李家超完全下架习近平。青联副主席彭丽媛缺席青联大会。习近平仅发贺信。夫妻二人双双缺席。济公游本昌入党的唯一意义

 

李家超完全下架习近平。青联副主席彭丽媛缺席青联大会。习近平仅发贺信。夫妻二人双双缺席。济公游本昌入党的唯一意义

大家好，
李家超作为香港特区行政长官，在2024年7月1日香港特区成立27周年和2025年7月1日香港特区成立28周年的致辞中，分别阐述了特区政府施政成果与未来目标。今年2025年致辞“只字不提习近平”，而2024年多次提及习近平及其讲话精神，对比之下表明习近平已经丧失大权，等待官宣下台。

我们对比李家超今年和去年的两篇致辞发现5点主要区别

1. 有没有提习近平：
   2024年致辞：明确提及习近平及其讲话精神，李家超称“两年前的今天，习近平主席在这里发表重要讲话，对香港提出‘四个必须’、‘四点希望’，成为我的施政蓝图。两年来，我们贯彻习近平主席对香港所做的系列重要讲话精神”（2024年7月1日）。习近平被置于施政核心，强调习近平对香港的直接指导。
   2025年致辞：完全没有提习近平或其讲话精神，仅泛泛地说“国家机遇”“一国两制”，未涉及习近平（2025年7月1日）。

2025年“只字不提习近平”，对比2024年李家超对习近平高调提及，表明习近平影响力骤减，可能因为被胡锦涛派系控制，失去对香港施政的指导地位，符合多家媒体报道的失权传闻。

28周年李家超旁边是梁振英，梁振英这边是周霁是中联办主任。
周霁最早是田纪云的侄子田承忠，田纪云是赵紫阳的头号马仔。赵紫阳曾经担任过中共总书记。
李家超就相当于香港市长。中联办主任周霁就相当于香港的市委书记。
香港和中国现在也差不多。香港就相当于中国的直辖市。相当于一个省。
李家超就是香港省长，中联办主任周霁就相当于香港的省委书记。

第二是关于中央政府的表述：
2024年致辞：李家超多次提及“中央”支持，如“我感谢中央对香港的支持和厚爱，推出多项惠港措施，包括增加十个‘个人游’城市；深化内地与香港金融合作的多项新举措”（2024年7月1日）。强调中央权威，暗指习近平领导。
2025年致辞：李家超仅泛化提及“国家机遇”“融入国家发展大局”，没有直接感谢“中央”或具体政策，比如李家超说“把握国家机遇和世界机遇”“积极融入国家发展大局”（2025年7月1日）。
区别是：2024年突出“中央”支持，间接颂扬习近平权威；2025年淡化“中央”，用“国家”替代，暗示习近平掌控中央的能力下降，权力受限，等待下台。

第三点是施政蓝图的来源：
2024年致辞：李家超明确将施政蓝图归于习近平，称“习近平主席提出的‘四个必须’、‘四点希望’，成为我的施政蓝图”（2024年7月1日）。施政方向直接与习近平挂钩。
2025年致辞：李家超没有提及施政蓝图的来源，仅称“政府推动改革”“以结果为目标的政府”，聚焦自身团队成果（2025年7月1日）。
区别是：2025年不提习近平作为施政蓝图来源，表明李家超不再以习近平指示为指导，反映习近平权威丧失，可能已经被胡锦涛派系边缘化。

第四点是国家安全的表述：
2024年致辞：李家超强调完成《基本法》第二十三条立法为“宪制责任”，没有直接提国家安全，但暗合习近平“全面管治权”理念（2024年7月1日）。
2025年致辞：李家超突出“以高水平安全护航高质量发展”“坚定维护国家安全”，并称香港在全球最安全城市排名第七（2025年7月1日）。
区别是：2025年更强调国家安全，但没有提及习近平的“总体国家安全观”，对比2024年暗合习近平理念，表明习近平对香港安全政策的指导力减弱，支持其失权。

