习近平四中全会下台。再被边控，习近平缺席巴西峰会。习近平93阅兵的真正原因

 

习近平四中全会下台。再被边控，习近平缺席巴西峰会。习近平93阅兵的真正原因

大家好，
这名网友说
重大消息，习近平将缺席马上要开的金砖会议，由李强代替，真的就在这几个月下台了。
这名网友说，
人民日报和新华社关于阅兵的报道中，都把习近平要检阅部队这句话给删除了。目前主要就是那个吴少将说了习近平要检阅，旁边的胡和平呢，全程没有提习近平检阅部队。胡和平是中宣部二把手应该知道内情，而吴少将只是一个执行者，可能还蒙在鼓里呢。

李强频繁会见多国领导人，而习近平仅会见新加坡总理黄循财

李强近期分别会见了厄瓜多尔总统诺沃亚、吉尔吉斯斯坦总理卡瑟马利耶夫、越南总理范明政，以及新加坡总理黄循财，展现了其在外交事务中的活跃角色。然而，习近平仅仅会见黄循财，这一安排在前新加坡总理李显龙的夫人何晶于2025年4月21日转发批评习近平的文章后显得格外引人注目。

这位名网友说，
6月25日上午，国务院总理李强在天津出席2025年夏季达沃斯论坛开幕式并致辞。习近平没来，李强讲话也没提习近平一个字。
李强忽略包子大家都习惯了。
这是正常操作，李强不说习近平，对外展示，自己独立于习近平，不受习近平控制，实际上大家都知道，他是习近平的马仔。
别放屁了行吗，李强明明是江泽民的人。
李强什么派系，可能不是习近平的人吧。
就是细胞子的人，过去是细胞子的大秘。
不是的，李强被习和蔡排挤得不要太明显。

国务院总理李强2025年6月24日上午在北京人民大会堂会见来华出席夏季达沃斯论坛的厄瓜多尔总统诺沃亚。国务院总理李强6月24日下午在天津会见来华出席夏季达沃斯论坛的吉尔吉斯斯坦总理卡瑟马利耶夫。李强提了一句习近平。李强6月24日上午还在人民大会堂，下午就去天津了，应该是中午坐高铁去天津的。国务院总理李强6月24日下午在天津会见来华出席夏季达沃斯论坛的越南总理范明政。

李强表示，今年是中越建交75周年。过去75年，中越始终相互支持、携手共进，“同志加兄弟”的深厚情谊历久弥坚、历久弥新。习近平总书记、国家主席4月成功访问越南以来，中越全面战略合作进一步向前推进。这里李强也提了习近平。

但是习近平会见新加坡总理黄循财表明，习近平只是在胡春华的只是下配合演戏而已。表明习近平的行动已经不能自主决策，而是受制于幕后的势力，尤其是胡春华的潜在主导。

我们注意一个是新加坡前总理夫人何晶虽然转发了两篇骂习近平的文章，但是中国外交部并没有抗议新加坡，王毅没有召见新加坡驻华大使。就和没发生这件事情一样，还继续邀请新加坡总理黄循财访华。这在习近平掌握大权的情况下是不可能发生的。

此外，将要担任胡春华的总书记办公室主任职务的金善文已升任国家机关工委副书记，这一人事变动进一步强化了胡春华派系的影响。金善文的升迁，成为蔡奇副手，可能是胡春华为接班的信号，习近平的会见安排或被利用来淡化习近平个人权威。

现在主子还没上去，奴才先上去了。

中共官方先宣布习近平将参加2025年93阅兵，随后迅速传出其缺席7月6-7日金砖国家峰会的消息，由李强代为出席。这一戏剧性反转引发外界猜测。《南华早报》称习近平因“日程冲突”缺席，但巴西官员的失望和卢拉的“善意”未获回应，暗示可能另有内情。

中国国家主席习近平据报不会出席下个月在巴西里约热内卢举行的金砖国家峰会，这将是他首次缺席这一主要新兴经济体大会。

香港《南华早报》引述知情政府官员称，中国已告知巴西，中国国务院总理李强将代表习近平，出席7月6日至7日的金砖国家峰会。知情官员称，中国向巴西表明，习近平缺席峰会是因为日程安排有冲突，此外，习近平过去一年与巴西总统卢拉频繁会晤也是原因之一。

