胡锦涛任中央决策委员会主任，李瑞环，温家宝，张德江任副主任。6月政治局会议分析，8点解读

 

胡锦涛任中央决策委员会主任，李瑞环，温家宝，张德江任副主任。6月政治局会议分析，8点解读

大家好，中共中央政治局6月30日召开会议，审议《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》。中共中央总书记习近平主持会议。

会议指出，设立党中央决策议事协调机构，是健全党中央对重大工作集中统一领导、推动重大任务落实的重要制度安排。制定出台《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》，进一步规范党中央决策议事协调机构的设立、职责和运行，对于发挥好对重大工作的顶层设计、统筹协调、整体推进、督促落实职能作用，具有重要意义。

会议强调，党中央决策议事协调机构要准确把握职责定位，坚持谋大事、议大事、抓大事，对重大工作实施更为有效的统领和协调，做到统筹不代替、到位不越位。要深入调查研究，提升决策议事质效，提出切合实际、行之有效的政策举措。要力戒形式主义、官僚主义，工作务求实效。

会议还研究了其他事项。

我们看6月政治局会议8大看点，
第一是再次取消了习近平的核心地位
6月政治局会议成为观察习近平权力状态的关键窗口。今年以来的政治局会议显示出显著的表述变化：3月31日的政治局会议首次取消“以习近平同志为核心的党中央”表述，4月25日政治局会议短暂恢复习近平的核心，5月29日的政治局会议秘密召开，6月30日再次取消习近平同志为核心的表述。这一反复不仅反映了高层内部的分歧与博弈，也可能预示着权力结构的重大调整。
3月取消“核心”表述与此前传言的习近平健康恶化（5-6月失踪两周）、安保减半及《人民日报》淡化宣传，比如改称“习近平同志”）相呼应，可能胡锦涛等人主导，旨在削弱习近平个人权威。4月暂时恢复可能是维稳之举，应对国内外对权力真空的猜测；5月秘密召开则暗示内部斗争进入白热化，6月再次取消则强化了元老派主导的清洗信号。

政治局会议，通常是一个月召开一次，关注度很高，这个新华社通稿，就是相当于政治局的正式文件。政治局真的发一个文件，可能还没有人看呢。
其实这个表述很清楚，习近平暂时还是中共的总书记。
但是习近平已经不是中共的一把手了。3月和6月两个月的官方文件已经确认了。
再给倒回去，那就太恶心了。

二是成立中央决策委员会是修改政体级别的改动，因为涉及到整个权力结构。
如果成立中央决策委员会，那么是不是高于政治局常委会，也就是说中央决策委员会的决定政治局常委会要不要听取。
这名网友说，
包子的权力被剥夺了，出现一个凌驾于常委会的决策议事协调机构，就看哪些人进入这个机构了…
设立中央决策委员会被视为一次政体级别的重大调整，超越常规人事变动，直接触及中国共产党的权力结构核心。如果成立，其地位很可能高于政治局常委会，涉及决策层级与执行机制的重新定义。
政治局常委会作为中共最高决策机构，集中了党政军权，习近平自2012年起通过“核心”地位强化个人控制。新委员会如果凌驾其上，要求政治局常委无条件执行，可能打破现有权力平衡。
从功能上看，中央决策委员会可能借鉴中顾委（1982-1992）的形式，但是定位更高，旨在协调元老派与现任领导层的利益。

第三是中央决策委员会的人员组成，现任政治局常委要不要参加。

新旧权力交接的试金石中央决策委员会的人员组成是其成败的关键。如果包括现任政治局常委比如习近平、丁薛祥，则可能维持现有体系的连续性；如果仅仅由退休常委，比如胡锦涛、温家宝等人主导，则标志新旧权力交接。

传言胡锦涛中央决策委员会任主任，李瑞环、温家宝、张德江任副主任，显示委员会可能由退休高层组成，排除现任常委。
如果属实，意味着新机构可能成为权力交接的过渡平台。然而，是否能够有效运行，仍取决于胡锦涛温家宝的执行力。
这可能削弱习近平的直接影响力，甚至将其边缘化。
人员名单还没有公开，需要关注后续人事动态。
我最早在2024年9月29日的节目中说过温家宝担任政治体制改革小组总顾问。
2024年12月29日和2025年1月4日，说过两期温家宝担任过渡委员会主任。
如果真的由胡锦涛或者温家宝来担任中央决策委员会主任。
那么他们还真的按照我说治国理政呢，醉了。
具体中共会怎么操作，我也不知道。

