央视画面证实：胡温4人出席了政治局会议。中央决策委员会7人名单曝光。为什么他是江派新共主？

 

央视画面证实：胡温4人出席了政治局会议。中央决策委员会7人名单曝光。为什么他是江派新共主？

大家好，

根据新华社报道，2025年6月30日，中共中央政治局召开会议，审议通过了《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》，正式宣布设立“党中央决策议事协调机构”。这一机构的设立被官方描述为“健全党中央对重大工作集中统一领导、推动重大任务落实的重要制度安排”。然而，这一举措在中共党章和政治惯例中显得极为异常。

   根据中共党章，中央委员会是“党中央”的核心决策机构，在闭会期间，中央政治局及其常务委员会（政治局常委会）代行其职权。政治局会议由总书记主持，负责重大决策。然而，在四中全会尚未召开、中央委员会未产生新领导机构的情况下，政治局直接通过设立一个新的“党中央决策议事协调机构”，并赋予其超越政治局的决策权，这一做法打破了常规。  

   这一新机构的权力“应超越了政治局，否则就没有必要设立”。这意味着政治局、常委甚至总书记的决策权被部分或全部转移至新机构，形同“禅让”。这种权力转移在中共历史上极为罕见，类似中国古代的“禅让制”。

   新机构的职责、构成及运行规则尚未公开，仅强调其负责“重大工作的顶层设计、统筹协调、整体推进、督促落实”。官方措辞中提到“统筹不代替、到位不越位”，试图掩盖新机构对政治局的实际取代，但这种表述反而凸显了其权力的主导性。

   央视画面显示，6月30日的政治局扩大会议规模空前，人数达56人，且后排空出4个座位，暗示可能有关键人物（可能是中共元老）在上午的关键会议中出现，但没有参加下午的集体学习。这进一步佐证了新机构可能由元老主导，形成了新的权力核心。

中央决策委员会的假设结构与派系分析

据传“中央决策委员会”的组成如下：

主任：胡锦涛（胡锦涛派系）

副主任：李瑞环、温家宝（胡锦涛派系），张德江（江泽民派系）

委员：习近平（习近平派系），李强、赵乐际（江泽民派系）

以下是对这一结构的分析：

1. 胡锦涛派系的强势回归

   胡锦涛、温家宝和李瑞环均属于“胡锦涛派系”（或称“团派”），在2002-2012年胡锦涛主政时期具有重要影响力。胡锦涛作为主任，意味着其在中共元老中的威望和政治资源被重新激活，可能代表团派试图通过新机构重新掌握权力。  

胡锦涛：作为前总书记，胡锦涛在2012年“裸退”，完全交出总书记和军委主席职务，被外界视为中共权力交接制度化的标志。 此次以主任身份复出，可能表明其在党内元老中的协调角色，试图平衡各派系的利益。 

温家宝：作为胡温体制的核心人物，温家宝在经济和社会政策上以温和务实著称，其回归可能反映党内对当前经济困境的不满，需借助其经验稳定局势。

李瑞环：作为江泽民时代的政治局常委和全国政协主席，李瑞环在政治上以低调和平衡著称，其加入可能意在调和派系矛盾。 

2. 江泽民派系的延续与张德江的角色 

   张德江、李强和赵乐际被归为江泽民派系（或称“上海帮”）。江泽民派系在江泽民主政时期（1989-2002）及其后续影响中占据主导地位，但在胡锦涛和习近平时代逐渐被削弱。

  张德江：作为副主任，张德江被认为是江泽民死后江派的新“共主”。张德江在2012-2017年担任政治局常委和全国人大常委会委员长，政治资历深厚，但在习近平时代影响力下降。其担任副主任可能表明江派在元老层仍有一定话语权，但需与团派合作。 

