网传胡锦涛病危对现今局势的影响。网传中央决策委员会工作条例 (草案)的分析

 

网传胡锦涛病危对现今局势的影响。网传中央决策委员会工作条例 (草案)的分析

大家好，

这名网友说，

大包谈谈胡病危对现今局势的影响

我的回复是，

首先我可以告诉你这是一个假消息。

这名网友说，

大包，都在说老胡在301不行了。

这名网友回复说，

不是你们说他已经死了么？还是同一个人前后几天换了几种说法？

一会儿给大家展开说。

我们

先看所谓的条例。

《中共党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例 (草案)》 

首先这个写的挺真的，但是穿帮的地方也不少。

首先这个标题就不对，几乎是对的，但是还是不对。

这种工作条例以前又不是没有过

比如《中国共产党中央委员会工作条例》（2020年）  

《中国共产党纪律检查机关监督执纪工作规则》（2019年）  

从来没有过中共党中央这种用法啊

在中共语境中，“党中央”是一个泛指概念，通常包括中央政治局、中央政治局常务委员会、中央委员会等，是党的最高领导机构的统称。《中国共产党中央委员会工作条例》（2020年）明确“中央委员会是党中央的主体部分”，但在实际运作中，政治局和常委会是核心决策机构。

《条例》的名称出现在2025年6月30日政治局会议的审议报道中，正值北戴河会议和四中全会前的敏感时期。X帖子将该机构解读为“防止一人说了算”“协调元老与常委”，暗示其旨在削弱习包子的个人权威。“中共党中央”作为前缀，可能有意强调“党中央”的集体性，以淡化个人领导的色彩。

然而，“中共党中央”这一表述在强调集体领导的同时，可能也暴露了党内权力博弈的痕迹。X帖子提到“习包子权力受限”“元老派重返决策圈”，暗示该机构的设立可能与胡锦涛或其他势力推动的“集体领导回归”有关。名称中的“中共党中央”试图以最高权威的姿态掩盖这种博弈，却因其冗长和模糊而显得“不对劲儿”。

新华社报道确认2025年6月30日政治局会议审议《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》，但报道中未明确使用“中共党中央”，仅称“党中央决策议事协调机构”。X平台爆料（）提供的全文使用了“中共党中央”，可能为爆料者自行添加，降低了名称的真实性。

“中共”作为“中国共产党”的简称，在非正式场合常见，但在正式法规中较少单独使用。“党中央”是中共内部的习惯性统称，但与“中共”组合显得不伦不类，可能为爆料者为强调权威而改编。

名称的主体部分“决策议事协调机构”与官方报道一致，但“中共党中央”作为前缀可能为非官方添加，真实文件中更可能使用“中共中央”或直接省略前缀（如“党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例”）。

中共公布的名称就叫做

“党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例”  

给便这个人挖了一个坑，

要么他就叫做“党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例”  

要么他就叫做“中国共产党决策议事协调机构工作条例”  

中共党中央，太别扭了。

这个

全文可能基于真实审议文件改编，但“中共党中央”可能为爆料者添加，以突出机构的超然地位。这种改编导致名称显得“怪异”，不符合中共的命名逻辑。

“党中央决策议事协调机构”作为一个新设机构的名称，搭配“中共党中央”显得冗长且模糊。中共通常为新机构取简洁名称（如“中央深改委”），而非如此复杂的复合前缀。

也就是说，中共如果真的成立一个新机构，一定会叫我说的这个名字

中央决策委员会或者说中央议事委员会。

他会和中央深改委或者中顾委，起一个简洁的名字。

他一定不会叫什么

中共党中央决策议事协调机构

然后我们看这句话，这也不是正经的党八股的语言。

经党中央批准特邀部分退休中央领导同志及具有重大影响力的高级干部。

如果是正经的党八股会怎么说呢？

“议事机构由党中央统一领导、统一设立，成员由党中央根据工作需要和组织原则统筹安排，主要包括中央政治局常委、政治局委员中相关负责同志。根据党中央决策部署，适当吸收具有丰富经验的老同志参与相关工作，充分发挥党内各方面力量的积极作用，确保党中央重大决策部署的贯彻落实。”

