北戴河如临大敌，习马上下台。秘书供出马兴瑞曾经给习近平姐姐齐桥桥送钱

 

北戴河如临大敌，习马上下台。秘书供出马兴瑞曾经给习近平姐姐齐桥桥送钱

大家好，

多方消息表明，从北京至河北北戴河沿线的安保措施显著升级。途经线路上的岗哨骤增，车站和列车实施多重查验，旅客反映通过订票软件查询发现，6月26日至7月7日北戴河站附近区间无任何车次，7月8日后购买前往北戴河的火车票也异常困难。网友认为，这一反常现象暗示中共高官可能已经陆续前往北戴河。访民赵女士通过同伴描述，从北京到北戴河沿途设置了七道检查关卡，涵盖进站、上车、车内巡逻、下车、出站以及打车等环节，警车和便衣遍布，气氛异常紧张。相较往年，北戴河沿海一带的岗哨密度更高，显示出超乎寻常的戒备。

此外，北京和河北近期向地方当局下达口头通知，要求“稳控对象”，特别是访民和异见人士不得靠近北戴河沿线。知情人说，靠近海边的旅馆和民宿被政府包场，禁止普通人入住，当地手机和网络信号也受到明显干扰，信号弱而不稳。这种全面动员警力和兵力的措施，远远超过以往北戴河会议的安保规模，暗示可能涉及更重大、更敏感的议题。

北戴河会议素有“闭门分赃会”之称，高层在此敲定人事安排，随后通过正式会议走程序表决并官宣。观察人士分析，今年提前集会可能与以下几点有关：

平衡势力与人事变动：、习近平丧失大权，反习派可能借机推动人事调整，削弱习近平派系。

四中全会筹备：四中全会聚焦党建和人事安排，传言习近平可能在会上卸去党魁职务。提前北戴河会议可能为四中全会定调，加速决策进程。

二十一大布局：2027年二十一大将是下届党代会，提前规划新的常委班子，或为避免权力真空风险。

北戴河会议的成果通常为后续全会奠定基础。如果今年会议达成共识，可能推出新的中共领导人，移交习近平部分或全部权力，甚至重塑常委班子，为四中全会提供框架。四中全会的召开日期若提前，也可能紧随北戴河会议，预计7月中下旬或8月初举行。

2024年2月5日，中央纪委国家监委宣布对中国南方电网有限责任公司原党组成员、纪检监察组组长龙飞涉嫌严重违纪违法展开调查。龙飞，1969年8月出生于四川广安，曾在中国航天系统及南方电网任职，曾经担任马兴瑞的秘书，2024年8月1日被开除党籍。调查显示，其自2000年至2023年间利用职务便利，收受613万元贿赂。2025年3月21日，山东省烟台市中级人民法院一审公开开庭审理此案，龙飞在关押期间曾经供述，其上司——前新疆维吾尔自治区党委书记马兴瑞，曾指示他向习近平的姐姐齐桥桥输送资金。

传言称，马兴瑞在担任航天科技集团总经理期间，通过龙飞向齐桥桥及其丈夫邓家贵及其女儿张燕南的家族网络输送利益，涉及金额可能有几个亿人民币。齐桥桥自2014年起假装退出商界，但其家族资产，比如持有深圳市远为实业74.5%股份，后改名建银创信投资的财富规模据称高达数亿美元。龙飞的供词暗示，这笔资金可能通过航天项目的经济交易暗中转移，旨在换取习包子的提拔。

2005年至2013年，正值齐桥桥持有深圳市远为实业74.5%股份，并推动其子公司建银远为改组为建银创信投资上市的敏感阶段。

2025年6月10日，烟台市中级人民法院一审宣判，龙飞因受贿罪被判处有期徒刑七年，并处罚金50万元，赃款613万元及孳息依法追缴。这一判决出人意料地轻于预期——根据中国法律，数额特别巨大的受贿案，比如赖小民案，通常面临十年以上徒刑甚至死缓。法院认定龙飞具有自首、认罪悔罪及退赃全部情节，依法减轻处罚。传言称，龙飞可能因交代马兴瑞及齐桥桥家族的涉案细节，获得中央纪委的“宽大处理”，以换取更多高层内幕。龙飞案的行贿对象是一名政治局委员，也就是马兴瑞，受贿对象是齐桥桥，也就是习包子的亲姐姐。

