他接总书记，他接总理？新总书记总理名单。新疆书记陈小江的派系背景。马兴瑞何去何从？

 

他接总书记，他接总理？新总书记总理名单。新疆书记陈小江的派系背景。马兴瑞何去何从？

大家好，

我们先简单看一下政治局委员，

我们从14大开始回顾，即便14大开始，一共也没有几个人。

十四大拿下了陈希同，15大就没有人被拿下

16大拿下陈良宇，17大拿下薄熙来，18大拿下孙政才，19大没有变化，

20大，现在短短3个月的时间，胡锦涛痛下杀手，对政治局委员三连杀。

何卫东应该不至于死了吧，没死也是在秦城。生死不明吧。

李干杰贬黜统战部，马兴瑞退居二线。

一共只有17个政治局委员，现在已经拿下3个人，还要怎么着？

非要胡锦涛也把习包子从四中全会会场架出去，才算数吗？

自1992年十四大以来，政治局委员的清洗先例极为罕见，凸显其作为中共最高领导层核心的稳固地位。十四大期间，陈希同因所谓的腐败问题被拿下，开启了政治局委员落马的先河。十五大政治局委员没有变动，体现权力结构的暂时稳定。十六大拿下陈良宇，以上海社保案借口。反腐败都是借口，都是骗子。哪个政治局委员不贪污不腐败。十七大拿下薄熙来，因为重庆打黑以及王立军事件），十八大拿下孙政才，习包子清除潜在接班人，十九大则维持不变。 

习包子不仅仅拿下孙政才，还想拿下胡春华，没有成功而已。

统计显示，1992-2022年30年间，政治局委员总数每届约20-25人，七届党代会累计政治局委员人数应在80-100人之间（考虑跨届连任与新人补入），而落马者仅4人，平均每届约0.57人。加上郭伯雄和徐才厚也就是6个人，郭伯雄和徐才厚，也是政治局委员，退休之后被查的。

更多政治局委员因年龄，超68岁退休，所谓的七上八下，或者晋升常委，变动都是派系斗争。官方常以“依法治国”或“反腐倡廉”为由，实则掩盖权力再分配的深层动机。

这些都是骗傻子的口号。你说法治我都觉得有点好笑。

2025年短短3个月拿下三名政治局委员，频率之高打破历史惯例，值得深入剖析。

2022年10月二十大闭幕式上，胡锦涛被架出会场，官方称其“身体不适”，外界多解读为习包子偷换名单。然而，2025年6月，胡锦涛反守为攻，拿下政治局委员实施“三连杀”。包括何卫东、李干杰、马兴瑞：  

何卫东，中央军委副主席，传言因军权争夺被拿下，生死不明，可能被拘禁在秦城监狱。  

李干杰，原生态环境部长，后贬至统战部，传言因腐败调查受挫。  

马兴瑞，新疆党委书记，退居二线，因为派系失势。  

政治局委员从十七人，3人占近18%，远超历史平均水平。表明胡锦涛在习包子执政后期夺回主动，意在重塑权力格局。

何卫东作为军方核心，命运引发广泛猜测。“应该不至于死了”，但是如果没有死，秦城监狱或为其归宿。秦城象征清洗的终点，何卫东被查，军权从习包子派系转向胡锦涛，动摇习包子军事支柱。  

李干杰从中组部长贬至统战部，职权大幅降低，传言因生态环境领域贪腐，这都是借口。腐败是真的腐败，不可能单纯因为腐败就被查。马兴瑞退居二线，失去新疆实权，显示其政治生命几近终结。三人皆为习包子提拔的亲信，清洗指向胡锦涛对“习包子”马仔的系统性打击。

人生如戏，全靠演技。

马兴瑞当广东省长的时候，当时的广东省委书记是李希

李希现在是中纪委书记，李希没把马兴瑞，算是给马兴瑞面子。

当然了也不是李希能决定的。

哈尔滨帮，罗健，彭丽媛，马兴瑞。

彭丽媛已经失踪快两个月了。快成秦刚了。

我们首先要关注一个党八股的新闻。

既然是党八股，那么这条新闻自然是没有任何新闻价值的。

但是现在随着马兴瑞下台，不一样了。

6月28日，自治区党委书记、兵团党委第一书记、第一政委马兴瑞，自治区党委副书记、自治区主席艾尔肯·吐尼亚孜来到自治区公安厅，深入调研调度维护社会大局稳定、防范化解风险隐患等工作。

