黄胜强涉及李克强案，压力太大，走了。人民日报纪念李克强 《求是》诡异删文

 

黄胜强涉及李克强案，压力太大，走了。人民日报纪念李克强 《求是》诡异删文

大家好，
2023年10月27日，中国前国务院总理李克强在上海突发心脏病去世，享年68岁，官方通报简短而模糊，引发广泛质疑。2025年7月3日，李克强70岁冥诞当天，《人民日报》刊登由中共中央党史和文献研究院撰写的长篇纪念文章《为党和人民事业奋斗终身》，高度赞扬李克强的政治品格与功绩。然而，中共中央机关刊物《求是》网站转载该文后迅速删除，显示“404”页面，引发外界对中共内部派系斗争的猜测。我试了一下，的确还是404。这一事件不仅将李克强之死的疑团重新推向前台，也说明了党媒内部的激烈博弈。

李克强的突然死了一开始就在疑云之中。官方称其因心脏病猝死，但缺乏详细的病史披露或抢救过程说明。2023年8月，李克强在敦煌莫高窟的最后一次公开露面显示其身体健康，鲜有心脏病史的报道。遗体火化迅速、相关信息严格管控，进一步加剧了公众的怀疑。

最新央视搞了一个严选舞台剧:大梦敦煌，也特别的牛。

2022年，李克强在二会上公开提及“6亿人月收入不足1000元”，被认为是对习近平“全面小康”论述的挑战；同年，2022年8月，李克强在深圳考察时喊出“黄河长江不会倒流”，被解读为对改革开放路线的坚持，暗含与习近平政策分歧的意味。

这个和我们刚刚分析过的人民日报每年的社论，可以吻合。
2022年七八月是习近平权力的一个低谷期。
20大之后习近平权力走上巅峰之后，迅速跌落。

卸任前，李克强对国家发改委的告别讲话中提到“人在干，天在看”，被外界视为对高层政治生态的隐晦批评。这些事件使李克强的死被人视为政治报复的结果。

《人民日报》发文与《求是》删文的背后

2025年7月3日，《人民日报》刊登的纪念文章详细回顾了李克强的生平，赞扬其“始终保持共产主义者的政治本色和高尚道德情操”，并强调其在推动共青团工作、中原崛起、东北振兴及高质量发展中的贡献。文章特别提到，李克强卸任后“坚决拥护以习近平为核心的党中央”，并支持反腐斗争。然而，这篇文章的发表方式与后续《求是》的删文行为，显示出中共内部的复杂博弈。

1. 《人民日报》的政治信号

《人民日报》作为中共最大党媒，其刊文被视为官方口径的体现。纪念文章的发表，表面上是按照“党中央关于已故党和国家领导同志诞辰纪念活动有关规定”，对李克强70周年冥诞的例行纪念。但其高调程度——近6000字的长篇、详细梳理生平、突出李克强的亲民形象和改革贡献——却超出了常规，引发外界关注。文章开篇的“编者按”特意强调“按规定刊发”，似乎在为发表此文寻找合法性依据，这反而凸显了其敏感性。

分析认为，《人民日报》此举可能反映了党内部分势力试图为李克强“正名”或“昭雪”。李克强被视为胡派代表，李克强去世后民间悼念热潮，比如合肥故居献花、长街送灵，显示李克强深厚的群众基础。文章的发表可能是一些党内人士借机重塑李克强形象，回应民间对其死因的质疑。同时，文章反复提及李克强对习近平的“拥护”，又似在平衡派系矛盾，避免被解读为对现任领导的挑战。这种“既纪念又表忠”的写法，显示出文章在党内的妥协性。

2. 《求是》删文的诡异之处

与《人民日报》的保留态度形成鲜明对比的是，《求是》网站在转载纪念文章后迅速删除，页面显示“404”，且中央党史和文献研究院的官网也未保留该文。《求是》作为中共中央委员会主办的理论刊物，直接听命于中央书记处，其删文行为被视为高层意志的体现。分析指出，《求是》的举动可能反映了习近平核心派系对纪念李克强的警惕，担心其形象被过度拔高，激发民间对死因的进一步追问。