李强和赵乐际：两人均为现任政治局常委，分别担任国务院总理和全国人大常委会委员长。

江泽民死后，江派的共主是谁我不知道。

李强是台面上的老大，江绵恒是江泽民的儿子。

大家不要忘记，还有军队的问题，军权的问题。江派在军队的势力由谁来掌控呢。

张德江提拔的李强。

张德江，李强，江绵恒三个人之中，谁是老大，谁说了算。

以前不知道谁说了算，现在证据来了，就是黄建发。

黄建发的派系特别重要，我们要单独说一期。

从黄建发的派系背景来看，张德江李强，江绵恒三个人，张德江说了算。

谁掌握了人事权，谁就是老大。

是不是江泽民临死致死，交代的，指定的，那我不知道。

有这种可能

习近平派系的孤立

   习近平作为唯一代表“习近平派系”的委员，其地位显得孤立。6月30日政治局会议未提及“以习近平为核心的党中央”或“两个确立”“两个维护”，这与2018年以来强调习近平核心地位的惯例形成鲜明对比。 

   – 习近平自2012年起大幅提升总书记的权力，削弱了政治局常委会的集体领导作用。 新机构的设立可能意味着党内元老和部分现任领导人对其个人集权的反弹，通过制度化方式限制其权力。

   – 央视画面中后排空出的4个座位，可能暗示4位政治局常委（除习近平外，可能包括王沪宁、丁薛祥、蔡奇、李希等）未被纳入新机构的权力核心，显示习近平派系的影响力被进一步压缩。  

首先不可能请假。

政治局扩大会议，除非进了ICU，带病也得出席。

对于低级别的官员，如果能够参加政治局扩大会议，那是莫大的政治荣誉。

可能预示着将来被提拔，还能关键时刻掉链子，这个时候请假吗？

再说哪里会有上午参加，下午请假的道理。

除非去发射火箭。再说发射火箭中将还是上将也没有资格参加这个会议。

够资格参加的，最多只有一个人，不可能一下子缺席了三四个人。

这个桌子还摆着茶杯和文件呢。就是上午开会的时候，有4名政治局常委，被赶到了外圈去坐着。

他们观察的还是细致，事实就是有三四个空座位，上面还有茶杯和文件。

就怎么解释这个事情吧，不可能是请假。

这个会议没有晕倒就需要参加啊。

三、派系博弈与权力再平衡

1. 胡锦涛派系与江泽民派系的联合 

   新机构的组成显示，胡锦涛派系（团派）与江泽民派系（上海帮）可能形成了的政治联盟，以发动军事政变，把习近平赶下台。现在中央决策委员会的机构，逐渐浮出水面。可能标志着胡锦涛和江泽民的分赃基本结束。

   胡锦涛、李瑞环、温家宝、张德江等元老的复出，表明中共党内元老政治的回潮。元老可能在上午的政治局会议中坐镇，迫使现任政治局成员同意权力转移。 

2. 习近平权力的削弱

   习近平自2012年以来通过反腐和制度改革巩固个人权力，政治局常委会的决策权被削弱，总书记地位被大幅提升。 新机构的设立和集体领导的重新强调，可能表明党内对习近平“一人说了算”的不满。 

   – 《求是》杂志近期强调“团结”，暗示党内高层存在激烈博弈。

中共的宣传，一贯都是缺什么嚷嚷什么。习包子突然高喊团结，被很多网友解读为求饶的信号。掌权的时候怎么不嚷嚷团结，现在不掌握大权了，开始嚷嚷团结了。

这名网友说，

牛逼，打不过，开始《求是》上讲“团结奋斗”。牛逼，脸皮够厚。

敢于斗争，善于斗争。让中顾委干趴了。要是直接下台，这货绝对撂挑子，发起全面斗争。

这逼，太SB了卧槽。

这名网友说，

今天新闻联播，放到第2条的重要播报:《求是》杂志发表习近平文章《团结奋斗是中国人民创造历史伟业的必由之路》。 如果还是定于一尊无反对派，不会出来说什么“团结”； 如果形势一片大好，不会出来说什么“奋斗”。