报道称，巴西官员们毫不掩饰他们对习近平缺席的失望。据消息人士披露，卢拉今年5月访华是为了“表达善意”，并期望习近平能够对此回应，出席里约峰会。卢拉的首席特别顾问阿莫林今年2月与中国外交部长王毅会面，阿莫林当时对外称，他已向王毅明确表明，巴西希望接待习近平。阿莫林说：“我对他们说，没有中国的金砖国家不是金砖国家。”他强调，鉴于目前的全球形势，习近平出席峰会尤为重要。

也就是说巴西官员强烈要求习近平出席金砖国家峰会，但是习近平就是拒绝出席。欧中建交50周年峰会一样，最后被迫改在中国举行。巴西金砖国家峰会邀请很多国家，也不可能改在中国举行啊。

网友说，人民日报和新华社删除习近平检阅部队的表述，胡和平没有确认而吴少将仍然提及，反映出中共信息控制的混乱。这可能不是偶然，而是高层有意制造权力交接的舆论氛围。习近平缺席金砖会议、李强代为出席，有可能胡春华派系通过李强削弱习近平国际曝光度的做法，配合后续阅兵安排的调整，为四中全会权力更替铺垫。

习近平是否参加93阅兵存在变数。如果习近平就是要参加阅兵的话，如果2025年8月召开的四中全会调整职务，习近平可能卸任总书记和党的军委主席，由胡春华接任并检阅部队。另一种情景是习近平以国家军委主席身份阅兵，因为国家军委主席到2026年两会才卸任。这种安排的目的是凸显习近平是“主动辞去”总书记和军委主席， 合法化胡春华的接班。也可以这么解释。

关键是四中全会什么时候召开，习近平下不下，如果已经定下来，四中全会的召开日期。定下来习近平要下台。那么习近平阅兵还不不阅兵不是决定性因素。我说了中共会自己整活。这不是又不让习近平参加金砖国家峰会。刚让包蜜爽一会儿，又被打下去了。现在习近平的状态和蔡奇董军差不多，动不动不让出来了，过两天又放出来一次。

金善文升任国家机关工委副书记，这进一步支持胡春华派系的崛起。胡春华要接班，金善文可能循丁薛祥路径，先担任中办副主任和国家主席办公室主任，总书记办公室主任，21大会担任中办主任，22大会入常，目标或为第一副总理或中央书记处书记，前提是中共还没有倒台。

金善文曾经担任中华全国总工会基层工作部部长，2018年随副主席尹德明调研，显示两人关系密切。尹德明早年仕途与李克强（1995-1999）、胡春华（1999-2001）交集深厚，后在西藏（2004-2012）多次担任胡春华下级，与胡锦涛派系绑定。尹德明的提拔可能受李瑞环、胡锦涛影响，尹德明天津市和总工会经历与李瑞环和王兆国关系有关。金善文如果是尹德明的“马仔”，金善文升迁证明胡春华派系渗透蔡奇体系，取代原属习近平的官员，习近平控制的地盘。金善文的因工会背景，比较边缘，肯定不是习近平嫡系，金善文的升迁预示胡春华接班的幕后布局。

李强的外交活跃、习近平的低调会见及缺席金砖会议、阅兵安排的模糊性，结合金善文的升迁，共同指向胡春华派系可能主导权力过渡。习近平会见黄循财并非自主决策，而是胡春华指令下的“演戏”，金善文升任国家机关工委副书记为其升任铺垫，表明胡春华将接任总书记。尹德明的李克强和胡春华背景进一步佐证胡春华派系的深厚根基，习近平的角色被边缘化，四中全会是关键节点。

下就是下，不下就不不下，还能因为一个阅兵就改变决定吗？

这名网友说，
一个93阅兵很多靠下水道供应的都慌了。

只要习近平能完成以下任何一个任务，就证明习近平不会下，我就再也不说习近平要下台

第一，查处胡锦涛，李瑞环，温家宝，张德江，胡春华，张又侠，李强，赵乐际任何一个人。如果说这些人常委或者退休常委，那么胡春华不过是一个政协副主席，苏荣能抓，令计划能抓，胡春华有什么不能抓的？何卫东能抓，张又侠怎么就不能？习近平实现不了这些硬指标，就谈不上翻盘。

