it was all about grandeur and a new journey; the next two years were about immense power.

This year, it’s all about firm confidence. There’s no confidence at all. In the CCP’s discourse, “firm confidence” actually implies a lack of confidence.

However, the term “Xi Jinping Thought” wasn’t mentioned in 2022. It’s unclear whether “Xi Jinping Thought” hadn’t been invented yet, or what happened.

The term “Xi Jinping Core” was mentioned twice, and “2442” was mentioned once.

This wasn’t written in 2022.

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era was formally proposed and incorporated into the Party Constitution at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held from October 18th to 24th, 2017.

Let’s look at the 100th anniversary. “Forging a Century of Glory, Writing a Millennium of Great Achievements—Warmly Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China”

The 100th anniversary mentioned “Xi Jinping Core” twice, “2442” once, and “Xi Jinping Thought” twice.

If we look at the People’s Daily editorials over the past five years, on July 1st, 2022, before the 20th National Congress…

Xi Jinping was supposed to step down. He only successfully counterattacked on the eve of the 20th National Congress.

At the time of July 1st, 2022, there was no mention of Xi Jinping; it was likely that Xi Jinping’s stepping down at the 20th National Congress was already anticipated.

Of course, this year’s tone is even more subdued than that of July 1, 2022.

We always find many unexpected answers.

We note that on July 1, 2021, Xi Jinping’s power was not yet affected.

It was only after the Beidaihe meeting in August 2021 that Xi Jinping dealt with Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.

He remained low-key until July 1, 2022, when he successfully counterattacked at the 20th Party Congress.

After the 20th Party Congress, he enjoyed a brief period of power before his influence waned.

Hu Jintao launched a military coup on June 19, 2024, but the People’s Daily editorial on July 1 did not react.

By July 1, 2025, it was fully evident.

From the high-profile and comprehensive approach of 2021, to the low-key probing of 2022, and then the brief resurgence in 2023-2024, the sharp decline in the tone of the 2025 editorial clearly outlines the trajectory of Xi Jinping’s power from its peak to its decline. The complete absence of the “2442” principle in 2025, in particular, indicates that the CCP’s propaganda system no longer emphasizes “two establishments/two safeguards.” In the CCP’s highly centralized political culture, this is almost tantamount to a public weakening of Xi Jinping’s core position.

Therefore, there are countless dimensions from which to observe changes within the CCP.

The shift in wording in the People’s Daily editorial titles, from the boldness of 2021-2024 to the caution of 2025, reflects the collapse of confidence within the CCP: 2021: “Forging a Century of Glory, Writing a Millennium of Great Achievements,” grand and imposing, showcasing the historical confidence of the Party’s centennial.

2022: “Striving Forward to Uphold the Original Aspiration, Embarking on a Magnificent New Journey,” while still positive, the word “magnificent” feels somewhat vague, indicating caution before the 20th Party Congress.

2023-2024: “Impressive Power” and “Impressive Strength” continue the high-profile rhetoric; this is precisely when Xi Jinping is arrogant, attempting to cover up the low point of 2022.

The slogan “Firmly Uphold Belief and Confidence, Striding Forward on the Journey of Rejuvenation” for 2025 collapsed. In the CCP’s discourse, “firmly uphold confidence” often implies a lack of confidence. Against the backdrop of economic downturn and escalating geopolitical conflicts, the 2025 headline abandoned grandiloquent pronouncements in favor of “belief” and “confidence,” effectively an indirect acknowledgment of the CCP’s internal and external difficulties.

This degradation in headline wording, from “glorious” and “grand” to “firmly uphold confidence,” is not merely a shift in propaganda style, but also suggests the CCP regime’s anxieties about its future.

These five headlines alone are enough to prove that Xi Jinping has stepped down.

The new CCP leaders are more low-key and pragmatic, unlike Xi Jinping’s arrogance.

These five headlines alone show that Xi Jinping has stepped down.

After our evaluation, it’s clear: from the low-key approach before the 20th Party Congress to the pinnacle of power after the 20th Party Congress.

Then, a rapid fall from the peak to the bottom.