《求是》的删文与《人民日报》的保留形成强烈反差，表明党媒内部的意见分歧。一种可能是，习近平派系对李克强的纪念持谨慎态度，担心其被利用为团派或其他反对派的旗帜。《求是》作为理论喉舌，经常刊登习近平的讲话和文章，其删文可能是在高层授意下，试图压制李克强话题的热度。另一种可能是，删文反映了党内宣传系统的混乱，中央书记处（可能涉及常委蔡奇）与中宣部在处理李克强问题上的立场不一，导致宣传口径出现分裂。

3. 文章作者的背景

纪念文章由中共中央党史和文献研究院撰写，其院长曲青山的背景为事件增添了复杂性。曲青山被大外宣说成是团派和邓派的重要人物。曲青山不是青海官员出身吗？怎么这时候不说曲青山是赵乐际的人了？大外宣什么时候能逻辑自洽啊？

2021年12月，曲青山在《人民日报》和《求是》发表文章《改革开放是党的一次伟大觉醒》，九次提及邓小平，强调改革开放路线，却没有提习近平，引发“打脸习核心”的解读。随后，习近平派系通过中央政策研究室主任江金权的文章反击，凸显党内路线斗争的激烈。曲青山在习近平权力高峰期敢于挑战，显示其后台较硬。

19届6中全会根本就不是习近平权力的高峰期，既然曲青山敢挑战习近平的路线。
就说明19届6中全会不是习近平的权力高峰期。19届6中全会刚好在2021年北戴河会议之后。
这是习近平的权力受挫期。
我已经通过一系列的人事分析给大家分析过了，2021年北戴河会议之后，习近平的权力受挫。

如今，在习近平权力传闻削弱的背景下，曲青山主笔的纪念文章既赞扬李克强，又提及“两个确立、四个意识”，被认为是一种“高级黑”：表面拥护习近平，实则通过纪念李克强暗讽现领导层的政策倒退。这种微妙的笔法，可能进一步刺激了《求是》的删文反应。

党媒博弈与中共内部斗争

《人民日报》发文与《求是》删文的矛盾，折射出中共内部围绕李克强之死的深刻分歧。以下从几个方面分析这一博弈的背景和意义：

1. 派系斗争的投影
   李克强作为胡锦涛派系的代表，李克强死亡被认为与习近平的权力巩固有关。2022年中共二十大上，李克强胡春华没有能进入政治局。2023年李克强的猝死，进一步加剧了胡派与习派的对立。纪念文章的发表，可能是一些胡派或所谓的改革派人士试图借李克强之名，重申改革开放路线，暗中挑战习近平的集权模式。用所谓的改革不改革来划分派系，本来就是和模糊的标准，完全不准确。
   而《求是》的删文，则可能是习派对这种挑战的快速压制，反映了双方在宣传领域的激烈角力。
2. 民间情绪与维稳压力
   李克强死亡后，合肥、北京等地爆发自发悼念，民间将其视为“亲民总理”，与习近平的高压政策形成对比。2025年6月，所谓的程虹申诉的出现，进一步点燃了公众对李克强死于谋杀的关注。《人民日报》的纪念文章，可能是在维稳压力下，试图通过官方叙事平息民间质疑。然而，《求是》的删文表明，高层对李克强话题的敏感性远超预期，担心过度宣传可能引发更大的舆论反弹。
3. 北戴河会议与四中全会的背景
   2025年7月正值北戴河会议前夕，传闻习近平丧失权力、四中全会将讨论重大人事调整。纪念文章的发表与删除，可能与这一敏感时点有关。胡派或其他反对派可能借李克强之名，测试高层反应，为即将到来的权力博弈造势。

《人民日报》刊文纪念李克强与《求是》神秘删文的矛盾，反映了中共内部围绕李克强之死的激烈博弈。纪念文章的发表，可能是胡派或改革派为李克强“正名”的尝试，同时通过“拥护习核心”的表述掩饰政治意图。《求是》的删文，则显示习近平派系对李克强话题的高度敏感，试图压制其潜在的政治影响。这一事件间接印证了李克强之死的不寻常性，无论是谋杀还是自然死亡，其背后都隐藏着复杂的派系斗争。