第二，连续提拔10名副部级或正部级官员。这在三中全会之前对习近平来说都不算个事儿。现在习近平根本就不能实现，如果习近平突然能做到这一点，就说明他重掌全大权了。就刚提拔的这个金善文他是总工会的官员，这不都是退休养老的地方吗？习近平的马仔为什么会在这种二线，退休的职位呢？

第三、平反苗华，何卫东“冤假错案”。把军队习近平被抓的马仔都放出来呀，苗华贪污怎么了，何卫东腐败怎么了。就说这是我习近平亲自批准的怎么了？中国哪个官员不贪污，哪个官员不腐败啊。凭什么抓的，习近平如果大权在握，凭什么抓呀。

第四，复活秦刚，热地，吴邦国，姜春云等等，这些习近平的马仔。

这四条不用都做到，只要能做到一条，就说明习近平重掌大权。除了第四条，前三条在习近平掌权的时候，不算个事儿，完全可以做到。反过来习近平实现不了这些硬指标，那他还得下台。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Xi Jinping stepped down on August 18th. He was again placed under border control and missed the Brazil summit. The real reason behind Xi Jinping’s 93rd military parade.

Hello everyone,

This netizen said,

Breaking news: Xi Jinping will miss the upcoming BRICS meeting and be replaced by Li Qiang. He’s truly stepping down in the next few months.

This netizen said,

Both the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency’s coverage of the military parade deleted the mention of Xi Jinping reviewing the troops. The main point is that Major General Wu mentioned Xi Jinping’s review, while Hu Heping, who was standing next to him, made no mention of Xi Jinping reviewing the troops. Hu Heping, as the second-in-command of the Central Propaganda Department, should have known the details, while Major General Wu was merely an executor and may have been kept in the dark.

Li Qiang frequently meets with leaders of various countries, while Xi Jinping only met with Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong.

Li Qiang recently met with Ecuadorian President Novoa, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kasemaliev, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, and Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, demonstrating his active role in diplomatic affairs. However, Xi Jinping only met with Lawrence Wong. This arrangement became particularly noteworthy after Ho Ching, wife of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, retweeted an article criticizing Xi Jinping on April 21, 2025.

This netizen commented,

On the morning of June 25, Premier Li Qiang attended and addressed the opening ceremony of the 2025 Summer Davos Forum in Tianjin. Xi Jinping was not present, and Li Qiang didn’t mention Xi Jinping a single word in his speech.

Everyone is used to Li Qiang ignoring Baozi.

This is normal practice. Li Qiang doesn’t mention Xi Jinping to demonstrate his independence from Xi Jinping and his freedom from his control. In reality, everyone knows he’s Xi Jinping’s lackey.

Stop talking nonsense, Li Qiang is clearly Jiang Zemin’s man.

What faction does Li Qiang belong to? He’s probably not Xi Jinping’s man.

He’s just a member of the “Cell” group and was once their chief aide.

No, it’s obvious that Li Qiang has been marginalized by Xi and Tsai Ing-wen.

On the morning of June 24, 2025, Premier Li Qiang met with Ecuadorian President Noboa at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, who was in China for the Summer Davos Forum. On the afternoon of June 24, Premier Li Qiang met with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kasemaliev in Tianjin, who was in China for the Summer Davos Forum. Li Qiang mentioned Xi Jinping. Li Qiang was at the Great Hall of the People on the morning of June 24 and left for Tianjin in the afternoon, presumably taking the high-speed train there at noon. On the afternoon of June 24, Premier Li Qiang met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh in Tianjin, who was in China for the Summer Davos Forum.

Li Qiang stated that this year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam. Over the past 75 years, China and Vietnam have consistently supported each other and worked together for progress. The deep friendship of “comrades and brothers” has endured, growing stronger and more revitalized. Since General Secretary and President Xi Jinping’s successful visit to Vietnam in April, China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperation has made further progress. Li Qiang also mentioned Xi Jinping here.

However, Xi Jinping’s meeting with Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong suggests that Xi Jinping was merely cooperating under Hu Chunhua’s guidance. This indicates that Xi Jinping’s actions are no longer his own, but rather subject to the influence of behind-the-scenes forces, particularly the potential dominance of Hu Chunhua.

