董军只字不提习近平。美中达成贸易协议。深度求索替共军窃取情报，恐遭美国制裁

 

董军只字不提习近平。美中达成贸易协议。深度求索替共军窃取情报，恐遭美国制裁

大家好，

贸易战与稀土争端的升级

美中贸易紧张关系自2025年初加剧，始于4月2日美国因贸易不对等对华加征34%关税，随后中国实施报复性措施，导致双方关税分别升至145%和125%，近乎贸易禁运。5月，双方在日内瓦达成90天关税暂停共识，但中国对稀土出口的限制，自4月起对七种稀土元素及磁铁实施许可制，成为主要争议点。美国指责中国没有履行承诺，川普威胁取消日内瓦协议，促使6月5日川普与习近平通话，6月9-10日伦敦会谈，最终于6月26-27日确认框架协议。这一背景显示，稀土出口已成为双方博弈的核心，协议的达成是贸易战缓和的暂时成果。

协议内容与影响

川普于6月26日宣布与中方达成贸易协议，称将“打开中国”，并暗示可能与印度有类似安排。白宫官员补充，协议基于日内瓦共识，旨在“加快恢复向美国运送稀土”。财政部长贝森特确认协议包括降低关税和恢复稀土磁铁出口，缓解了汽车、半导体和国防工业的供应链危机，比如福特短缺。中国商务部回应称，双方确认伦敦会谈框架，承诺依法审批出口申请，美国将取消部分反制措施，比如半导体软件限制。然而，细节未明，市场反应平淡，显示对长期效果存疑。协议短期内缓解供应压力，但未解决中国对军事用途稀土的限制，凸显其战略杠杆未完全放手。

双方立场与动机

• 美国立场：川普高调宣传协议，强调“55%关税换10%”及稀土供应，意在兑现竞选承诺，重振制造业。但其没有公布让步，比如允许中国学生签证。贝森特提到反制措施调整，暗示美国寻求平衡贸易与技术竞争，然而依赖中国稀土的现实使其立场被动。中国稀土占全球90%加工能力。
• 中国立场：中国商务部强调出口管制符合国际惯例，兼顾“合规贸易”，反映中国不愿完全放弃稀土杠杆。4月限制后，许可制仅部分放行，比如对美国车企），5-6月逐步发放更多许可，显示策略性调整。北京可能借此缓和贸易战，换取美国取消技术限制，同时保留对美防务产业的控制力。

3. 潜在动机与质疑
   协议表面上缓和贸易战，但动机值得审视。美国急需稀土保障国防，比如F-35需417kg稀土和经济稳定，然国内替代，比如美国公司仅生产1,000吨磁铁）远不及中国138,000吨（2018年数据），10年脱钩计划尚不现实。川普的“胜利”叙述或掩盖谈判中的妥协，如学生签证让步。中国则利用稀土“核选项”牵制美国，伦敦框架或为拖延战术，维持全球供应链主导地位。双方均未解决根本依赖问题，协议更像权宜之计，而非长久解决方案。

美中稀土出口协议是贸易战缓和的暂时成果，6月26-27日达成的框架缓解了供应危机，但细节不清，军事用途限制未解。川普借此宣传政绩，中国则保留战略杠杆，双方动机各异。美国寻求短期稳定，中国谋求长期控制，协议本质反映双方在稀土博弈中的妥协与博弈。然依赖未改，未来仍存变数，需关注执行进展与四季度谈判。

美国指控的证据与支持

美国国务院高级官员于2025年6月24日向记者表示，中国人工智能公司深度求索“心甘情愿”地为中国军事和情报活动提供支持，并可能继续这样做。支持这一指控的证据包括：一是中国国家媒体宣称人民解放军、武警及国家国防动员机构已将深度求索部署于非作战支持用途，如医院和人员管理；二是公开采购记录显示，深度求索在解放军及中国国防工业实体采购中被提及超过150次；三是深度求索与多家与中国军方和国防工业相关的学术机构，比如中国工程物理研究院、北京航空航天大学等，开展前沿AI研究，这些机构已被美国商务部列入实体清单；四是传言中国可能整合深度求索用于可扩展的军事和情报政府运作。这些证据表明深度求索可能已深度嵌入中国军事-民用融合体系，超出单纯的商业AI应用。