2025年7月的上海，浦江两岸高楼林立，霓虹闪烁，掩盖了这座城市暗流涌动的政治暗面。黄胜强，69岁，曾是海关系统的一颗明星。从1973年参加工作，到2013年成为海关总署党组成员、国家口岸管理办公室主任，他的职业生涯横跨数十年，积累了深厚的政治人脉。尤其在2009年至2013年担任上海海关关长期间，他与时任上海市委书记韩正、后来的上海市长龚正建立了密切的工作关系。

黄胜强与龚正的交集始于海关系统。两人早年在海关总署共事，龚正作为黄胜强的同事，对其能力颇为赏识。
1998年9月，38岁的龚正任海关总署政策法规司司长。期间，龚正曾陪同海关总署署长钱冠林向当时的中国总理朱镕基汇报工作。
1998年至2000年，43岁的黄胜强任海关总署办公厅（口岸规划办公室）副主任（副司局级）。
2000年至2002年，45岁的黄胜强任海关总署办公厅（口岸规划办公室）主任（正司局级）。当时的中国海关总署署长是钱冠林（1993年1月 – 2001年4月）。
也就是说黄胜强和龚正是钱冠林的左膀右臂。朱镕基的马仔。

后来，龚正进入上海政坛，2020年升任上海市长，而黄胜强则在上海海关的岗位上，与韩正领导的上海市委保持了频繁互动。2013年4月，黄胜强推动浦东新区“十条新举措”，与韩正的“总部经济”战略高度契合，韩正多次公开称赞其为“上海国际航运中心建设的支柱”。这一时期，上海的权力网络错综复杂，韩正的“党羽”遍布各关键部门，而黄胜强无疑是其中重要一员。

然而，这张由权力和利益编织的网络，在2023年10月27日李克强猝死后，开始崩裂。

李克强的最后一日

2023年10月27日凌晨，上海东郊国宾馆，一则震惊中外的消息传出：前国务院总理李克强因“突发心脏病”去世，享年68岁。当时的上海市长正是龚正，而韩正虽然已于2017年离开上海，担任国务院副总理，国家副主席，但韩正在上海的影响力依然根深蒂固。官方通报称，李克强在上海休息期间突发疾病，抢救无效。然而，网络上普遍质疑其死因的真实性。有人指出，李克强最后一次公开露面是在2023年8月敦煌莫高窟，身体健康，为何突然猝死？遗体火化过于仓促，相关信息被严格封锁。这些处理手法，和民间的群体性事件的核心，就是抢遗体强迫火化，完全一样。即便是李克强这样的高官，也是这样处理的。

一封匿名信在2025年6月通过“某某频道”流传，声称李克强的死是一场代号为“23-107”的政治谋杀，由朱镕基，彭丽媛指使，龚正指挥、韩正的上海“党羽”执行。这场行动的目的是清除李克强在政坛的潜在影响力，而黄胜强，作为龚正的前同事和韩正的旧部，因其在上海海关的特殊地位，知晓了某些不可告人的内幕。
龚正是朱镕基的马仔，韩正更是朱镕基一手提拔的，韩正提拔副局级和正局级的时候，朱镕基是上海市委书记和市长一肩挑。韩正1990年6月提拔共青团上海市委副书记主持工作的时候，上海市委书记正是朱镕基，上海市长还是朱镕基。韩正1991年5月提拔共青团上海市委书记也是朱镕基提拔的。任命在1个月之前就已经下达了。

黄胜强的隐秘角色

黄胜强在2009年至2013年担任上海海关关长期间，掌控了上海这一国际贸易枢纽的进出境物流命脉。他熟悉每一条通关流程，掌握着敏感物资的进出记录。李克强之死可能涉及某种特殊物资的运输，而黄胜强在其中扮演了掩盖痕迹的角色。进口了某种毒药。黄胜强的办公室曾是上海权力网络的枢纽，与龚正、韩正的频繁互动让他成为上海政坛不可忽视的幕后人物。