所以重大影响力的高级干部这不是党八股的语言

他会说具有丰富经验的老同志

这个编造的人，可能觉得不写退休常委，不够直白。

这个就和讣告是一样，比如久经考验的共产主义战士。

主要是给政治局常委用的，不需要明确说他是政治局常委。

如果让中共用党八股来说的话，具有丰富经验的老同志，就是暗指退休常委

不会说那么直白。

然后我们看这两条有问题

第七条 议事机构下设办公室，负责日常工作。办公室主任由中央办公厅负责人兼任。

第十七条 本条例由中央办公厅负责解释。

如果新机构“凌驾于政治局”，为了“防止一人说了算”，可能为应对习包子权力集中而设，与2025年四中全会前的权力博弈有关。

其地位应该高于现有协调机构，比如中央深改委、中央国安委，理应设立独立办公室以彰显权威。国安委都没有单独的办公室

现在党中央决策议事协调机构连一个单独的办公室都没有是吧？

继续使用中央办公厅，暗示其地位可能低于政治局，与X帖子的“凌驾”说法矛盾。  

X帖子传闻袁家军可能接替中办主任，暗示蔡奇面临退休压力。第七条将办公室主任设为“中央办公厅负责人”，可能为蔡奇巩固地位的策略，确保其在新机构中的影响力。  

如果是蔡奇“放风”，通过夸大新机构“凌驾于政治局”，可能意在制造舆论，凸显中央办公厅。也就是蔡奇自身的关键角色，抵御退休压力。

如果新机构地位超然，单独设立办公室更能体现其独立性，而依赖蔡奇掌控的中央办公厅可能反映习包子对机构的控制需求，而非真正的“集体领导”。  

前两天就说，袁家军要接替蔡奇的中央办公厅主任，看样子，蔡奇不想退休到处放风。看样子这个工作条例和袁家军的消息都是蔡奇在放风。

也就是说，这是蔡奇的在放风。

这名网友说，

大包谈谈胡病危对现今局势的影响

我的回复是，

首先我可以告诉你这是一个假消息。

这名网友说，

大包，都在说老胡在301不行了。

这名网友回复说，

不是你们说他已经死了么？还是同一个人前后几天换了几种说法？

胡锦涛即便现在死了

不等于政权自动回到习包子手中

习包子还需要重新发动军事政变。粉碎，胡春华，张又侠，温家宝，李瑞环，张德江，李强，赵乐际政变集团

政权才能重新回到习包子手中

胡锦涛如果死了，张又侠还是习会先得到消息？

张又侠先得到消息，肯定立马干掉习包子

不然张又侠就要被习包子抓起来

胡锦涛是2024年6月19日发动的军事政变

他从什么时候开始准备的呢？最早从2017年就开始准备了。

那个时候江泽民还没死呢。这是7年才干成功的事情。

江泽民死了也没有影响胡锦涛发动军事政变。

2024年6月19日，如果胡锦涛已经嗝屁了，那么发动军事政变可能很难成功。

就是说发动军事政变成功，难度很大。

守住这个成果，能有多大难度啊？

大家想想，现在谁在保习包子，还没看明白吗？

只有掌握的了最高权力的人才能保习包子，才有资格保习包子

如果你认为现在中共掌握最高权力的人是胡锦涛，那么就是胡锦涛在保习包子

如果你认为是张又侠，那么就是张又侠保习包子

如果你认为是习包子本人掌握大权，那就是要解释为什么要抓苗华何卫东，

为什么要贬黜李干杰和马兴瑞。

这都是政治局委员，说拿下就拿下了。

2025年6月30日，还在拿下马兴瑞，

而且扶上去的陈小江就是胡锦涛马仔。

胡锦涛像他们瞎编的病危，怎么把陈小江扶上位的？

做着梦拿下马兴瑞的呀？那不就说明更不需要胡锦涛了。

黑社会之所以，不火拼是因为有人在罩场子

如果没有人罩住场子，立马就开始火拼了。

天天在传胡锦涛要嗝屁，他们能有什么渠道能知道，都是瞎编。

第一个知道消息的人肯定是张又侠，不会是外人。

张又侠如果知道胡锦涛要死了，肯定先下手为强。肯定先干习包子，保证自身的安全。

胡锦涛是“罩场子”的人，维持派系平衡，避免“火拼”。

胡锦涛如果不在了，就不需要在演戏，直接动粗上手了。

只要胡锦涛不在，张又侠肯定动粗上手。

要不然张又侠自身难保。

是胡锦涛要演一出所谓和平交权的戏码。

换个人早就动粗了。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

The impact of the online rumor of Hu Jintao’s critical illness on the current situation. An analysis of the online rumored draft of the Working Regulations of the Central Decision-Making Committee.

Hello everyone,

This netizen said,

Da Bao, talk about the impact of Hu’s critical illness on the current situation.

My reply is,

First, I can tell you this is fake news.

This netizen said,

Da Bao, everyone is saying that Lao Hu (Hu Jintao) is not doing well in 301 Hospital.

This netizen replied,

Didn’t you all say he was already dead? Or did the same person change several times over a few days?

I’ll explain in detail later.

Let’s

First, look at the so-called regulations.

“The Working Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Decision-Making and Coordination Body (Draft)”

First of all, it’s written quite convincingly, but there are quite a few flaws.

First of all, the title is wrong, almost right, but still wrong.

Such working regulations are not unprecedented.