One noteworthy point is that although Ho Ching, the wife of Singapore’s former prime minister, retweeted two articles criticizing Xi Jinping, the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not protest against Singapore, and Wang Yi did not summon the Singaporean ambassador to China. It was as if the incident had never occurred, and the invitation to Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong to visit China was still in place. This would have been impossible under Xi Jinping’s control.

Furthermore, Jin Shanwen, who was to assume Hu Chunhua’s position as Director of the General Secretary’s Office, has been promoted to Deputy Secretary of the State Organs Working Committee. This personnel change further strengthens the influence of Hu Chunhua’s faction. Jin Shanwen’s promotion to Cai Qi’s deputy may signal Hu Chunhua’s succession, and Xi Jinping’s meeting arrangements may be used to dilute Xi Jinping’s personal authority.

Now, the master has not yet ascended, but the servant has ascended first.

The Chinese Communist Party officially announced that Xi Jinping would attend the 93rd military parade in 2025, but soon after, news broke that he would be absent from the July 6-7 BRICS summit, with Li Qiang attending in his place. This dramatic reversal sparked speculation. The South China Morning Post reported that Xi Jinping’s absence was due to a “scheduling conflict,” but Brazilian officials’ disappointment and Lula’s unanswered “goodwill” offer suggest a deeper story.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will reportedly not attend next month’s BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, marking his first absence from the gathering of major emerging economies.

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, citing government officials with knowledge of the matter, reported that China has informed Brazil that Premier Li Qiang will represent Xi at the July 6-7 BRICS summit. The official stated that China informed Brazil that Xi’s absence was due to a scheduling conflict, in addition to Xi’s frequent meetings with Brazilian President Lula over the past year.

The report stated that Brazilian officials made no secret of their disappointment at Xi’s absence. According to sources, Lula’s visit to China in May was intended as a “goodwill gesture,” with the expectation that Xi would reciprocate by attending the Rio summit. Lula’s chief special adviser, Amorim, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in February, and Amorim stated at the time that he had made it clear to Wang Yi that Brazil wished to host Xi Jinping. Amorim said, “I told them that BRICS without China is not BRICS.” He emphasized that Xi Jinping’s attendance at the summit was particularly important given the current global situation.

In other words, Brazilian officials strongly urged Xi Jinping to attend the BRICS summit, but Xi Jinping simply refused. Just like the summit marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and the EU, it was ultimately forced to be held in China. The BRICS summit in Brazil invited many countries, so it couldn’t possibly be held in China.

Netizens commented that the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency’s deletion of the reference to Xi Jinping reviewing the troops, the non-confirmation by Hu Heping, and the continued mention by Major General Wu reflect the CCP’s chaotic information control. This may not be accidental, but rather a deliberate effort by top leaders to create a favorable atmosphere for a power transition. Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS meeting and Li Qiang’s attendance in his place may be a move by Hu Chunhua’s faction, using Li Qiang to reduce Xi Jinping’s international visibility, in conjunction with adjustments to the subsequent military parade arrangements, paving the way for a power transition at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

Whether Xi Jinping will attend the 93rd military parade remains uncertain. If Xi Jinping is determined to attend the parade, and if the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in August 2025 reshuffles positions, Xi Jinping could step down as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, with Hu Chunhua taking over and reviewing the troops. Another scenario is Xi Jinping reviewing the parade as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, since the chairman of the Central Military Commission doesn’t step down until the 2026 Two Sessions. This arrangement aims to highlight Xi Jinping’s “voluntary resignation” from both positions, legitimizing Hu Chunhua’s succession. This could also be interpreted this way.

The key is when the Fourth Plenary Session will be held and whether Xi Jinping will step down. If the date has already been set, then Xi Jinping’s resignation is not the decisive factor. I’ve always said the CCP will do things its own way. This isn’t another case of Xi Jinping being barred from attending the BRICS summit. Just when Bao Mi was enjoying himself, he was rebuked again. Xi Jinping’s current situation is similar to that of Cai Qi and Dong Jun: he’s often banned from public life, only to be released again a few days later.