如果要成立中央决策委员会的，那么肯定所有人都会想到中顾委。
我们简单说一下中顾委，然后再说怎么处理习近平的问题。

第四是我们简单回复一下中顾委的历史，比较一下当时的权力结构，
中央顾问委员会简称中顾委，中顾委的历史可以为今天的中央决策委员会提供参考。1982年中顾委设立，首任主任邓小平（1982-1987），第二任主任陈云（1987-1992），中顾委就存在了10年，邓小平和陈云分别担任5年。

当时的党内的一把手就是邓小平，二把手是陈云。邓小平虽然不担任第二任中顾委主任，但是邓小平还是一把手。而前后三任总书记胡耀邦，赵紫阳，江泽民的党内排名是第三，高于排名第5的中顾委第一副主任薄一波。

1984年5月26日，赵紫阳给邓小平专门写过一封信，同时抄送陈云，胡耀邦一直被蒙在鼓里，此信事实上打响了推倒胡耀邦的第一枪，也是打向胡耀邦背后的最为致命的一枪。内容长达3500多字，赵在信中就当时的中共中央领导班子调整问题谈了自己的看法，明确指出：“中央主要领导人思想落伍、态度顽固，不能保证和贯彻小平同志的伟大战略……建议您（指的是邓小平）和陈云同志身体允许的情况下解决这一复杂的问题。”

赵紫阳作为总理给邓小平写信同时抄送陈云，但是没有抄送薄一波
证明当时的中共党内的权力排名是邓小平，陈云，总书记，总理，中顾委第一副主任。
就是一个很奇怪的排名顺序。
这种权力结构就说明，中顾委什么作用也没用，最多就是一个由头，也就是说，今天设立中央决策委员会也是一个效果。
因为中顾委主任陈云的权力很大，是二把手，但是中顾委第一副主任薄一波权力没有那么大。

如果中共现在仿照中顾委成立一个中央决策委员会，
主任胡锦涛自然是一把手，那么副主任温家宝呢。
温家宝在党内的地位，到底是高于总书记还是低于总书记呢？
这都是问题。如果设立中央决策委员会，到底是临时机构，还是长期的制度设计呢？

第五是，如何拿下习近平
有网上传言说，习近平坚决不辞职。这种传言真假不知道。
只能说节目效果的成分多一些，现在政治局已经公然取消习近平的核心地位。
习近平也是一个党棍，网上这些照片说明习近平不掌权的时候他也是很憨厚，很老实的。

如果设立中央决策委员会，由胡锦涛或者温家宝担任主任。

如果中央决策委员会，凌驾于政治局常委之上，
那就无所谓习近平辞职不辞职了，可以习近平主动辞职，也可以由中央决策委员会建议习近平辞职。
反正决定权已经不在习近平手中。
其实决定权早就不在习近平手中了，现在只不过要把这个手续在党内合法化而已。
不知道为什么还执着于这一点呢，共产党本来就是非法，没有经过人民的选票授权。
本来就是非法政权，还要假装合法

第六是，
中央决策委员会的设立性质是其存续与影响的关键：是临时机构为拿下习近平权力，还是长期权力设计的改革？
如果为临时机构，旨在应对习近平下台问题。那么新的总书记接班之后，可能解散，恢复政治局常委主导。
如果为长期设计，则需修改党章，确立元老参与决策的机制，类似中顾委但是地位更高，旨在平衡现任领导与历史资历，避免一言堂重演。
还是要看，这个机构的组成人员名单。

但是从政治局公告来看，是确定要搞得，已经出台了《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》
这个工作条例的具体内容还没有公布，可以看出来到底有什么职权。
从他们的说法来看，谋大事、议大事、抓大事
应该是有比较高的权限

第七是，为什么文革之后是邓小平和陈云掌权，分别是一把手和二把手呢。
文革后邓小平与陈云掌权有其历史根源。

这就要从1956年9月28日八届一中全会的政治常委名单说起毛泽东、刘少奇、周恩来、朱德、陈云、邓小平
当时政治局常委只有6个人，不是奇数
1958年5月25日八届五中全会增补林彪为政治局常委，排在陈云之后，邓小平之前。
这就7个政治局常委呢。最早刘少奇1969年死了，林彪1971年坠机死了，毛泽东，周恩来，朱德1976年一起死了。
等于8届5中全会7个政治局常委，文革之后死了5个，剩下两个人就是邓小平和陈云。
他们两个人是活着的，中共党内资历最深的两个人，所以他们两个人掌权有一定的合理性。