深度求索的背景与影响

深度求索成立于2023年，总部位于杭州，其2025年1月推出低成本开源AI模型，声称性能媲美OpenAI等美国领先模型，引发科技界震撼。仅5.6百万美元的训练成本，远低于Meta的数十亿美元，使其被视为中国AI崛起的象征，下载量飙升至160万次。然而，深度求索隐私政策显示收集用户数据，引发隐私担忧。多个国家，比如美国国防部、澳大利亚禁止在公务设备使用，美国众议院2025年2月提议禁令，反映对其国家安全威胁的警惕。结合采购记录和军方使用，如中部战区医院部署，深度求索的军事关联可能非偶然，其低成本策略或为掩盖技术转移的手段。

美国政策反应与制裁可能性

美国国务院虽然没有立即宣布对深度求索的制裁或出口限制，但美国国务院审查态度明确。2025年4月16日，众议院与中共战略竞争特设委员会报告称深度求索使用“数万”块受限英伟达芯片，比如H100，并警告出口管制漏洞。美国商务部正调查深度求索的芯片来源，新加坡2月28日指控三人倒卖英伟达芯片给中国企业，涉及深度求索，凸显供应链空子，中国喜欢钻空子。美国国务院发言人称“目前无公告”，可能因证据收集或国际协调未完成，但禁令呼声高涨，反映美国欲遏制中国AI军事化。然制裁若实施，可能引发中方报复，加剧科技战。

潜在动机与争议
美国指控的动机或涉及遏制中国AI崛起，深度求索的成功挑战了美方芯片出口限制效果，川普政府可能重塑叙事。官方证据比如采购记录，具有可信度，但没有证实深度求索主动提供军事支持，这个也很难证实。深度求索未回应置评，H100芯片来源存疑，英伟达称其使用合法H800，英伟达为了挣钱可能配合中国公司，可能涉及东南亚壳公司规避制裁。中国没有否认但强调“合规贸易”，可能是拖延战术。

综合结论
美国务院指控深度求索支持中国军事和情报活动，基于采购记录、军方使用及学术合作证据，凸显其军事化风险。然其低成本崛起和数据政策引发全球关注，美国正加紧审查芯片来源，制裁呼声高涨但暂未实施。动机或兼具安全考量与政治宣传，中国或利用其为杠杆，双方博弈继续。

董军现身但未提及习近平：信号微妙

2025年6月26日，国防部长董军在青岛会见出席上海合作组织（SCO）成员国国防部长会议的来宾，包括上合组织秘书长叶尔梅克巴耶夫、乌兹别克斯坦国防部长哈尔穆哈梅多夫等，讨论防务安全合作及“上海精神”。此次会见由国防部网报道，董军强调中方愿推动防务合作，维护地区稳定，但全程未提及习近平。这一举动与以往军方高官讲话常突出习近平“强军思想”的惯例形成对比。结合董军自2023年12月接任国防部长以来多次缺席（如2024年国防部记者会），及2025年5月苗华落马后军方人事调整传言，其现身但低调处理领导层表态，或暗示军方宣传口径在调整，习近平的个人权威可能不再是核心叙事。

习近平、蔡奇、董军的不稳定现身模式

习近平、蔡奇、董军近期的曝光模式呈现出“时不时现身打卡、时不时无法现身”的特征。习近平在2025年6月传言缺席金砖峰会、阅兵安排反复调整后，6月23日会见新加坡总理黄循财，但没有后续高调活动；蔡奇自2024年底传言健康问题后，2025年仅偶尔现身，比如二会，缺席频次增加；董军则在2024年下半年多次“失联”后，6月26日重现，但作用有限。三人状态的不稳定性与近期传言，比如习近平中风、四中全会权力交接相呼应，可能反映高层权力博弈或健康因素导致的角色模糊。董军全程没有提习近平。

权力结构变化的潜在暗示
董军全程没有提习近平，与《解放军画报》2024年7月后多次下架习近平照片、2025年5-6月再次下架的趋势一致，表明军方宣传在淡化习近平形象。结合苗华开除军委委员、习近平军中支柱李汉军被罢免人大代表资格，军方高层清洗迹象明显。四中全会将会调整军委领导，董军现身只是过渡期安排，董军低调表态可能受控于新权力核心，胡春华派系。习近平、蔡奇、董军的“打卡”模式，只是控局者为避免震荡而设计的“演戏”策略，旨在维持表象至权力交接完成。