Jin Shanwen’s promotion to Deputy Secretary of the State Organs Working Committee further supports the rise of Hu Chunhua’s faction. If Hu Chunhua were to succeed him, Jin Shanwen would likely follow Ding Xuexiang’s path, first serving as Deputy Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, Director of the Presidential Office, and Director of the General Secretary’s Office. He would then become Director of the General Office at the 21st National Congress and become a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee at the 22nd National Congress. His goal could be First Vice Premier or Member of the CPC Central Secretariat, assuming the CCP remains in power.

Jin Shanwen previously served as Director of the Grassroots Work Department of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. In 2018, he accompanied Vice Chairman Yin Deming on a research trip, demonstrating their close relationship. Yin Deming’s early career intertwined with Li Keqiang (1995-1999) and Hu Chunhua (1999-2001). Later, in Tibet (2004-2012), he served repeatedly as Hu Chunhua’s subordinate, aligning him with the Hu Jintao faction. Yin Deming’s promotion may have been influenced by Li Ruihuan and Hu Jintao. Yin Deming’s experience in Tianjin and with the Federation of Trade Unions is related to his relationship with Li Ruihuan and Wang Zhaoguo. If Jin Shanwen is Yin Deming’s henchman, his promotion demonstrates that Hu Chunhua’s faction is infiltrating Cai Qi’s system, replacing officials previously affiliated with Xi Jinping and establishing Xi Jinping’s control. Jin Shanwen’s trade union background makes him a relatively marginal figure, certainly not one of Xi Jinping’s direct allies. His promotion foreshadows behind-the-scenes planning for Hu Chunhua’s succession.

Li Qiang’s diplomatic activism, Xi Jinping’s low-key meetings and absence from the BRICS summit, and the ambiguity surrounding the military parade arrangements, combined with Jin Shanwen’s promotion, all point to the possibility that Hu Chunhua’s faction may be leading the power transition. Xi Jinping’s meeting with Lawrence Wong was not an independent decision, but rather a “staged performance” under Hu Chunhua’s direction. Jin Shanwen’s promotion to Deputy Secretary of the State Organs Work Committee paves the way for his promotion, indicating that Hu Chunhua will take over as General Secretary. Yin Deming’s connections with Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua further demonstrate the deep-rooted strength of Hu Chunhua’s faction. Xi Jinping’s role has been marginalized, and the Fourth Plenum is a crucial turning point.

If he’s going to step down, he’s going to step down. If he’s not going to step down, he’s not going to step down. Can a military parade change the decision?

This netizen said, “The 93rd military parade caused panic among those who rely on sewer supplies.”

As long as Xi Jinping can accomplish any of the following tasks, it will prove that Xi Jinping will not step down, and I will never again say that Xi Jinping will step down.

First, investigate and punish any of Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Zhang Dejiang, Hu Chunhua, Zhang Youxia, Li Qiang, or Zhao Leji. If these are members of the Standing Committee or retired members, then Hu Chunhua is just a vice chairman of the CPPCC. If Su Rong and Ling Jihua can be arrested, why can’t Hu Chunhua be arrested? If He Weidong can be arrested, why not Zhang Youxia? If Xi Jinping can’t achieve these hard targets, there’s no turning back.

Second, promote 10 vice-ministerial or ministerial officials in a row. This was not a problem for Xi Jinping before the Third Plenum. Now, Xi Jinping simply cannot achieve this. If Xi Jinping can suddenly do this, it means that he has regained full power. Just look at the recently promoted Jin Shanwen, he is an official of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Aren’t these places for retirement and retirement? Why are Xi Jinping’s henchmen in these second-tier, retired positions?

Third, redress the “false charges” against Miao Hua and He Weidong. Release all of Xi Jinping’s henchmen in the military. What’s wrong with Miao Hua’s corruption? What’s wrong with He Weidong’s corruption? Just say it was something Xi Jinping personally approved. What’s wrong? Which Chinese official isn’t corrupt? What’s the basis for arresting them? If Xi Jinping holds all the power, why would he arrest them?

Fourth, resurrect Qin Gang, Redi, Wu Bangguo, Jiang Chunyun, and other Xi Jinping henchmen.

You don’t have to achieve all four of these; just one will indicate Xi Jinping’s return to power. With the exception of the fourth, the first three weren’t a big deal when Xi Jinping was in power; they were completely achievable. On the other hand, if Xi Jinping fails to meet these hard targets, he will have to step down.

Okay, thank you everyone.