For example, the Working Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (2020)

and the Rules for Supervision and Discipline Enforcement by the Discipline Inspection Organs of the Communist Party of China (2019).

But the term “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” has never been used before.

In the CCP context, “Central Committee” is a general concept, usually including the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the Central Committee itself; it is the collective name for the Party’s highest leadership body. The Working Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (2020) explicitly states that “the Central Committee is the main body of the Central Committee,” but in practice, the Politburo and the Standing Committee are the core decision-making bodies.

The name of the Regulations appeared in the report on the Politburo meeting on June 30, 2025, during a sensitive period before the Beidaihe meeting and the Fourth Plenary Session. Post X interprets this body as “preventing one person from having absolute power” and “coordinating the elders and the Standing Committee,” implying that it aims to weaken Xi Jinping’s personal authority. The prefix “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” may intentionally emphasize the collective nature of the “Central Committee” to downplay the influence of individual leadership.

However, the term “CPC Central Committee” while emphasizing collective leadership may also reveal traces of power struggles within the party. The X post mentions “Xi Jinping’s power is limited” and “the return of the veteran faction to the decision-making circle,” suggesting that the establishment of this institution may be related to the “return of collective leadership” promoted by Hu Jintao or other forces. The use of “CPC Central Committee” in the name attempts to conceal this power struggle with a posture of supreme authority, but its length and ambiguity make it seem “off.”

Xinhua News Agency confirmed that the Politburo meeting on June 30, 2025, reviewed the “Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Body,” but the report did not explicitly use “CPC Central Committee,” only referring to it as “the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” The full text provided by the X platform ( ) uses “CPC Central Committee,” which may have been added by the whistleblower, reducing the authenticity of the name.

“CPC” is commonly used in informal settings as an abbreviation for “Communist Party of China,” but it is rarely used alone in formal regulations. “CPC Central Committee” is a habitual general term within the CPC, but its combination with “CPC” seems incongruous, possibly an alteration by the whistleblower to emphasize authority.

The main body of the name, “Decision-Making and Coordinating Body,” is consistent with official reports, but the prefix “CPC Central Committee” may have been added unofficially. The actual document is more likely to use “CPC Central Committee” or omit the prefix altogether (e.g., “Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordinating Body”).

The name published by the CPC is:

“Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordinating Body.”

This sets a trap for this person:

Either he calls it “Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordinating Body,”

or he calls it “Working Regulations of the Communist Party of China’s Decision-Making and Coordinating Body.”

The CPC Central Committee is too awkward.

This:

The entire text may be adapted from actual review documents, but “CPC Central Committee” may have been added by the whistleblower to emphasize the body’s aloof status. This adaptation makes the name seem “strange” and doesn’t conform to the CPC’s naming logic.

“CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordinating Body,” as the name of a newly established body, paired with “CPC Central Committee,” appears lengthy and vague. The CPC usually gives new bodies concise names (e.g., “Central Deepening Reform Commission”), rather than such a complex compound prefix.

In other words, if the CCP were to actually establish a new institution, it would definitely use the name I’ve mentioned:

Central Decision-Making Committee or Central Deliberative Committee.

It would have a concise name, similar to the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform or the Central Advisory Commission.

It certainly wouldn’t be called:

“CCP Central Committee Decision-Making and Deliberative Coordination Body.”

Then let’s look at this sentence; it’s not standard Party jargon either.

“With the approval of the Central Committee, some retired central leaders and senior cadres with significant influence were specially invited.”

If it were standard Party jargon, how would it say it?

“The deliberative body is under the unified leadership and establishment of the Central Committee. Its members are arranged by the Central Committee according to work needs and organizational principles, mainly including relevant responsible comrades among the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau. In accordance with the decisions and deployments of the Central Committee, experienced veteran comrades are appropriately absorbed to participate in relevant work, giving full play to the positive role of all aspects of the Party, and ensuring the implementation of the major decisions and deployments of the Central Committee.”

Therefore, “senior cadres with significant influence” is not standard Party jargon.

It would say “experienced veteran comrades.”

The person who fabricated this probably felt that not mentioning retired Standing Committee members wasn’t straightforward enough.

This is similar to an obituary, such as “a long-tested communist fighter.”

It’s mainly for members of the Politburo Standing Committee; it doesn’t need to explicitly state that they are members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

If the CCP were to use its official party jargon, “a veteran comrade with rich experience” would be an indirect reference to a retired Standing Committee member.

They wouldn’t be so explicit.

Then we see these two problematic articles:

Article 7: An office shall be established under the deliberative body to handle daily work. The director of the office shall be concurrently held by the head of the General Office of the Central Committee.

Article 17: The General Office of the Central Committee is responsible for interpreting this regulation.