龙飞的轻判恰逢马兴瑞免职前20天——6月30日，官方宣布马兴瑞不再担任新疆党委书记，改由陈小江接任。时间上的巧合引发强烈猜测：龙飞的供词可能为胡锦涛派系打击习近平盟友的关键证据，中央可能通过龙飞案为马兴瑞下台铺垫。官方仅称马兴瑞“另有任用”，未提及具体原因，掩盖了可能的派系清洗动机。共产党天天就是这么巧，什么事情都特别的巧合。

2025年3月21日庭审吸引人大代表、政协委员及新闻记者旁听，显示案件的敏感性。

6月30日马兴瑞的免职紧随6月10日龙飞判决，时间节点高度吻合。传言胡锦涛派系利用龙飞供词，配合“三连杀”（何卫东、李干杰、马兴瑞），削弱习近平势力。陈小江接任新疆书记，其水利背景与胡锦涛（清华水利系）暗合，是胡锦涛的布局。

马兴瑞同乡彭丽媛失踪两个月，可能加剧马兴瑞失势，齐桥桥家族作为习近平家族代表，可能成为派系斗争的牺牲品。

然而，故事还没有画上句号。官方沉默掩盖了真相，龙飞轻判（7年vs预期10年以上）是否真为交易？齐桥桥涉案的内幕是什么？2025年8月四中全会或将揭晓答案，但截至目前，权力博弈的幕后依然雾里看花。

英文翻译

Beidaihe is on high alert; Xi Jinping may be forced to step down. A secretary revealed that Ma Xingrui had given money to Xi Jinping’s sister, Qi Qiaoqiao.

Hello everyone,

Multiple sources indicate that security measures along the Beijing-Beidaihe route in Hebei Province have been significantly upgraded. The number of checkpoints along the route has increased dramatically, and multiple checks are being implemented at stations and on trains. Passengers report that there are no trains running near Beidaihe Station from June 26th to July 7th, and purchasing train tickets to Beidaihe after July 8th is also extremely difficult. Netizens believe this unusual phenomenon suggests that high-ranking CCP officials may have already begun their journey to Beidaihe. A petitioner, Ms. Zhao, described through her companion that seven checkpoints have been set up along the Beijing-Beidaihe route, covering entry, boarding, onboard patrols, disembarking, exiting the station, and even hailing a taxi. Police cars and plainclothes officers are everywhere, creating an unusually tense atmosphere. Compared to previous years, the density of checkpoints along the Beidaihe coast is much higher, indicating an extraordinary level of vigilance.

Furthermore, Beijing and Hebei recently issued verbal notices to local authorities, demanding that those under “stability control,” particularly petitioners and dissidents, be kept away from the Beidaihe area. Insiders say that hotels and guesthouses near the beach have been booked by the government, prohibiting ordinary people from staying there. Local mobile phone and internet signals are also significantly disrupted, becoming weak and unstable. This comprehensive mobilization of police and military forces far exceeds the security scale of previous Beidaihe meetings, suggesting that more significant and sensitive issues may be involved.

The Beidaihe meeting is known as a “closed-door spoils-sharing meeting,” where top leaders finalize personnel arrangements, which are then formally voted on and officially announced. Observers analyze that this year’s early meeting may be related to the following factors:

Balancing power and personnel changes: Xi Jinping’s loss of power may prompt anti-Xi factions to use the opportunity to push for personnel adjustments and weaken Xi’s faction.

Preparations for the Fourth Plenary Session: The Fourth Plenary Session focuses on Party building and personnel arrangements, and there are rumors that Xi Jinping may relinquish his position as Party leader at the meeting. The early Beidaihe meeting may set the tone for the Fourth Plenary Session and accelerate the decision-making process.

The 21st Party Congress: The 21st Party Congress in 2027 will be the next Party Congress. Planning the new Standing Committee in advance may be to avoid the risk of a power vacuum.

The outcomes of the Beidaihe meeting usually lay the foundation for subsequent plenary sessions. If this year’s meeting reaches a consensus, it may introduce a new CCP leader, transfer some or all of Xi Jinping’s power, and even reshape the Standing Committee, providing a framework for the Fourth Plenary Session. If the Fourth Plenary Session is held earlier, it may follow closely after the Beidaihe meeting, expected in mid-to-late July or early August.