国际合作背景下的战略考量
此次上海合作组织会议上，董军与会国讨论防务合作，应对“单边主义、霸权主义”，反映中国想通过多边平台巩固影响力。乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦等国赞扬中方作用，印度国防部长辛格虽提及“搬不走的邻居”并寻求缓和印中关系，但没有提习近平。其实没准儿真提了，中国不让报道。董军的现身强化中方在上海合作组织的军事外交形象，但没有提习近平或因国际关注习近平的权力状态。

综合结论
董军6月26日现身会见上海合作组织国防部长，但是全程没有提习近平，叠加习近平、蔡奇、董军的不稳定曝光模式，暗示中国高层权力结构可能正在发生微妙变化。军方宣传的调整、军中人事变动及三人的“打卡”现象，或是四中全会前权力交接的铺垫，旨在淡化习近平权威并为新领导过渡做准备。上海合作组织会议背景下的外交表态，则反映中方在国际舞台上维持稳定形象的努力。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Dong Jun made no mention of Xi Jinping. The US and China reached a trade agreement. A deep investigation into intelligence theft for the PLA may lead to US sanctions.

Hello everyone,

The Escalation of the Trade War and the Rare Earth Dispute
US-China trade tensions have intensified since early 2025, starting with the US imposing a 34% tariff on China on April 2 due to trade asymmetry. China subsequently retaliated, raising tariffs on both sides to 145% and 125%, respectively, a near-trade embargo. In May, the two sides reached a 90-day tariff suspension in Geneva. However, China’s restrictions on rare earth exports, including the licensing system for seven rare earth elements and magnets since April, became a major point of contention. The US accused China of failing to fulfill its commitments, and Trump threatened to cancel the Geneva agreement. This led to a phone call between Trump and Xi Jinping on June 5, talks in London on June 9-10, and ultimately the confirmation of the framework agreement on June 26-27. This context demonstrates that rare earth exports have become the core of the bargaining chip between the two sides, and the agreement represents a temporary easing of the trade war.

Agreement Content and Impact
On June 26, Trump announced a trade agreement with China, saying it would “open up China” and hinting at a possible similar arrangement with India. White House officials added that the agreement, based on the Geneva consensus, aims to “accelerate the resumption of rare earth shipments to the United States.” Treasury Secretary Benson confirmed that the agreement includes tariff reductions and the resumption of rare earth magnet exports, alleviating supply chain crises in the automotive, semiconductor, and defense industries, such as Ford’s shortage. China’s Ministry of Commerce responded that both sides confirmed the London talks framework, committed to legally reviewing export applications, and that the United States would lift some countermeasures, such as semiconductor software restrictions. However, the lack of details and the muted market reaction indicate skepticism about its long-term effectiveness. The agreement alleviates supply pressures in the short term, but does not address China’s restrictions on rare earths for military use, highlighting its continued strategic leverage.

Both Sides’ Positions and Motives
US Position: Trump touted the agreement, emphasizing the “55% tariff for 10%” trade and rare earth supplies, as a way to fulfill his campaign promise to revive the manufacturing industry. However, he did not publicly announce concessions, such as the permitting of Chinese student visas. Bessant mentioned adjustments to countermeasures, suggesting the US is seeking to balance trade and technological competition. However, its dependence on Chinese rare earths puts it in a passive position. China accounts for 90% of global rare earth processing capacity.

China’s Position: China’s Ministry of Commerce emphasized that export controls are in line with international practice and take into account “compliant trade,” reflecting China’s reluctance to completely relinquish its rare earth leverage. Following the April restrictions, the licensing system was only partially relaxed, for example for US automakers, with more licenses gradually being issued in May and June, signaling a strategic shift. Beijing may be using this to ease the trade war in exchange for the US lifting technology restrictions while retaining control over the US defense industry.

