《人日》改称习近平同志，不再称习近平总书记。新常委名单，戴道晋的许达哲背景

 

《人日》改称习近平同志，不再称习近平总书记。新常委名单，戴道晋的许达哲背景

大家好，这名网友说，
大包不好了，现在人民日报都不称习近平总书记了，改称习近平同志了
我们看人民网发了一篇报道《参天之木有其根——习近平同志在福建金融实践探索的三个故事》，新华网发了一篇报道《为有源头活水来——习近平同志在闽金融论述与实践启示》。

习近平同志在福建工作17年半里，对金融工作做出了一系列极具前瞻性、开创性、战略性的理念创新与实践探索。在全省首创“借外债搞基建”模式，成功解决厦门机场建设资金缺口；推动金融深度参与扶贫，填补下党乡金融服务空白；推进福耀玻璃重组，成功化解资金危机……三个故事生动展现了习近平同志对金融工作的深邃思考与实践探索，为开拓中国特色金融发展之路提供了源头活水和重要指导。

这里面真有没有称呼习近平为总书记，而是称呼为习近平同志。

是不是习近平已经不是总书记了呢？

另外一篇报道里面是这样写的。

福建是习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的重要孕育地之一。

  习近平同志在福建工作17年半，领导和推动了地方改革开放和现代化建设事业，对金融领域的一系列重大命题进行了深入研究、长远谋划和有益探索，形成了大量原创性理念，开创了多项变革性实践，取得了一系列标志性成果，为开拓中国特色金融发展之路提供了理论与实践的源头活水。

  站在新的历史起点上，在以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下，我们坚定不移走中国特色金融发展之路，金融血脉将持续为中国经济社会发展注入澎湃动力，为以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业提供有力支撑。

传统上，“同志”多用于党内平等称呼，“习近平总书记”则是彰显最高领导权威的正式头衔。此前，比如2024年7-8月传言习近平被控制后，《人民日报》曾短暂淡化习近平的名字
其实习近平同志在中共的正式文件中又不是没有消失过，是真的消失过。

3月31日，中国共产党召开每月一次的政治局会议。如果仔细阅读第二天《人民日报》头版所刊登的政治局会议的正式公告，人们会发现一些不寻常的情况。“党中央”一词在官方的公告中出现了五次左右，但先前所使用的“以习近平同志为核心的党中央委员会”的表述则已经消失。 “党中央”已变成单纯的“党中央”。
“以习近平同志为核心的党中央”的表述已从政治局会议正式声明中消失，看来“排除习近平”的举动不仅在军方，在党内也是一步一步在进行中。
但是4月25日召开的，以习近平同志为核心的党中央又回来了。

5月的政治局会议，的确召开了。
而且有好多的议程，任命了两个正部级，开除了苗华的党籍。
现在还没有公布开除苗华的党籍，但是已经开除军委委员了。
但是官媒并没有公布5月份召开政治局会议的消息。

而且我们看，这是中国教育部的网站，的确有以习近平同志为总书记的说法。
所以新华网这个是高级黑还是怎么回事儿，习近平同志到底还是不是总书记呢？
新华网和人民网的“高级黑”嫌疑，可能是因为故意模糊身份以试探反应，反映宣传口径的分歧。
还消息是习近平还是同志，习近平同志的弟弟习远平马上可能就可能不是同志了。
要被中纪委查处了。

称呼从“习近平总书记”改为“习近平同志”，可能暗示习近平总书记身份受到质疑。2025年3月政治局会议“以习近平同志为核心的党中央”消失，4月恢复，5月会议偷偷召开并开除苗华党籍，叠加军方画报下架习近平照片、董军没有提习近平床em；字，显示权力交接的迹象。传言习近平中风、被军方控制，胡春华可能接班，如果属实，称习近平“同志”可能是淡化习近平现任角色，保留历史地位而不是现职权威。然“以…为核心”的表述回归，表明官方可能仍在维稳，称呼调整或为过渡期策略，未必立即丧失权力。

2025年6月24日，广东省珠海市中级人民法院一审公开宣判湖南省政协原党组副书记、副主席戴道晋受贿、利用影响力受贿案，对被告人戴道晋以受贿罪判处死刑，缓期二年执行，剥夺政治权利终身，并处没收个人全部财产；以利用影响力受贿罪判处有期徒刑四年，并处罚金人民币四十万元，决定执行死刑，缓期二年执行，剥夺政治权利终身，并处没收个人全部财产。对被告人戴道晋犯罪所得财物及其孳息依法予以追缴，上缴国库，不足部分，继续追缴。

