韩国三大报报道，习近平缺席金砖峰会，将会下台。关注《朝鲜日报》的报道，李强出访巴西和埃及

 

韩国三大报报道，习近平缺席金砖峰会，将会下台。关注《朝鲜日报》的报道，李强出访巴西和埃及

大家好，我们关注《朝鲜日报》的一篇文章
首先我们简单看一下朝鲜日报的基本背景。

《朝鲜日报》是韩国历史最悠久的报纸之一，创刊于1920年，以韩文发行，每日发行量高达230万份，是韩国发行量最大的报纸之一。它与东亚日报》和《中央日报》并称为韩国三大报纸。《朝鲜日报》的立场偏向韩国保守派，并以亲美、亲日、友台、反中以及鲜明的反共、反北韩政权等观点著称。该报还在包括中国大陆、台湾、香港等在内的多个国家和地区设有常驻记者。
《朝鲜日报》的中文版新闻网站供中文使用者浏览。其网站提供朝鲜日报的中文新闻内容，方便中文读者了解该报的新闻报道和评论。
总的来说，《朝鲜日报》是韩国重要的媒体，其立场和报道内容在韩国国内以及国际社会都具有一定的影响力。

也就是说，朝鲜日报是韩国三大报之一，是韩国的主要报纸。
打一个不太恰当的比喻，就是中国的人民日报。
而且这名作者李伐飡，朝鲜日报派北京特派记者

习近平首次缺席金砖峰会，失权传闻沸沸扬扬

中国国家主席缺席关键国际会议，引发权力动荡猜测
李伐飡 《朝鲜日报》驻北京特派记者

中国国家主席习近平决定不出席7月6-7日在巴西里约热内卢举行的第十七次金砖国家领导人峰会，打破其自2009年金砖成立以来从未缺席的记录，引发国际社会广泛关注。金砖峰会以对抗西方主导国际秩序的“非西方联盟”性质著称，中国一直是其核心推动者。自2009年首次峰会以来，中国领导人从未缺席，习近平自2013年上任以来保持12年“全勤”（2020-2022年因疫情转为线上参会）。此次缺席是习近平首次缺席实体峰会，尤其在金砖扩员至20国后的首次元首会议背景下，显得格外引人注目。近期，海外反体制人士及媒体流传“习近平失权”的传闻，这一事件进一步加剧了外界对中国内部权力异动的猜测。

金砖峰会作为中国推动“去美元化”及全球影响力扩张的重要平台，2025年会议因新增伊朗、阿联酋、埃及、埃塞俄比亚等10个成员及伙伴国而备受关注。此前金砖维持五国机制（中国、俄罗斯、印度、巴西、南非），2024年起扩员至20国，习近平缺席这一历史性会议令人意外。北京外交圈人士评论称：“习近平放弃了精心准备的国际舞台。”7月2日，中国外交部发言人毛宁宣布，国务院总理李强将代表习近平赴巴西出席峰会。部分受中国政府审查的网络媒体称，习近平因过去一年两次会见巴西总统而无需亲自参会，但这一解释未能平息外界质疑。

有分析认为，习近平缺席可能与其国内权力斗争有关，尤其是为即将于8月召开的中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第四次全体会议（也就是四中全会）做准备。四中全会素来是重塑党内权力格局的关键节点。更有海外声音提出激进猜测：习近平可能面临下台危机。美国前国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林在X平台发文称：“中国内部显然正在酝酿权力更替。”前美国驻百慕大大使格雷戈里·斯莱顿在《纽约邮报》撰文指出：“习近平或因健康问题在8月四中全会被迫退位。”台湾《自由时报》进一步报道，习近平的军中亲信何卫东与苗华已被清洗，暗示其军权受损。这些传闻得到海外反体制人士的广泛传播，X平台上，2025年7月1日，称习近平“权力被系统性削弱”，有媒体也将习近平缺席金砖峰会与失权联系起来。

简单说习近平三连任图什么，不久图一个外国来朝的感觉吗？习近平如果大权在握，为什么要放弃这样的表演机会呢？

近期，习近平核心马仔的异常动态加剧了失权传闻。2025年6月27日，中央军委政治工作部主任苗华因“严重违纪违法”被免职，此前2025年3月14日苗华的人大代表资格已经被撤销。军委副主席何卫东自2025年3月11日起再也没有公开出现过，传闻何卫东被拘捕，可能与苗华案有关。何卫东被抓都多家国际大媒体报道过。