Potential Motives and Questions
The agreement ostensibly eases the trade war, but its motives warrant scrutiny. The US urgently needs rare earths for national defense, such as the 417 kg required for the F-35, and for economic stability. However, domestic substitution, for example, with US companies producing only 1,000 tons of magnets (far less than China’s 138,000 tons (2018 data), makes a 10-year decoupling plan unrealistic. Trump’s “victory” narrative may mask compromises made in the negotiations, such as concessions on student visas. China is using the rare earth “nuclear option” to contain the United States. The London framework may be a delaying tactic to maintain its dominance in the global supply chain. Neither side has resolved the fundamental dependency issue, making the agreement more of a stopgap measure than a lasting solution.

The US-China rare earth export agreement is a temporary outcome of trade war de-escalation. The framework reached on June 26-27 alleviated the supply crisis, but details are unclear and restrictions on military use remain unresolved. Trump is using it to promote his political achievements, while China is retaining strategic leverage. The two sides have different motivations. The United States seeks short-term stability, while China seeks long-term control. The agreement essentially reflects the compromise and maneuvering between the two sides in the rare earth game. However, dependency remains, and future uncertainties remain. We must pay attention to implementation progress and fourth-quarter negotiations.

Evidence and Support for US Accusations
A senior US State Department official told reporters on June 24, 2025, that Chinese artificial intelligence companies are “willingly” supporting Chinese military and intelligence activities and are likely to continue to do so. Evidence supporting this accusation includes: First, Chinese state media claims that the People’s Liberation Army, the Armed Police Force, and the National Defense Mobilization Agency have deployed Deepin Quest for non-combat support purposes, such as hospital and personnel management; second, public procurement records show that Deepin Quest was mentioned over 150 times in procurement by the PLA and Chinese defense industry entities; third, Deepin Quest conducts cutting-edge AI research with several academic institutions associated with the Chinese military and defense industry, such as the China Academy of Engineering Physics and the Beihang University, which have been added to the US Department of Commerce’s Entity List; and fourth, rumors that China may integrate Deepin Quest for scalable military and intelligence government operations. This evidence suggests that Deepin Quest may be deeply embedded in China’s military-civilian integration system, extending beyond purely commercial AI applications.

Background and Impact of Deepin Quest
Founded in 2023 and headquartered in Hangzhou, Deepin Quest launched a low-cost, open-source AI model in January 2025, claiming performance comparable to leading American models like OpenAI, which shocked the tech community. With a training cost of only $5.6 million, far less than Meta’s multi-billion-dollar training effort, it was seen as a symbol of China’s AI rise, and its downloads soared to 1.6 million. However, ShenDuQiusuo’s privacy policy indicates that it collects user data, raising privacy concerns. Several countries, such as the US Department of Defense and Australia, prohibit its use on official equipment. The US House of Representatives proposed a ban in February 2025, reflecting concern about its national security threat. Considering its procurement records and military use, such as the deployment of a Central Theater Command hospital, ShenDuQiusuo’s military ties are likely more than accidental, and its low-cost strategy may be a means of concealing technology transfer.

US Policy Response and Potential Sanctions

While the US State Department did not immediately announce sanctions or export restrictions against ShenDuQiusuo, its review was clear. On April 16, 2025, the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with China reported that ShenDuQiusuo used “tens of thousands” of restricted Nvidia chips, such as the H100, and warned of export control loopholes. The US Department of Commerce is investigating the source of ShenDuQiusuo’s chips. On February 28, Singapore charged three individuals with reselling Nvidia chips to Chinese companies, including ShenDuQiusuo, highlighting supply chain loopholes that China readily exploits. A US State Department spokesperson stated that “there are no announcements at this time,” possibly due to incomplete evidence gathering or international coordination. However, growing calls for a ban reflect US efforts to curb China’s militarization of AI. However, if sanctions are implemented, they could trigger retaliation from China, exacerbating the tech war.

Potential Motives and Controversy
The US accusations may be motivated by efforts to contain China’s rise in AI. Deep Quest’s success challenges the effectiveness of US chip export restrictions, and the Trump administration may be reshaping the narrative. Official evidence, such as procurement records, is credible, but it does not confirm that Deep Quest actively provided military support, a claim that is difficult to verify. Deep Quest did not respond to requests for comment. The source of the H100 chip is questionable, and Nvidia claims it uses legitimate H800 chips. Nvidia may be colluding with Chinese companies to generate revenue, potentially involving Southeast Asian shell companies to circumvent sanctions. China has not denied the allegations, but has emphasized “compliant trade,” potentially a delaying tactic.