第五点是未来发展的重点**：
2024年致辞：李家超展望三大方面（经济发展、强化优势、融入国家），强调“中央支持”及习近平倡导的“大湾区”“一带一路”机遇（2024年7月1日）。
2025年致辞：李家超同样提三大方面（安全与发展、北部都会区、改善民生），但聚焦“北部都会区”“新质生产力”，没有提习近平推动的“大湾区”或“一带一路”（2025年7月1日）。
区别就是：2025年淡化习近平核心政策，比如“大湾区”，转而突出本地项目，表明香港施政脱离习近平指引，反映其权力丧失。

大湾区，习近平一下台，早晚也得黄，大湾区基金的经历李月中，之前就是习近平姐姐齐桥桥公司的经理。大湾区就是习近平姐姐齐桥桥和习近平弟弟习远平的生意。
习近平一下台，大湾区也得完蛋。

对比李家超2024年和2025年致辞，2025年不提习近平（区别1）、淡化中央支持（区别2）、施政蓝图不归于习近平（区别3）、国家安全没有提习近平理念（区别4）、未来发展忽视习近平政策（区别5），就是不提大湾区和一带一路。表明习近平对香港的影响力已经消失。结合媒体报道的习近平缺席金砖峰会、苗华何卫东被肃清，证明习近平已被胡锦涛派系控制，行动受限，丧失大权。主流媒体，比如《朝鲜日报》《自由时报》及X帖子支持下台传闻，习近平可能在8月四中全会官宣下台。

2025年7月2日，习近平致信祝贺中华全国青年联合会第十四届委员会全体会议（青联十四届全委会）和中华全国学生联合会第二十八次代表大会（学联二十八大）召开，强调“坚定正确政治方向，深化改革创新，在党的旗帜下奋进新征程创造新业绩”。

中共中央政治局常委、中央书记处书记蔡奇出席开幕会。
中共中央政治局委员、中央组织部部长石泰峰在会上宣读了习近平的贺信。
李干杰、陈文清、刘金国、王小洪、铁凝、巴特尔出席会议。

习近平现在什么正事儿都干不了，天天就是写写贺信。
这些贺信也不知道是习近平写的，还是秘书写的改了习近平的签名章。
习近平不识字，故意也不会写贺信。小学生，只能拿拼音写一封信。

贺信内容泛泛而谈，十分的空洞，强调“中国式现代化”“青年担当”，没有提出具体政策或新指示，仅仅重复套话，比如“听从党和人民召唤”“奋力书写青春篇章”。习近平无力主导任何实质事务，只能通过贺信维持表面存在感。

因为这封贺信就是手下人代写的，又不是习近平的指示。
就没有任何的指标，习近平也发不出来什么指示。

青联和习近平的关系还真不一般
首先习近平的情人铁凝就坐在主席台上
习近平的正宫彭丽媛曾经是正经的青联副主席。

铁凝作为文化领域要员，其高调现身可能为习近平派系撑场面，但习近平仅发贺信未亲临，表明其无法直接掌控青联活动，权力受限。

彭丽媛是全国青联第十届副主席。
第十一届的秘书长刘佳晨从第十届就开始担任副秘书长秘书长
担任彭丽媛的大秘。
十一届全国青联主席王晓就是彭丽媛的情人。
刘佳晨都已经抓了，王晓还没有抓
贺军科，马化腾都是彭丽媛的人。要不然今年2月开民营座谈会，马云都参加了
为什么不让马化腾参加呢？
第十三届青联副主席姚明就是彭丽媛的马仔。