我的回复是，中共就是缺什么嚷嚷什么

   – 部分X帖子分析认为，新机构是“元老派重掌大权”的信号，习近平的权力被“架空”。 虽然这些观点可能带有推测性质，但反映了外界对中共权力结构变化的关注。  

3. 禅让的隐喻

   有网友将新机构的设立比作中国古代的“禅让制”，暗示政治局被迫将权力让渡给中央决策委员会。 历史上，禅让往往伴随着权力斗争和被迫退位。

周静帝宇文衍“禅让”隋文帝杨坚、隋恭帝杨侑“禅让”唐高祖李渊、周恭帝柴宗训“禅让”宋太祖赵匡胤等，还有清宣统皇帝宣布退位，禅让给中华民国。

这些所谓的禅让，实质上都是刺刀下的禅让。

中央决策委员会的设立可能意味着习近平的实际权力被削弱，但其总书记和国家主席的头衔可能暂时保留，以维持表面上的稳定。

四、政治意义与未来展望

1. 集体领导的回归

   新机构强调“集体领导”和“规范决策”，与习近平时代的小组治国（如中央深改委、中央财经委等）形成对比。 这可能意味着中共试图回归胡锦涛时代的集体领导模式，以分散权力、减少个人集权带来的风险。  

   然而，集体领导的回归并不意味着民主化，而更可能是元老与现任领导层的妥协，以应对经济下行、国际压力等危机。 

2. 经济与社会危机的背景

   新机构的设立可能与当前中国的经济困境，比如房地产危机、地方债务和社会不稳定比如抗议活动有关。胡锦涛派系的温和派形象和江泽民派系的经济经验，可能被认为更适合应对当前危机。 

“党中央决策议事协调机构”（中央决策委员会）的设立是中共权力结构的一次重大调整，反映了党内派系博弈的最新动态。胡锦涛派系通过胡锦涛、温家宝、李瑞环的强势回归，联合江泽民派系的张德江、李强、赵乐际，形成了对习近平派系的制衡。新机构的权力超越政治局，形同“禅让”，可能标志着习近平个人集权的终结和集体领导的回归。然而，这一变化的背后是经济危机和社会不稳定的压力，未来仍需观察四中全会的召开和新机构的实际运作，以判断其长期影响。

这名网友说

马兴瑞工作过的航天科技和龙飞的航天科工是不同的公司。。。哪里看得出做过秘书？

这名网友替我回复说，

航天总公司五院

龙飞

1992年8月参加工作，历任中国航天工业总公司第五研究院502所干部；

第五研究院团委副书记、团委书记、团委书记兼政治部青年工作处处长；

1999年7月，中国航天机电集团公司办公厅总经理办公室秘书；

中国航天科工集团公司办公厅总经理办公室主任、党组秘书，

那么马兴瑞呢

1996年5月，调任中国航天总公司五院（中国空间技术研究院）副院长（正司局级）。

1999年9月，任中国航天科技集团公司党组成员、副总经理。

马兴瑞确认曾经是龙飞的上级，没有错啊

只是马兴瑞和龙飞到底关系亲密到什么程度，你不知道而已

航天机电和中国航天科工集团有限公司之间是母子公司关系。中国航天科工集团是航天机电的 控股股东。

具体来说，航天机电是中国航天科工集团旗下的上市公司，其前身是中国航天机电集团公司，于2001年7月更名为中国航天科工集团公司，并在2017年11月再次更名为中国航天科工集团有限公司。航天机电主要从事汽车零部件、光伏发电和智能装备等业务，而中国航天科工集团则是一家以航天为核心的国有大型科技企业集团，业务涵盖防务、信息、能源等领域。

简单来说，航天机电是中国航天科工集团的一个组成部分，是中国航天科工集团在资本市场上的重要载体。

AI 回答可能包含错误。

好的，

谢谢大家

英文翻译

CCTV footage confirms that Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and two others attended the Politburo meeting. The seven-member list of the Central Decision-Making Committee has been revealed. Why is he the new leader of the Jiang faction?

Hello everyone,

According to Xinhua News Agency, on June 30, 2025, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting and reviewed and approved the “Working Regulations of the Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanisms,” formally announcing the establishment of the “Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanisms.” The official description of this mechanism is “an important institutional arrangement to improve the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee over major work and promote the implementation of major tasks.” However, this move appears extremely unusual in the CPC Constitution and political conventions.

According to the CPC Constitution, the Central Committee is the core decision-making body of the “Central Committee.” During the recess, the Politburo and its Standing Committee (the Standing Committee of the Politburo) exercise its powers. The Politburo meetings are chaired by the General Secretary and are responsible for major decisions. However, before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee has been held and before a new leadership body has been established within the Central Committee, the Politburo directly established a new “Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanisms,” granting it decision-making power exceeding that of the Politburo. This practice breaks with convention.