2011年12月，54岁的戴道晋任湖南省人民政府党组成员、副秘书长（排第一），办公厅主任。2012年3月，55岁的戴道晋任湖南省人民政府秘书长、党组成员，办公厅主任、党组书记。当时的湖南省长是徐守盛（2010年6月 – 2013年4月），杜家毫（2013年4月 – 2016年9月）。
戴道晋的省政府秘书长一直担任到2015年5月

从2011年12月算起，戴道晋担任徐守盛1年多一点的秘书，担任杜家毫三年的秘书。后来杜家毫担任湖南省委书记，戴道晋任湖南省政协副主席。两个人又在一起工作4年。前前后后戴道晋和杜家毫共事7年。
徐守盛已经死了，2020年12月5日，徐守盛死亡，不死也得抓吧。
杜家毫居然没事儿。

2015年5月 – 2017年1月，58岁的戴道晋任湖南省人民政府副省长。戴道晋的大秘是虢正贵。
虢正贵也没有抓，虢正贵曾经担任张家界市委书记，张家界几乎是习近平的全家桶。
虢正贵的张家界市委书记就是杜家毫和许达哲提拔的。
许达哲已经抓了。

中南海政局动荡，习近平失去权力引发国际关注。美东时间6月27日，美国前中将福林将军（Michael Flynn）在X平台上发帖说，中共正在发生权力更替（power shift)，并呼吁中国观察家密切关注中共的核心成员。福林将军并附上丁薛祥、陈吉宁、张又侠的配图，似乎意有所指，以上3人是中共新的领导班子的核心成员。

美东时间6月27日，福林将军忽然在X平台发帖。贴文说，注意！中国显然正在发生权力更替。中国观察家需要密切关注中共核心成员，尤其政府和国家安全部门的官员。福林形容，中共领导层的变动造成的后果是巨大的。

福林的贴文还配了3张图，一张是中共官员在人民大会堂开会的场景；另外一副图包括丁薛祥、陈吉宁和张又侠三人，让人浮想联翩。丁薛祥被摆放在中间，似意指为总书记「一尊」地位，陈吉宁应是总理人选，而张又侠入常委，很可能是接任中央军委主席。第三张照片。是张又侠一个人，背后配以一杆枪，马上让人联想到张又侠「带枪入常。通常来说，军权意味著掌握实权。福林配此图，意指张又侠是中共高层真正的「话事人」。

然而，丁薛祥作为习近平的长期亲信，自2012年起担任习近平秘书，2017年晋升中办主任，2022年入常，2023年接替韩正任第一副总理，被视为习近平的“影子”。丁薛祥仕途与习近平紧密绑定，如果丁薛祥接班，仅仅是“换汤不换药”，延续习近平派系统治，与权力转移的初衷相悖。张又侠如果主掌军权，断难接受习近平在“后台”继续操控，改革派更不会认可此人选，福林的推测忽略了派系博弈的现实。

传言汪洋、胡春华与丁薛祥竞争总书记，团派（胡锦涛、温家宝派系）力推汪洋或胡春华，张又侠也支持此方向。胡春华作为团派代表，近年高调，比如2025年6月主持政协会议，代表改革派诉求。汪洋则以务实著称，均较丁薛祥具有广泛认同。丁薛祥如果上位，改革派恐因为丁薛祥代表习近平旧政而抵制，全国人民更是不买账。习近平13年执政（2012-2025）经济增速放缓、房地产危机频发、民怨沸腾，民众对“洗杯子派系”已失望透顶，福林忽视这一民意基础，推测缺乏说服力。

习近平执政13年，中国面临债务危机、人口老龄化及国际孤立，经济增速从2012年的7.9%降至2024年的4.6%，民生疾苦加剧。传言习近平谋杀李克强，2023年10月李克强突然死了，如果不了了之，引发公愤，网友多条帖子质疑其合法性。如果丁薛祥接班，延续“习近平”治理，恐加剧社会动荡。福林没有提及这些治理失败及道德污点，仅凭派系推测，忽视了接班人选需承担的历史包袱，福林的判断显得浅薄。