2025年习近平多次发贺信，比如
2025年5月3日，习近平给谢依特小学戍边支教西部计划志愿者服务队队员回信。
2025年5月20日，国家主席习近平向2025年上海合作组织减贫和可持续发展论坛致贺信。
2025年5月25日，习近平向第二十届中国西部国际博览会致贺信。
2025年5月27日祝贺少先队第九次全国代表大会。
2025年6月26日，习近平同莫桑比克总统查波就中莫建交50周年互致贺电
2025年6月29日，习近平回信勉励西藏林芝市巴宜区林芝镇嘎拉村全体村民
2025年7月2日祝贺青联十四届全委会与学联二十八大。
2025年7月4日，习近平委托中组部负责同志向游本昌转达勉励和问候
习近平委托中央组织部负责同志，向92岁高龄加入中国共产党的国家话剧院一级演员游本昌转达了勉励和问候。他表示，得知游本昌的向党之心令人感动，希望他发挥党员先锋模范作用，带动更多文艺工作者为社会主义文化大发展大繁荣贡献力量。
游本昌入党唯一价值，就是能够多走一个共产党员。

现在习近平每天干的事情就是贺信，贺电，回信。
全是这些礼仪性的工作

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

John Lee has completely ousted Xi Jinping. Peng Liyuan, Vice-Chairperson of the All-China Youth Federation, was absent from the Federation’s congress. Xi Jinping only sent a congratulatory letter. Both husband and wife were absent. The sole significance of You Benchang’s (a character from the Journey to the West) joining the Party.

Hello everyone, John Lee, as Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, outlined the achievements and future goals of the SAR government in his addresses on July 1, 2024, the 27th anniversary of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, and July 1, 2025, the 28th anniversary. His 2025 address made no mention of Xi Jinping, while his 2024 address repeatedly mentioned Xi Jinping and the spirit of his speeches. This contrast suggests that Xi Jinping has lost power and is awaiting official confirmation of his resignation.

A comparison of John Lee’s speeches this year and last year reveals five key differences:

Is Xi Jinping mentioned?
2024 Speech: Explicitly mentioned Xi Jinping and the spirit of his speeches. Lee stated, “Two years ago today, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech here, putting forward ‘four musts’ and ‘four hopes’ for Hong Kong, which became my governance blueprint. Over the past two years, we have implemented the spirit of President Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches on Hong Kong” (July 1, 2024). Xi Jinping was placed at the core of governance, emphasizing his direct guidance to Hong Kong.

2025 Speech: Completely omitted any mention of Xi Jinping or the spirit of his speeches, only vaguely mentioning “national opportunities” and “one country, two systems,” without mentioning Xi Jinping himself (July 1, 2025).

The complete omission of Xi Jinping in the 2025 speech, compared to Lee’s high-profile mention of Xi in 2024, indicates a sharp decline in Xi Jinping’s influence, possibly due to his being controlled by Hu Jintao’s faction and losing his guiding position in Hong Kong governance, consistent with reports of power loss by multiple media outlets.

On the 28th anniversary, next to John Lee was Leung Chun-ying, and next to Leung Chun-ying was Zhou Ji, the Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong.

Zhou Ji was originally Tian Chengzong, the nephew of Tian Jiyun, who was Zhao Ziyang’s top henchman. Zhao Ziyang once served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.

John Lee is equivalent to the mayor of Hong Kong. Zhou Ji, the Director of the Liaison Office, is equivalent to the Party Secretary of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong and China are now quite similar. Hong Kong is equivalent to a municipality directly under the central government of China, or a province.

John Lee is the governor of Hong Kong, and Zhou Ji, the Director of the Liaison Office, is equivalent to the Party Secretary of Hong Kong.

Secondly, regarding the statements about the central government: In his 2024 address, John Lee repeatedly mentioned the support of the “central government,” such as, “I thank the central government for its support and affection for Hong Kong, and for introducing a number of preferential measures for Hong Kong, including adding ten more cities to the ‘Individual Visit Scheme’; and several new measures to deepen financial cooperation between the mainland and Hong Kong” (July 1, 2024). This emphasizes the authority of the central government, implicitly referring to Xi Jinping’s leadership.

In his 2025 address, John Lee only vaguely mentioned “national opportunities” and “integrating into the overall national development,” without directly thanking the “central government” or specifying concrete policies. For example, Lee stated “seizing national and global opportunities” and “actively integrating into the overall national development” (July 1, 2025).