關於中共中央軍委副主席何衛東被抓或被查的消息，主要由海外媒體進行了報導和引述，其中提及的媒體包括：

美國華盛頓時報 (The Washington Times)：該報引述兩名美國國防官員消息，何衛東已從公眾視野中消失，遭到清洗。美國情報機構認為，何衛東是中共解放軍高層政治清洗的最新受害者。

英國金融時報 (Financial Times)：該報報導稱，何衛東因涉嫌貪腐已被免職，並從被拘留後一直在接受審訊。報導引述了多名消息人士。

中央社 (CNA)：作為台灣的官方通訊社，中央社也轉述了美國華盛頓時報和英國金融時報的相關報導。

自由亞洲電台 (Radio Free Asia, RFA)：該電台也有相關報導，引述了美國防官員的說法。

此外，2025年6月，政协副主席胡春华主持政治协商会议，副总理丁薛祥赴俄罗斯会晤普京，这些通常由习近平亲自指挥，亲自部署的场合改由他人代为出席，引发外界对习近平行动受限的猜测。胡春华作为胡锦涛派系（团派）成员，其高调活动可能暗示胡锦涛影响力回升，限制了习近平的自由。

什么叫软禁？现在习近平的状态是这也不能出席，那也不能出席。当然时不时还跳出来打卡。
这到底和软禁的区别是什么呢？
我给大家总结过习近平缺席至少十次重要会议，涉及军事、外交、经济、民生及意识形态领域。这些还都不是小场合，小场面。如果大大小小都统计进去的话。习近平至少了30场以上各种各样的活动。
被软禁了，不也就这样吗？

部分分析认为，习近平缺席金砖峰会可能出于外交考量。俄罗斯总统普京因国际刑事法院（ICC）逮捕令而放弃参会，习近平如果现身可能被解读为默认国际刑事法院决定或与俄罗斯疏远。
这解释的说法太过牵强了。那么普京不能参加活动，世界上所以的国家都放弃外交活动吗？
这种说法明显就是强行洗地。金砖国家印度和普京的关系也不错，不是照样参加吗？
印尼和俄罗斯的关系也不错，还一起联合军演呢
印尼总统普拉博沃将出席此次金砖国家峰会。

所以，这些解释难以掩盖习近平缺席的异常性，尤其是在习近平亲信被清洗、胡春华等代班的背景下。外界推测，习近平可能正面临胡锦涛派系的压力，为四中全会权力斗争做准备，习近平可能已无法自由行动。

总之，习近平首次缺席金砖峰会，结合苗华、何卫东被清洗及胡春华、丁薛祥代班，强烈暗示习近平已被胡锦涛派系控制，行动受限。

朝鲜日报毕竟是韩国的三大报之一，是韩国的主要媒体。

朝鲜日报最出名的报道，在我这里对中国最重要的报道就是。
朝鲜日报曾经报道。
胡锦涛在担任贵州省委书记、西藏自治区党委书记时曾兼任当地军区党委第一书记，首次同军队人士建立了直接关系。1989年在拉萨镇压西藏骚乱和实施戒严后，胡锦涛与朱启、桂全智、陶昌廉等将军建立了友好关系。
朝鲜日报的这段报道之中出现了三个中国将军的名字
朱启，桂全智，陶昌廉。其中朱启和陶昌廉不知道是谁。
但是桂全智提拔的王西欣，王西欣提拔的刘振立。
因此，我们可以确定刘振立的派系背景
我们看这个报道就是多年前的报道。没有被大外宣污染的信息。
才可以放心的引用。
一般10年15之前的报道，被大外宣污染过的信息不多。

中国外交部发言人周三在一份声明中表示：“李强将应邀出席于7月5日至8日在巴西里约热内卢举行的第17届金砖国家领导人峰会。”北京方面表示，李强访问巴西后，将于7月9日至10日对埃及进行正式访问。

因此可以推测7月5日到7月10日，中国不会召开重要的会议。
因为李强将缺席。

目前不清楚，习近平将会有什么动作。
好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

South Korea’s three major newspapers reported that Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS summit suggests he may step down. We are also following a report in the Chosun Ilbo about Li Qiang’s visits to Brazil and Egypt.

Hello everyone, we are following an article from the Chosun Ilbo.

First, let’s briefly look at the basic background of the Chosun Ilbo.

