习再被软禁隐身，等待四中全会裁决。王小洪，何立峰，蔡奇，谁是下一个下台的？

 

习再被软禁隐身，等待四中全会裁决。王小洪，何立峰，蔡奇，谁是下一个下台的？

大家好
根据新华社报道，2025年7月1日上午，习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第六次会议，讨论“纵深推进中国统一大市场建设”和“海洋经济高质量发展”等问题。这是二十届中央财经委员会的第六次会议，官方高调报道。然而，报道引出了一个关键问题：第五次会议（以及第三次会议）的召开时间和内容为何没有公开？

历史数据显示，中央财经委员会会议以往是公开的。2017-2022年十九届中央财经委员会召开了11次会议，每次均由新华社、人民日报等官方媒体详细报道，比如2018年4月2日第一次会议讨论污染防治，2021年3月15日第十一次会议讨论碳达峰。会议通常聚焦重大经济政策，凸显习近平作为中央财经委员会主任的核心地位。

2022年起二十届中央财经委员会的前四次会议中的3次有明确报道：
第一次是2023年5月5日，研究现代化产业体系和人口高质量发展。
第二次是2023年7月20日，研究耕地保护和盐碱地改造。
第四次是2024年2月23日，研究设备更新和消费品以旧换新、降低物流成本。

然而，第三次和第五次会议的召开时间和内容均没有官方报道，“六次会议中有两次未公开”，第五次会议的消息“封锁”尤为引人注目。

第五次会议的召开时间应在2024年2月23日的第四次会议到2025年7月1日的第六次会议之间。结合财经领域的重大事件，2024年7月中旬的三中全会，出台《中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的决定》和2024年9月后的财经政策大转向是关键节点。推测第五次会议可能在2024年9月前后秘密召开，与政策转向，包括“适度宽松”货币政策、10万亿元地方债务纾困的时间吻合。习近平丧失大权导致会议保密，反映了党内权力斗争的复杂性。

十九届中央财经委员会每次会议均公开，二十届却有两次，第三次和第五次“隐身”，与中共强调“透明治理”的宣传口径不符。“不公开报道的目的在于将决策内容、决策流程秘密化、地下化”，暗示第五次会议涉及敏感议题，可能与习近平权力受限或派系博弈有关。

时间节点的敏感性：2024年9月前后，习近平主持的中央财经委员会没有公开报道，而财经政策发生重大转向，比如货币政策从“稳健”转为“适度宽松”，显示决策过程可能受到非习派系的影响。

也就是说，由于中央财经委员会第六次会议的报道，我们发现第五次会议没有公开报道。
推测是在2024年9月前后召开。
也就是说，在2024年9月前后，习近平已经丧权了对中国经济的主导权。
中央财经委员会的副主任，就是李强，那肯定就是李强主导的。
有可能是2024年9月作为中央财经委员会的主任习近平没有参加
中央财经委员会第5次会议，因此没有报道。

2024年9月后的财经政策转向，比如“适度宽松”货币政策、10万亿元债务纾困，可能不是习近平主导。
无非就是两种可能，一种可能是中央财经委员会第5次会议，习近平参加了
另外一种可能就是习近平没有参加。
不管习近平参加还是没参加，他都已经做不了主了。

第五次会议的“封锁”消息可能因其讨论了敏感议题，比如承认经济恶化、调整习近平的发展路线，如果公开可能表明习近平的决策失误或权力削弱。

习近平参加这次中央财经会议，其实也没有公开影像出现。
6月30日政治局会议之后的集体学习，习近平公开出现了一次。
自从7月1日，习近平又没有公开的报道活动，进入隐身，被软禁的状态。
现在7月7日，又是一个礼拜了。那么习近平什么时候再有公开活动，
我们不知道。
鉴于20届3中全会，是6月的政治局会议公布的，随后7月三中全会就召开了。
因此四中全会如果在8月召开的话。
7月的政治局会议肯定会公布。
如果7月底的政治局会议不公布的，四中全会就没法在8月召开了。

其实都在现在这份上儿了。
李尚福，苗华，何卫东都是习近平的人都被抓了。
就剩下张又侠，刘振立和张升民。这三个人肯定都是胡锦涛江泽民阵营的。
我觉得都不需要拿下张又侠，刘振立和张升民只要习近平能拿下任何一个人。
就是证明习近平重掌大权了。
其他也没有什么指标性的意义。
胡锦涛这边都拿下两个军委委员，一个军委副主席。
李尚福和苗华就对标刘振立和张升民
何卫东就对标张又侠。
何卫东李尚福苗华都能拿下
张又侠刘振立张升民有什么不能拿下的呢？
就这三个人，习近平随便拿下就说明重掌大权。
不然下面那些上将中将，还要挨个分析派系，也不具有指标性的意义。