2023年10月李克强去世时，龚正作为上海市长，负责协调上海的重大事务。韩正虽已离开上海，但韩正在当地的“党羽”依然活跃，控制着公安、海关等关键部门。黄胜强因与两人的历史关系，被认为是这场“谋杀”计划的知情人之一。黄胜强可能协助处理了某些敏感物资的通关手续，为行动提供了便利。

2025年初，关于李克强死因的讨论再度升温。前新华社记者顾万明的公开信要求彻查李克强死因，提出暂停遗体火化、成立调查组等诉求，却因此被上海法院以“寻衅滋事”罪判刑一年。顾万明的遭遇点燃了公众的愤怒。

沉默的代价

2025年6月，黄胜强早已从海关总署退休，担任上海海关学院特聘教授。
我们注意，黄胜强退休也没有离开上海。
然而，黄胜强的生活并未平静。他开始接到匿名电话，内容含糊。一位老同事回忆，黄胜强曾私下透露：“有些事我不能说，也不敢说。”他与龚正、韩正的旧日关系，让他掌握了李克强之死的致命秘密。

7月1日晚，黄胜强独自在上海的公寓中度过了最后一个夜晚。第二天清晨，他的秘书发现他倒在书房，手中握着一封未完成的信，写道：“我知太多，却无路可走。”警方迅速介入，宣布黄胜强系自己走的，享年69岁。然而，网上很快传出另一种说法：黄胜强并非自己走的，而是被“灭口”，以确保李克强之死的真相永远埋藏。

暗流未平

黄胜强的死如同一颗石子，激起舆论的滔天巨浪。X平台上，匿名用户爆料称，黄胜强在上海海关的经历，使他可能接触到与李克强之死相关的敏感记录。
黄胜强指使前手下未经海关验放，就让某种药物通关。
有人将矛头指向彭丽媛，朱镕基龚正和韩正，称他们利用上海的权力网络，策划了这场“完美谋杀”。还有人猜测，黄胜强的死是高层为平息争议而采取的极端手段。

黄胜强的死，如同李克强的死，留下了一个无人能解的谜团。浦江的夜色依旧，但黄胜强的沉默，似乎在诉说着一个永远无法揭开的秘密。

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Huang Shengqiang, implicated in the Li Keqiang case, was under immense pressure and passed away. People’s Daily commemorates Li Keqiang; Qiushi mysteriously deletes article.

Hello everyone, On October 27, 2023, former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang died suddenly of a heart attack in Shanghai at the age of 68. The official announcement was brief and vague, sparking widespread skepticism. On July 3, 2025, Li Keqiang’s 70th birthday, the People’s Daily published a long commemorative article, “Striving for the Cause of the Party and the People Throughout My Life,” written by the Central Party History and Literature Research Institute of the Communist Party of China, highly praising Li Keqiang’s political character and achievements. However, the website of Qiushi, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, quickly deleted the article after reprinting it, displaying a “404” error, fueling speculation about factional struggles within the CCP. I tried it myself, and it was indeed a 404 error. This incident not only brought the mystery surrounding Li Keqiang’s death back to the forefront but also illustrates the intense power struggles within the Party’s media.

Li Keqiang’s sudden death was shrouded in mystery from the very beginning. Official sources stated he died suddenly of a heart attack, but detailed medical history and descriptions of the resuscitation process were lacking. In August 2023, Li Keqiang’s last public appearance at the Mogao Grottoes in Dunhuang showed him in good health, with few reports of a history of heart disease. The rapid cremation of his body and strict control over related information further fueled public suspicion.

Recently, CCTV produced a carefully selected stage play: “The Great Dream of Dunhuang,” which is also quite impressive.

In 2022, Li Keqiang publicly mentioned at the Two Sessions that “600 million people have a monthly income of less than 1,000 yuan,” which was seen as a challenge to Xi Jinping’s “comprehensive well-off society” rhetoric. In August of the same year, during an inspection tour in Shenzhen, Li Keqiang declared that “the Yellow River and the Yangtze River will not flow backwards,” which was interpreted as a commitment to the reform and opening-up policy, implying a policy divergence with Xi Jinping.