The Chosun Ilbo is one of South Korea’s oldest newspapers, founded in 1920. Published in Korean, it has a daily circulation of 2.3 million copies, making it one of South Korea’s largest newspapers. It is considered one of the three major newspapers in South Korea, along with the Dong-A Ilbo and the JoongAng Ilbo. The Chosun Ilbo leans towards South Korean conservatism and is known for its pro-US, pro-Japan, pro-Taiwan, anti-China, and strongly anti-communist and anti-North Korean regime views. The newspaper also has resident correspondents in several countries and regions, including mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The Chosun Ilbo‘s Chinese-language news website is available for Chinese-speaking users. Its website provides Chinese-language news content from the Chosun Ilbo, making it convenient for Chinese readers to understand the newspaper’s news reports and commentary. In general, the Chosun Ilbo is an important media outlet in South Korea, and its stance and reporting have a certain influence both domestically and internationally. In other words, the Chosun Ilbo is one of South Korea’s three major newspapers and a major newspaper in the country.

To use a somewhat inappropriate analogy, it’s like China’s People’s Daily.

Moreover, this author, Lee Bak-kun, is a special correspondent for the Chosun Ilbo in Beijing.

Xi Jinping’s First Absence from BRICS Summit Sparks Rumors of Power Loss

Chinese President’s Absence from Key International Meeting Sparks Speculation of Power Instability

Lee Bak-kun, Special Correspondent for the Chosun Ilbo in Beijing

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision not to attend the 17th BRICS Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6-7, breaks his record of never missing a summit since BRICS’s inception in 2009, drawing widespread international attention. The BRICS Summit is known for its nature as a “non-Western alliance” to counter the Western-dominated international order, and China has always been a key driving force behind it. Since the first summit in 2009, Chinese leaders had never been absent, and Xi Jinping maintained a perfect attendance record for 12 years since taking office in 2013 (except for 2020-2022 when he participated online due to the pandemic). This absence marks Xi Jinping’s first absence from a physical summit, and it is particularly noteworthy given the context of the first summit after BRICS expanded to 20 members. Recently, rumors circulating overseas among anti-establishment figures and media outlets suggest that Xi Jinping has lost power, further fueling speculation about potential power shifts within China.

The BRICS summit, a crucial platform for China’s efforts to promote “de-dollarization” and expand its global influence, is attracting significant attention in 2025 due to the addition of 10 new members and partner countries, including Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Previously, BRICS maintained a five-member structure (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa), but expanded to 20 members in 2024. Xi Jinping’s absence from this historic meeting was unexpected. Sources in Beijing’s diplomatic circles commented that “Xi Jinping abandoned a carefully prepared international stage.” On July 2nd, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning announced that Premier Li Qiang would represent Xi Jinping at the summit in Brazil. Some Chinese government-censored online media outlets claimed that Xi Jinping did not need to attend in person because he had met with the Brazilian president twice in the past year, but this explanation failed to quell external doubts.

Some analysts believe that Xi Jinping’s absence may be related to domestic power struggles, especially in preparation for the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in August. The Fourth Plenary Session has historically been a crucial juncture for reshaping the power structure within the Party. Some overseas voices have even made radical speculations: Xi Jinping may face a crisis of stepping down. Former US National Security Advisor Michael Flynn posted on the X platform, stating, “A power shift is clearly brewing within China.” Former US Ambassador to Bermuda, Gregory Slayton, wrote in the New York Post, “Xi Jinping may be forced to step down at the Fourth Plenary Session in August due to health problems.” Taiwan’s Liberty Times further reported that Xi Jinping’s close military confidants, He Weidong and Miao Hua, have been purged, suggesting a loss of military power. These rumors have been widely disseminated by overseas anti-establishment figures. On the X platform, on July 1, 2025, it was claimed that Xi Jinping’s “power has been systematically weakened,” and some media outlets have also linked Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS summit to a loss of power.

Simply put, what is Xi Jinping after for a three-term term? Is it simply to gain the feeling of foreign patronage? If Xi Jinping truly holds power, why would he forgo such an opportunity to perform?

Recent unusual activities by Xi Jinping’s core henchmen have fueled rumors of his loss of power. On June 27, 2025, Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, was dismissed for “serious violations of discipline and law.” Prior to this, on March 14, 2025, Miao Hua’s qualification as a delegate to the National People’s Congress had been revoked. He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, has not appeared in public since March 11, 2025. Rumors circulate that He Weidong has been arrested, possibly related to the Miao Hua case. Several major international media outlets have reported on He Weidong’s arrest.