The power of this new institution “should surpass that of the Politburo; otherwise, there would be no need to establish it.” This means that the decision-making power of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and even the General Secretary has been partially or completely transferred to the new institution, akin to a “bestowal.” Such a power transfer is extremely rare in the history of the CCP, similar to the “abdication system” in ancient China.

The responsibilities, structure, and operating rules of the new institution have not yet been made public; only that it is responsible for “top-level design, overall coordination, overall advancement, and supervision of implementation of major tasks.” The official wording mentions “overall planning without substitution, and fulfilling responsibilities without overstepping boundaries,” attempting to conceal the new institution’s actual replacement of the Politburo, but this wording actually highlights its dominant power.

CCTV footage shows that the expanded Politburo meeting on June 30 was unprecedented in scale, with 56 people attending, and four seats in the back row were empty, suggesting that a key figure (possibly a CCP elder) may have appeared in the crucial morning meeting but did not participate in the afternoon’s collective study session. This further corroborates that the new institution may be dominated by elders, forming a new power core.

Hypothetical Structure and Factional Analysis of the Central Decision-Making Committee

The composition of the “Central Decision-Making Committee” is rumored to be as follows:

Chairman: Hu Jintao (Hu Jintao faction)

Vice Chairmen: Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao (Hu Jintao faction), Zhang Dejiang (Jiang Zemin faction)

Members: Xi Jinping (Xi Jinping faction), Li Qiang, Zhao Leji (Jiang Zemin faction)

The following is an analysis of this structure:

1. The Strong Return of the Hu Jintao Faction

Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Li Ruihuan all belong to the “Hu Jintao faction” (or “Youth League faction”), which wielded significant influence during Hu Jintao’s rule from 2002 to 2012. Hu Jintao’s appointment as chairman signifies a reactivation of his prestige and political resources among CCP elders, possibly representing the faction’s attempt to regain power through a new institution.

Hu Jintao: As former General Secretary, Hu Jintao’s “naked retirement” in 2012, completely relinquishing his positions as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was seen by outsiders as a sign of the institutionalization of power transition within the CCP. Zhang Dejiang’s return as director may indicate his coordinating role among party elders, attempting to balance the interests of various factions.

Wen Jiabao: As a core figure in the Hu-Wen system, Wen Jiabao is known for his moderate and pragmatic approach to economic and social policies. His return may reflect dissatisfaction within the party regarding the current economic difficulties, requiring the use of his experience to stabilize the situation.

Li Ruihuan: As a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference during the Jiang Zemin era, Li Ruihuan is known for his low-key and balanced approach to politics. His joining may be intended to reconcile factional conflicts.

2. The Continuation of the Jiang Zemin Faction and Zhang Dejiang’s Role

Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji are categorized as members of the Jiang Zemin faction (or the “Shanghai Gang”). The Jiang Zemin faction dominated during Jiang Zemin’s rule (1989-2002) and its subsequent influence, but it has gradually weakened under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

Zhang Dejiang: As deputy director, Zhang Dejiang is considered the new “common leader” of the Jiang faction after Jiang Zemin’s death. Zhang Dejiang served as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017, possessing deep political experience, but his influence declined under Xi Jinping. His appointment as vice chairman may indicate that the Jiang faction still holds some influence among the elder statesmen, but needs to cooperate with the Youth League faction.

Li Qiang and Zhao Leji: Both are current members of the Politburo Standing Committee, serving as Premier of the State Council and Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, respectively.

After Jiang Zemin’s death, I don’t know who the leader of the Jiang faction is.

Li Qiang is the apparent leader; Jiang Mianheng is Jiang Zemin’s son.

Don’t forget the issue of the military, the issue of military power. Who controls the Jiang faction’s influence in the military?

Li Qiang was promoted by Zhang Dejiang.

Among Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, and Jiang Mianheng, who is the leader, who has the final say?

Previously, we didn’t know who had the final say, but now the evidence is there: Huang Jianfa.

Huang Jianfa’s faction is particularly important; we will discuss it in a separate episode.

Judging from Huang Jianfa’s factional background, among Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, and Jiang Mianheng, Zhang Dejiang has the final say.

Whoever controls personnel appointments is the boss.

Whether it was Jiang Zemin’s dying instructions or designation, I don’t know.