This aligns with the annual editorials of the People’s Daily that we just analyzed.

July and August of 2022 marked a low point in Xi Jinping’s power.

After reaching the peak of his power following the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping’s power rapidly declined.

Before stepping down, Li Keqiang’s farewell speech to the National Development and Reform Commission, in which he mentioned “Heaven is watching what people do,” was seen by outsiders as a veiled criticism of the political environment at the top. These events led some to view Li Keqiang’s death as a result of political retribution.

The People’s Daily Article and the Deletion of an Article in Qiushi Journal

On July 3, 2025, the People’s Daily published a commemorative article that reviewed Li Keqiang’s life in detail, praising him for “always maintaining the political character and noble moral sentiments of a communist,” and emphasizing his contributions to promoting the work of the Communist Youth League, the rise of Central China, the revitalization of Northeast China, and high-quality development. The article specifically mentioned that after stepping down, Li Keqiang “firmly supported the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core” and supported the anti-corruption struggle. However, the way this article was published and the subsequent deletion of the article by Qiushi Journal revealed a complex power struggle within the CCP.

The People’s Daily’s Political Signals
As the CCP’s largest party media outlet, the People’s Daily’s articles are seen as a reflection of the official stance. The publication of the commemorative article, ostensibly a routine commemoration of Li Keqiang’s 70th birthday in accordance with the “Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Commemorative Activities for the Birthdays of Deceased Party and State Leaders,” has, on the surface, exceeded the norm in its high-profile nature—a nearly 6,000-word article detailing his life and highlighting his approachable image and contributions to reform—drawing widespread attention. The editor’s note at the beginning of the article specifically emphasizes “published in accordance with regulations,” seemingly seeking a legitimacy for its publication, which ironically underscores its sensitivity.

Analysts believe that this move by the People’s Daily may reflect an attempt by certain factions within the Party to “rehabilitate” or “exonerate” Li Keqiang. Li Keqiang is considered a representative of the Hu Jintao faction, and the public outcry following his death—such as the laying of flowers at his former residence in Hefei and the long procession of mourners—demonstrates his strong popular support. The publication of this article may be an opportunity for some Party members to reshape Li Keqiang’s image and respond to public questions about the cause of his death. Meanwhile, the article repeatedly mentions Li Keqiang’s “support” for Xi Jinping, seemingly balancing factional conflicts and avoiding interpretation as a challenge to the current leadership. This “commemorative yet loyal” approach reveals the article’s compromise within the Party.

The Strangeness of Qiushi’s Deletion of the Article In stark contrast to the People’s Daily’s retention of the article, Qiushi’s website quickly deleted it after reprinting it, displaying a “404” error. The official website of the Central Party History and Literature Research Institute also did not retain the article. As a theoretical journal sponsored by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Qiushi is directly under the command of the Secretariat of the Central Committee; its deletion is seen as a manifestation of the will of the top leadership. Analysis suggests that Qiushi’s actions may reflect the wariness of Xi Jinping’s core faction regarding the commemoration of Li Keqiang, fearing that his image might be excessively elevated, inciting further public questioning about the cause of his death.

The stark contrast between Qiushi’s deletion and the People’s Daily’s retention indicates internal disagreements within the Party media. One possibility is that Xi Jinping’s faction is cautious about commemorating Li Keqiang, fearing he might be used as a banner for the Youth League faction or other opposition groups. As a theoretical mouthpiece, Qiushi frequently publishes Xi Jinping’s speeches and articles. The deletion of this article may be at the behest of higher authorities, an attempt to suppress the buzz surrounding Li Keqiang. Another possibility is that the deletion reflects chaos within the Party’s propaganda system, with the Central Secretariat (possibly involving Standing Committee member Cai Qi) and the Central Propaganda Department holding differing stances on the Li Keqiang issue, leading to a split in the propaganda narrative.