福林将军虽然是美国前国家安全顾问，2025年6月27日发文称中国发生权力更替，提及丁薛祥、陈吉宁、张又侠，但福林的分析基于X平台配图及传言，缺乏实质证据。张又侠掌军权、苗华落马、何卫东失踪等迹象支持权力转移，但是丁薛祥接班仅仅是坊间猜测。习近平如果还有本事扶丁薛祥上位， 那么他就不会退休。福林退休后其信息来源多为二手传闻，易受误导。相比之下，汪洋、胡春华的接班传言更符合派系平衡，福林的“丁薛祥说”或为吸引眼球，未必可信。

福林将军认为丁薛祥可能接班的说法因为丁薛祥是习近平亲信身份、改革派及民意的反对、习近平治理失败的包袱以及自身判断局限而难以成立。丁薛祥若上台，换人不变政，违背权力转移的改革需求；民众对“习系”的不满及李克强事件疑云，更不支持丁薛祥接班。当前局势下，胡春华或者汪洋更具接班潜力。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

People’s Daily has changed its name to Comrade Xi Jinping, no longer referring to General Secretary Xi Jinping. New Standing Committee list, Dai Daojin’s background on Xu Dazhe.

Hello everyone, this netizen said,
It’s not good to be so rude. Now People’s Daily no longer refers to General Secretary Xi Jinping, but instead refers to him as Comrade Xi Jinping. 

People’s Daily published a report titled “A Towering Tree Has Its Roots: Three Stories of Comrade Xi Jinping’s Financial Practices and Explorations in Fujian,” and Xinhua News Agency published a report titled “For a Source of Fresh Water: Enlightenment from Comrade Xi Jinping’s Financial Theory and Practice in Fujian.”

During his 17 and a half years in Fujian, Comrade Xi Jinping made a series of forward-looking, pioneering, and strategic conceptual innovations and practical explorations in financial work. He pioneered the “borrowing foreign debt for infrastructure” model in the province, successfully addressing the funding gap for Xiamen Airport construction; promoted the deep involvement of finance in poverty alleviation, filling the financial services gap in Xiadang Township; and facilitated the restructuring of Fuyao Glass, successfully resolving a financial crisis… These three stories vividly demonstrate Comrade Xi Jinping’s profound thinking and practical explorations in financial work, providing fresh water and important guidance for pioneering a path of financial development with Chinese characteristics.

In these reports, Xi Jinping is not actually referred to as General Secretary, but rather as Comrade Xi Jinping. Is Xi Jinping no longer General Secretary?

Another report wrote this.

Fujian is one of the important birthplaces of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

Comrade Xi Jinping worked in Fujian for 17 and a half years, leading and promoting local reform, opening up, and modernization. He conducted in-depth research, long-term planning, and beneficial exploration on a series of major issues in the financial sector. He developed numerous original concepts, pioneered numerous transformative practices, and achieved a series of landmark results, providing a theoretical and practical source of inspiration for pioneering a path of financial development with Chinese characteristics.

Standing at a new historical starting point, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, we are unswervingly pursuing a path of financial development with Chinese characteristics. The financial bloodline will continue to inject strong momentum into China’s economic and social development, providing strong support for comprehensively advancing China’s development and the great cause of national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.

Traditionally, “comrade” is mostly used as an equal address within the Party, while “General Secretary Xi Jinping” is a formal title that demonstrates the authority of the highest leader. Previously, for example, in July and August 2024, following rumors of Xi Jinping’s arrest, the People’s Daily briefly downplayed Xi Jinping’s name. In fact, it’s not as if Comrade Xi Jinping hasn’t disappeared from official CCP documents; he’s truly disappeared.

On March 31st, the Chinese Communist Party held its monthly Politburo meeting. A careful reading of the official announcement of the Politburo meeting, published on the front page of the People’s Daily the following day, reveals some unusual details. The term “Central Committee of the Party” appears approximately five times in the official announcement, but the previously used phrase “Central Committee of the Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core” has disappeared. “Central Committee of the Party” has become simply “Central Committee of the Party.”
The phrase “Central Committee of the Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core” has disappeared from official Politburo statements, suggesting that the process of “excluding Xi Jinping” is underway not only within the military but also within the Party.

However, on April 25th, the Central Committee of the Party, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has returned.