That’s a possibility.

The Isolation of the Xi Jinping Faction

As the sole representative of the “Xi Jinping faction,” Xi Jinping’s position appears isolated. The June 30th Politburo meeting did not mention “the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping as its core” or “the two establishments” or “the two safeguards,” a stark contrast to the convention since 2018 that emphasized Xi Jinping’s core position.

– Since 2012, Xi Jinping has significantly increased the power of the General Secretary, weakening the collective leadership role of the Politburo Standing Committee. The establishment of the new institution may signify a backlash from party elders and some current leaders against his personal consolidation of power, attempting to limit his power through institutional means.

– The four empty seats in the back row of the CCTV footage may suggest that four members of the Politburo Standing Committee (besides Xi Jinping, possibly including Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang, Cai Qi, and Li Xi) have not been included in the core power structure of the new body, indicating a further reduction in the influence of Xi Jinping’s faction.

Firstly, it’s impossible for them to have taken leave.

Attending an expanded Politburo meeting is mandatory unless one is in the ICU, even if ill.

For lower-ranking officials, attending an expanded Politburo meeting is a tremendous political honor.

It might indicate future promotion, and would they really need to be present at a crucial moment?

Besides, why would someone attend in the morning and then take leave in the afternoon?

Unless they’re launching a rocket. Even then, a lieutenant general or general wouldn’t be qualified to attend such a meeting.

At most, only one person would be qualified to attend; it’s impossible for three or four to be absent at once.

The table still has teacups and documents. It means that during the morning meeting, four members of the Politburo Standing Committee were relegated to the outer circle.

Their observations were meticulous; the fact was there were three or four empty seats, with teacups and documents on them.

As for how to explain this, it couldn’t be a leave of absence.

If you didn’t faint, you need to attend the meeting.

III. Factional Game and Power Rebalancing

1. The Alliance of Hu Jintao’s and Jiang Zemin’s Factions

The composition of the new institutions suggests a possible political alliance between Hu Jintao’s faction (the Youth League faction) and Jiang Zemin’s faction (the Shanghai Gang) to launch a military coup and oust Xi Jinping. The structure of the Central Decision-Making Committee is gradually emerging. This may mark the basic end of the power struggle between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.

The return of veterans like Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, and Zhang Dejiang indicates a resurgence of elder statesman politics within the CCP. These elders may be present at the morning Politburo meeting, forcing current Politburo members to agree to the power transfer.

2. The Weakening of Xi Jinping’s Power

Since 2012, Xi Jinping has consolidated his personal power through anti-corruption campaigns and institutional reforms. The decision-making power of the Politburo Standing Committee has been weakened, while the General Secretary’s status has been significantly elevated. The establishment of new institutions and the renewed emphasis on collective leadership may indicate dissatisfaction within the Party regarding Xi Jinping’s “one-man rule.”

• Qiushi magazine recently emphasized “unity,” suggesting intense power struggles within the Party’s top ranks.

The CCP’s propaganda has always been about what it lacks. Xi Jinping’s sudden call for unity has been interpreted by many netizens as a signal of surrender. Why didn’t he shout about unity when he was in power? Now that he’s out of power, he’s starting to shout about unity.

This netizen said,

Awesome, unable to win, he starts talking about “unity and struggle” in Qiushi. Awesome, shameless enough.

Dare to struggle, good at struggle. He let the Central Advisory Commission crumble. If he were to step down directly, this guy would definitely quit and launch a full-scale struggle.

This guy is so stupid, damn it.

This netizen said,

Today’s evening news broadcast featured a major announcement: “Qiushi” magazine published an article by Xi Jinping entitled “Unity and Struggle are the Only Path for the Chinese People to Create Great Historical Achievements.” If the system were still one of absolute power with no opposition, there would be no talk of “unity”; if the situation were excellent, there would be no talk of “struggle.”

My reply is: The CCP only talks about what it lacks.

• Some X posts analyze that the new institution is a signal of “the old guard regaining power,” and that Xi Jinping’s power has been “robe-emptied.” While these views may be speculative, they reflect external attention to changes in the CCP’s power structure.