这场调研，不知道是巧合还是故意安排的。

而且这个title也很意味深长啊。

自治区党委书记、兵团党委第一书记、第一政委马兴瑞

这可能是马兴瑞最后一次享受，这三大头衔。

现在这个人已经换成了陈小江。

陈小江现在已经是新疆党委书记了。

但是从技术上来说，陈小江是不是新疆兵团的第一书记，第一政委。

还不一定。也许还没有来得及任命

这可能只是一个技术问题，即便没有同时任命为兵团第一书记，第一政委。

也会随后任命的。

我们看陈小江的派系背景。陈小江，简单说，就是胡锦涛马仔。

有强烈的胡锦涛背景。因为胡锦涛在清华大学就是学水利工程的。

1959年，胡锦涛考入清华大学水利工程系学习。

1965年大学毕业后，胡锦涛被学校留在水利系参加科研工作、任教，并继续担任政治辅导员。

1968年，胡锦涛前往位于甘肃的水电部刘家峡工程局房建队，参加工作。

1984年8月，陈小江参加工作

2015年8月，53岁的陈小江担任中纪委宣传部部长

陈小江在水利部任职长达31年

也就是说让陈小江发家的所有人际关系都在水利部，

不可能在中纪委，中纪委谁认识陈小江是谁

胡锦涛在清华大学那肯定是很多教师给他上过课。

其中有一个人叫做张光斗。

2007年4月28日，值我校校友、我国著名水利水电工程专家、清华大学教授张光斗先生95岁生日以及张光斗先生奉献祖国水利水电事业70周年之际，中共中央总书记胡锦涛致信表示深情祝贺。贺信全文如下：

尊敬的张光斗先生： 值此先生九十五岁华诞之时，我谨祝先生生日快乐！ 从一九三七年归国至今，七十年来，先生一直胸怀祖国，热爱人民，情系山河，为我国的江河治理和水资源开发利用栉风沐雨、殚精竭虑，建立了卓越功绩。先生钟爱教育事业，在长期的教学生涯中，默默耕耘，传道授业，诲人不倦，为祖国的水利水电事业培养了众多优秀人才，做出了重要贡献。先生的品德风范山高水长，令人景仰！ 愿先生继续为我国的水利水电建设和教育事业贡献智慧和力量！敬祝先生健康长寿！