张又侠刘振立张升民这三个人还在屹立不倒，就说明他们不是习近平的人。
只要习近平有这个本事拿下他们就证明习近平重掌大权。

然后有指标性的意义的就是三个政治局委员，何卫东，李干杰，马兴瑞。
除了打倒四人帮那一次，从1976年到现在49年
差不多50年，我们见证的是50年才会发生一次的历史

50年没有发生过这样的事情，3个月内拿下3名政治局委员。
从1992年14大开始统计，33年一共只拿下了6名政治局委员。
我们的确在经历很罕见的历史。
历史上很少发生这种事情。

这名网友说，
大包分析的只字不错，慈禧死了以后，大臣们先出去把光绪做掉，回来先宣布的光绪驾崩，缓了缓才宣布的慈禧殡天。
我的回复是，这个比喻也很好。
中共打着所谓的反封建的旗号，其实他们与封建王朝到底有什么区别的？
尽管中共标榜社会主义，但其权力斗争却充满封建色彩：核心领导人就像皇帝一样，政治局常委政治局委员等于就相当于顾命大臣，各怀心思，各怀鬼胎。
作为一个皇帝心里的想法肯定和大臣不一样。
其实从这个比喻也能知道是胡锦涛在操盘。
胡锦涛想要传位给他的干儿子胡春华，和古代皇帝传位是一样的。

胡锦涛现在保着习近平的体面，其实就是保着胡锦涛自己和他干儿子胡春华的体面。
现在直接把习近平赶下台是痛快，可是将来胡春华接班。
也有人想把胡春华赶下台怎么办呢？
当然习近平应该是没有这个机会反扑，等着胡春华接班之后。
再想办法，把胡春华赶下台？
但是将来会有新的野心家出现啊。
胡锦涛不直接赶习近平下台，是为了避免未来胡春华接班时被类似方式挑战。

张又侠或者赵乐际，我们就是简化讨论，少说几个人名。
就相当于顾命大臣。他们自然是下手越狠越好啊。
这就叫做拥立之功。他们对习近平下手越狠，他们的权势越大啊。

就说如果现在胡锦涛死了。
按照古代的做法，顾命大臣只会再拥立一个儿皇帝。
找个小皇帝接班。当作傀儡控制。
绝对不可能让习近平再复辟。
顾命大臣已经掌握了权力，怎么可能再心甘情愿地交出去呢？

习近平想要重掌大权，不经过血雨腥风是不可能的。
清朝1908年，慈禧死前光绪“先驾崩”，掩盖权力过渡的混乱。
顾命大臣在慈禧死后拥立新帝以巩固权力。

这名网友说
包子不下台，老胡肯定会吊着一口气，哪一天把包子铲了，这口气不在，倒是随时可能走
我的回复是
的确是这样，人活一口气。
胡锦涛如果没有发动军事政变成功，可能就活活气死了。
郁郁而终。
现在都已经成功，四中全会就在眼前，
不是8月也差不了一两个月，很可能就是8月。
这个节骨眼，他怎么可能嗝屁呢。
一定会亲眼看到习近平下台才会走的。
这就是胡锦涛的命，他就是被派来收拾习近平。
没有完成任命就想滚蛋，怎么可能啊。
现在硬指标摆在面前
三个军委委员，三个政治局委员。当然何卫东重复。
其实是5个人。

下一步指标性人物自然就是王小洪，何立峰，蔡奇。
蔡奇是常委不是说能拿下就能拿下。
但是蔡奇中办主任的身份，那肯定要拿下。
就李干杰和马兴瑞也没有抓起来啊
但是他们的政治生涯已经结束了。

王小洪，何立峰，蔡奇，不一定就要送秦城
但是他们的职务肯定要被拿下的，

好的，谢谢大家。

英文翻译

Xi Jinping is again under house arrest, awaiting the Fourth Plenary Session’s decision. Wang Xiaohong, He Lifeng, Cai Qi—who will be next to step down?

Hello everyone.
According to Xinhua News Agency, on the morning of July 1, 2025, Xi Jinping chaired the sixth meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, discussing issues such as “deepening the construction of a unified Chinese market” and “high-quality development of the marine economy.” This was the sixth meeting of the 20th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, and it received high-profile official coverage. However, the report raises a crucial question: why were the dates and contents of the fifth meeting (and the third meeting) not made public?