The difference is that the 2024 address emphasized “central government” support, indirectly praising Xi Jinping’s authority; the 2025 address downplayed “central government,” replacing it with “nation,” implying a decline in Xi Jinping’s ability to control the central government, limited power, and a potential step down.

The third point concerns the source of his policy blueprint: In his 2024 address, Lee explicitly attributed the policy blueprint to Xi Jinping, stating that “President Xi Jinping’s ‘four musts’ and ‘four hopes’ have become my policy blueprint” (July 1, 2024). The policy direction is directly linked to Xi Jinping.

In his 2025 address, John Lee did not mention the source of the governance blueprint, only stating that “the government promotes reform” and is “a results-oriented government,” focusing on his team’s achievements (July 1, 2025).

The difference is that the 2025 address did not mention Xi Jinping as the source of the governance blueprint, indicating that John Lee no longer takes Xi Jinping’s instructions as guidance, reflecting the loss of Xi Jinping’s authority and possible marginalization by Hu Jintao’s faction.

The fourth point concerns the wording regarding national security: In his 2024 address, John Lee emphasized that completing Article 23 of the Basic Law was a “constitutional responsibility,” without directly mentioning national security, but implicitly aligning with Xi Jinping’s concept of “comprehensive governance” (July 1, 2024).

In his 2025 address, John Lee highlighted “safeguarding high-quality development with high-level security” and “firmly safeguarding national security,” stating that Hong Kong ranks seventh among the safest cities in the world (July 1, 2025). The difference is that the 2025 address places greater emphasis on national security but makes no mention of Xi Jinping’s “overall national security concept,” contrasting with the 2024 address which implicitly aligns with Xi Jinping’s ideology. This suggests a weakening of Xi Jinping’s guidance over Hong Kong’s security policy, supporting his loss of power.

The fifth point concerns future development priorities:

2024 Address: John Lee outlined three key areas (economic development, strengthening advantages, and integration into the nation), emphasizing “central government support” and the opportunities presented by Xi Jinping’s “Greater Bay Area” and “Belt and Road Initiative” (July 1, 2024).

2025 Address: John Lee also mentioned three key areas (security and development, the northern metropolitan area, and improving people’s livelihoods), but focused on the “northern metropolitan area” and “new quality productivity,” omitting Xi Jinping’s “Greater Bay Area” or “Belt and Road Initiative” (July 1, 2025).

The difference is that the 2025 address downplayed Xi Jinping’s core policies, such as the “Greater Bay Area,” instead highlighting local projects, indicating that Hong Kong’s governance has deviated from Xi Jinping’s guidance, reflecting his loss of power.

The Greater Bay Area will inevitably collapse sooner or later once Xi Jinping steps down. Li Yuezhong, who previously managed the Greater Bay Area fund, was a manager at Qi Qiaoqiao’s company. The Greater Bay Area is essentially a business run by Qi Qiaoqiao and Xi Yuanping.

The Greater Bay Area will also be finished once Xi Jinping steps down.

Comparing Li Jiachao’s speeches in 2024 and 2025, the 2025 speech omitted Xi Jinping (difference 1), downplayed central government support (difference 2), did not attribute the governance blueprint to Xi Jinping (difference 3), did not mention Xi Jinping’s ideas on national security (difference 4), and ignored Xi Jinping’s policies on future development (difference 5). It completely omitted the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. This indicates that Xi Jinping’s influence over Hong Kong has vanished. Combined with media reports of Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS summit and the purging of Miao Hua and He Weidong, this proves that Xi Jinping has been controlled by Hu Jintao’s faction, his actions are restricted, and he has lost power. Mainstream media, such as the Chosun Ilbo, Liberty Times, and X-post, support the rumors of his resignation, suggesting that Xi Jinping may officially step down at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in August.

On July 2, 2025, Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the convening of the 14th National Committee of the All-China Youth Federation (ACYF) and the 28th National Congress of the All-China Students’ Federation (ACSF), emphasizing the need to “firmly adhere to the correct political direction, deepen reform and innovation, and forge ahead on a new journey to create new achievements under the banner of the Party.”