学生胡锦涛二OO七年四月二十八日

胡锦涛自称是学生。

张光斗至少有三名官员学生，一个胡锦涛本人

一个是张春园，水利部副部长

一个是汪恕诚，水利部部长。

张春园是水利部副部长，没有人知道他说谁，1960年张春园毕业于清华大学。

也就是说胡锦涛考入清华大学的时候，张春园还有1年就毕业。

就是张春园和汪恕诚在水利部提拔的陈小江。

汪恕诚和胡锦涛的关系，网上也有很多的描述。

我们看这个描述是最有意思的

胡锦涛所在清华“5字班”的温暖回忆

“5字班”的毕业生中，走出了胡锦涛和吴官正两位党和国家领导人，还产生了三位部长—原城乡建设部部长叶如棠、原水利部部长汪恕诚、原司法部部长张福森

现在我已经知道他们的派系了，吴官正和城乡建设部部长叶如棠是习包子派系的。

水利部部长汪恕诚和司法部部长张福森是胡锦涛派系的。

我们看看这些资料，他们说的不一定准，我看看他们的说法

还有一个汪恕诚，论权力级别远不能与上述几位校友相提并论，只是当今国务院水利部长，但是论与胡锦涛的关系，却比他们近得多——他是胡锦涛的同系同届的同窗。

这句话就有点意味深长，他说的哪几位校友都是谁啊？

宋平，胡启立，吴邦国，黄菊，吴官正  

宋平，吴邦国，吴官正都是习包子派系的。

胡启立应该是江泽民派系的，黄菊应该是胡锦涛派系的。

胡启立和黄菊我们还没有拿出铁证。

宋平，吴邦国，吴官正，百分百是陈云习包子派系的。

其实很正常，清华大学那么多人，打包成一个派系，肯定不对。

他们因为专业不同，学业上的接触不是很多。

他们就是胡锦涛和汪恕诚，这个专业应该是小方向的专业，都是学水利的。

但是汪恕诚当年是团支部组织委员，作为学生干部，社会活动很多，与胡锦涛相当熟识。毕业后汪恕诚接著读研究生，与留校当政治辅导员兼搞一些科研的胡锦涛同在一个党支部，胡锦涛这时已经是正式党员，而汪恕诚则是预备党员，接触就更频繁。  

有的资料就直接把胡锦涛和汪恕诚写成了同班同学。

有可能这些细节可能有水分，但是胡锦涛和汪恕诚，关系不一般是真的。

这个照片就是同学聚会的照片。

汪恕诚后来被分配到第六工程局，与胡锦涛就天各一方了。他的仕途之路一度蹒跚难行，一九八二年当上第六工程局党委副书记，一九八七年晋升为正局级职务，工作岗位换了好几个，但是都不算提升。一九九三年八届人大国务院换届时，胡锦涛主持人事安排，汪恕诚由被撤消的能源部的一个司长，升为新的电力工业部副部长兼党组成员。但是到九八年，国家机关进一步改革，电力工业部又被撤消，汪恕诚被安排屈居国家电力公司副总经理。

2001年10月至2004年3月，陈小江先后挂职任甘肃省政府副秘书长、办公厅党组成员，甘肃省政府副秘书长、办公厅主任、厅党组副书记。当时的甘肃省长是陆浩（2001年1月 – 2006年10月）。陆浩是冯纪新的秘书，冯纪新提拔的胡锦涛提拔的。

陈小江去中纪委是怎么回事儿呢，中纪委宣传部部长是副部级，

不是王岐山中纪委书记一个小马仔能提拔的。

即便要说陈小江是王岐山或者习包子的人，那么中纪委宣传部部长这一步

也不是王岐山能提拔的，需要政治局常委会通过

陈小江中纪委宣传部部长这一步，要么是习包子提拔的，要么是李克强提拔的。

之后陈小江去辽宁，李克强不就是辽宁的吗？

陈小江早年在水利部是副部长张春园提拔的，

张春园的老师张光斗是胡锦涛的老师。

之后陈小江是水利部部长汪恕诚提拔的，汪恕诚是胡锦涛同班同学，反正关系十分密切。

陈小江挂职甘肃省政府担任当时的省长陆浩的大秘。

陆浩是冯纪新的秘书，冯纪新提拔的胡锦涛的副局级和正局级。

胡锦涛不就是甘肃省的官员吗？

陈小江之后的副部级正部级应该都是李克强提拔的。

现在陈小江担任新疆党委书记要进政治局，那只能胡锦涛提拔的。

中国新一代领导层或已初露端倪

近期迹象显示，中共最高领导层可能正酝根一轮重要人事调整。

出生于1960年代的胡春华和袁家军，

是未来担任总书记和总理两个关键职务的有力人选。

2025年6月29日起，包括新华社、人民日报在内的多家官方媒体，

将国家主席习近平致西藏林芝市嘎拉村的一封回信置于头条位置。

习近平在信中提到他对该村的“这刻印象”，

官方媒体高调报道习与林芝的这一互动，带有强烈的政治内涵。

林芝在胡春华的仕途中具有特殊意义:

1992年，他在这里开启了地方行政管理的任职，

担任林芝地区行政公署副专员。

同一天的央视《新闻联播》也以此为头条报道。

在随后的评论中还出现了“春华秋实六十载，雪域高原谱新篇”一句，

“春华秋实”这一成语，巧妙点出了胡春华的名字，

进一步引发外界对其职务走向的揣测。

外界普遍预计，如果有重大变动，

或将在即将召开的中共二十届四中全会上得到确认。

与此同时，袁家军的公开活动引发关注。

他与国务院多位部委负责人频繁会晤，

并出访欧洲多国，持续保持高曝光度。

观察人士普遍认为，

这些动向释放出他有望接任国务院总理的信号。

喜家军的仕途起点还与邓小平家族存在象征性联系:

2006年，他曾当选中国科协副主席，

当时该机构的第一书记正是邓小平之女邓楠。

“胡袁体制”呼之欲出，

中国将重回改早开放的正统路绪。

随着相关人事调整的逐步明明，

这一变化对中国内政与对外政策的影响，

仍将是外界持续关注的焦点。

我的回复是袁家军应该是接任蔡奇或者丁薛祥，

好的，谢谢大家

英文翻译

He’ll become General Secretary, he’ll become Premier? The list of new General Secretary and Premier. The factional background of Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Xiaojiang. What will become of Ma Xingrui?