The moon wanes after it’s full; the dragon that soars too high will regret it. This is the inevitable law of development for everything in the world.

This netizen said:

Jiang Moumou’s prediction that Yuan Jiajun would take over as Director of the General Office of the Central Committee is impossible, right? Yuan’s ambitions seem a bit small.

This netizen said:

Jiang Moumou’s latest report on July 4th: Chen Jining goes to Chongqing as Party Secretary, Yuan Jiajun goes to the Central Committee as Director of the General Office. Jiang’s views are nonsense, but the information is still accurate. He reported on Ma Xingrui’s matter on June 26th.

If this is true, a big move has begun.

My reply is:

I don’t know who wants to be the Director of the General Office. If the Director of the General Office is to be replaced, if Cai Qi is to be targeted, then Xi Jinping is to be targeted.

Besides, isn’t Jin Shanwen the Director of the General Office?

And the Director of the General Office must be a member of the Politburo.

Ling Jihua is not a member of the Politburo, but only a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Furthermore, Chen Xiaojiang is not a member of the Politburo, but he still serves as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, right?

The formalities can be completed. These things have no impact at all.

I don’t know if Jiang Moumou’s information is real or if he’s just making it up.

The requirement of being a member of the Politburo limits his imagination.

If we follow Chen Xiaojiang’s example, we could simply appoint a ministerial-level Director of the General Office of the Central Committee first.

Then, at the Fourth Plenary Session, the formalities could be completed, and he could be promoted to a member of the Politburo or a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

It wouldn’t affect him at all. The Communist Party doesn’t care about that.

Generally speaking, there are rumors that Yuan Jiajun will be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

If Yuan Jiajun takes over as Director of the General Office, will the next Director of the General Office be a member of the Standing Committee like Cai Qi?

This is unlikely, because Hu Jintao’s two Directors of the General Office, Wang Gang and Ling Jihua, were not members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Xi Jinping has already made the Director of the General Office a member of the Standing Committee; Hu Jintao certainly wouldn’t.

No reason is needed; he just doesn’t like Xi Jinping.

In other words, if Yuan Jiajun takes over as Director of the General Office, he won’t be a member of the Standing Committee for the time being.

Then someone else needs to be found to replace Cai Qi.

Yuan Jiajun is probably the designated candidate to succeed Cai Qi as a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

But he won’t be the Director of the General Office.

So this news must have been released by Cai Qi; Cai Qi doesn’t want to step down yet.

He only wants to hand over the position of Director of the General Office of the Central Committee, not retire—dream on!

Cai Qi is tied to Xi Jinping; if Xi Jinping steps down, Cai Qi must step down as well.

Secondly, Chen Jining met with Jiang Mianheng, Hu Haifeng, and Wu Bangguo’s son, Wu Lei.

This is all too obvious; the Jiang faction wants Chen Jining’s position.

Secondly, as we just mentioned today, it’s because of the promotion of Huang Jianfa to Executive Vice Minister of the Organization Department.

When Huang Jianfa was serving as the Fujian Provincial Party Secretary, Song Defu and Zhang Dejiang shared a secretary, Xiao Zhiheng.

Because Zhang Dejiang controls personnel appointments, he is the undisputed leader of the Jiang faction.

Zhang Dejiang previously served as the Chongqing Municipal Party Secretary; if Chen Jining wants to go to Chongqing, can Zhang Dejiang refuse?

Li Qiang previously served as the Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary; Li Qiang’s approval is also necessary.

Therefore, Chen Jining went to see Jiang Mianheng.

Jiang Mianheng’s word doesn’t count.

If the Jiang faction were to rank its members,

Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Mianheng.

Jiang Mianheng would be at most fourth, and there might be others.

It’s not Jiang Mianheng’s place to make the decisions.

Chen Jining going to Jiang Mianheng is useless.

Unless Chen Jining goes to Zhang Dejiang, and Zhang Dejiang agrees, there might be a chance.

But Zhang Dejiang is probably too busy managing his own people to bother with Chen Jining.

I was just saying, I don’t have any information either.

Okay, thank you everyone.