If the new body “exceeds the Politburo,” and is established to “prevent one person from having absolute power,” it may be related to the power struggle before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 2025, possibly aimed at countering Xi Jinping’s concentration of power.

Its status should be higher than existing coordinating bodies, such as the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform and the Central National Security Commission, and it should have an independent office to demonstrate its authority. Even the National Security Commission doesn’t have a separate office.

So, the Party Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies don’t even have a separate office?

The continued use of the term “General Office of the Central Committee” suggests its status may be lower than the Politburo, contradicting the “superiority” claim in Post X.

Post X rumored that Yuan Jiajun might succeed Cai Qi as Director of the General Office, implying pressure on Cai Qi to retire. Article 7, which designates the Director of the General Office as “Head of the General Office of the Central Committee,” may be a strategy for Cai Qi to consolidate his position and ensure his influence in the new institution.

If Cai Qi is “leaking” information, exaggerating the new institution’s “superiority over the Politburo,” it may be intended to create public opinion highlighting the General Office of the Central Committee—Cai Qi’s key role—to resist retirement pressure.

If the new institution has a superior status, a separate office would better reflect its independence, while reliance on the General Office of the Central Committee controlled by Cai Qi might reflect Xi Jinping’s need for control over the institution, rather than genuine “collective leadership.”

It was said a few days ago that Yuan Jiajun would succeed Cai Qi as Director of the General Office of the Central Committee. It seems Cai Qi doesn’t want to retire and is leaking information everywhere. It seems this working regulation and the news about Yuan Jiajun are both leaks by Cai Qi.

In other words, this is Cai Qi leaking information.

This netizen said,

“Da Bao, talk about the impact of Hu’s critical illness on the current situation.”

My reply was,

“First of all, I can tell you this is fake news.”

This netizen said,

“Da Bao, everyone’s saying Hu Jintao is dying in 301 Hospital.”

This netizen replied,

“Didn’t you all say he was already dead? Or did the same person change the story several times in a few days?

Even if Hu Jintao were dead now,

it wouldn’t mean power would automatically return to Xi Jinping’s hands.

Xi Jinping would still need to launch another military coup to crush the coup group of Hu Chunhua, Zhang Youxia, Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji.

Only then could power return to Xi Jinping’s hands.

If Hu Jintao were dead, would Zhang Youxia or Xi Jinping get the news first?

If Zhang Youxia gets the news first, he would definitely kill Xi Jinping immediately.

Otherwise, Zhang Youxia would be arrested by Xi Jinping.

Hu Jintao launched a military coup on June 19, 2024.

When did he start preparing?” Preparations began as early as 2017.

At that time, Jiang Zemin was still alive. This took seven years to accomplish.

Jiang Zemin’s death did not prevent Hu Jintao from launching a military coup.

If Hu Jintao is dead by June 19, 2024, then a military coup will likely be very difficult to succeed.

In other words, launching a successful military coup is extremely difficult.

How difficult is it to maintain this achievement?

Think about it, who is protecting Xi Jinping now? Don’t you understand?

Only those who hold supreme power can protect Xi Jinping, and only they are qualified to do so.

If you believe that Hu Jintao currently holds supreme power within the CCP, then it is Hu Jintao who is protecting Xi Jinping.

If you believe it is Zhang Youxia, then it is Zhang Youxia who is protecting Xi Jinping.

If you believe that Xi Jinping himself holds supreme power, then you need to explain why Miao Hua and He Weidong were arrested,

and why Li Ganjie and Ma Xingrui were demoted.

These are all Politburo members; they can be taken down so easily.

On June 30, 2025, they were still taking down Ma Xingrui.

And Chen Xiaojiang, whom they promoted, is a henchman of Hu Jintao.

How could Hu Jintao, who was supposedly critically ill as they fabricated, have promoted Chen Xiaojiang?

Were they dreaming of taking down Ma Xingrui? That would mean they needed Hu Jintao even less.

The reason gangsters don’t fight each other is because someone is protecting them.

If no one is protecting them, they’ll immediately start fighting.

They keep spreading rumors that Hu Jintao is going to die; how could they possibly know? It’s all fabricated.

The first person to know the news would definitely be Zhang Youxia; it wouldn’t be an outsider.

If Zhang Youxia knew Hu Jintao was going to die, he would definitely strike first. He would definitely target Xi Jinping first to ensure his own safety.

Hu Jintao is the one “protecting” the factions, maintaining a balance of power and preventing a “bloodbath.”

If Hu Jintao were no longer around, there would be no need for pretense; he would just resort to violence.

As long as Hu Jintao is gone, Zhang Youxia would definitely resort to violence.

Otherwise, Zhang Youxia himself would be in danger.

It’s Hu Jintao who’s putting on this so-called peaceful transfer of power act.

Anyone else would have already resorted to violence.

Okay, thank you everyone.