The news of the arrest or investigation of He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, has been primarily reported and cited by overseas media, including:

The Washington Times: Citing two US defense officials, the newspaper stated that He Weidong has disappeared from public view and has been purged. US intelligence agencies believe He Weidong is the latest victim of a political purge within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The Financial Times reported that He Weidong has been dismissed from his post on suspicion of corruption and has been interrogated since his detention. The report cited multiple sources.

CNA, Taiwan’s official news agency, also relayed reports from The Washington Times and The Financial Times.

Radio Free Asia (RFA) also reported on the matter, citing US defense officials.

Furthermore, in June 2025, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC Hu Chunhua chaired the CPPCC meeting, and Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang traveled to Russia to meet with Putin. These occasions, usually personally directed and arranged by Xi Jinping, were instead attended by others, sparking speculation that Xi’s movements were being restricted. Hu Chunhua, as a member of Hu Jintao’s faction (the Youth League faction), has been active in public, potentially indicating a resurgence of Hu Jintao’s influence and a restriction of Xi Jinping’s freedom.

What is house arrest? Xi Jinping is currently restricted from attending various events, though he occasionally makes public appearances.

What is the difference between this and house arrest?

I’ve summarized Xi Jinping’s absences from at least ten important meetings, covering military, diplomatic, economic, livelihood, and ideological fields. These are not small occasions. If all are included, Xi Jinping has attended at least 30 events of various kinds.

Isn’t this what house arrest looks like?

Some analysts believe Xi Jinping’s absence from the BRICS summit may be due to diplomatic considerations. Russian President Putin withdrew from the summit due to an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Xi Jinping’s presence could be interpreted as acquiescence to the ICC’s decision or a distancing from Russia.

This explanation is far-fetched. If Putin cannot attend, does that mean all countries in the world should abandon diplomatic activities?

This argument is clearly a forced attempt to whitewash the situation. India, a BRICS member, has a good relationship with Putin, yet it still participated, didn’t it?

Indonesia and Russia also have a good relationship, even conducting joint military exercises.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto will attend this BRICS summit.

Therefore, these explanations cannot mask the unusual nature of Xi Jinping’s absence, especially given the backdrop of the purge of his close associates and the replacement of leaders like Hu Chunhua. It is speculated that Xi Jinping may be facing pressure from Hu Jintao’s faction, preparing for the power struggle at the Fourth Plenary Session, and may no longer be able to act freely.

In short, Xi Jinping’s first absence from the BRICS summit, combined with the purge of Miao Hua and He Weidong, and the replacements by Hu Chunhua and Ding Xuexiang, strongly suggests that Xi Jinping is controlled by Hu Jintao’s faction and his actions are restricted.

The Chosun Ilbo is, after all, one of South Korea’s three major newspapers and a major media outlet.

The Chosun Ilbo’s most famous report, and in my opinion, the most important report on China, is…

The Chosun Ilbo once reported…

that when Hu Jintao served as the Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee and the Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee, he concurrently served as the First Secretary of the Party Committee of the local military region, establishing direct contact with military personnel for the first time. Following the suppression of the Tibetan riots and the imposition of martial law in Lhasa in 1989, Hu Jintao established friendly relations with generals Zhu Qi, Gui Quanzhi, and Tao Changlian.

This report from the Chosun Ilbo mentions three Chinese generals: Zhu Qi, Gui Quanzhi, and Tao Changlian. The identities of Zhu Qi and Tao Changlian are unknown.

However, Gui Quanzhi promoted Wang Xixin, and Wang Xixin promoted Liu Zhenli.

Therefore, we can confirm Liu Zhenli’s factional background.

This report is from many years ago and has not been contaminated by propaganda.

It can be safely cited.

Generally, reports from 10 to 15 years ago have less information contaminated by propaganda.

A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated on Wednesday: “Li Qiang will attend the 17th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from July 5th to 8th at the invitation of the Chinese government.” Beijing indicated that after visiting Brazil, Li Qiang will pay an official visit to Egypt from July 9th to 10th.

Therefore, it can be inferred that no important meetings will be held in China from July 5th to July 10th.

This is because Li Qiang will be absent.

It is currently unclear what actions Xi Jinping will take.

Okay, thank you everyone.