The author’s background: The commemorative article was written by the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee. The background of its director, Qu Qingshan, adds complexity to the event. Qu Qingshan is portrayed by the external propaganda apparatus as a key figure in both the Youth League faction and the Deng Xiaoping faction. Isn’t Qu Qingshan a former official from Qinghai? Why isn’t it now being said that Qu Qingshan is Zhao Leji’s man? When will the external propaganda apparatus achieve logical consistency?

In December 2021, Qu Qingshan published an article in People’s Daily and Qiushi entitled “Reform and Opening Up Was a Great Awakening of the Party,” mentioning Deng Xiaoping nine times and emphasizing the reform and opening-up policy, but omitting Xi Jinping, sparking interpretations of a “slap in the face to Xi Jinping as the core leader.” Subsequently, Xi Jinping’s faction countered through an article by Jiang Jinquan, director of the Central Policy Research Office, highlighting the fierce internal struggle over party lines. Qu Qingshan’s willingness to challenge Xi Jinping during his peak of power demonstrates his strong backing.

The 6th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee was by no means the peak of Xi Jinping’s power. Since Qu Qingshan dared to challenge Xi Jinping’s line,

this indicates that the 6th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee was not Xi Jinping’s peak of power. The 6th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee occurred right after the Beidaihe Conference in 2021.

This was a period of power setbacks for Xi Jinping.

As I have already analyzed through a series of personnel analyses, Xi Jinping’s power was weakened after the Beidaihe Conference in 2021.

Now, against the backdrop of weakened rumors surrounding Xi Jinping’s power, Qu Qingshan’s commemorative article, which both praises Li Keqiang and mentions “two establishments and four consciousnesses,” is seen as a form of “sophisticated satire”: outwardly supporting Xi Jinping, but actually using the commemoration of Li Keqiang to subtly criticize the current leadership’s policy regression. This subtle writing style may have further provoked the censorship reaction from Qiushi magazine.

The Party Media Game and Internal Struggle within the CCP

The contradiction between the People’s Daily’s published article and Qiushi’s deleted article reflects the profound divisions within the CCP surrounding the death of Li Keqiang. The following analyzes the background and significance of this game from several aspects:

A Projection of Factional Struggle
As a representative of Hu Jintao’s faction, Li Keqiang’s death is considered related to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power. At the 2022 CCP National Congress, neither Li Keqiang nor Hu Chunhua entered the Politburo. Li Keqiang’s sudden death in 2023 further exacerbated the antagonism between the Hu and Xi factions. The publication of the commemorative article may be an attempt by some members of the Hu faction or so-called reformists to use Li Keqiang’s name to reiterate the reform and opening-up policy, implicitly challenging Xi Jinping’s centralized power model. Using the so-called reform or non-reform criteria to divide factions is inherently vague and completely inaccurate.

The deletion of the article by Qiushi may be a rapid suppression of this challenge by Xi’s faction, reflecting the fierce struggle between the two sides in the propaganda field.

Public Sentiment and Pressure to Maintain Stability
Following Li Keqiang’s death, spontaneous mourning erupted in Hefei, Beijing, and other cities, with the public viewing him as a “people-friendly premier,” contrasting sharply with Xi Jinping’s high-pressure policies. In June 2025, the alleged appeal by Cheng Hong further fueled public attention to the possibility that Li Keqiang was murdered. The People’s Daily’s commemorative article may have been an attempt to quell public doubts through official narrative under pressure to maintain stability. However, the deletion of the article in Qiushi Journal indicates that the top leadership’s sensitivity to the Li Keqiang topic far exceeded expectations, fearing that excessive publicity could trigger a greater public backlash.

Background of the Beidaihe Meeting and the Fourth Plenary Session
July 2025 coincided with the eve of the Beidaihe Meeting, with rumors circulating that Xi Jinping had lost power and that the Fourth Plenary Session would discuss major personnel adjustments. The publication and deletion of the commemorative article may be related to this sensitive timing. The Hu faction or other opposition groups may have used Li Keqiang’s name to test the top leadership’s reaction and build momentum for the upcoming power struggle.