The May Politburo meeting did indeed take place.
And there were many items on the agenda: the appointment of two ministerial-level officials and the expulsion of Miao Hua from the Party. Miao Hua’s expulsion from the Party has not yet been announced, but he has been removed from the Central Military Commission.

However, official media outlets have not reported on the Politburo meeting held in May.

Furthermore, this is the website of the Ministry of Education of China, and it does mention Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary.
So, is Xinhua News Agency’s attempt at a high-level blackmail campaign or something else entirely? Is Comrade Xi Jinping still General Secretary?
The suspicion of “high-level blackmail” by Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily Online may be a deliberate attempt to blur the lines of communication to test reactions, reflecting differences in propaganda.
The news suggests that Xi Jinping is still a comrade, but Comrade Xi Jinping’s younger brother, Xi Yuanping, may soon no longer be a comrade.
He will be investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

The change in title from “General Secretary Xi Jinping” to “Comrade Xi Jinping” may suggest that General Secretary Xi Jinping’s identity is being questioned. The Politburo meeting of March 2025, which referenced “the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core,” disappeared, resumed in April, and then secretly convened in May, leading to the expulsion of Miao Hua from the Party. Combined with the military’s removal of Xi Jinping’s photos from its publications and Dong Jun’s omission of any mention of Xi Jinping’s bed, these indicate signs of a power transition. Rumors circulate that Xi Jinping suffered a stroke and is under military control, with Hu Chunhua potentially taking over. If true, referring to Xi Jinping as “comrade” may be an attempt to downplay his current role, preserving his historical status rather than his current authority. However, the return of the phrase “with… as the core” suggests officials may still be maintaining stability, and the title adjustment may be a transitional strategy, not necessarily an immediate loss of power.

On June 24, 2025, the Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province publicly pronounced the first-instance verdict in the case of Dai Daojin, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Vice Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, for bribery and abuse of influence. Dai Daojin was sentenced to death for bribery with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. He was also sentenced to four years in prison and a fine of RMB 400,000 for abuse of influence. The court decided to execute him with a two-year reprieve, deprivation of political rights for life, and confiscation of all personal property. The defendant’s criminal property and interest will be recovered and turned over to the state treasury in accordance with the law. Further recovery will be made for any shortfall.

In December 2011, 54-year-old Dai Daojin was appointed member of the Party Leadership Group, Deputy Secretary-General (first in rank), and Director of the General Office of the Hunan Provincial People’s Government. In March 2012, 55-year-old Dai Daojin was appointed Secretary-General, member of the Party Leadership Group, Director of the General Office, and Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Hunan Provincial People’s Government. The governors of Hunan at the time were Xu Shousheng (June 2010–April 2013) and Du Jiahao (April 2013–September 2016).
Dai Daojin served as Secretary-General of the Provincial Government until May 2015.

From December 2011, Dai Daojin served as Xu Shousheng’s secretary for a little over a year and as Du Jiahao’s secretary for three years. Later, Du Jiahao became Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, and Dai Daojin became Vice Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The two worked together for another four years. In total, Dai Daojin and Du Jiahao worked together for seven years.
Xu Shousheng is deceased. He died on December 5, 2020. Even if he hadn’t died, he would have been arrested. Du Jiahao is surprisingly fine.

From May 2015 to January 2017, 58-year-old Dai Daojin served as Vice Governor of the Hunan Provincial People’s Government. Dai Daojin’s chief aide was Guo Zhenggui.
Guo Zhenggui was also not arrested. He previously served as Secretary of the Zhangjiajie Municipal Party Committee, a position that practically belonged to Xi Jinping.
Guo Zhenggui was promoted to Secretary of the Zhangjiajie Municipal Party Committee by Du Jiahao and Xu Dazhe.
Xu Dazhe has already been arrested.

The political turmoil in Zhongnanhai and Xi Jinping’s loss of power have drawn international attention. On June 27, Eastern Time, former US Lieutenant General Michael Flynn posted on the X platform, saying that a power shift was occurring within the CCP and urged Chinese observers to closely monitor its core members. Flynn also included images of Ding Xuexiang, Chen Jining, and Zhang Youxia, seemingly hinting that these three individuals are core members of the CCP’s new leadership.

On June 27th, Eastern Time, General Flynn suddenly posted on Platform X. The post read, “Attention! A power transition is clearly underway in China. China observers need to pay close attention to core members of the Chinese Communist Party, especially those in the government and national security departments.” Flynn described the consequences of the CCP leadership change as enormous.