Hello everyone,

Let’s take a brief look at the Politburo members.

Let’s review from the 14th Party Congress onwards. Even then, there weren’t many.

The 14th Party Congress removed Chen Xitong, and no one was removed by the 15th.

The 16th Party Congress removed Chen Liangyu, the 17th removed Bo Xilai, the 18th removed Sun Zhengcai, and there were no changes at the 19th.

The 20th Party Congress, and now, in just three months, Hu Jintao has taken drastic measures, eliminating three Politburo members in succession.

He Weidong shouldn’t be dead, right? If he isn’t, he’s probably in Qincheng Prison. His fate is unknown.

Li Ganjie was demoted to the United Front Work Department, and Ma Xingrui has been relegated to the second line.

There are only 17 Politburo members in total, and three have already been removed. What more can be done?

Does it only count if Hu Jintao also removes Xi Jinping from the Fourth Plenary Session?

Since the 14th National Congress in 1992, the precedent of purging Politburo members has been extremely rare, highlighting their stable position as the core of the CCP’s top leadership. During the 14th National Congress, Chen Xitong was removed for alleged corruption, setting a precedent for the downfall of Politburo members. The 15th National Congress saw no changes in the Politburo members, reflecting the temporary stability of the power structure. The 16th National Congress removed Chen Liangyu, using the Shanghai social security fund scandal as a pretext. Anti-corruption is just an excuse, a lie. Which Politburo member isn’t corrupt? The 17th National Congress removed Bo Xilai (due to the Chongqing crackdown and the Wang Lijun incident). The 18th National Congress removed Sun Zhengcai, with Xi Jinping eliminating potential successors. The 19th National Congress maintained the status quo.

Xi Jinping not only removed Sun Zhengcai but also wanted to remove Hu Chunhua, though he failed.

Statistics show that between 1992 and 2022, the total number of Politburo members was approximately 20-25 per term. The cumulative number of Politburo members across seven Party Congresses should be between 80-100 (considering re-election and new additions), while only four were investigated and removed from their posts, averaging about 0.57 per term. Including Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, that makes six. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were also Politburo members who were investigated after retirement.

Many more Politburo members retired due to age, exceeding 68. The so-called “seven up, eight down” or promotions to the Standing Committee are all factional struggles. The official explanation often uses “rule of law” or “anti-corruption” as pretexts, but this actually masks the deeper motives of power redistribution.

These are all slogans to fool the gullible. I find it laughable that you talk about the rule of law.

The removal of three Politburo members in just three months in 2025 is unprecedented and deserves in-depth analysis.

At the closing ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2022, Hu Jintao was escorted out of the venue, with the official explanation being “ill health,” which was widely interpreted as Xi Jinping secretly replacing the list of attendees. However, in June 2025, Hu Jintao turned the tables, removing three members of the Politburo in a “triple whammy.” These included He Weidong, Li Ganjie, and Ma Xingrui:

He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was rumored to have been removed due to a power struggle within the military, his fate unknown, possibly imprisoned in Qincheng Prison.

Li Ganjie, former Minister of Ecology and Environment, later demoted to the United Front Work Department, was rumored to have suffered a setback in a corruption investigation.

Ma Xingrui, Xinjiang Party Secretary, stepped down from his position due to a loss of power within his faction.

The number of Politburo members dropped from 17 to 3, nearly 18%, far exceeding the historical average. This indicates that Hu Jintao regained the initiative in the later stages of Xi Jinping’s rule, aiming to reshape the power structure.