The contradiction between the People’s Daily’s article commemorating Li Keqiang and the mysterious deletion of an article in Qiushi Journal reflects the intense power struggle within the CCP surrounding Li Keqiang’s death. The publication of the commemorative article may have been an attempt by the Hu Jintao faction or reformists to “rehabilitate” Li Keqiang, while simultaneously masking their political intentions through the expression of “supporting Xi Jinping’s core leadership.” The deletion of the article in Qiushi Journal, on the other hand, demonstrates the Xi Jinping faction’s high sensitivity to the topic of Li Keqiang, attempting to suppress his potential political influence. This event indirectly confirms the unusual nature of Li Keqiang’s death; whether murder or natural death, it conceals complex factional struggles.

In July 2025, Shanghai, with its towering buildings and flashing neon lights lining both sides of the Huangpu River, conceals the city’s undercurrents of politics. Huang Shengqiang, 69, was once a star in the customs system. From joining the workforce in 1973 to becoming a member of the Party Committee of the General Administration of Customs and Director of the National Port Management Office in 2013, his career spanned decades, accumulating a deep political network. Especially during his tenure as Director-General of Shanghai Customs from 2009 to 2013, he established close working relationships with Han Zheng, then Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and later Gong Zheng, Mayor of Shanghai.

Huang Shengqiang’s connection with Gong Zheng began within the customs system. The two worked together at the General Administration of Customs in their early years, and Gong Zheng, as Huang Shengqiang’s colleague, greatly appreciated his abilities.

In September 1998, 38-year-old Gong Zheng became Director-General of the Policy and Regulations Department of the General Administration of Customs. During this period, Gong Zheng accompanied Qian Guanlin, then Director-General of the General Administration of Customs, to report to then-Premier Zhu Rongji.

From 1998 to 2000, 43-year-old Huang Shengqiang served as Deputy Director-General (Deputy Director-General level) of the General Office (Port Planning Office) of the General Administration of Customs.

From 2000 to 2002, 45-year-old Huang Shengqiang served as Director-General (Director-General level) of the General Office (Port Planning Office) of the General Administration of Customs. The Director-General of the General Administration of Customs at that time was Qian Guanlin (January 1993 – April 2001). In other words, Huang Shengqiang and Gong Zheng were Qian Guanlin’s right-hand men and Zhu Rongji’s henchmen.

Later, Gong Zheng entered Shanghai politics, becoming Mayor of Shanghai in 2020, while Huang Shengqiang, working at Shanghai Customs, maintained frequent interactions with the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee led by Han Zheng. In April 2013, Huang Shengqiang promoted the “Ten New Measures” for Pudong New Area, which highly aligned with Han Zheng’s “headquarters economy” strategy. Han Zheng repeatedly praised it publicly as a “pillar of Shanghai’s international shipping center construction.” During this period, Shanghai’s power network was intricate, with Han Zheng’s cronies spread across key departments, and Huang Shengqiang was undoubtedly an important member.

However, this network woven from power and interests began to crumble after Li Keqiang’s sudden death on October 27, 2023. Li Keqiang’s Last Day

In the early hours of October 27, 2023, at the Shanghai Eastern Suburbs State Guesthouse, shocking news broke that former Premier Li Keqiang had died of a sudden heart attack at the age of 68. The then-mayor of Shanghai was Gong Zheng, and although Han Zheng had left Shanghai in 2017 to become Vice Premier and Vice President, his influence in Shanghai remained deeply entrenched. The official report stated that Li Keqiang suffered a sudden illness while resting in Shanghai and could not be saved. However, the veracity of his death was widely questioned online. Some pointed out that Li Keqiang’s last public appearance was in August 2023 at the Mogao Grottoes in Dunhuang, where he appeared to be in good health; why the sudden death? The cremation was rushed, and related information was strictly controlled. These methods are identical to the core of mass incidents involving the forced cremation of bodies. Even high-ranking officials like Li Keqiang were handled in this way.

An anonymous letter circulated on a certain channel in June 2025, claiming that Li Keqiang’s death was a political assassination codenamed “23-107,” orchestrated by Zhu Rongji and Peng Liyuan, directed by Gong Zheng, and carried out by Han Zheng’s Shanghai “clique.” The aim of this operation was to eliminate Li Keqiang’s potential influence in politics. Huang Shengqiang, a former colleague of Gong Zheng and a former subordinate of Han Zheng, possessed certain inside information due to his special position in the Shanghai Customs.