Flynn’s post included three pictures. One showed CCP officials meeting in the Great Hall of the People. Another picture included Ding Xuexiang, Chen Jining, and Zhang Youxia, sparking speculation. Ding Xuexiang’s placement in the center seems to imply his supreme position as General Secretary. Chen Jining is likely a candidate for Premier, while Zhang Youxia’s membership in the Standing Committee likely means he will succeed the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The third picture shows Zhang Youxia alone, with a gun on his back, immediately evoking the notion of him “bringing a gun to the Standing Committee.” Generally speaking, military power implies real power. Flynn’s inclusion of this picture suggests that Zhang Youxia is the true “caller” within the CCP leadership.

However, Ding Xuexiang, a longtime confidant of Xi Jinping, has served as Xi’s secretary since 2012, was promoted to Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee in 2017, became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2022, and will succeed Han Zheng as First Vice Premier in 2023. He is considered Xi’s “shadow.” Ding Xuexiang’s career is closely tied to Xi Jinping. If Ding Xuexiang were to take over, it would simply be a “change of name, change of substance,” continuing the Xi Jinping faction’s system of rule, contradicting the original purpose of the power transfer. If Zhang Youxia were to take control of the military, he would undoubtedly be unacceptable to Xi Jinping’s continued manipulation from behind the scenes, and reformists would certainly disapprove of this candidate. Fulin’s speculation ignores the reality of factional dynamics.

Rumors suggest that Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and Ding Xuexiang are competing for General Secretary. The Youth League faction (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao faction) is pushing for either Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua, and Zhang Youxia also supports this direction. As a representative of the Youth League faction, Hu Chunhua has been highly publicized in recent years, such as chairing the CPPCC meeting in June 2025, representing the demands of reformists. Wang Yang, on the other hand, is known for his pragmatism, and both enjoy a wider recognition than Ding Xuexiang. If Ding Xuexiang were to take office, reformists would likely boycott him because he represents Xi Jinping’s old policies, and the Chinese people would be even more dissatisfied. Xi Jinping’s 13 years in power (2012-2025) have been marked by slowing economic growth, frequent real estate crises, and boiling public discontent. The public has become deeply disillusioned with the “cup-washing faction.” Flynn’s speculation, ignoring this popular support, lacks persuasiveness.

During Xi Jinping’s 13 years in power, China has faced a debt crisis, an aging population, and international isolation. Economic growth has fallen from 7.9% in 2012 to 4.6% in 2024, exacerbating public suffering. Rumors circulated that Xi Jinping had murdered Li Keqiang, who died suddenly in October 2023. If the case remains unresolved, it would spark public outrage, with numerous online posts questioning his legitimacy. If Ding Xuexiang were to take over, continuing Xi Jinping’s governance would likely exacerbate social unrest. Flynn fails to address these governance failures and moral flaws, relying solely on factional speculation and ignoring the historical baggage that the successor must bear. His assessment appears superficial.

Although General Flynn, a former US National Security Advisor, published an article on June 27, 2025, alleging a power transition in China, mentioning Ding Xuexiang, Chen Jining, and Zhang Youxia, his analysis was based on images and rumors from an X platform and lacked substantive evidence. Zhang Youxia’s command of the military, Miao Hua’s downfall, and He Weidong’s disappearance support a power transition, but Ding Xuexiang’s succession is merely speculation. If Xi Jinping still had the clout to prop up Ding Xuexiang, he wouldn’t have retired. After his retirement, Flynn’s information was largely secondhand, making him susceptible to misleading. In contrast, rumors of Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua succeeding him are more consistent with factional balance. Flynn’s “Ding Xuexiang theory” may be attention-seeking and may not be credible.

Flynn’s suggestion that Ding Xuexiang might succeed him is difficult to justify due to his status as a close confidant of Xi Jinping, opposition from reformists and public opinion, the burden of Xi Jinping’s failed governance, and his own limited judgment. If Ding Xuexiang were to take power, replacing him without changing the political landscape would violate the reform imperatives of a power transition. Public dissatisfaction with the “Xi clique” and the murky Li Keqiang incident further undermine his support for Ding Xuexiang’s succession. Under the current circumstances, Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang have greater potential to succeed him.

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