1. The Metaphor of Abdication

Some netizens compared the establishment of the new institution to the “abdication system” in ancient China, implying that the Politburo was forced to relinquish power to the Central Decision-Making Committee. Historically, abdication was often accompanied by power struggles and forced resignation.

The abdication of Emperor Jing of Zhou (Yuwen Yan) to Emperor Wen of Sui (Yang Jian), Emperor Gong of Sui (Yang You) to Emperor Gaozu of Tang (Li Yuan), and Emperor Gong of Zhou (Chai Zongxun) to Emperor Taizu of Song (Zhao Kuangyin), as well as the abdication of Emperor Xuantong of Qing to the Republic of China, are all examples of so-called abdication, in reality, abdication under duress.

The establishment of the Central Decision-Making Committee may mean a weakening of Xi Jinping’s actual power, but his titles of General Secretary and President may be temporarily retained to maintain a semblance of stability.

IV. Political Significance and Future Prospects

1. The Return of Collective Leadership

The new institution emphasizes “collective leadership” and “standardized decision-making,” contrasting with the group-based governance of the Xi Jinping era (such as the Central Deepening Reform Commission and the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission). This may indicate that the CCP is attempting to return to the collective leadership model of the Hu Jintao era to disperse power and reduce the risks associated with centralized power.

However, the return of collective leadership does not necessarily mean democratization, but rather a compromise between the elders and the current leadership to cope with crises such as economic downturn and international pressure.

2. Background of Economic and Social Crisis

The establishment of the new institution may be related to China’s current economic difficulties, such as the real estate crisis, local debt, and social instability, such as protests. The moderate image of Hu Jintao’s faction and the economic experience of Jiang Zemin’s faction may be considered more suitable for dealing with the current crisis.

The establishment of the “Central Committee for Decision-Making and Coordination” (Central Decision-Making Committee) represents a major adjustment to the CCP’s power structure, reflecting the latest dynamics of factional struggles within the party. Through the strong return of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao’s faction, in conjunction with Zhang Dejiang, Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji of Jiang Zemin’s faction, has formed a check and balance against Xi Jinping’s faction. The new institution’s power transcends the Politburo, resembling a “transfer,” and may signify the end of Xi Jinping’s personal consolidation of power and the return of collective leadership. However, behind this change lies the pressure of economic crisis and social instability; its long-term impact will require further observation of the Fourth Plenary Session and the actual operation of the new institution.

This netizen said:

The Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation where Ma Xingrui worked and the Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation of China where Longfei worked are different companies. Where does it show he was a secretary?

This netizen replied on my behalf:

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Fifth Academy

Long Fei

Joined the workforce in August 1992, serving successively as a cadre at the 502 Institute of the Fifth Academy of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation;

Deputy Secretary of the Youth League Committee, Secretary of the Youth League Committee, and Secretary of the Youth League Committee concurrently serving as Director of the Youth Work Department of the Political Department of the Fifth Academy;

In July 1999, Secretary of the General Manager’s Office of the General Office of China Aerospace Electromechanical Group Corporation;

Director of the General Manager’s Office and Secretary of the Party Committee of the General Office of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation.

So what about Ma Xingrui?

In May 1996, he was transferred to the Fifth Academy of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (China Academy of Space Technology) as Vice President (at the level of a director-general).

In September 1999, he became a member of the Party Committee and Vice President of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

Ma Xingrui was indeed Long Fei’s superior, that’s correct.

It’s just that you don’t know the extent of the close relationship between Ma Xingrui and Long Fei.

Aerospace Electromechanical and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation are parent and subsidiary companies. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) is the controlling shareholder of Aerospace Electromechanical Systems Co., Ltd.

Specifically, Aerospace Electromechanical Systems is a listed company under CASIC. Its predecessor was China Aerospace Electromechanical Group Corporation, which changed its name to CASIC Corporation in July 2001, and then again to CASIC Limited in November 2017. Aerospace Electromechanical Systems mainly engages in automotive parts, photovoltaic power generation, and intelligent equipment businesses, while CASIC is a large state-owned technology enterprise group with aerospace as its core business, covering defense, information, energy, and other fields.

In short, Aerospace Electromechanical Systems is a component of CASIC and an important vehicle for CASIC in the capital market.

(AI answer may contain errors.)

Okay,

Thank you everyone.