空军情报部部长贺德全资料里面有一个关键点，涉及到
中共党史为什么是邓小平陈云掌权。
1967年想对苏联进行技术侦察，监听。从1967年下半年开始，筹建了4个新的技侦团。按照一个团配备1000 来个懂外语的上机人员，4 个团要将近4000 人。全是高干子弟。由周恩来亲自安排。空军军务部具体操办。后来的空军上将刘亚洲，当时在福州技侦2 团当兵，也是利用这个机会去了武汉的一所大学学习英语。
这段材料的关键点，就是一句，周恩来亲自安排。刘亚洲在福州技侦2团当兵。
刘亚洲又是空军，又是技侦，又是福州，全是习近平的人。
证明刘亚洲和习近平是一个派系的。
李先念就是陈云习近平派系的。

陈云和李先念帮助邓小平复出的，就为了让邓小平把华国锋搞倒。

第八点解读我们下期继续，还有三个瓜

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Hu Jintao appointed Chairman of the Central Decision-Making Committee, Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, and Zhang Dejiang appointed Vice Chairmen. Analysis of the June Politburo Meeting: 8 Key Points

Good afternoon. The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting on June 30 to review the “Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies.” General Secretary Xi Jinping presided over the meeting.

The meeting pointed out that establishing the CPC Central Committee’s decision-making and coordination bodies is an important institutional arrangement to improve the CPC Central Committee’s centralized and unified leadership over major work and promote the implementation of major tasks. The formulation and promulgation of the “Working Regulations of the CPC Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies” further standardizes the establishment, responsibilities, and operation of these bodies, which is of great significance for effectively fulfilling their functions of top-level design, overall coordination, overall advancement, and supervision of implementation of major work.

The meeting emphasized that the CPC Central Committee’s decision-making and coordination bodies should accurately grasp their responsibilities and positioning, adhere to planning, discussing, and handling major issues, and implement more effective leadership and coordination for major work, ensuring that overall planning does not replace or overstep their bounds. They should conduct in-depth investigations and research to improve the quality and efficiency of decision-making and deliberation, and propose practical and effective policy measures. They must resolutely guard against formalism and bureaucracy, and strive for practical results in their work. The meeting also discussed other matters.

We can look at eight key points from the June Politburo meeting:

First, the core position of Xi Jinping was once again removed.

The June Politburo meeting became a crucial window for observing the state of Xi Jinping’s power. The Politburo meetings this year have shown significant changes in wording: the March 31 meeting removed the phrase “the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core” for the first time; the April 25 meeting briefly reinstated Xi Jinping as the core; the May 29 meeting was held secretly; and the June 30 meeting again removed the phrase “Comrade Xi Jinping as the core.” This back-and-forth not only reflects internal divisions and power struggles within the top leadership but may also foreshadow a major adjustment in the power structure.

The removal of the “core” phrase in March echoes previous rumors of Xi Jinping’s deteriorating health (his disappearance for two weeks in May and June), halved security measures, and the People’s Daily downplaying its propaganda (e.g., changing to “Comrade Xi Jinping”). This may be orchestrated by Hu Jintao and others, aiming to weaken Xi Jinping’s personal authority. The temporary resumption of meetings in April was likely a move to maintain stability and address domestic and international speculation about a power vacuum; the secret meeting in May suggested the internal struggle had intensified, and the cancellation in June reinforced the signal of a purge led by the veteran faction.

The Politburo meetings, usually held monthly, attract significant attention. This Xinhua News Agency press release is essentially an official Politburo document. Even if the Politburo actually issued a document, it might not be read by anyone yet.

In fact, this statement is quite clear: Xi Jinping is still the General Secretary of the CCP for the time being.

However, Xi Jinping is no longer the top leader of the CCP. Official documents from March and June have already confirmed this.

Going back would be utterly disgusting.

Secondly, the establishment of the Central Decision-Making Committee represents a change in the political system’s hierarchy, as it involves the entire power structure.

If the Central Decision-Making Committee is established, does it supersede the Politburo Standing Committee? In other words, should the Politburo Standing Committee heed the decisions of the Central Decision-Making Committee?