Gong Zheng was a henchman of Zhu Rongji, and Han Zheng was personally promoted by Zhu Rongji. When Han Zheng was promoted to deputy bureau-level and bureau-level positions, Zhu Rongji was both the Shanghai Party Secretary and Mayor. When Han Zheng was promoted to deputy secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League in June 1990, Zhu Rongji was both the Shanghai Party Secretary and Mayor. Han Zheng’s promotion to Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League in May 1991 was also due to Zhu Rongji’s promotion. The appointment had been issued a month earlier.

Huang Shengqiang’s Hidden Role

During his tenure as Director of Shanghai Customs from 2009 to 2013, Huang Shengqiang controlled the lifeline of import and export logistics in Shanghai, an international trade hub. He was familiar with every customs clearance procedure and had access to records of the import and export of sensitive goods. Li Keqiang’s death may have involved the transportation of some special materials, and Huang Shengqiang played a role in covering it up. It is possible that some kind of poison was imported. Huang Shengqiang’s office was once the hub of Shanghai’s power network, and his frequent interactions with Gong Zheng and Han Zheng made him an undeniable behind-the-scenes figure in Shanghai politics.

When Li Keqiang passed away in October 2023, Gong Zheng, as Mayor of Shanghai, was responsible for coordinating major affairs in Shanghai. Although Han Zheng had left Shanghai, his “clique” remained active there, controlling key departments such as public security and customs. Huang Shengqiang, due to his past relationship with the two men, was considered one of the insiders in this “murder” plot. Huang may have assisted with customs clearance procedures for certain sensitive goods, facilitating the operation.

In early 2025, discussions about Li Keqiang’s cause of death intensified again. Former Xinhua News Agency reporter Gu Wanming’s open letter demanded a thorough investigation into Li Keqiang’s death, proposing demands such as suspending cremation and establishing an investigation team. However, he was sentenced to one year in prison by a Shanghai court for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Gu Wanming’s fate ignited public anger.

The Price of Silence

In June 2025, Huang Shengqiang had already retired from the General Administration of Customs and became a specially appointed professor at the Shanghai Customs College.

It is noteworthy that Huang Shengqiang did not leave Shanghai even after retirement.

However, Huang Shengqiang’s life was not peaceful. He began receiving anonymous, ambiguous phone calls. A former colleague recalled that Huang Shengqiang privately revealed, “There are some things I cannot say, and dare not say.” His past relationship with Gong Zheng and Han Zheng gave him access to the fatal secret behind Li Keqiang’s death.

On the evening of July 1st, Huang Shengqiang spent his last night alone in his Shanghai apartment. The next morning, his secretary found him collapsed in his study, clutching an unfinished letter that read, “I know too much, yet I have nowhere to go.” Police quickly intervened, announcing that Huang Shengqiang had committed suicide at the age of 69. However, another version of events soon circulated online: Huang Shengqiang did not commit suicide, but was silenced to ensure the truth about Li Keqiang’s death would be forever buried.

The undercurrents haven’t subsided.

Huang Shengqiang’s death, like a pebble thrown into a pond, has stirred up a massive wave of public opinion. On the X platform, an anonymous user revealed that Huang Shengqiang’s experience at Shanghai Customs may have given him access to sensitive records related to Li Keqiang’s death.

Huang Shengqiang allegedly instructed his former subordinates to allow a certain drug to pass through customs without inspection.

Some have pointed the finger at Peng Liyuan, Zhu Rongji, Gong Zheng, and Han Zheng, claiming they used Shanghai’s power network to orchestrate this “perfect murder.” Others speculate that Huang Shengqiang’s death was an extreme measure taken by high-ranking officials to quell the controversy.

Huang Shengqiang’s death, like Li Keqiang’s, has left behind an unsolved mystery. The night on the Huangpu River remains unchanged, but Huang Shengqiang’s silence seems to whisper a secret that can never be revealed.

Okay, thank you everyone.