Historical data shows that meetings of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission were previously public. From 2017 to 2022, the 19th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission held 11 meetings, each of which was reported in detail by official media such as Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily. For example, the first meeting on April 2, 2018, discussed pollution prevention and control, and the eleventh meeting on March 15, 2021, discussed carbon peaking. The meetings typically focused on major economic policies, highlighting Xi Jinping’s core position as the director of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission.

Of the first four meetings of the 20th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission since 2022, three were explicitly reported: The first was on May 5, 2023, focusing on modernizing the industrial system and promoting high-quality population development.

The second was on July 20, 2023, focusing on farmland protection and saline-alkali land improvement.

The fourth was on February 23, 2024, focusing on equipment upgrades, consumer goods trade-ins, and reducing logistics costs.

However, the dates and content of the third and fifth meetings were not officially reported; “two out of six meetings were not made public,” with the “secrecy” surrounding the fifth meeting being particularly noteworthy.

The fifth meeting should have been held between the fourth meeting on February 23, 2024, and the sixth meeting on July 1, 2025. Considering major events in the financial and economic field, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in mid-July 2024, which issued the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Further Comprehensively Deepening Reform and Promoting Chinese-Style Modernization,” and the major shift in financial and economic policy after September 2024, are key junctures. It is speculated that the fifth meeting may have been held secretly around September 2024, coinciding with the policy shift, including a “moderately loose” monetary policy and the 10 trillion yuan local government debt relief package. Xi Jinping’s loss of power leading to the secrecy of the meeting reflects the complexity of the power struggle within the Party.

While all meetings of the 19th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission were public, the 20th Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission held two, and the third and fifth meetings were “hidden,” contradicting the CCP’s propaganda emphasizing “transparent governance.” The statement that “the purpose of not publicizing the meetings is to keep the content and process of the decisions secret and underground” suggests that the fifth meeting involved sensitive issues, possibly related to Xi Jinping’s power limitations or factional infighting.

The sensitivity of the timing: Around September 2024, the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission chaired by Xi Jinping was not publicly reported, while significant shifts in financial policy occurred, such as the change in monetary policy from “prudent” to “moderately loose,” indicating that the decision-making process may have been influenced by non-Xi factions.

In other words, due to the reporting of the sixth meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, we find that the fifth meeting was not publicly reported.

It is speculated that it was held around September 2024.

In other words, around September 2024, Xi Jinping had already lost control over China’s economy.

The Vice Chairman of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission is Li Qiang, so it was definitely Li Qiang who led the effort.

It’s possible that Xi Jinping, as the Chairman of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, did not attend the 5th meeting of the Commission in September 2024, hence the lack of media coverage.

The shift in economic and financial policies after September 2024, such as the “moderately loose” monetary policy and the 10 trillion yuan debt relief, may not have been led by Xi Jinping.

There are essentially two possibilities: one is that Xi Jinping attended the 5th meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission; the other is that he did not attend.

Regardless of whether Xi Jinping attended or not, he had already lost control.

The “blocking” of news about the 5th meeting may be because it discussed sensitive topics, such as acknowledging the economic downturn and adjusting Xi Jinping’s development path. Public disclosure might indicate decision-making errors or a weakening of power on Xi’s part.

There was no public footage of Xi Jinping attending this Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting.

Xi Jinping did appear publicly once during the collective study session following the Politburo meeting on June 30th.

Since July 1st, Xi Jinping has had no public appearances and has entered a state of seclusion, essentially under house arrest.

Now it’s July 7th, another week has passed. When will Xi Jinping make another public appearance?

We don’t know.

Given that the 20th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session was announced at the June Politburo meeting, and then the Third Plenary Session itself was held in July,

if the Fourth Plenary Session is held in August,

the July Politburo meeting will definitely announce it.

If the Politburo meeting at the end of July doesn’t announce it, the Fourth Plenary Session can’t be held in August.

Actually, things are already at this point.

Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, and He Weidong, all Xi Jinping’s people, have been arrested.

That leaves Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin. These three are definitely from Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin’s camp.

I think it’s not even necessary to take down Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, or Zhang Shengmin; if Xi Jinping could just take down any one of them,

that would prove Xi Jinping has regained power.

There’s no other significant indication.

Hu Jintao has already removed two members of the Central Military Commission and one vice chairman.

Li Shangfu and Miao Hua are comparable to Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin.