This netizen commented, “Xi Jinping’s power has been stripped away, and a decision-making and coordinating body has emerged that transcends the Standing Committee. The question now is who will enter this body…” The establishment of the Central Decision-Making Committee is seen as a major adjustment at the political system level, going beyond routine personnel changes and directly touching the core of the Chinese Communist Party’s power structure. If established, its status is likely to be higher than the Politburo Standing Committee, involving a redefinition of decision-making levels and execution mechanisms.

The Politburo Standing Committee, as the highest decision-making body of the CCP, concentrates party, government, and military power. Since 2012, Xi Jinping has strengthened his personal control through its “core” status. If the new committee transcends it, demanding unconditional execution from the Politburo Standing Committee, it could disrupt the existing power balance.

Functionally, the Central Decision-Making Committee may draw on the form of the Central Advisory Commission (1982-1992), but with a higher positioning, aiming to coordinate the interests of the veteran faction and the current leadership.

Thirdly, there is the composition of the Central Decision-Making Committee, and whether current Politburo Standing Committee members should participate.

The composition of the Central Decision-Making Committee is a touchstone for the transition of power between the old and new regimes; its success or failure hinges on this. If current Politburo Standing Committee members such as Xi Jinping and Ding Xuexiang are included, the continuity of the existing system may be maintained; if it is dominated solely by retired Standing Committee members such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, it signifies a power transition.

Rumors suggest that Hu Jintao will chair the Central Decision-Making Committee, with Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, and Zhang Dejiang as vice-chairs, indicating that the committee may be composed of retired high-ranking officials, excluding current Standing Committee members.

If true, this means the new institution may serve as a transitional platform for power transfer. However, its effective operation depends on the execution capabilities of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.

This could weaken Xi Jinping’s direct influence, or even marginalize him.

The personnel list has not yet been released; further personnel developments need to be monitored.

I first mentioned in a program on September 29, 2024, that Wen Jiabao would serve as the chief advisor to the Political System Reform Leading Group.

On December 29, 2024, and January 4, 2025, I mentioned twice that Wen Jiabao would serve as the chairman of the Transitional Committee.

If Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao does indeed become the chairman of the Central Decision-Making Committee…

So they’re actually governing the country according to my advice? Unbelievable.

I don’t know the specifics of how the CCP will operate.

If a Central Decision-Making Committee is to be established, everyone will definitely think of the Central Advisory Commission (CAC).

Let’s briefly discuss the CAC, and then talk about how to deal with Xi Jinping’s situation.

Fourth, let’s briefly review the history of the CAC and compare its power structure at the time.

The Central Advisory Commission (CAC) can provide a reference for today’s Central Decision-Making Committee. Established in 1982, the CAC’s first director was Deng Xiaoping (1982-1987), and the second director was Chen Yun (1987-1992). The CAC existed for 10 years, with Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun each serving for 5 years.

At that time, Deng Xiaoping was the top leader of the Party, and Chen Yun was the second-in-command. Although Deng Xiaoping did not serve as the second director of the CAC, he was still the top leader. The three General Secretaries—Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin—ranked third within the Party, higher than Bo Yibo, the fifth-ranked First Vice Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission.

On May 26, 1984, Zhao Ziyang wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, also copying Chen Yun. Hu Yaobang was kept in the dark. This letter effectively fired the first shot in the overthrow of Hu Yaobang, and also the most fatal shot fired behind his back. The letter, over 3,500 words long, expressed Zhao’s views on the adjustment of the CCP Central Committee leadership at the time, explicitly stating: “The main leaders of the Central Committee are outdated in their thinking and stubborn in their attitude, unable to guarantee and implement Comrade Xiaoping’s great strategy… I suggest that you (referring to Deng Xiaoping) and Comrade Chen Yun resolve this complex issue if your health permits.”

The fact that Zhao Ziyang, as Premier, wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping and copied Chen Yun, but not Bo Yibo, proves that the power ranking within the CCP at that time was Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, General Secretary, Premier, and First Vice Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission.

It’s a very strange ranking order.

This power structure demonstrates that the Central Advisory Commission (CAC) was essentially useless, merely a pretext. In other words, establishing a Central Decision-Making Committee today would have the same effect.

Because Chen Yun, the CAC chairman, wielded considerable power, being the second-in-command, while Bo Yibo, the first vice-chairman, did not have nearly as much power.