He Weidong, as a core member of the military, has sparked widespread speculation about his fate. “He shouldn’t be dead,” but if he isn’t, Qincheng Prison may be his final destination. Qincheng Prison symbolizes the end of the purge. He Weidong’s investigation signifies the shift of military power from Xi Jinping’s faction to Hu Jintao, shaking Xi’s military backbone.

Li Ganjie’s demotion from Minister of the Organization Department to the United Front Work Department represents a significant reduction in his power. Rumors circulated about corruption in the environmental sector, but these are pretexts. The corruption was genuine; it’s impossible to be investigated simply for corruption. Ma Xingrui’s retreat to the second tier, losing real power in Xinjiang, indicates his political life is nearing its end. All three were close associates promoted by Xi Jinping, suggesting a systematic crackdown by Hu Jintao on Xi’s cronies.

Life is like a play, all about acting.

When Ma Xingrui was Governor of Guangdong Province, the then Guangdong Provincial Party Secretary was Li Xi.

Li Xi is now the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Li Xi not removing Ma Xingrui is seen as giving him face.

Of course, it wasn’t something Li Xi could decide.

The Harbin clique: Luo Jian, Peng Liyuan, Ma Xingrui.

Peng Liyuan has been missing for almost two months. She’s almost become like Qin Gang (a notorious corrupt official in Chinese history).

First, we need to focus on a piece of Party jargon.

Since it’s Party jargon, this news naturally has no news value.

However, things are different now that Ma Xingrui has stepped down.

On June 28th, Ma Xingrui, Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee, First Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee, and First Political Commissar, along with Erkin Tuniyaz, Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee and Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, visited the Xinjiang Public Security Department to conduct in-depth research and coordinate work on maintaining social stability and preventing and resolving risks and hidden dangers.

This research visit—whether it was a coincidence or deliberately arranged—is unclear.

Moreover, the titles themselves are quite significant.

Ma Xingrui, Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee, First Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee, and First Political Commissar

This may be the last time Ma Xingrui enjoys these three titles.

Now, that person has been replaced by Chen Xiaojiang.

Chen Xiaojiang is now the Secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee.

However, technically speaking, is Chen Xiaojiang still the First Secretary and First Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps?

It’s not certain yet. Perhaps the appointment hasn’t been made yet.

This might just be a technical issue; even if he wasn’t simultaneously appointed as the First Secretary and First Political Commissar of the Corps, he will be appointed later.

Let’s look at Chen Xiaojiang’s factional background. Simply put, Chen Xiaojiang is Hu Jintao’s crony.

He has a strong connection to Hu Jintao because Hu Jintao studied hydraulic engineering at Tsinghua University.

In 1959, Hu Jintao entered the Department of Hydraulic Engineering at Tsinghua University.

After graduating in 1965, Hu Jintao was retained by the university in the Department of Hydraulic Engineering to participate in research, teach, and continue serving as a political instructor.

In 1968, Hu Jintao went to work at the Liujiaxia Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Water Resources in Gansu.

In August 1984, Chen Xiaojiang began working.

In August 2015, at the age of 53, Chen Xiaojiang became the Minister of the Publicity Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).

Chen Xiaojiang served in the Ministry of Water Resources for 31 years.

This means that all the connections that enabled Chen Xiaojiang to rise to prominence were within the Ministry of Water Resources,

not within the CCDI. Who in the CCDI would know who Chen Xiaojiang is?

Hu Jintao, at Tsinghua University, must have had many professors teach him.

One of them was named Zhang Guangdou.

On April 28, 2007, on the occasion of the 95th birthday of Professor Zhang Guangdou, an alumnus of our university, a renowned expert in water conservancy and hydropower engineering, and a professor at Tsinghua University, and the 70th anniversary of Professor Zhang Guangdou’s dedication to the nation’s water conservancy and hydropower cause, General Secretary Hu Jintao of the CPC Central Committee sent a letter of heartfelt congratulations. The full text of the congratulatory letter is as follows:

Dear Professor Zhang Guangdou: On the occasion of your 95th birthday, I wish you a happy birthday! Since returning to China in 1937, for seventy years, Mr. Zhang has always cherished his motherland, loved his people, and cared deeply for the country. He has worked tirelessly and diligently for the management of rivers and the development and utilization of water resources, achieving outstanding results. Mr. Zhang was devoted to education, and throughout his long teaching career, he quietly cultivated and tirelessly imparted knowledge, nurturing numerous outstanding talents for the country’s water conservancy and hydropower industry, making significant contributions. Mr. Zhang’s character and conduct are as lofty as the mountains and as enduring as the rivers, worthy of our admiration! May Mr. Zhang continue to contribute his wisdom and strength to the construction of water conservancy and hydropower and education in our country! We wish Mr. Zhang good health and longevity!