Overall Conclusion
The US State Department’s accusation that Deep Quest supports Chinese military and intelligence activities, based on procurement records, military use, and academic collaboration, highlights the risk of its militarization. However, its low-cost rise and data policies have drawn global attention. The United States is intensifying its scrutiny of chip sources, and calls for sanctions are growing, but they have yet to be implemented. The motivation may be a combination of security concerns and political propaganda, with China potentially using it as leverage, and the game between the two sides continues.

Dong Jun appeared but did not mention Xi Jinping: A subtle signal.
On June 26, 2025, Defense Minister Dong Jun met in Qingdao with guests attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states’ defense ministers’ meeting, including SCO Secretary-General Yermekbayev and Uzbek Defense Minister Khalmukhamedov, to discuss defense and security cooperation and the “Shanghai Spirit.” The meeting was reported on the Ministry of National Defense website. Dong Jun emphasized China’s willingness to promote defense cooperation and maintain regional stability, but made no mention of Xi Jinping. This move contrasts with the previous practice of senior military officials highlighting Xi Jinping’s “Strengthening the Military Thought” in their speeches. Considering Dong Jun’s repeated absences since taking over as Defense Minister in December 2023 (such as the 2024 Defense Ministry press conference) and rumors of military personnel changes following Miao Hua’s fall from power in May 2025, his appearances but low-key handling of leadership statements may suggest adjustments in the military’s propaganda narrative, and that Xi Jinping’s personal authority may no longer be the core narrative.

The Erratic Appearances of Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, and Dong Jun
The recent public appearances of Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, and Dong Jun have been characterized by sporadic appearances and occasional absences. Following rumors of Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS summit in June 2025 and repeated adjustments to the military parade schedule, Xi Jinping met with Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on June 23rd, but did not engage in any subsequent high-profile activities. Following rumors of health issues at the end of 2024, Cai Qi made only occasional appearances in 2025, such as at the Second Session of the 1989-2008 National People’s Congress, with his absences increasing. Dong Jun, after several “missings” in the second half of 2024, reappeared on June 26th, but his impact was limited. The instability of the three individuals’ positions echoes recent rumors, such as Xi Jinping’s stroke and the power transition at the Fourth Plenum. This may reflect a power dynamic at the top or a blurring of roles due to health issues. Dong Jun made no mention of Xi Jinping at all.

Potential implications of shifting power structures.
Dong Jun’s failure to mention Xi Jinping aligns with the PLA Pictorial’s repeated removal of Xi Jinping’s photos after July 2024 and again in May-June 2025, suggesting that military propaganda is downplaying Xi Jinping’s image. Combined with Miao Hua’s expulsion from the CMC and the dismissal of Li Hanjun, Xi Jinping’s pillar of support in the military, from his position as a National People’s Congress representative, there are clear signs of a purge within the military’s leadership. The Fourth Plenum will restructure the CMC leadership, and Dong Jun’s appearance is merely a transitional arrangement. His low-key stance may be driven by the control of the new power center, Hu Chunhua’s faction. The “check-in” pattern of Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, and Dong Jun is merely a “theatrical” strategy designed by those in control to avoid volatility and maintain appearances until the power transfer is complete.

Strategic Considerations in the Context of International Cooperation
Dong Jun met with fellow SCO defense ministers at the meeting to discuss defense cooperation and counter unilateralism and hegemonism, reflecting China’s desire to consolidate its influence through multilateral platforms. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and other countries praised China’s role. While Indian Defense Minister Singh referred to “immovable neighbors” and sought to ease India-China relations, he made no mention of Xi Jinping. Perhaps he did, but China blocked reporting. Dong Jun’s appearance bolstered China’s military diplomacy within the SCO, but the omission of Xi Jinping may be due to international concerns about his power status.

Overall Conclusion
Dong Jun met with SCO defense ministers on June 26th, but made no mention of Xi Jinping. This, combined with the erratic public appearances of Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, and Dong Jun, suggests subtle shifts in China’s top power structure. Adjustments in military propaganda, personnel changes, and the “clocking in” phenomenon of the three individuals may be groundwork for the power transition before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, aimed at diluting Xi Jinping’s authority and preparing for the transition to a new leadership. China’s diplomatic stance in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting reflects its efforts to maintain a stable image on the international stage.

Okay, thank you.