If the CCP were to establish a Central Decision-Making Committee modeled after the CAC,

Hu Jintao would naturally be the chairman, but what about Wen Jiabao, the vice-chairman?

Wen Jiabao’s position within the party—whether higher or lower than the General Secretary—is a question.

These are all issues. If a Central Decision-Making Committee is established, will it be a temporary body or a long-term institutional design?

Fifthly, how to remove Xi Jinping?

There are rumors online that Xi Jinping resolutely refuses to resign. The veracity of these rumors is unknown.

It can only be said that they are largely for entertainment purposes. The Politburo has already openly relinquished Xi Jinping’s core position.

Xi Jinping is also a party hack. These online photos show that when Xi Jinping is not in power, he is quite docile and honest.

If a Central Decision-Making Committee is established, with Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao as chairman…

If the Central Decision-Making Committee supersedes the Politburo Standing Committee,

then the question of whether Xi Jinping resigns or not becomes irrelevant. He can resign voluntarily, or the Central Decision-Making Committee can recommend his resignation.

In any case, the decision-making power is no longer in Xi Jinping’s hands.

In fact, the decision-making power has long been out of Xi Jinping’s hands; now it’s just a matter of legalizing the procedure within the Party.

I don’t understand why people are still fixated on this point. The Communist Party is inherently illegitimate, not authorized by the people’s vote.

It’s an illegitimate regime, yet it pretends to be legitimate.

Sixthly, the nature of the Central Decision-Making Committee’s establishment is crucial to its survival and influence: Is it a temporary body designed to remove Xi Jinping from power, or a reform designed for long-term power?

If it’s a temporary body aimed at addressing Xi Jinping’s potential downfall, then it might be dissolved after a new General Secretary takes over, restoring the Politburo Standing Committee’s dominance.

If it’s a long-term design, then the Party Constitution needs to be amended to establish a mechanism for veterans to participate in decision-making, similar to the Central Advisory Commission but with a higher status, aiming to balance current leadership with historical seniority and prevent a repeat of one-man rule.

It still depends on the list of members of this body.

However, judging from the Politburo announcement, it’s definitely going to be implemented, and the “Working Regulations of the Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies” have already been issued.

The specific content of these regulations hasn’t been released yet, but we can see what their powers and responsibilities are.

Judging from their statements, they are responsible for planning, discussing, and handling major issues.

They likely have relatively high authority.

Seventhly, why did Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun take power after the Cultural Revolution, becoming the top leader and second-in-command respectively?

The rise of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun to power after the Cultural Revolution has historical roots.

This stems from the list of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Eighth Central Committee held on September 28, 1956: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping.

At that time, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau only had six members, not an odd number.

On May 25, 1958, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee added Lin Biao to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, ranking after Chen Yun and before Deng Xiaoping.

This made a total of seven members on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Liu Shaoqi died first in 1969, Lin Biao died in a plane crash in 1971, and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De all died in 1976.

Of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, five died after the Cultural Revolution, leaving only Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun.

These two were still alive, and were the two most senior members of the CCP, so their rise to power had a certain legitimacy.

A key point in the materials on He Dequan, the Minister of the Air Force Intelligence Department, relates to

why Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun held power in the CCP’s history.

In 1967, they wanted to conduct technical reconnaissance and wiretapping against the Soviet Union. Starting in the latter half of 1967, they established four new technical reconnaissance regiments. Each regiment was to be equipped with about 1,000 aircrew members fluent in foreign languages, totaling nearly 4,000 people for the four regiments. All were children of high-ranking officials. This was personally arranged by Zhou Enlai, with the Air Force Military Affairs Department handling the specifics. Later, Air Force General Liu Yazhou was serving in the 2nd Technical Reconnaissance Regiment in Fuzhou at the time. He used this opportunity to study English at a university in Wuhan.

The key point of this material is the sentence, “Zhou Enlai personally arranged it.” Liu Yazhou served in the 2nd Technical Reconnaissance Regiment in Fuzhou.

Liu Yazhou was in the Air Force, in technical reconnaissance, and in Fuzhou—all people associated with Xi Jinping.

This proves that Liu Yazhou and Xi Jinping belong to the same faction.

Li Xiannian was in the Chen Yun-Xi Jinping faction.

Chen Yun and Li Xiannian helped Deng Xiaoping regain power so that Deng Xiaoping could bring down Hua Guofeng.

We’ll continue with the analysis of point eight next time; there are three more juicy details to come.

Okay, thank you everyone.