On February 5, 2024, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced an investigation into Long Fei, former member of the Party Leadership Group and head of the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Group of China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., for suspected serious violations of discipline and law. Long Fei, born in Guang’an, Sichuan in August 1969, previously worked in the China Aerospace System and China Southern Power Grid, and served as Ma Xingrui’s secretary. He was expelled from the Party on August 1, 2024. The investigation showed that he accepted bribes totaling 6.13 million yuan from 2000 to 2023 by taking advantage of his position. On March 21, 2025, the Intermediate People’s Court of Yantai City, Shandong Province, held a public hearing for the first instance trial of this case. During his detention, Long Fei confessed that his superior, Ma Xingrui, the former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, had instructed him to transfer funds to Qi Qiaoqiao, Xi Jinping’s sister.

Rumors suggest that during his tenure as General Manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Ma Xingrui, through Long Fei, transferred benefits to the family network of Qi Qiaoqiao, her husband Deng Jiagui, and their daughter Zhang Yannan, potentially involving hundreds of millions of RMB. Qi Qiaoqiao has feigned retirement from the business world since 2014, but her family assets, such as a 74.5% stake in Shenzhen Yuanwei Industrial Co., Ltd. (later renamed Jianyin Chuangxin Investment), are said to amount to hundreds of millions of US dollars. Long Fei’s confession suggests that these funds may have been secretly transferred through economic transactions related to aerospace projects, aimed at securing Xi Jinping’s promotion.

From 2005 to 2013, Qi Qiaoqiao held a 74.5% stake in Shenzhen Yuanwei Industrial Co., Ltd., and was pushing for the restructuring of its subsidiary, Jianyin Yuanwei, into Jianyin Chuangxin Investment for listing. This period was highly sensitive.

On June 10, 2025, the Yantai Intermediate People’s Court delivered its first-instance verdict, sentencing Long Fei to seven years in prison for bribery, fining him 500,000 yuan, and confiscating 6.13 million yuan in illicit gains and their accrued interest. This verdict was surprisingly lenient—under Chinese law, bribery cases involving exceptionally large sums, such as the Lai Xiaomin case, typically carry sentences of ten years or more, even a suspended death sentence. The court recognized Long Fei’s mitigating circumstances, including surrendering himself to the authorities, confessing his guilt, showing remorse, and returning the illicit gains, thus reducing his sentence accordingly. Rumors circulated that Long Fei might have received leniency from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for revealing details of the cases involving Ma Xingrui and the Qi Qiaoqiao family, in exchange for more high-level inside information. The bribe-giver in Long Fei’s case was a Politburo member, Ma Xingrui, while the recipient was Qi Qiaoqiao, Xi Jinping’s older sister.

Long Fei’s lenient sentence came just 20 days before Ma Xingrui’s dismissal—on June 30th, the official announcement stated that Ma Xingrui would no longer serve as the Xinjiang Party Secretary, and Chen Xiaojiang would succeed him. This timing coincidence has sparked strong speculation: Long Fei’s testimony might be key evidence used by Hu Jintao’s faction to attack Xi Jinping’s allies, and the central government might be using Long Fei’s case to pave the way for Ma Xingrui’s removal. The official statement only mentioned that Ma Xingrui was “assigned to another post,” without mentioning specific reasons, thus concealing the possible factional purge motive. The Communist Party is always full of such coincidences.

The trial on March 21, 2025, attracted NPC deputies, CPPCC members, and journalists to observe, indicating the case’s sensitivity.

Ma Xingrui’s dismissal on June 30th followed closely on June 10th with Long Fei’s verdict, a highly synchronized timing. Rumors circulate that Hu Jintao’s faction used Long Fei’s testimony in conjunction with the “three assassinations” (He Weidong, Li Ganjie, and Ma Xingrui) to weaken Xi Jinping’s power. Chen Xiaojiang’s appointment as Xinjiang Party Secretary, with his background in water conservancy aligning with Hu Jintao’s (a graduate of Tsinghua University’s water conservancy department), is seen as part of Hu’s strategy.

The disappearance of Peng Liyuan, a fellow townsman of Ma Xingrui, for two months may exacerbate Ma Xingrui’s decline. The Qi Qiaoqiao family, representing Xi Jinping’s family, may become casualties of factional infighting.

However, the story is far from over. Official silence has concealed the truth. Was Long Fei’s lenient sentence (7 years vs. expected 10+ years) truly a transaction? What are the inside stories of Qi Qiaoqiao’s case? The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in August 2025 may reveal the answers, but as of now, the power struggle behind the scenes remains shrouded in mystery.