Student Hu Jintao, April 28, 2007

Hu Jintao refers to himself as a student.

Zhang Guangdou had at least three official students: one was Hu Jintao himself;

one was Zhang Chunyuan, Vice Minister of Water Resources;

one was Wang Shucheng, Minister of Water Resources.

Zhang Chunyuan was Vice Minister of Water Resources; no one knows who he is referring to. Zhang Chunyuan graduated from Tsinghua University in 1960. In other words, when Hu Jintao entered Tsinghua University, Zhang Chunyuan was one year away from graduating.

This refers to Chen Xiaojiang, who was promoted by Zhang Chunyuan and Wang Shucheng from the Ministry of Water Resources.

There are many descriptions online about the relationship between Wang Shucheng and Hu Jintao.

This description is the most interesting:

Warm Memories of Hu Jintao’s Tsinghua “Class of 2015”

Among the graduates of the “Class of 2015,” two Party and state leaders, Hu Jintao and Wu Guanzheng, emerged, along with three ministers—former Minister of Urban and Rural Construction Ye Rutang, former Minister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng, and former Minister of Justice Zhang Fusen.

Now I know their factions: Wu Guanzheng and Minister of Urban and Rural Construction Ye Rutang belong to Xi Jinping’s faction.

Minister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng and Minister of Justice Zhang Fusen belong to Hu Jintao’s faction.

Let’s look at these materials. What they say might not be accurate. Let me see what they say.

There’s also Wang Shucheng. In terms of power level, he’s far inferior to the aforementioned alumni; he’s only the current Minister of Water Resources. However, in terms of relationship with Hu Jintao, he’s much closer—he was Hu Jintao’s classmate in the same department and year.

This statement is somewhat meaningful. Who are these alumni he’s referring to?

Song Ping, Hu Qili, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng

Song Ping, Wu Bangguo, and Wu Guanzheng are all from Xi Jinping’s faction.

Hu Qili should be from Jiang Zemin’s faction, and Huang Ju should be from Hu Jintao’s faction.

We haven’t presented conclusive evidence for Hu Qili and Huang Ju yet.

Song Ping, Wu Bangguo, and Wu Guanzheng are 100% from Chen Yun and Xi Jinping’s faction.

Actually, this is quite normal. With so many people at Tsinghua University, it’s definitely not right to group them into one faction.

Because they have different majors, they didn’t have much academic contact.

They were Hu Jintao and Wang Shucheng, both majoring in water conservancy, a specialized field.

However, Wang Shucheng was the organization committee member of the Youth League branch. As a student leader, he participated in many social activities and became quite familiar with Hu Jintao. After graduation, Wang Shucheng pursued postgraduate studies, sharing the same Party branch as Hu Jintao, who stayed at the university as a political instructor and conducted some research. Hu Jintao was already a full Party member at this time, while Wang Shucheng was a probationary member, leading to even more frequent contact.

Some sources directly state that Hu Jintao and Wang Shucheng were classmates.

While these details may be embellished, it is true that Hu Jintao and Wang Shucheng had a close relationship.

This photo is from a class reunion.

Later, Wang Shucheng was assigned to the Sixth Engineering Bureau, separating him from Hu Jintao. His career path was initially difficult; he became the deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the Sixth Engineering Bureau in 1982 and was promoted to a full bureau-level position in 1987. He changed jobs several times, but none of these promotions were significant. During the 1993 reshuffle of the State Council at the Eighth National People’s Congress, Hu Jintao oversaw personnel arrangements. Wang Shucheng, a director in the abolished Ministry of Energy, was promoted to Vice Minister and Party Member of the newly established Ministry of Electric Power Industry. However, in 1998, further reforms of state organs led to the abolition of the Ministry of Electric Power Industry, and Wang Shucheng was reassigned as Vice General Manager of the State Power Corporation.