Cai Qi, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, attended the opening ceremony.

Shi Taifeng, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, read Xi Jinping’s congratulatory letter at the meeting.

Li Ganjie, Chen Wenqing, Liu Jinguo, Wang Xiaohong, Tie Ning, and Bater attended the meeting.

Xi Jinping can’t do anything productive now; all he does is write congratulatory letters.

It’s unclear whether these letters were written by Xi Jinping or by his secretary who altered his signature.

Xi Jinping is illiterate and deliberately doesn’t know how to write congratulatory letters. Like a primary school student, he can only write a letter using pinyin.

The congratulatory letter was vague and empty, emphasizing “Chinese-style modernization” and “youth responsibility” without offering any specific policies or new instructions. It merely repeated platitudes such as “heeding the call of the Party and the people” and “striving to write a new chapter of youth.” Xi Jinping is powerless to lead any substantive affairs and can only maintain a superficial presence through this congratulatory letter.

Because this letter was written by someone under his command and was not an instruction from Xi Jinping,

there were no targets or directives, and Xi Jinping could not issue any instructions.

The relationship between the All-China Youth Federation and Xi Jinping is indeed unusual.

Firstly, Xi Jinping’s mistress, Tie Ning, was seated on the dais.

Xi Jinping’s official wife, Peng Liyuan, was formerly a legitimate vice-chairperson of the All-China Youth Federation.

Tie Ning, as a key figure in the cultural field, may have made a high-profile appearance to support Xi Jinping’s faction, but Xi Jinping’s lack of direct control over the activities of the All-China Youth Federation, as evidenced by his sending a congratulatory letter, indicates that he cannot directly control the activities of the All-China Youth Federation and his power is limited.

Peng Liyuan was the vice-chairperson of the 10th All-China Youth Federation.

Liu Jiachen, the secretary-general of the 11th All-China Youth Federation, has served as deputy secretary-general and secretary-general since the 10th session, and is Peng Liyuan’s chief secretary.

Wang Xiao, the former chairman of the 11th All-China Youth Federation, was Peng Liyuan’s lover.

Liu Jiachen has already been arrested, but Wang Xiao hasn’t.

He Junke and Ma Huateng are both Peng Liyuan’s people. Otherwise, why would Jack Ma have attended the private sector symposium in February this year?

Why wasn’t Ma Huateng allowed to attend?

Yao Ming, the former vice chairman of the 13th All-China Youth Federation, is Peng Liyuan’s henchman.

Xi Jinping sent several congratulatory letters in 2025, for example:

On May 3, 2025, Xi Jinping replied to members of the Western China Volunteer Service Team for Border Defense and Teaching at Xieyite Primary School.

On May 20, 2025, President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Forum on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development.

On May 25, 2025, Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the 20th Western China International Fair.

On May 27, 2025, he congratulated the 9th National Congress of the Young Pioneers.

On June 26, 2025, Xi Jinping and Mozambican President Chapo exchanged congratulatory messages on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Mozambique.

On June 29, 2025, Xi Jinping replied to a letter encouraging all villagers of Gala Village, Linzhi Town, Bayi District, Linzhi City, Tibet.

On July 2, 2025, he congratulated the 14th National Committee of the All-China Youth Federation and the 28th National Congress of the All-China Students’ Federation.

On July 4, 2025, Xi Jinping entrusted an official from the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee to convey encouragement and greetings to You Benchang.

Xi Jinping entrusted an official from the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee to convey encouragement and greetings to You Benchang, a first-class actor of the National Theatre of China who joined the Communist Party of China at the age of 92. He said that he was moved by You Benchang’s devotion to the Party and hoped that he would play an exemplary role as a Party member and inspire more literary and artistic workers to contribute to the great development and prosperity of socialist culture.

The only value of You Benchang joining the Party is that it allows one more Communist Party member to join the Party.

Now, Xi Jinping’s daily work consists of sending congratulatory letters and telegrams and replying to letters.

All these are ceremonial tasks.

Okay, thank you everyone.