He Weidong is comparable to Zhang Youxia.

If He Weidong, Li Shangfu, and Miao Hua could be removed, why can’t Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin be removed?

If Xi Jinping can easily remove these three, it would demonstrate his regaining of power.

Otherwise, analyzing the factions of the lower-ranking generals and lieutenant generals wouldn’t be meaningful.

The fact that Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin are still standing shows they are not Xi Jinping’s people.

If Xi Jinping has the ability to remove them, it proves he has regained power.

Then the three Politburo members who are truly significant are He Weidong, Li Ganjie, and Ma Xingrui.

Aside from the downfall of the Gang of Four, from 1976 to now, 49 years—almost 50 years—we have witnessed history that only happens once every 50 years.

Nothing like this has happened in 50 years: removing three Politburo members within three months. Statistics from the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992 show that only six new members have been elected to the Politburo in 33 years.

We are indeed experiencing a very rare historical event.

Such a thing rarely happens in history.

This netizen said, “Da Bao’s analysis is spot on. After Empress Dowager Cixi died, the ministers went out to kill Emperor Guangxu first, then announced Guangxu’s death before announcing Cixi’s passing.”

My reply was, “This analogy is also very good.”

The CCP uses the so-called anti-feudal banner, but what is the real difference between them and feudal dynasties?

Although the CCP proclaims itself socialist, its power struggles are full of feudal characteristics: the core leaders are like emperors, and the Politburo Standing Committee members are like regents, each with their own agendas and ulterior motives.

An emperor’s thoughts are certainly different from those of his ministers.

In fact, this analogy also reveals that Hu Jintao is in charge.

Hu Jintao wants to pass the throne to his adopted son, Hu Chunhua, just like the succession of emperors in ancient times.

Hu Jintao is currently preserving Xi Jinping’s dignity, which is essentially preserving the dignity of himself and his godson, Hu Chunhua.

It would be satisfying to oust Xi Jinping now, but what about when Hu Chunhua succeeds him?

What if someone wants to oust Hu Chunhua?

Of course, Xi Jinping probably won’t have the opportunity to retaliate; he’ll have to wait until Hu Chunhua takes over.

Then he can try to oust Hu Chunhua?

But new ambitious figures will emerge in the future.

Hu Jintao isn’t directly ousting Xi Jinping to avoid a similar challenge to Hu Chunhua when he succeeds him.

Zhang Youxia or Zhao Leji—we’re simplifying the discussion by mentioning fewer names.

They’re essentially regents. Naturally, the more ruthless they are, the better.

This is called the merit of supporting the emperor. The more ruthless they are towards Xi Jinping, the greater their power.

For example, if Hu Jintao were to die now,

according to ancient practices, the regents would only support a puppet emperor.

Find a young emperor to succeed him and control him as a puppet.

It’s absolutely impossible for Xi Jinping to regain power.

The regents have already seized power; how could they willingly relinquish it?

Xi Jinping’s desire to regain power is impossible without bloodshed.

In 1908, during the Qing Dynasty, Emperor Guangxu died before Empress Dowager Cixi, masking the chaos of the power transition.

The regents installed a new emperor after Cixi’s death to consolidate their power.

This netizen said, “As long as Xi Jinping doesn’t step down, Hu Jintao will be clinging to life. The day he removes Xi Jinping, that life will end, and he might die at any time.”

My reply is, “That’s indeed true; people live for their pride.”

If Hu Jintao hadn’t successfully staged a military coup, he might have died of anger.

He died in despair.

Now that it’s successful, the Fourth Plenary Session is just around the corner,

at least a month or two before August, very likely.

At this crucial juncture, how could he possibly kick the bucket?

They will definitely see Xi Jinping step down before they leave.

That’s Hu Jintao’s fate; he was sent to deal with Xi Jinping.

How could he possibly leave before fulfilling his appointment duties?

Now the hard targets are clear: three members of the Central Military Commission, three members of the Politburo. Of course, He Weidong is mentioned again.

Actually, it’s five people.

The next key figures will naturally be Wang Xiaohong, He Lifeng, and Cai Qi.

Cai Qi is a member of the Standing Committee; it’s not something that can be easily removed.

But Cai Qi’s position as Director of the General Office of the Central Committee means he will definitely be removed.

Even Li Ganjie and Ma Xingrui haven’t been arrested yet,

but their political careers are over.

Wang Xiaohong, He Lifeng, and Cai Qi may not necessarily be sent to Qincheng Prison,

but their positions will definitely be removed.

Okay, thank you everyone.