From October 2001 to March 2004, Chen Xiaojiang successively held temporary positions as Deputy Secretary-General of the Gansu Provincial Government, Party Member of the General Office, and Deputy Secretary-General of the Gansu Provincial Government, Director of the General Office, and Deputy Secretary of the Party Group of the General Office. The then Governor of Gansu Province was Lu Hao (January 2001 – October 2006). Lu Hao was Feng Jixin’s secretary, and was promoted by Hu Jintao after being promoted by Feng Jixin.

How did Chen Xiaojiang end up at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)? The Minister of the CCDI’s Propaganda Department is a vice-ministerial level official,

not someone a mere lackey of Wang Qishan, the CCDI Secretary, could promote.

Even if we say Chen Xiaojiang is affiliated with Wang Qishan or Xi Jinping, the position of Minister of the Propaganda Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)

is not something Wang Qishan could promote; it requires approval from the Politburo Standing Committee.

Chen Xiaojiang’s position as Minister of the CCDI’s Propaganda Department was either promoted by Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang.

Afterwards, Chen Xiaojiang went to Liaoning, and isn’t Li Keqiang from Liaoning?

Early in his career, Chen Xiaojiang was promoted by Zhang Chunyuan, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Water Resources.

Zhang Chunyuan’s teacher, Zhang Guangdou, was Hu Jintao’s teacher.

Later, Chen Xiaojiang was promoted by Wang Shucheng, the Minister of Water Resources. Wang Shucheng was Hu Jintao’s classmate; their relationship was very close.

Chen Xiaojiang served as the chief secretary to Lu Hao, the then Governor of Gansu Province.

Lu Hao was Feng Jixin’s secretary, and Feng Jixin promoted Hu Jintao to deputy bureau-level and bureau-level positions.

Isn’t Hu Jintao an official in Gansu Province?

Following Chen Xiaojiang, all vice-ministerial and ministerial-level officials were likely promoted by Li Keqiang.

Now, for Chen Xiaojiang, as the Xinjiang Party Secretary, to enter the Politburo, he can only be promoted by Hu Jintao.

China’s new generation of leadership may be emerging.

Recent signs indicate that a major personnel reshuffle may be brewing within the top leadership of the CCP.

Hu Chunhua and Yuan Jiajun, born in the 1960s,

are strong candidates for the key positions of General Secretary and Premier.

Starting June 29, 2025, multiple official media outlets, including Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily,

placed President Xi Jinping’s reply to Gala Village in Nyingchi City, Tibet, as their headline.

In the letter, Xi Jinping mentioned his “impression of the village at this moment.”

The high-profile reporting of this interaction between Xi and Nyingchi by official media carries strong political implications.

Linzhi holds special significance in Hu Chunhua’s career:

In 1992, he began his local administrative career there,

serving as Deputy Commissioner of the Linzhi Prefectural Administrative Office.

This was also the headline story on CCTV’s “News Broadcast” that same day.

The subsequent commentary included the phrase “Sixty years of spring blossoms and autumn harvests, a new chapter unfolds on the snowy plateau,”

the idiom “spring blossoms and autumn harvests” cleverly alluding to Hu Chunhua’s name,

further fueling speculation about his future career path.

It is widely expected that any major changes,

will likely be confirmed at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee.

Meanwhile, Yuan Jiajun’s public activities have attracted attention.

He has frequently met with heads of several ministries under the State Council,

and visited several European countries, maintaining a high profile.

Observers generally believe that

these moves signal his potential succession as Premier of the State Council.

Xi Jinping’s political career also has a symbolic connection to the Deng Xiaoping family:

In 2006, he was elected Vice Chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology,

whose First Secretary at the time was Deng Xiaoping’s daughter, Deng Nan.

The “Hu-Yuan system” is emerging,

and China will return to the orthodox path of early reform and opening up.

As the relevant personnel adjustments become clearer,

the impact of this change on China’s domestic and foreign policies

will remain a focus of continued international attention.

My reply is that Yuan’s faction should succeed Cai Qi or Ding Xuexiang.

Okay, thank you everyone.